

Selected Writings of Norman H. Baynes

Norman Hepburn Baynes (1877 – 1961) was an influential British scholar specializing in the history of the Byzantine empire. The 16 studies below were published in a variety of journals between 1904 and 1954.

Contents:

[Rome and Armenia in the Fourth Century](#), in 20 pdf pages. This classic study appeared on pp. 625-643 of the *English Historical Review* #25(1910). Baynes compares and contrasts information found in the 4th-century Latin historian Ammianus Marcellinus with materials from the 5th-century Armenian historian P'awstos Buzand, whose *History of the Armenians* describes events of the 4th century.

[Constantine's Successors to Jovian, and the Struggle with Persia](#), Chapter 3 in Volume 1 of the *Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge, 1911). Chapter 3 describes the period from 337 to 364 and includes: Last dispositions of Constantine; the Persian War; Reign of Constans; Revolt of Magnentius; Civil War—Vetranio—Battle of Mursa; Julian's youth and conversion to Paganism; Julian made Caesar—his first campaign in Gaul; Constantius at Rome; Battle of Strassburg; Julian on the Rhine; Constantius on the Danube; Siege of Amida; Julianus Augustus; Negotiations with Constantius; Death and character of Constantius; Julian's reforms; Julian's religious policy; the Persian Expedition; Death of Julian—Election of Jovian; Disgraceful Peace with Persia; Death of Jovian. Includes Title Page, Table of Contents, Chapter 3 (pp. 55-86), Bibliography for Chapter 3 (pp. 630-635), and Chronological Table in 42 pdf pages.

[The Dynasty of Valentinian and Theodosius the Great](#), Chapter 8 in Volume 1 of the *Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge, 1911). Chapter 8 describes the period from 364 to 395 and includes: Election of Valentinian; Revolt of Procopius; Valentinian in Gaul—Count Theodosius in Britain; Rome and Armenia; Conspiracy of Theodorus; Count Romanus in Africa; Execution of Count Theodosius; Work and character of Valentinian; Gratian Emperor; The Goths—Battle of Hadrianople—Death and character of Valens; Theodosius and the Gothic war; The usurper Maximus; Partition of Armenia; Riot at Antioch; The Fall of Maximus; Ambrose and Theodosius; Revolt of Arbogast—Eugenius; Battle of Frigidus; Death of Theodosius. Includes Title Page, Table of Contents, Chapter 8 (pp. 218-249), Bibliography for Chapter 8 (pp. 649-651), and Chronological Table in 39 pdf pages.

[The Successors of Justinian](#), Chapter 9 in Volume 2 of the *Cambridge Medieval History* (New York, 1913). Chapter 9 describes the period from ca. 565-641. Topics include: Accession and Policy of Justin II; Negotiations with Persia; Avars and Turks; The Persian War; Policy of Tiberius; Tiberius Emperor; Maurice Emperor; Chosroes restored by Maurice; Campaigns on the Danube; Phocas Emperor—Character of Maurice; Persian War; Revolt of Africa—Heraclius Emperor; Persian War—Capture of Jerusalem; The Avar Surprise; Invasion of Persia; Siege of Constantinople; Battle of Nineveh—March on Ctesiphon; Peace with Persia; Character of Heraclius. Includes Title Page, Table of Contents, Chapter 9 (pp. 263-301), Bibliography for Chapter 9 (p. 747-757), and Chronological Table in 59 pdf pages.

[The Restoration of the Cross at Jerusalem](#), in 14 pdf pages. This study appeared on pages 287-299 of the *English Historical Review* volume 27(1912). Baynes translates or summarizes and

meticulously analyzes historical sources on Emperor Heraclius' retrieval of the true Cross. The Cross had been triumphantly taken to Persia as a trophy after Jerusalem was captured by the Iranian shah Khosrov II in 614.

[The First Campaign of Heraclius against Persia](#), from the *English Historical Review*, Vol. 19, No. 76 (Oct., 1904), pp. 694-702, in 10 pdf pages.

[Two Notes on the Great Persecution](#), from *Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1924), pp. 189-194, in 7 pdf pages.

[The Chronology of Eusebius: Reply](#), by H. J. Lawlor, Norman H. Baynes and G. W. Richardson, *Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1925), pp. 94-100, in 8 pdf pages.

[The Early Life of Julian the Apostate](#), from *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 45, Part 2 (1925), pp. 251-254, in 5 pdf pages.

[Three Notes on the Reforms of Diocletian and Constantine](#), from *Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 15 (1925), pp. 195-208, in 15 pdf pages.

[Alexandria and Constantinople: A Study in Ecclesiastical Diplomacy](#), from the *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, Vol. 12, No. 3/4 (Oct., 1926), pp. 145-156, in 13 pdf pages.

[Some Aspects of Byzantine Civilisation](#), from *Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 20 (1930), pp. 1-13, in 14 pdf pages.

[The Death of Julian the Apostate in a Christian Legend](#), from *Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 27, Part 1: Papers Presented to Sir Henry Stuart Jones (1937), pp. 22-29, in 9 pdf pages.

[The Decline of the Roman Power in Western Europe. Some Modern Explanations](#), from *Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 33, Parts 1 and 2 (1943), pp. 29-35, in 8 pdf pages.

[The Icons before Iconoclasm](#), from *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Apr., 1951), pp. 93-106, in 15 pdf pages.

[St. Antony and the Demons](#), from the *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, Vol. 40 (Dec., 1954), pp. 7-10, in 5 pdf pages.

[Byzantium: an Introduction to East Roman Civilization](#), edited by Norman H. Baynes and H. Moss (Oxford, 1948), in 510 pdf pages. Contents: 1. Outline of Byzantine History, H. Moss and Charles Diehl; 2. The Economic Life of the Byzantine Empire, by A. Andreades; 3. Public Finances, by A. Andreades; 4. The Byzantine Church by H. Gregoire; 5. Byzantine Monasticism, by H. Delehaye; 6. Byzantine Art, by Charles Diehl; 7. Byzantine Education, by G. Buckler; 8. Byzantine Literature, by F. H. Marshall; 9. The Greek Language in the Byzantine Period, by R. M. Dawkins; 10. The Emperor and the Imperial Administration, by W. Ensslin; 11. Byzantium and Islam, by A. A. Vasiliev; 12. The Byzantine Inheritance in South-eastern Europe, by W. Miller; 13. Byzantium and the Slavs, by Steven Runciman; 14. The Byzantine Inheritance in Russia, by Baron Meyendorff and Norman H. Baynes.

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Rome and Armenia in the Fourth Century

THE aim of the present paper is to inquire into the chronology and the historical value of the work of Faustus of Byzantium, and to attempt to estimate his contribution to our knowledge of Roman history in the fourth century. The thesis from which the paper proceeds is that modern writers have failed to appreciate the importance of that contribution, because of a confusion which occupies a central position in the narrative of Faustus; it is sought to demonstrate that when once this confusion is recognised we may gain a new insight into the relations between east and west, and that, further, we are enabled to institute fresh comparisons with the account of Ammianus Marcellinus, and to judge from the study of an independent authority the value of his narrative. It should be understood from the outset that we are concerned with the internal history of Armenia only so far as may be necessary to understand its influence upon the policy of the Roman empire.¹

The confusion in the work of Faustus to which reference has been made arises from the acceptance by the historian of the view

¹ This paper owes its existence to H. Gelzer's study, 'Die Anfänge der armenischen Kirche,' in *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der kön. sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, xlvii. (1895), 109-174. I have been unable to touch upon geographical questions and would merely refer the reader to the map of ancient Armenia given by H. Hübschmann, 'Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen, mit Beiträgen zur historischen Topographie Armeniens,' in *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xvi. (1904), 197-490, and to J. Marquart, 'Eränsähr nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac'i,' in *Abhandlungen der kön. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, N.F. iii. no. 2 (1901). Being unfortunately unable to read Armenian, I have used the German translation of Faustus by M. Lauer (Köln, 1879), and it is to this book that reference is made in the following notes.

that Nerses, the great Armenian catholicos, was consecrated by Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea (A.D. 362-370), in the presence of St. Basil, and that, in consequence, this event took place in the reign of Valens. The result of this confusion has been that the name of Valens has been substituted in several cases for that of Constantius, and that, since Faustus mentions no emperor by name except Constantine the Great² and Valens, his chronology has been greatly obscured. In truth, as we shall see shortly, Nerses was not consecrated by Eusebius in the reign of Valens, but (presumably by Bishop Dianius) in the year 339 or 340, when Constantius was ruling over the Roman east.³ If we ask however how this confusion arose, a natural explanation lies ready to our hand. Nerses had been educated at Caesarea and had adopted as his own the aims and methods of the eastern church; he carried out in Armenia the same policy as was followed by St. Basil in Cappadocia; it was Basil who on the murder of Nerses refused to recognise King Pap's nominee, who was consecrated in his despite, an event which led to the independence of the church of Armenia.⁴ Men who looked back upon the old *régime* with longing and who approved of the intimate connexion which had bound nascent Armenian Christianity in the closest ties of intimacy with the see of Caesarea felt that their last great catholicos⁵ must at the most solemn moment in his career have been brought into touch with Basil and with the honoured bishop Eusebius, whom the latter had served so faithfully. Thus in their view Nerses is consecrated by Eusebius, Basil is present at the ceremony, and the holy dove only leaves the head of Basil to settle on that of their national hero: further, an incident from the career of Basil is related at length as an event in the life story of Nerses.⁶ The loving reverence of Armenia has transported a beautiful fancy into the realm of history. The remarkable fact however is that this account has simply been inserted by Faustus into the true historical framework: there has been no consequential chronological displacement;⁷ if the references to Eusebius and Basil (Barsilios) are omitted, and if we

² Faustus, iii. 21, and cf. iii. 10.

³ It is unnecessary to labour the point that Nerses could not have been consecrated in the reign of Valens. One argument among many may be mentioned: Gnel was assassinated by Arsak before A.D. 358, and from the day of the murder the catholicos refused to appear at the king's court (see Faustus, iv. 15, v. 1). It is then impossible that Nerses should only have been consecrated at some date subsequent to the year 364. The chronology of Moses of Chorene is of course quite untrustworthy: it is however worth noticing that according to him Nerses was patriarch for thirty-four years: he was poisoned by Pap some time before A.D. 375 (cf. Moses Chor. iii. 38).

⁴ On this subject cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.* p. 155 *sqq.*

⁵ Cf. Faustus, iv. 4, *s.f.*

⁶ Compare Allard, *Saint Basile* (4th ed., Paris, 1903), p. 81 *sq.*; Greg. Naz. Or. xliii. 54; Soor. iv. 26; Soz. vi. 16; Theod. iv. 16, &c. (on the death of the son of Valens in 372), with Faustus, iv. 5.

⁷ Excepting only the opening words of bk. iii. 13, which are merely resumptive of the close of iii. 10.

read, where necessary, Constantius for Valens, the history of Faustus is a consecutive chronological whole. It is this statement which we shall now proceed to illustrate in some detail so far as the history of the Roman empire is concerned.

The starting point for our study may well be the passage in the panegyric on Constantius in which Julian describes⁸ how Constantius upon his arrival in Asia (after the meeting of the sons of Constantine in 338) restored the fugitive Armenian king to his throne and exiled those nobles who had deserted their sovereign. Now this had always seemed a very remarkable achievement in view of the fact that the armies of the east were disorganised and the defences of the Asian provinces endangered. How came it that Constantius was able to effect so much? We return to the detailed account of Faustus; in barest outline it is as follows: Waras, the Persian satrap of Atrapatana, had been offended by Tiran,⁹ king of Armenia, and in revenge reported to his master Narses that the king was plotting against Persia; he then treacherously seized the persons of Tiran, the queen, and the young prince Arsak, and carried them prisoners to the Sassanid court, where Tiran was blinded. The feudal nobility of Armenia,¹⁰ after an unsuccessful attempt at recapture and a foray into Persian territory, called a national assembly, at which were present, it is interesting to note, not only the great ones of the land but also representatives of the peasantry and the common folk.¹¹ Feeling their own weakness before the might of Persia, they determined to appeal to the allied empire of Rome.¹² Andok and Arshavir—representatives of two old Armenian houses—were at once despatched to plead the cause of their distressed country. In their absence the Persian king at the head of a vast army marched into Armenia to take formal possession of the land, and with him travelled the royal harem. The nobles fled before him and took refuge within the empire. Now it is almost certain that Arsak was restored to his country by Constantius and ascended the throne in the year 339,¹³ but in the thirtieth year of the reign of Arsak the Armenians looked back over a period of thirty-four years of almost constant hostility with Persia;¹⁴ we are thus led to the conclusion that this enmity began in or about the year 335. It is just at this time that, as we learn from our western authorities, Constantine raised

⁸ Julian (ed. Hertlein), p. 24, 20 *sqq.*

⁹ The Armenian king had failed to send him a particular horse which he coveted (Faustus, iii. 20).

¹⁰ Cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.* p. 132.

¹¹ Faustus, iii. 21.

¹² *Ibid.* (Lauer, p. 46). The treaty of Constantine with Armenia is to be accepted as historical: cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.* pp. 165 *sqq.*

¹³ It is the first operation of Constantius in the east recorded by Julian, *loc. cit.* Cf. Seeck, *sub voce* 'Constantius,' in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 1, p. 1053.

¹⁴ Faustus, iv. 50.

Hannibalianus to a 'kingdom' (*regnum*)¹⁵ over Armenia and the allied peoples.

Faustus proceeds to relate that, in response to the appeal of the fugitive nobles, the emperor chose Andok and Arshavir as generals, and himself marched to Oscha in the canton of Basan, where the Persians had fixed their camp, surprised the unsuspecting enemy, routed them, and captured the Persian harem. Narses fled into Persia, while Andok and Arshavir were appointed as vice-generals of Rome and *the emperor took into his own possession the land of all the Armenian satraps*. It is a natural conjecture that Hannibalianus was really the 'emperor' who led this expedition, and the account of Faustus gives us a clear explanation of the institution of a *regnum* over Armenia, which has often created great difficulties for later historians. Hannibalianus was in fact for the time being to represent the captive royal house of Armenia.¹⁶ Constantine in 337 was himself on the point of driving home this success by a campaign against Persia when death overtook him. But what is even more important is that we can now understand how in 339 Constantius was enabled to achieve so startling a success: he held in captivity the Persian harem. The Persian monarch himself sent an embassy praying that at the least his wives might be returned to him and that this horrible blot upon his kingly honour might be removed. The answer of the emperor is thus given by Faustus:

'First,' said he, 'thou shalt give up the prisoners taken captive in Armenia and the king Tiran himself unharmed, together with all the booty which has been carried off. If thou dost this, I will surrender my prisoners which I have taken. But if thou dost not surrender first thy spoil, neither will I surrender my booty.'

The bargain was struck: Tiran returned to Armenia but refused on account of his blindness to resume his kingship, and his son Arsak ascended the throne. With honourable escort and queenly pomp the Sassanid harem was restored by Constantius and the Persian captives released. It would seem that at this time the emperor, in order to secure the loyalty of Armenia,¹⁷ took as hostages Gnel and Tirith, the nephews of Arsak.

Julian the panegyrist suggests that force had won a victory which, as appears from Faustus, was in fact a diplomatic triumph. The two accounts however supplement each other: Julian tells us that Constantius banished those Armenian nobles who had deserted the cause of their king; we learn from Faustus that Arsak broke

¹⁵ Cf. Amm. xiv. 1, 2, 'Hannibaliano regi.' See the note of Valesius on this passage (in Wagner's edition, i. 3-4), and the citations given by Clinton, *Fasti Romani*, under the year 335. Compare Professor Bury's appendix to Gibbon, ii. (1897). 561.

¹⁶ We need not conclude that the arrangement was intended to be permanent.

¹⁷ Cf. Faustus, iv. 5 *sub fin.*

up the power of the feudal nobility by distributing their armed followers in various parts of the country, and thus weakened the force of local connexions. The one measure is manifestly a sequel of the other.¹⁸

The intervention of the Roman empire brought with it the general supremacy of Greek ideas under the restored monarchy: church and state were both alike to be reorganised, and accordingly a new catholicos was selected without delay.¹⁹ Nerses had been educated on Roman soil, and was ready to introduce into Armenia the institutions of which he had learned from his teachers at Caesarea.²⁰ The account of Faustus implies that his consecration followed almost immediately upon the accession of Arsak (late in 339 or early in 340). Faustus, having described the new system inaugurated by Nerses, tells of an embassy to Constantius ('Valens') headed by the catholicos, and of the latter's detention for nine years by the Roman emperor. This account has been rejected as incredible,²¹ and we must therefore consider when this embassy of Nerses took place, and whether the chronology of Faustus must be dismissed as untenable. It is essential for this purpose to have before us a scheme of the order of events according to Faustus. The following is a brief outline:—

Book iv. c. 1—The restoration of Tiran to Armenia and the beginning of the rule of Arsak.

c. 2—Administrative and military reorganisation of Armenia.

c. 3—Election of Nerses; sketch of his early life.

c. 4—His consecration at Caesarea and his reforms.

c. 5—His embassy to 'Valens' and his imprisonment (here the incident from the life of Basil has been introduced).²² The persecutions of the Arian emperor 'Valens'; he restores the hostages Gnel and Tirith, and sends costly presents to the king of Armenia while detaining Nerses.

c. 6—Nerses is banished to an island, and for nine years the emperor refuses to permit his return to Armenia.

cc. 7–10—Incidents from the lives of Eusebius and Basil.²³

c. 11—The return of the embassy from 'Valens'; wrath of Arsak at the detention of Nerses. Wasak the Armenian leads an expedition into Roman territory as far as Ancyra, and after this for six years in succession conducts forays into Roman territory.

c. 12—Bishop Chad, the representative of Nerses during his absence, continues the policy of the catholicos and resists Arsak.

¹⁸ Faustus, iii. c. 21, *s.f.* Lauer, p. 48. This was throughout his reign the policy of Arsak: cf. iv. 12, Lauer, p. 80 *sqq.*; iv. 19, Lauer, p. 101; cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.* p. 154 *sqq.*

¹⁹ Faustus, iv. 3, Lauer, p. 51.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Lauer, p. 52.

²¹ For the chronology of Faustus see Gelzer's criticisms, *op. cit.* p. 118.

²² See above, p. 626 note 6.

²³ A reason for the insertion of these passages has been suggested above, p. 626.

- c. 13—The return of Nerses and his opposition to Arsak.
- c. 14—Incident of Nerses and the master of the Harem Hair.
- c. 15—Arsak puts to death his nephews Gnel and Tirith and marries Gnel's widow against her will. Because of her continued hatred he sends to Rome for a wife and marries Olympias.

At this point we reach a date which we can check from our western authorities : we are at some year subsequent to A.D. 350.²⁴

To return then to 339 : Arsak was naturally anxious that his throne should be protected from Persian aggression, and that the friendship of Rome should be a real and effective defence. As soon therefore as Nerses had set on foot his reorganisation of the church, the account of Faustus gives us to understand that the king sent his greatest subject and Rome's pupil on an embassy to the emperor. We might expect that this would take place about 341. Faustus gives us no exact date, but he does tell us that at this time a great church council had been called together and that as a result many of the orthodox bishops were banished and Arian successors appointed in their place ; Nerses shared the banishment of these deposed bishops. This would however be an accurate description of the great synod of Antioch, which after sitting for three years ultimately broke up in the year 341.²⁵ The detention of Nerses may thus with considerable probability be assigned to this year. What was then the reason which led Constantius to take this step ? It may of course be suggested that Nerses was a more valuable hostage than two princes who would not be the direct successors of Arsak, should he have a son ; but the action of Constantius was probably dictated by more far-reaching considerations. His efforts at this time were directed to securing the victory of the Arian doctrine in the eastern church : Roman influence had been re-established in Armenia : the tie which throughout its history drew Armenia towards Rome was a common faith, but no one can study the subsequent relations of the two countries without perceiving the fatal consequences of a difference in the creeds professed at Dvin and Constantinople. The emperor was not content to protect fellow-Christians ; he felt himself impelled to attempt the work of their conversion.²⁶ It would seem that the statesmanship of Constantius had already appreciated the support which would be gained for Roman authority in the east if one and the same creed united the church of the empire with that of Armenia. In the latter country the cult and the forms of worship

²⁴ Probably A.D. 354, see below, p. 632 (cf. Ammianus Marcellinus, xx. 11, Athan. *Hist. Ar. ad Mon.* 69).

²⁵ For a convenient summary of its work cf. Seeck, *sub voce* 'Constantius,' in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 1.

²⁶ Compare especially the history of the latter part of the sixth and the first part of the seventh centuries.

had always been imposed upon the people by authority: ²⁷ it was indeed only through the activity of the monks and the work of Mesrob in the fifth century that Christianity became in any real sense a national faith: in the fourth century Christianity in Armenia was a human ordinance and was acquiesced in by the people just as they bowed to any other royal command. ²⁸ If Constantius could convert the catholicos, he had gained Armenia. He could afford to provoke insignificant border forays if this was the price which had to be paid for a great and permanent victory in the sphere of religious diplomacy. Nerses however refused to bow to imperial persuasion: the school of Caesarea had done its work too well.

Nine years, says Faustus, was Nerses in exile, and nine years from 341 take us down to the year 350. Now 350 is the very year of the revolt of Magnentius, when Constantius left Asia for his western campaign. We know from Ammianus Marcellinus ²⁹ that when Constantius was starting in 360 to meet the usurper Julian he summoned Arsak to his court and crowded favours upon him in order to secure his loyalty: in the same way when he set forth in 350 he would seem to have bound the Armenians to the Roman alliance by restoring to them their revered catholicos. The pressing need for present tranquillity in the Roman east drove him to relinquish his wider schemes for Armenia's conversion. If this be the true explanation, it is to Faustus alone that we owe a deeper insight into the emperor's statesmanship and his loyalty to his great trust. ³⁰

As we have seen from the analysis previously given, after the return of Nerses, which we may provisionally place in A.D. 350, Faustus gives an account of the deaths of Gnel and Tirth and of the forced marriage of Gnel's widow Pharrantsem with Arsak. Her dislike for this union caused the king to ask a wife of the emperor. Ammianus Marcellinus informs us that Constantius complied with the request and sent Olympias to the Armenian court; she was the daughter of the former praetorian praefect Ablabius, and had been *sponsa* of the emperor's brother Constans; the latter however died in 350, and therefore it is only after that date that his betrothed could have become the wife of Arsak. Further we learn ³¹

²⁷ Cf. H. Gelzer, 'Zur armenischen Götterlehre,' in *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der kön. sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1896, ii. iii. (1897), p. 122: 'Der Gottesdienst wird also einfach von oben octroyirt. Im Orient ist es zu allen Zeiten so gewesen.'

²⁸ Cf. Faustus, iii. 13, Lauer, p. 27: 'Schon längst, von der Zeit an, da [die Armenier] den Namen des Christentums angenommen, hatten sie dieses allein als menschliches Gesetz und nicht mit glühendem Glauben, sondern als einen der Menschheit aufgenötigten Betrug hingenommen, nicht wie es sich gebührt hätte, mit Wissen, Vertrauen und Glauben.'

²⁹ See below, p. 634.

³⁰ As already noted (p. 626 note 7) the insertion of the extraneous material in bk. iii. 8-10 which close with the death of Valens has produced a confusion in the resumptive sentence at the beginning of c. 13.

³¹ Lauer, p. 95.

that Arsak did not travel in person to fetch his consort, and we therefore naturally expect to find some mention of a mission from Constantius to act as conduct for so distinguished a lady. It is thus a natural conjecture that this was the purpose of the journey into Armenia of Taurus the quaestor, which according to Ammianus took place in 354. The matter is only mentioned incidentally by the Roman historian and no reason is given, but we do know that Taurus was despatched upon his errand directly from the court of Constantius.³² If this explanation be correct, the marriage of Arsak with Olympias took place in 354. It was not long however before she fell a victim to the craft of Pharrantsem, and the Armenian king might thus naturally expect to have aroused the wrath of Rome and be predisposed to turn to the protection of Persia. King Sapor was absent at this time waging a long and distant frontier war, but the forays of his generals upon Armenia were evidence of his disapproval of Arsak's alliance with the empire.³³ Disunion had rent the Mami-konian house—one of the greatest families amongst the Armenian nobility; the elder brother Wardan favoured alliance with Persia, while the younger, the general-in-chief Wasak, was loyal to the empire. Sapor with the help of Wardan induced Arsak to journey to the Persian court, and there forced him to swear a solemn oath upon the gospel that he would be loyal to Persia and would have no dealings with Rome. But Wasak, envious of Wardan's success, warned the king of Persian treachery, and Arsak fled. Supported by the queen Pharrantsem, whose former husband had been slain by Wardan, Wasak murdered his brother: again Armenia seemed driven into the arms of Rome.

At this point the chronology of Faustus supports our conjectural date for the marriage of Olympias. From the flight of the king down to the time of the peace of Jovian, when hostilities between Armenia and Persia broke out afresh (*i.e.* in 364), eight years elapsed.³⁴ The flight of Arsak from Persia must accordingly be placed in A.D. 356, which is precisely the period which we might have expected. Between 354 and 356 fell the murder of Olympias and Arsak's consequent fear of the wrath of Rome.

But suddenly the position of affairs in the east assumed a new complexion. Sapor's frontier wars were over and he therefore abruptly terminated the negotiations for peace which had been opened by the praetorian praefect Musonianus.³⁵ A Persian embassy demanded that Mesopotamia and Armenia should be surrendered by Rome, and an immediate invasion of the empire was threatened

³² Amm. xiv. 11, 14.

³³ Amm. xv. 13, 4: 'Persici duces vicini fluminibus, rege (*i.e.* Sapor) in ultimis terrarum suarum terminis occupato, per praedatorios globos nostra vexabant, nunc Armeniam, aliquoties Mesopotamiam confidentius incursantes, Romanis ductoribus ad colligendas obediuntium exuvias occupatis.'

³⁴ Faustus, iv. 21.

³⁵ Cf. Amm. Marcellinus, xvi. 9. 1-4, xvii. 5.

if these terms were refused. Envoys from Constantius professed willingness to conclude an honourable peace but would not hear of the cession of Armenia or Mesopotamia.³⁶ Thus with every prospect of a renewal of the struggle between the two powers Arsak 'looked forth to see who first of the contending parties would sue for his support in the war. He waited, since his desire was to march to the help of the emperor of Greece, but the Greeks did not invite his assistance and showed him neither regard nor honour.'³⁷ The explanation is simple: Constantius was far distant in Sirmium; and affairs in Asia were in hopeless confusion, for Ursicinus had been removed and Sabinianus was utterly incapable. There was no statesman in the east to secure the support of Armenia's king. Sapor, on the other hand, sent an embassy courteously requesting alliance: 'If thou art on our side,' wrote the Persian monarch, 'the victory is ours.' Arsak was won, and his general Wasak was ordered to raise an army. An attack on Nisibis was planned, which was to be supported by the troops of Persia, but, as their arrival was delayed, the Armenian soldiers forced their king to take immediate action. The foray upon the country round Nisibis was successful and the booty captured was enormous (A.D. 359). Such is the account of Faustus, and though the part played by Arsak is not mentioned by our western authorities, the latter tend to support the Armenian historian.³⁸

Ursicinus had been ordered by Constantius to return to the east, but he could effect little as his position was now that of a subordinate to Sabinianus. The first act of Ursicinus was to hurry with all speed to Nisibis in order to improve its defences, and on the way he was all but captured by marauding parties of the enemy.³⁹ Further we know that the Persian army was delayed by the magnitude of its preparations: it was midsummer before the Tigris was crossed. Sapor's plan of campaign had been to strike for Syria, but he was detained by the long siege of Amida. He did not intend to attack Nisibis, and the devastation about that city was only committed by *vastatoriae manus* of the enemy.⁴⁰ The narrative of Faustus at once elucidates and supplements Ammianus's account.

Persia as a reward for this harrying of the empire offered Armenia alliance and proposed that Arsak should wed Sapor's daughter; a new marriage should consecrate the new loyalty; the celebrations should take place in Assyria. The Armenian troops however refused to leave the country, for each man longed to return to his home;

³⁶ The references are conveniently collected by Seeck, in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 1, pp. 1083-4.

³⁷ Faustus, iv. 20, Lauer, p. 101.

³⁸ That Wasak acted *against* as well as for Rome is also implied in the figure of the two mountains: Faustus, iv. 54, Lauer, p. 134.

³⁹ Cf. Amm. xviii. 6.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 7, 4; 6, 9.

it has always been difficult to hold together for any long period an army composed of feudal levies. Andok, the father of the queen Pharrantsem, fearing that his own daughter might be despised if Arsak married a Persian princess, won over by wholesale bribery a noble of the Sassanid court and a large number of Armenian satraps. One and all professed that the overtures of Sapor were inspired by a treacherous desire to secure the person of Arsak. The Armenian king fled precipitately and the negotiations were fruitless.⁴¹

Constantius was now himself in the east : he realised the omissions of his agents ; if he were to feel free to leave Asia in order to combat the rebel Julian, the loyalty of Arsak must be regained. The passage of Ammianus, xx. 11, 1-3, is highly important in this connexion :

Constantius adcitum Arsacen Armeniae regem summaque liberalitate susceptum praemonebat et hortabatur ut nobis amicus preseveraret et fidus. Audiebat enim saepius eum temptatum a rege Persarum fallaciis et minis et dolis, ut Romanorum societate posthabita suis rationibus stringeretur. Qui crebro adiurans animam prius posse amittere quam sententiam, muneratus cum comitibus quos duxerat redit ad regnum nihil ausus temerare *postea* promissorum, obligatus gratiarum multiplici nexu Constantio.

It might be suggested that in the word *postea* we have an implicit recognition by Ammianus of the truth of the account of Faustus. The western author in his turn is corroborated by the Armenian historian :

For eight years after the departure and flight of King Arsak of Armenia from the Persian king Sapor (as we have seen A.D. 356) the Persian king spoke no word of enmity. Rather he carried on negotiations adopting quite a humble tone, and besought King Arsak of Armenia to remain in close and friendly ties of alliance with him. For the king of Persia was in pressing danger of immediate and ceaseless armed attacks from the king of the Greeks. Yet King Arsak of Armenia would not yield to his entreaties or meet him, and if the king of Persia sent ambassadors to him he refused either to give presents or draw near to him at all ; he would not even hear the ambassadors' names. Still the king of Persia sent very often to him presents and ambassadors, but came with all speed to terms with the king of Greece.⁴²

Thus was Arsak loyal alike to Constantius and Julian, not merely rejecting the overtures of Persia but during the war of 363-4 even ravaging Chiliocomum on Julian's instructions.⁴³ In 364 the peace of Jovian was signed ; the terms are thus given by Faustus :

The emperor of Greece sealed and subscribed a treaty wherein was written 'I have given unto thee the town Mdsbin (Nisibis) which lies in Arorestan,

⁴¹ Faustus, iv. 20.

⁴² *Ibid.* 21.

⁴³ For the ravaging of Chiliocomum, cf. Amm. xxv. 7, 12. Why Arsak took no more effective action against Persia during Julian's campaign still remains obscure. Libanius hints at mutual jealousies amongst the Roman commanders, but it is noticeable that during the fourth century we hardly ever hear of unprovoked attacks upon Persia by Armenia. Arsak was forced to depend upon the forces of a feudal nobility

Assyrian Mesopotamia, and the half of Armenia. I permit thee if thou art able to conquer and subdue the same: I will not come to their help.' Forced and in dire distress the king of Greece subscribed to this form of words as his decree and gave it to the king of Persia.

Vengeance for the ravaging of Chilocomum and freedom to invade Armenia at his will were among the ends which Sapor sought to obtain by this treaty.⁴⁴

Ammianus himself seems not to admit ⁴⁵ that by the terms of Jovian's surrender Persia was allowed a free hand in Armenia, but his history as a whole serves only to confirm the view that Faustus has given us an accurate summary of the treaty.⁴⁶ Forthwith in 364

who were deeply influenced by Persian thought and culture. Cf. Gutschmid, 'Über die Glaubwürdigkeit der armenischen Geschichte des Moses von Khoren' in *Kleine Schriften*, iii. p. 282 *sqq.* at p. 291: 'In Abstammung Sprache und Sage hing das armenische Volk mit Iran zusammen, die Cultur des Adels war eine persische und ist es in Armenien und seinen Nebenländern trotz der Verschiedenheit der Religion bis auf die neueste Zeit geblieben'; and H. Gelzer, 'Zur armenischen Götterlehre,' *loc. cit.* p. 103 *sqq.* It is further important to notice that the natural difficulties of the march were considerable. These detained Bindoes and John when on their way to join the Roman forces under Narses in 591: they were advancing from Armenia towards the river Zab. Cf. Theophylact, *Sim.* v. 8, 3, De Boor, p. 202, 22: *ὡς δὲ τῆς περὶ τὴν Ἀρμενίαν Ῥωμαϊκῆς στρατοπεδείσεως διὰ τὴν δυσχωρίαν τῶν τόπων οὐχ ὅλας τε οὐσας συνπτεσθαὶ ταῖς ἐφ' αὐαῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δύναμεσιν*; and see H. C. Rawlinson, 'Notes on a Journey from Tabriz through Persian Kurdistan,' &c., *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, x. (1840), p. 1 *sqq.*, and his memoir on the site of the Atrapatenean Ecbatana, *ibid.* at p. 71 *sqq.*

⁴⁴ Cf. *Amm.* xxv. 7, 12: Quibus exitiale aliud accessit et impium ne post haec ita composita Arsaci poscenti contra Persas ferretur auxilium amico nobis semper (i.e. all through the recent war) et fido. Quod ratione genuina cogitatum est ut puniretur homo qui Chilocomum mandatu vastaverat principis et remaneret occasio per quam subinde licenter invaderetur Armenia. See also Zosimus, iii. 31, 2: *προσφεύγοντο δὲ καὶ Ἀρμενίας τὸ πολλὸν μέρος οἱ Πέρσαι, βραχὺ τε ταύτης Ῥωμαίοις ἔχειν ἐνδόντας*; and Libanius, Förster, ii. p. 518, l. 12, *Ἀρμενία πᾶσα* was surrendered to the enemy.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Amm.* xxvi. 4, 6: Persarum rex manus Armeniis iniectabat, eos in suam dicionem ex integro vocare vi nimia properans sed iniuste causando quod post Ioviani excessum cum quo foedera firmarat et pacem nihil obstande debet quo minus ea recuperaret quae antea ad maiores suos pertinuisse monstrabat. In this passage Ammianus seems to base the claim of Persia on the fact of the death of Jovian: Persia by his decease was freed from her obligations. This can hardly be intended. Elsewhere Sapor's claim is that he is free to act in Armenia *because of* and not in spite of the treaty of Jovian. Cf. *Amm.* xxvii. 12, 1-2 (quoted below, p. 636).

⁴⁶ Cf. *Amm.* xxv. 7, 12, quoted above, note 44.

xxvii. 12, 10: sed pro tempore adiumentis negatis per Terentium ducem Parareducitur in Armeniam recturus interim sine ullis insignibus gentem, quod ratione iusta est observatum ne fracti foederis nos argueremur et pacis.

xxvii. 12, 15. After the arrival of count Arinthaeus in Armenia the Persians did not at once invade the country, 'hoc solo contenti quod ad imperatorem misere legatos petentes nationem eandem ut sibi et Ioviano placuerat non defendi.'

xxvii. 12, 18, after Roman interference in Hiberia: 'his percoitis Sapor pati se exclamans indigna quod contra foederum textum iuvarentur Armenii.'

xxix. 1, 2. Trajan and Vadomar are only to act on the defensive, 'hoc observare principis iussu adpositi ut arcerent potius quam lacerarent Persas . . . s. 3, operaque consulta retrocedentes ne ferro violarent adversorum quemquam primi et iudicarentur discissi foederis rei, ultima trudente necessitate congressi sunt.'

Sapor began to enforce his conception of his rights,⁴⁷ and endeavoured to subject Armenia.⁴⁸

Calcata fide sub Ioviano pactorum iniectabat Armeniae manum ut eam velut placitorum abolita firmitate ditioni iungeret suae. Et primo per artes fallendo diversas nationem omnem renitentem dispendiis levibus adflictabat sollicitans quosdam optimatum et satrapas, alios excursibus occupans improvisis.⁴⁹

Faustus gives us the detailed commentary on these words of Ammianus :⁵⁰ between 364 and 369 he chronicles twenty-seven forays into Armenia. For most of these Merushan, an Armenian fugitive who had become a convert to the Magian religion, acted as guide : one expedition was led by prince Dekhan, of the Armenian Mamikonian house ; another by Suren Pahlav, a relative of Arsak ; while two others were captained respectively by Hrevshoghum, of the same race as Arsak, and Aghanaiosan, a Pahlav of the Arsacid house. The history of the Armenian writer is thus a complete corroboration of that which Ammianus says was the result of the peace of Jovian : ' Unde postea contigit ut . . . Armeniae maximum latus Medis conterminans inter dissensiones et turbamenta raperent Parthi.'⁵¹ As a result of the wholesale defections of the Armenian nobility the kingdom fell into utter disorder :⁵² the king was distrusted and the counsels of Nerses were disregarded :⁵³ subjection to a fire-worshipping heathen seemed less terrible than the unbearable sufferings from constant rapine and slaughter. Only Andok, the king's father-in-law, and Wasak his general remained loyal,⁵⁴ and ultimately Arsak was compelled against his will to submit to Persia⁵⁵ and to journey with Wasak to the court of Sapor.⁵⁶ In the thirtieth year of his reign he gave up the long struggle.⁵⁷ This is an important point gained for the chronology of the eastern question as it affects the policy of Valens. Reiche,⁵⁸ relying only on inferences from Ammianus, had conjecturally placed the capture of Arsaces in the years 364-366 : we now know that it did not occur till the end of 368 or the beginning of 369.⁵⁹

⁴⁷ Faustus, iv. 21, Lauer p. 107, Amm. xxvi. 4, 6 (quoted above, p. 635 note 45).

⁴⁸ In what follows I presume a knowledge of F. Reiche's *Chronologie der letzten 6 Bücher des Ammianus Marcellinus* (Liegnitz, 1889), and of O. Seeck's 'Zur Chronologie und Quellenkritik des Ammianus Marcellinus' in *Hermes*, xli. (1906) pp. 480-539.

⁴⁹ Amm. xxvii. 12, 1-2.

⁵⁰ Faustus, iv. cc. 21-49. The numbers of the invaders are doubtless grossly exaggerated, cf. Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, II. ii. c. iv. Zahlen, p. 298 sqq.

⁵¹ Amm. xxv. 7, 12.

⁵² Faustus, iv. c. 50.

⁵³ *Ibid.* c. 51.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* c. 51.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* c. 52.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* c. 53.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* c. 54, cf. c. 51 *ad init.* Wasak was put to death in Persia.

⁵⁸ Reiche, *op. cit.* c. 6, p. 27 sqq.

⁵⁹ Arsak's death took place at a considerably later date: Faustus, v. 7. Ammianus, xxxii. 12, 3, in fact anticipates the death of Arsak. *Deinde* (in xxvii. 12, 4) means 'after Arsak's capture,' which is the real subject of xxvii. 12, 3.

With Arsak in his power, the Persian king began the work of the total subjection of Armenia and the establishment of fire-worship in that country. Faustus is only concerned with the history of his own people, but we learn from Ammianus⁶⁰ that Sapor took the further step of interfering in the affairs of Hiberia (in 369 it would appear). He drove out Sauromaces, who had been raised to the throne through the influence of Rome, and instated Aspacures, conferring upon him a diadem in recognition of Persia's overlordship. In Armenia the queen with 11,000 men⁶¹ took refuge in the fortress of Artagherk.⁶² At this point in his narrative Ammianus tells us that two prominent Armenian renegades, Cylaces and Artabannes, who were besieging the fortress, played Sapor false, and failing in their endeavours to induce Pharrantsem to surrender allowed her son Pap (Para) to escape from Artagherk and take refuge in Roman territory.⁶³ In view of the many Armenian nobles who acted now for their country and now for the interests of Persia⁶⁴ it is hardly surprising that Cylaces and Artabannes are not mentioned by Faustus.⁶⁵ He does not however contradict Ammianus's account: we learn from him that while the Persians were ravaging Armenia and the long blockade of the castle of Artagherk continued, Mushegh, son of the murdered general Wasak, joined Pap on Roman soil and appealed to the emperor for his support. But Valens feared to violate the terms of the peace of Jovian; he clearly felt that his right to interfere was doubtful, and considered that he could satisfy his scruples by a compromise: Terentius, the Roman dux, should return with Pap, but the troops of Rome should not oppose Persia; the Arsacid prince should assert his own authority, if he had the power, but the emperor would not confer upon him the insignia of a king.⁶⁶ It was a futile step while at the moment Sapor was harrying all Armenia, and it is remarkable that Faustus does not date the accession of Pap from this period, although he recognises the goodwill displayed by Rome.⁶⁷ Messages came from Pap⁶⁸ to Pharrantsem

⁶⁰ xxvii. 12, 4.

⁶¹ So at least Faustus, iv. c. 55.

⁶² Artogerassa: Amm. xxvii. 12, 5.

⁶³ Valens accorded him a residence at Neocaesarea, which naturally incensed Sapor.

⁶⁴ Cf. Meruschan, especially at v. 38.

⁶⁵ Their names were well known to the Romans, as their subsequent murder by King Pap was one of the arguments against that monarch raised by Terentius at a later date in his despatches to the emperor: Amm. xxx. i. 3.

⁶⁶ Amm. xxvii. 12, 10.

⁶⁷ Cf. Lauer, p. 136: Während sie (the ambassadors) mit dem Könige der Griechen verhandelten, vermochten sie diese, ihnen Hilfe zu bringen. This embassy, it may be noted, was, it seems, planned by Cylaces and Artabannes after they had permitted the escape of Pap: 'Qua humanitate (Cylaces et Artabannes) illecti (i.e. Valens' welcome of Pap) missis oratoribus ad Valentem auxilium eundemque Param sibi regem tribui poposcerunt,' Amm. xxvii. 12, 9.

⁶⁸ 'From her son Arsak,' as Faustus says, iv. 56. This is, of course, only the standing title of all Armenian kings; cf. Professor Bury's note to Gibbon, ii. p. 564.

week after week bidding her be of good hope and not surrender. But Rome would give no military help, and before Sapor's ravages the Armenian prince, with Cylaces and Artabannes, was forced to take refuge in the mountainous district which divided Lazica from the territory of the empire.⁶⁹ Faustus gives a terrible picture of pillage and rapine in Armenia (370): at length in the fourteenth month the garrison could hold out no longer; the queen was carried off to her death, and Artashat, Wagharshapat, Sarehavan, and other towns fell into the hands of Persia.⁷⁰ Sapor appointed generals to hold the captured forts; Sik and Karen were left in command of the troops, while the Armenian renegades, Wahan and Merushan, were entrusted with the government of Armenia and the introduction of the Magian religion.⁷¹

At last, in 371,⁷² Valens decided that he could not allow the Armenians to suffer unprotected, should the Persian ravages begin afresh; he took effective action, and despatched Count Arinthaëus⁷³ with an army.⁷⁴ Terentius had accompanied Pap to Armenia in the former year. It is precisely at this point that Faustus tells of the successful result of Mushegh's mission and of the accession of Pap. 'The great king of the Greeks made Pap, the son of Arsak, king over the land of Armenia, as Mushegh had prayed of him. The king of Greece became a strong support of Armenia, and sent a general, by name Terentius, and a Count Ade with six million men in the train of King Pap to Armenia.'⁷⁵ Count Ade is not mentioned by Ammian,⁷⁶ but it can hardly be doubted that this is the Addaeus whom we know as *comes domesticorum* under Theodosius I, and who in 393 held the position of *magister utriusque militiae per Orientem*.⁷⁷ The army of Rome now occupied the country: the newly erected fire-temples were destroyed, while Nerses left his retirement⁷⁸ and supported the restored monarchy; the captured fortresses were

⁶⁹ Amm. xxvii. 12, 11.

⁷⁰ Faustus, iv. 55. It was in the winter of 370, *sidere flagrante brumali*: Amm. xxvii. 12, 12.

⁷¹ Faustus, iv. 58-59. Wahan was soon after slain by his own son: Lauer, p. 144. On the efforts to set up the Persian religion, compare Moses of Chorene, iii. 36, and thereon Gutschmid, *op. cit.* p. 290. It is interesting to notice that at this time military and civil authority are separated and the former is given to Persian officers. It might be suggested that this was due to the fact of the disloyalty to Persia of the Armenian Cylaces and Artabannes; cf. Amm. xxvii. 12, 5: 'Cylaci spadoni et Artabanni quos olim susceperat (sc. Sapor) perfugas commisit Armeniam—horum alter ante gentis praefectus, alter magister fuisse dicebatur armorum—iisdem mandarat ut Artogerassam . . . exscinderent.' Apparently Armenian renegades were entrusted with the *military* command in the first instance.

⁷² Cf. Reiche, *op. cit.* p. 29.

⁷³ He had recently (at the end of 369) been conducting operations on the Danube.

⁷⁴ Amm. xxvii. 12, 13.

⁷⁵ Faustus, v. 1, a good example of the Armenian's exaggeration in regard to numbers.

⁷⁶ But compare Moses of Chorene, iii. 37.

⁷⁷ Cf. O. Seeck, *Die Briefe des Libanius*, p. 48.

⁷⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 626 note 3.

recovered, and the Roman troops were quartered 'in Errand and Bachischu through the whole land of Armenia, through all the cantons.'⁷⁹ Persia did not repeat the pillage of the previous year, but resorted to diplomacy: Sapor counselled Pap that Cylaces and Artabannes were plotting against him and they were in consequence beheaded; meanwhile an embassy complained to the emperor that this support of Armenia was in breach of the terms of the peace of Jovian. But Valens had taken action and he did not repent.⁸⁰ Hiberia was partitioned, and the Roman nominee was made king over that part of the country which bordered on Armenia and Lazica, Sauromaces being left to rule over the district which adjoined Persia. Once more Sapor protested and prepared for war.⁸¹

In this year (372) the Armenian general Mushegh invaded the territory of Persia, and attacked the camp of Sapor which was pitched at Thauresh in Atrpatakan. Many captives were taken, among them some of Sapor's wives, who were honourably restored to their master by Mushegh. It is important to notice that Faustus, in entire agreement with Ammian, states that this was a victory of the *Armenian* troops: the Roman leaders only shared the booty.⁸² Terentius with his twelve legions was indeed in all probability in Hiberia at the time of this campaign.

Valens had not as yet engaged Persia directly, but in 373 came the battle of Vagabanta (Ammianus) or Bagavan (Faustus), in which the Roman troops were forced to resist the Persian army. Ammianus writes as follows:

Exacta hieme rex Persarum gentis Sapor pugnarum fiducia pristinarum immaniter arrogans, suppleto numero suorum abundeque firmato erupturos in nostra cataphractos et sagittarios et conductam misit plebem. . . [Count Trajan and Vadomar are bidden to act on the defensive] qui cum venissent Vagabanta legionibus habilem locum rapidos turmarum procursus hostilium in se ruentium acriter exceperunt inviti; operaque consulta retrocedentes ne ferro violarent adversorum quemquam primi et iudicaretur discissi foederis rei, ultima trudente necessitate congressi sunt: confossisque multis discessere victores.⁸³

The parallelism of the account of Faustus is instructive: he emphasises the magnitude of the enemy's forces: Urnair, king of Aghovia, claimed gifts from Sapor and undertook to oppose the Armenian satraps, the Persian troops were to attack the Romans.⁸⁴ Sapor himself marched as far as Atrpatakan and there halted; the main army he sent forward into the heart of Armenia.⁸⁵ King

⁷⁹ Faustus, v. 1, Lauer, p. 147.

⁸⁰ Valens reached Antioch in April 372.

⁸¹ For the details of these measures read Amm. xxvii. 12, 14-18. The operations were carried out by Terentius with twelve legions.

⁸² Faustus, v. 2.

⁸³ xxix. 1, 1-2.

⁸⁴ Cf. *conducta plebs* in Ammianus.

⁸⁵ Cf. Amm., *misit*.

Pap gave orders to concentrate his own men in Bagavan while the Roman allies marched from Errand and encamped near the Euphrates. Terentius⁸⁶ would not allow the Armenian king to fight in person : his master would hold him guilty if any harm were to come to the king. The united forces won a great victory over the Persian host. In this battle, in striking agreement with Ammianus, Faustus tells us for the first time that the Roman legions took part in the actual fighting.⁸⁷ Ammianus proceeds : 'inter moras tamen utrimquesecus *tentatis* aliquotiens *levibus proeliis* varioque finitis eventu pactis indutiis ex consensu aestateque consumpta (A.D. 373) partium discessere ductores etiamtum discordes.'⁸⁸ Faustus gives an account of the success of the Armenians and Romans at Gantsak in Atrpatakan⁸⁹ and then with him too follows a peace. Mushegh proceeds to subdue the disloyal Armenians and the neighbouring peoples.⁹⁰

Nerses had now resumed his former commanding position in affairs of state, but the catholicos was hated by his sovereign. Fear of Rome alone stayed Pap's hand,⁹¹ but at length he murdered the patriarch ; and when Caesarea refused to consecrate the king's nominee, Pap broke through the long tradition and caused Iusik to be consecrated in Basil's despite. He himself began to reduce the privileges and property of the Christian church and favoured the restoration of the national paganism.⁹² Such actions and the unfavourable despatches of Terentius led Valens to extend a kingly invitation to Pap : once on Roman soil the honoured guest became a prisoner (374 ?), while Terentius counselled that Valens should enthrone a new king in Armenia.⁹³ Fleeing from Tarsus through many dangers and difficulties Pap escaped to his own country with 300 followers.⁹⁴ Of this journey into the territory of the empire Faustus says nothing, but he tells us that soon after the death of Nerses the king began by embassies to pave the way for alliance with Persia.⁹⁵ We learn that he sent to Valens the astonishing demand : 'Caesarea and ten towns belong to us ; give them up : the city of Urha was also built by our ancestors ; if you do not desire to arouse confusion give them up ; if you refuse then we will fight for them in violent

⁸⁶ Terentius, though not mentioned by Ammianus in connexion with this battle, was still in Armenia, cf. *Amm.* xxx. 1, 3.

⁸⁷ I have of set purpose suppressed all mention of those details in the account of Faustus which are more directly concerned with the internal affairs of Armenia : see the whole chapter, v. 4.

⁸⁸ *Amm.* xxix. 1, 4.

⁸⁹ Faustus, v. 5.

⁹⁰ Faustus, v. 8-20. Sapor retired to Ctesiphon, Valens to Antioch, *Amm.* xxix. 1, 4 (winter 373-4). The conspiracy of Theodorus engaged the latter's attention.

⁹¹ Faustus, v. 23.

⁹² See the highly interesting chapter, Faustus, v. 31.

⁹³ *Amm.* xxx. 1, 1-4.

⁹⁴ *Amm.* xxx. 5, 17.

⁹⁵ Cf. *Amm.* xxx. 2, 1 : 'Param (= Pap) sociare sibi impendio conabatur Sapor.' Ammian appears to regard Para as an innocent against whom Rome had sinned without provocation ; not so Faustus. For this claim to Caesarea and Edessa cf. Marquart *Eränsähr*, p. 160.

warfare.' Mushegh and the Armenian nobles pleaded with the king that he should remain loyal to Rome; but to no purpose. The story of the order for Pap's murder sent secretly by the emperor and the method of its execution is given by both authors, the only difference of any moment being that the feast at which the king was assassinated was according to Ammianus's version planned by Trajan, while Faustus ascribes the scheme to Terentius and Addaeus. It was probably a concerted plot on the part of all three commanders.⁹⁶ The Armenian nobles determined that they could ill afford to make both Rome and Persia their enemies and decided to attempt no revenge for the death of their king.⁹⁷ Sapor, in place of Pap, whom he had every hope of winning to his side, saw (A.D. 375) the Roman army of occupation instal with great pomp⁹⁸ an Arsacid princeling Warasdat upon the throne as nominee of the empire.

Persia resorted once more to diplomacy. A legate, Arsaces by name, proposed to Valens that Armenia, the apple of constant discord, should be divided between the two empires, or, if this was not agreeable to Rome, let the emperor withdraw his garrisons from Hiberia. The embassy is important as foreshadowing the partition of 387. During the autumn of 375 and through the year 376 it would seem that the negotiations continued. Victor, the *magister equitum*, and Urbicius, the *dux Mesopotamiae*, were sent with an ultimatum: the troops of Sauromaces were to evacuate Hiberia by the beginning of 377. The ambassadors complained that a Persian king who boasted himself to be just and contented with what was rightly his own was yet wickedly coveting Armenia when its inhabitants had been granted permission to live as it pleased them best.⁹⁹ The embassy, says Ammianus, performed its duty well, save that it went beyond its scope and accepted some small districts which were offered it in Armenia. This passage of Ammianus would seem to be explained by Faustus, who relates that Warasdat advised 'the Greek princes,' and through them the emperor, that a town or two fortresses should be built in every canton throughout Armenia as permanent garrison centres, and that the nobles and troops of Armenia should be armed at the cost of the empire to be a continual protection against Persia. The emperor willingly agreed to carry the scheme into execution. The small districts mentioned by Ammianus may thus have been intended for occupation by the Roman garrisons.

In the autumn of 376 Suren headed another embassy to the emperor offering to cede to Rome the land thus occupied, but returned with little accomplished.¹⁰⁰ Valens was raising Scythian mercenaries for an expedition against Persia in 377, when the whole position

⁹⁶ Faustus, v. 32; Amm. xxx. 1, 18-23.

⁹⁷ Faustus, v. 33.

⁹⁸ Faustus, v. 34, 'mit grossem Glanze.' Cf. the words of Ammianus, xxx. 2, 1: 'augentique nostri exercitus alacritate formidinem.'

⁹⁹ Cf. Amm. xxx. 2, 4.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* sect. 7.

was changed by the news of the Gothic invasion. One highly important fact is mentioned casually by Ammianus—the Roman legions were recalled from Armenia and sent to Europe : ¹⁰¹ this explains the fall of Warasdat before Manuel, which must have taken place in this year (377). Manuel having dethroned Rome's vassal king ¹⁰² was forced to ally himself with Persia, and received Suren with a Persian garrison of 10,000 men, agreeing to provide for the support of these troops and to pay tribute to Sapor. ¹⁰³ The account of the Armenian historian receives striking corroboration from Ammianus's narrative :

Sapor ultra solitum asperatus quod ad expeditionem accingi rectorem conpererat nostrum iram eius conculcans Surenae dedit negotium ut ea quae victor comes susceperat et Urbicius, armis repeteret si quisquam repugnaret et milites Sauromacis praesidio destinati malis adfigerentur extremis. Haecque ut statuerat maturata confestim nec emendari poterunt nec vindicari quia rem Romanam alius circumsteterat metus totius Gothiae, Thracias licentius perrumpentis. ¹⁰⁴

In the early months of 378 Valens before leaving for Constantinople sent Victor to Persia *ut super Armeniae statu pro captu rerum componeret impendentium*. ¹⁰⁵ The disaster of Adrianople tied the hands of Rome for some years, while in Armenia Merushan ¹⁰⁶ sowed discord between Manuel and Persia. The attempts of Persia to defeat Manuel were unsuccessful (378), and for seven years he ruled as regent for Pharrantsem and the sons of Pap (A.D. 378–385). ¹⁰⁷ Armenia enjoyed a brief interval of peace and prosperity. ¹⁰⁸ Sapor in his extreme old age was content not to interfere. for Roman intrigue in Armenia had ceased to be a danger.

In 384 an embassy arrived in Constantinople announcing the accession of Sapor III to the throne of Persia. (Sapor III, 383–388). ¹⁰⁹ On Manuel's death the link of a common faith induced the great protector to commend the young king Arsak ¹¹⁰ to Theodosius the

¹⁰¹ Amm. xxxi. 7, 2: 'legiones ab Armenia ductas.'

¹⁰² Warasdat fled to the empire and spent the rest of his days in exile; Faustus, v. 37.

¹⁰³ Faustus, v. 37–38.

¹⁰⁴ Amm. xxx. 2, 7–8.

¹⁰⁶ Amm. xxxi. 7, 1.

¹⁰⁵ Merushan was ultimately defeated and killed by Manuel; Faustus, v. 43. Cf. Gutschmid, *op. cit.* pp. 293–4 for criticism of the account of Moses of Chorene.

¹⁰⁷ Faustus, v. 39–41.

¹⁰⁸ 'Seine Regentschaft bildete einen Lichtpunkt in der armenischen Geschichte und war vielleicht, die wenig bekannte erste Zeit des Terdat abgerechnet, die glücklichste Periode deren sich die christlichen Armenier je erfreut haben': Gutschmid, *op. cit.* p. 293. 'Die letzte gute Zeit des Reichs war die Regentschaft des klerikal-gesinnten Adelshauptes Manuels des Mamikoniers': H. Gelzer, in Hauck, *Realencyklopädie*, vol. ii. p. 66, sub voc. 'Armenien.'

¹⁰⁹ See Karl Güterbock, 'Römisch-Armenien und die römische Satrapieen im vierten bis sechsten Jahrhundert; eine rechtsgeschichtliche Studie' (in *Festgabe der juristischen Fakultät zu Königsberg für ihren Senior Johann Theodor Schirmer zum 1. August 1900*, pp. 1–58) at pp. 11 *sqq.*

¹¹⁰ Arsak had married Manuel's daughter Wardanducht; Faustus, v. 44. Cf. Gutschmid, *op. cit.* p. 294, on Moses, iii. 41, 2.

champion of orthodoxy. Many of the nobility however appealed to Persia, and Sapor III set an Arsacid prince, Chosroes, to reign in Armenia as his vassal, while the Persian noble Sik undertook the government. Arsak was forced to flee to the protection of Rome, and was supported by the army of Theodosius. But diplomacy and not war decided the claims of the rival sovereigns. An embassy from Sapor reached Constantinople in 386, and Stilicho represented the emperor at the court of Ctesiphon.¹¹¹ The former project was revived, and Armenia was partitioned between the powers who had so long distracted the unhappy country with their rivalries. Large parts of Armenia were annexed, and while Chosroes ruled over four-fifths of the remaining territory as the nominee of Persia, Arsak as Rome's protégé was sovereign over but one-fifth of the divided realm (387). 'The kingdom of Armenia,' writes her greatest historian at the close of his work, 'was reduced, partitioned, brought to ruin : it had fallen from its greatness then and for all time.'¹¹²

Our study is at an end : it has, we believe, served to illustrate and justify Gutschmid's judgment of the high value of the work of Faustus ; it has, we hope, proved that his chronology, apart from the one confusion which we noticed at the outset, is consistent and accurate—not one single error have we been able to demonstrate ; it has enabled us to appreciate the difficulties with which Rome was faced upon her eastern frontier ; and lastly it has given us a new confidence in the splendid accuracy and historical insight of Ammianus Marcellinus.

NORMAN H. BAYNES.

¹¹¹ Claudian, *De consul. Stil.* 51 sqq.

¹¹² Faustus, vi. 1. I have not thought it necessary to repeat the arguments of Güterbock (*loc. cit.*) which in my judgment have established that A.D. 387 is the correct date for the partition of Armenia. So Hübschmann, *Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen* at p. 221. Nöldeke however (*Aufsätze*, p. 103) places it under Bahram IV (388–9–399) in 390, while Marquart, *Ērānsāhr*, p. 114 thinks that the first division of the land occurred in 384 while the kings remained : the second division occurred in 389 when 'der König Arsak III verzichtete förmlich auf seine Hoheitsrechte und trat sein Land an den Kaiser ab.' Modern historians have blamed Theodosius I for this act (cf. H. Gelzer, 'in äusserster politischer Kurzsichtigkeit,' in Hauk, *loc. cit.*), but during the whole century Armenia had been *perpetua aerumnarum causa* (Amm. xxx. 2, ad init.). Theodosius needed peace in the east for his campaign against Maximus : it was also the empire's need. I believe that in this matter the great Roman emperor has been hardly judged.

CHAPTER III

CONSTANTINE'S SUCCESSORS TO JOVIAN: AND THE STRUGGLE WITH PERSIA

DEATH had surprised Constantine when preparing to meet Persian aggression on the Eastern frontier and it seems certain that the Emperor had made no final provision for the succession to the throne, though later writers profess to know of a will which parcelled out the Roman world among the members of his family. During his lifetime his three sons had been created Caesars and while for his nephew Hanniballianus he had fashioned a kingdom in Asia, to his nephew Delmatius had been assigned the *Ripa Gothica*. Possibly we are to see in these latter appointments an attempt to satisfy discontent at Court; it may be that Optatus and Ablabius, espousing the cause of a younger branch of the imperial stock, had forced Constantine's hand and that it was for this interference that they afterwards paid the penalty of their lives. But it would seem a more probable suggestion that the Persian danger was thought to demand an older and more experienced governor than Constantius, while the boy Constans was deemed unequal to withstand the Goths in the north. At least the plan would appear to have been in substance that of a threefold division of spheres itself suggested by administrative necessity; Constantine was true to the principle of Diocletian, and it was only a superficial view which saw in this devolution of the central power a partition of the Roman Empire.¹ Thus on the Emperor's death there followed an interregnum of nearly four months. Constantine had, however, been successful in inspiring his soldiers with his own dynastic views; they feared new tumult and internal struggle and in face of the twenty year old Constantius felt themselves to be the masters. The armies agreed that they would have none but the sons of Constantine to rule over them, and at one blow they murdered all the other relatives of the dead Emperor save only the child Julian and Gallus the future Caesar; in the latter's case men looked to his own ill health to spare the executioner. At the same time perished Optatus and Ablabius. On 9 September 337 Constantius, Constantine II, and Constans each assumed the title of Augustus as joint Emperors.

¹ Cf. Victor, *Caes.* xxxix. 30, *quasi partito imperio*.

His contemporaries were unable to agree how far Constantius was to be held responsible for this assassination. He alone of the sons of Constantine was present in the capital, it was he who stood to gain most by the deed, the property of the victims fell into his hands, while it was said that he himself regarded his ill-success in war and his childlessness as Heaven's punishment and that this murder was one of the three sins which he regretted on his death-bed. In later times some, though considering the slaughter as directly inspired by the Emperor, have yet held him justified and have viewed him as the victim of a tragic necessity of state. Certainty is impossible but the circumstances suggest that inaction and not participation is the true charge against Constantius; the army which made and unmade emperors was determined that there should be no rival to question their choice. The massacre had fatal consequences; it was the seed from which sprang Julian's mistrust and ill-will: in a panegyric written for the Emperor's eye he might admit the plea of compulsion, but the deep-seated conviction remained that he was left an orphan through his cousin's crime.

In the summer of 338 the new rulers assembled in Pannonia (or possibly at Viminacium in Dacia, not far from the Pannonian frontier) to determine their spheres of government. According to their father's division, it would seem, Spain, Britain, and the two Gauls fell to Constantine: the two Italies, Africa, Illyricum, and Thrace were subjected to Constans, while southward from the Propontis, Asia and the Orient with Pontus and Egypt were entrusted to Constantius. It was thus to Constantius that, on the death of Hanniballianus, Armenia and the neighbouring allied tribes naturally passed, but with this addition the eastern Augustus appears to have remained content. The whole of the territory subject to Delmatius, *i.e.* the Ripa Gothica which probably comprised Dacia, Moesia I and II, and Scythia (perhaps even Pannonia and Noricum) went to swell the share of Constans who was now but fifteen years of age.¹ But though both the old and the new Rome were thus in the hands of the most youthful of the three emperors, the balance of actual power still seemed heavily weighted in favour of Constantine, the ruler of the West; indeed, he appears to have assumed the position of guardian over his younger brother. It may be difficult to account for the moderation of Constantius, but Julian points out that a war with Persia was imminent, the army was disorganised, and the preparations for the campaign insufficient; domestic peace was the Empire's great need, while Constantius himself really strengthened his own position by renouncing further claims: to widen his sphere of government might have only served to limit his moral authority. Further he was perhaps unwilling to demand for himself a capital in which his kinsmen had been

¹ In his eighteenth year, Eutrop. x. 9, cf. Seeck, *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, xvii. pp. 39 sqq.

so recently murdered : his self-denial should prove his innocence.¹ During the next thirteen years three great and more or less independent interests absorbed the energies of Constantius. the welfare and doctrine of the Christian Church,² the long drawn and largely ineffective struggle against Persia and lastly the assertion and maintenance of his personal influence in the affairs of the West.

It was to Asia that Constantius hastened after his meeting with his co-rulers. Before his arrival Nisibis had successfully withstood a Persian siege (autumn 337 or spring 338), and the Emperor at once made strenuous efforts to restore order and discipline among the Roman forces. Profiting by his previous experience he organised a troop of mail-clad horsemen after the Persian model — the wonder of the time — and raised recruits both for the cavalry and infantry regiments; he demanded extraordinary contributions from the eastern provinces, enlarged the river flotillas and generally made his preparations for rendering effective resistance to Persian attacks. The history of this border warfare is a tangled tale and our information scanty and fragmentary. In Armenia the fugitive king and those nobles who with him were loyal to Rome were restored to their country, but for the rest the campaigns resolved themselves in the main into the successive forays across the frontier of Persian or Roman troops. Though *Ludi Persici* (13–17 May) were founded, though court orators could claim that the Emperor had frequently crossed the Tigris, had raised fortresses on its banks and laid waste the enemy's territory with fire and sword, yet the lasting results of these campaigns were sadly to seek: now an Arab tribe would be induced to make common cause with Rome (as in 338) and to harry the foe, now a Persian town would be captured and its inhabitants transported and settled within the Empire, but it was rare indeed for the armies of both powers to meet face to face in the open field. Constantius persistently declined to take the aggressive; he hesitated to risk any great engagement which even if successful might entail a heavy loss in men whom he could ill afford to spare. Of one battle alone have we any detailed account. Sapor had collected a vast army; conscripts of all ages were enlisted, while neighbouring tribesmen served for Persian gold. In three divisions the host crossed the Tigris and by the Emperor's orders the frontier guards did not dispute the passage. The Persians occupied an entrenched camp at Hileia or Ellia near Singara, while a distance of some 150 stades lay between them and the Roman army. Even on Sapor's advance Constantius true to his defensive policy awaited the enemy's attack; it may be, as Libanius asserts, that Rome's best troops were absent at the time. Beneath their fortifications the Persians had posted their splendid mailed cavalry

¹ For the above of Victor, *Epit.* xli. 20; Vita Artemii Martyris, *AS. Boll.* Tom. viii. Oct. 20, Eutyches, *Chron. Alex. Ol.* 279, Seeck, *Zeits. f. Numismatik*, l.c.

² See Chap. v.

(*cataphracti*) and upon the ramparts archers were stationed. On a mid-summer morning, probably in the year 344 (possibly 348), the struggle began. At midday the Persians feigned flight in the direction of their camp, hoping that thus their horsemen would charge upon an enemy disorganised by long pursuit. It was already evening when the Romans drew near the fortifications. Constantius gave orders to halt until the dawn of the new day; but the burning heat of the sun had caused a raging thirst, the springs lay within the Persian camp and the troops with little experience of their Emperor's generalship refused to obey his commands and resumed the attack. Clubbing the enemy's cavalry, they stormed the palisades. Sapor fled for his life to the Tigris, while the heir to his throne was captured and put to death. As night fell, the victors turned to plunder and excess, and under cover of the darkness the Persian fugitives re-formed and won back their camp. But success came too late; their confidence was broken and with the morning the retreat began.

Turning to the history of the West after the meeting of the Augusti in 338, it would appear that Constantine forthwith claimed an authority superior to that of his co-rulers;¹ he even legislated for Africa although this province fell within the jurisdiction of Constans. The latter, however, soon asserted his complete independence of his elder brother and in autumn (338?) after a victory on the Danube assumed the title of Sarmaticus. At this time (339) he probably sought to enlist the support of Constantius, surrendering to the latter Thrace and Constantinople.² Disappointed of his hopes, it would seem that the ruler of the West now demanded for himself both Italy and Africa. Early in 340 he suddenly crossed the Alps and at Aquileia rashly engaged the advanced guard of Constans who had marched from Naissus in Dacia, where news had reached him of his brother's attack. Constantine falling into an ambush perished, and Constans was now master of Britain, Spain, and the Gauls (before 9 April 340). He proved himself a terror to the barbarians and a general of untiring energy who travelled incessantly, making light of extremes of heat and cold. In 341 and 342 he drove back an inroad of the Franks and compelled that restless tribe "for whom inaction was a confession of weakness" to conclude a peace: he disregarded the perils of the English Channel in winter, and in January 343 crossed from Boulogne to Britain, perhaps to repel the Picts and Scots. His rule is admitted to have been at the outset vigorous and just, but the promise of his early years was not maintained: his exactions grew more intolerable, his private vices more shameless, while his favourites were allowed to violate the laws with impunity. It would seem, however, to have been his unconcealed contempt for the army which caused his

¹ This is an inference drawn from his coinage.

² Cf. the language of the *ita Artemii*, *l.c.* ὁ δὲ Κωνσταντῖος . . . τὸ τῆς ἐξῆς ἀσπά-
ζεται μέρος καὶ τότε . . . κ. τ. λ.

fall. A party at Court conspired with Marcellinus, Count of the sacred largesses, and Magnentius, commander of the picked corps of Joviani and Herculeani, to secure his overthrow. Despite his Roman name Magnentius was a barbarian: his father had been a slave and subsequently a freedman in the service of Constantine. While at Augustodunum, during the absence of the Emperor on a hunting expedition, Marcellinus on the pretext of a banquet in honour of his son's birthday feasted the military leaders (18 January 350); wine had flowed freely and the night was already far advanced, when Magnentius suddenly appeared among the revellers, clad in the purple. He was straightway acclaimed Augustus: the rumour spread: folk from the country-side poured into the city: Illyrian horsemen who had been drafted into the Gallic regiments joined their comrades, while the officers hardly knowing what was afoot were carried by the tide of popular enthusiasm into the usurper's camp. Constans fled for Spain and at the foot of the Pyrenees by the small frontier fortress of Helene was murdered by Gaiso, the barbarian emissary of Magnentius. The news of his brother's death reached Constantius when the winter was almost over, but true to his principle never to sacrifice the Empire to his own personal advantage he remained in the East, providing for its safety during his absence and appointing Lucillianus to be commander-in-chief.

The hardships and oppression which the provinces had suffered under Constans were turned by Magnentius to good account. A month after his usurpation Italy had joined him and Africa was not slow to follow. The army of Illyricum was wavering in its fidelity when, upon the advice of Constantia sister of Constantius, Vetranio, *magister peditum* of the forces on the Danube, allowed himself to be acclaimed Emperor (1 March, at Mursa or Sirmium) and immediately appealed for help to Constantius. The latter recognised the usurper, sent Vetranio a diadem and gave orders that he should be supported by the troops on the Pannonian frontier. Meanwhile in Rome, the elect of the mob, Flavius Popilius Nepotianus, cousin of Constantius, enjoyed a brief and bloody reign of some 28 days until, through the treachery of a senator, he fell into the hands of the soldiers of Magnentius, led by Marcellinus the newly appointed *magister officiorum*.

In the East, Nisibis was besieged for the third and last time: Sapor's object was, it would seem, permanently to settle a Persian colony within the city. The siege was pressed with unexampled energy; the Mygdonius was turned from its course, and thus upon an artificial lake the fleet plied its rams but without effect. At length under the weight of the waters part of the city wall collapsed; cavalry and elephants charged to storm the breach, but the huge beasts turned in flight and broke the lines of the assailants. A new wall rose behind the old, and though four months had passed, Jacobus, Bishop of Nisibis, never lost heart. Then Sapor learned that the Massagetae were invading his own

country and slowly the Persian host withdrew. For a time the Eastern frontier was at peace (A.D. 350).

In the West while Magnentius sought to win the recognition of Constantius, Vetranio played a waiting game. At last, the historians tell us, the Illyrian Emperor broke his promises and made his peace with Magnentius. A common embassy sought Constantius: let him give Magnentius his sister Constantia to wife, and himself wed the daughter of Magnentius. Constantius wavered, but rejected the proposals and marched towards Sardica. Vetranio held the pass of Succii — the Iron Gate of later times — but on the arrival of the Emperor gave way before him. In Naissus, or as others say in Sirmium, the two Emperors mounted a rostrum and Constantius harangued the troops, appealing to them to avenge the death of the son of the great Constantine. The army hailed Constantius alone as Augustus and Vetranio sought for pardon. The Emperor treated the usurper with great respect and accorded him on his retirement to Prusa in Bithynia a handsome pension until his death six years later. Such is the story, but it can hardly fail to arouse suspicion. The greatest blot on the character of Constantius is his ferocity when once he fancied his superiority threatened, and here was both treason and treachery, for power had been stolen from him by a trick. All difficulties are removed if Vetranio throughout never ceased to support Constantius, even though the Emperor may have doubted his loyalty for a time when he heard that the prudent general had anticipated any action on the part of Magnentius by himself seizing the key-position, the pass of Succii. It is obvious that their secret was worth keeping: it is ill to play with armies as Constantius and Vetranio had done; while the clemency of an outraged sovereign offered a fair theme to the panegyrists of the Emperor.

Marching against one usurper in the West, Constantius was anxious to secure the East to the dynasty of Constantine: the recent success of Lucillianus may have appeared dangerously complete. The Emperor's nephew Gallus had, it would seem, for some time followed the Court, and while at Sirmium Constantius determined to create him Caesar. At the same time (15 March 351) his name was changed into Flavius Claudius Constantius, he was married to Constantia and became *frater Augusti*, forthwith the prince and his wife started for Antioch. Meanwhile Magnentius had not been idle; he had raised huge sums of money in Gaul, while Franks, Saxons, and Germans trooped to the support of their fellow-countryman, whose army now outnumbered that of Constantius. The latter however took the offensive in the spring of 351 and uniting Vetranio's troops with his own marched towards the Alpine passes. An ambush of Magnentius posted in the defiles of Atrians inflicted severe loss on his advance guard and the Emperor was compelled to withdraw. Elated by this success, the usurper now occupied Pannonia and passing Poetovio made for Sirmium.

Throughout his reign the policy of Constantius was marked by an anxious desire to husband the military forces of the Empire, and even now he was ready to compromise and to avoid the fearful struggle between the armies of Gaul and Illyricum. He dispatched Philippus, offering to acknowledge Magnentius as co-Augustus in the West, if he would abandon any claim to Italy. The ambassador was detained, but his proposals after some delay rejected; the usurper was so certain of victory that his envoy the Senator Titianus could even counsel Constantius to abdicate. An attack of Magnentius on Siscia was repulsed and an effort to cross the Save was also unsuccessful. Constantius then retired, preferring to await the enemy in open country where he could turn to the best advantage his superiority in cavalry. At Cibalae the army took up an entrenched position, while Magnentius advanced on Sirmium, hoping to meet with no resistance. Foiled in this he marched to Mursa in the rear of Constantius' army. The latter was forced to relieve the town and here on 28 September the decisive battle was fought. Behind Constantius flowed the Danube and on his right the Drave: for him flight must mean destruction. On both wings he posted mounted archers and in the forefront the mailed cavalry (*cataphracti*) which he had himself raised after the Persian model; in the centre the heavy armed infantry were stationed and in the rear the bowmen and slingers. Before the struggle Silvanus with his horsemen deserted Magnentius. From late afternoon till far into the night the battle raged; the cavalry of Constantius routed the enemy's right wing and this drew the whole line into confusion. Magnentius fled but Marcellinus continued the fight; the Gauls refused to acknowledge defeat; some few escaped through the darkness, but thousands were driven into the river or cut down upon the plain. It is said that Magnentius lost 24,000 men, Constantius 30,000.¹ The usurper took refuge in Aquileia and garrisoned the passes of the Alps; although his overtures were rejected and though his schemes to murder the Caesar Gallus and thus to raise difficulties for Constantius in the East were foiled, yet the exhaustion of his enemies and the approach of winter made pursuit impossible. Constantius forthwith proclaimed an amnesty for all the adherents of Magnentius except only those immediately implicated in his brother's murder; many deserted the pretender and escaped by sea to the victor. In the following year (352), Constantius forced the passes of the Julian Alps, while his fleet dominated the Po, Sicily, and Africa. At the news Magnentius fled to Gaul and by November the Emperor was already in Milan, abrogating all the fugitive's measures. In 353 Constantius crossed the Cottian Alps and at length, three years and a half after his assumption of the purple, Magnentius was surrounded in Lyons by his own troops, and finding his

¹ Zonaras states that Constantius had 80,000 men, Magnentius 36,000. Seeck has suggested that at this time Magnentius may have been besieging Sirmium.

cause hopeless committed suicide, while his Caesar Decentius also perished by his own hand.

The importance and significance of this unsuccessful bid for empire may easily be overlooked. A Roman civil official at the head of some discontented spirits at the Court hatches a plot against his sovereign, and in order to win the support of the army alienated by the contempt of Constans induces a barbarian general to declare himself Emperor. But though the Roman world was willing enough that Germans should fight the Empire's battles in their defence, they were not prepared to see another Maximin upon the throne; they refused to be reconciled to Magnentius even by the admitted justice of his rule. The lesson of his failure was well learned: the barbarian Arbogast caused not himself but the Roman civilian Eugenius to be elected Emperor. Further, while in this struggle the eastern and western halves of the Empire are seen falling naturally and almost unconsciously asunder, the most powerful force working for unity is the dynastic sentiment: Constantius claims support as the legitimate successor of the house of Constantine and as the avenger of the death of his son. His claim is not merely as the chosen of senate or army but far more as the rightful heir to the throne. This struggle throws into prominence the growth of the hereditary principle and the warmth of the response which it could evoke from the sympathies of the subjects of the Empire. No student of the history of the fourth century can indeed afford to neglect the battle of Mursa; contemporaries were staggered at the appalling loss of life, for while it is said that the Roman dead numbered 40,000 at Hadrianople (A.D. 378), at Mursa 54,000 are reported to have been slain. It is hardly too much to say that the defence of the Empire in the East was crippled by this blow, and it must have been largely through the slaughter at Mursa that Constantius was forced to make his fatal demand that the troops of Gaul should march against Persia. Neither must the military significance of the battle be forgotten: it lies in the fact that this was the first victory of the newly formed heavy cavalry, and the result of the impact of their charge, which carried all before it, showed that it was no longer the legionary who was to play the most important part in the campaigns of the future.

Meanwhile in Antioch Gallus was ruling as an oriental despot; there was in his nature a strain of savagery, and his appointment as Caesar seems to have awakened within him a brutal lust for a naked display of unrestrained authority. His passions were only fed by the violence of Constantia. The unsuccessful plot of Magnentius to assassinate the Caesar aroused the latter's suspicions and a reign of terror began; judicial procedure was disregarded and informers honoured, men were condemned to death without trial and the members of the city council imprisoned; when the populace complained of scarcity it was suggested that the responsibility lay with Theophilus governor of Syria: the mob

took the hint and the governor perished. The feeling of insecurity was rendered more intense by a rising among the Jews, who declared a certain Patricius their King, and by the raids of Saracens and Isaurians upon the country-side. The loyalty of the East was jeopardised. The reports of Thalassius, the praetorian praefect, and of Barbatio, the Caesar's Count of the guard, at length moved Constantius to action. On the death of Thalassius (winter 353-4) Domitian was sent to Antioch as his successor, directions being given him that Gallus was to be persuaded to visit the Emperor in the West. The praefect's studied discourtesy and overbearing behaviour enraged the Caesar; Domitian was thrown into prison and the populace responding to the appeal of Gallus tore in pieces both the praefect and Montius the quaestor of the palace. The trials for treason which followed were but a parody of justice; fear and hate held sway in Antioch. Constantius himself now wrote to Gallus praying his presence in Milan. In deep foreboding the Caesar started; on his journey the death of his wife, the Emperor's masterful sister, further dismayed him, and after passing through Constantinople his guard of honour became his gaolers; stripped of his purple by Barbatio in Poetovio, he was brought near Pola before a commission headed by Eusebius, the Emperor's chamberlain, and bidden to account for his administration in the East. The Court came to the required conclusion, and Gallus was beheaded.

Thus of the house of Constantine there only remained the Emperor's cousin Julian. Born in all probability in April 332, the child spent his early years in Constantinople; his mother Basilina, daughter of the praetorian praefect Anicius Julianus, died only a few months after the birth of her son, while his father Julius Constantius, younger brother of Constantine the Great, perished in the massacre of 337. From this Julian was spared by his extreme youth and was thereupon removed to Nicomedia and entrusted to the charge of a distant relative, by name Eusebius, who was at the time bishop of the city. When seven years of age, his education was undertaken by Mardonius, a "Scythian" eunuch — perhaps a Goth — who had been engaged by Julian's grandfather to instruct Basilina in the works of Homer and Hesiod. Mardonius had a passionate love for the classical authors, and on his way to school the boy's imagination was fired by the old man's enthusiasm. Already Julian's love for nature was aroused; in the summer he would spend his time on a small estate which had belonged to his grandmother; it lay eight stades from the coast and contained springs and trees with a garden. Here, free from crowds, he would read a book in peace, looking up now and again upon the ships and the sea, while from a knoll, he tells us, there was a wide view over the town below and thence beyond to the capital, the Propontis and the distant islands. Suddenly (in 341?) both he and his brother Gallus were banished to Marcellum, a large and lonely imperial castle in Cappadocia, lying at the foot of Mount Argaeus.

Here for six years the two boys lived in seclusion, for none of their friends were allowed to visit them. Julian chafed bitterly at this isolation : in one of his rare references to this period he writes "we might have been in a Persian prison with only slaves for our companions." For a time the suspicions of Constantius seem to have gained the upper hand. At length Julian was allowed to visit his birthplace Constantinople. Here, while studying under Christian teachers as a citizen among citizens, his natural capacity, wit, and sociability rendered him dangerously popular : it was rumoured that men were beginning to look upon the young prince as Constantius' successor. He was bidden to return to Nicomedia (349 ?), where he studied philosophy and came under the influence of Libanius, although he was not allowed to attend the latter's lectures. The rhetorician dates Julian's conversion to Neoplatonism from this period :—"the mud-bespattered statues of the gods were set up in the great temple of Julian's soul." At last, in 351, when Gallus was created Caesar, the student was free to go where he would, and the Pagan philosophers of Asia Minor seized their opportunity. One and all plotted to secure the complete conversion of the young prince. Aedesius and Eusebius at Pergamum, Maximus and Chrysanthius at Ephesus could hardly content Julian's hunger for the forbidden knowledge. It was at this time (351-2) when he was twenty years of age (as he himself tells us) that he finally rejected Christianity and was initiated into the mysteries of Mithras. The fall of Gallus, however, implicated the Caesar's brother and Julian was closely watched and conducted to Italy. For seven months he was kept under guard, and during the six months which he spent in Milan he had only one interview with Constantius which was secured through the efforts of the Empress Eusebia. When at length he was allowed to leave the Court and was on his way to Asia Minor, the trial of the tribune Marinus and of Africanus, governor of Pannonia Secunda, on a charge of high treason inspired Constantius with fresh fears and suspicions. Messages reached Julian ordering his return. But before his arrival at Milan Eusebia had won from the Emperor his permission for Julian to retire to Athens, love of study being a characteristic which might with safety be encouraged in members of the royal house. Men may have seen in this visit to Greece (355) but a banishment ; to Julian, nursing the perilous secret of his new-found faith, the change must have been pure joy. In Hellas, his true fatherland, he was probably initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, while he plunged with impetuous intensity into the life of the University. It was not to be for long, for he was soon recalled to sterner activities.

Since the death of Gallus, the Emperor had stood alone ; although no longer compromised by the excesses of his Caesar, he was still beset by the old problems which appeared to defy solution. At this time the power of the central government in Gaul had been still further weakened. Here Silvanus, whose timely desertion of Magnentius had contributed to

the Emperor's success at the battle of Mursa, had been appointed *magister peditum*. He had won some victories over the Alemanni but, driven into treason by Court intrigues, had assumed the purple in Cologne and fallen after a short reign of some 28 days a victim to treachery (August-September 355?). In his own person Constantius could not take the command at once in Rhaetia and in Gaul, and yet along the whole northern frontier he was faced with danger and difficulty. He was haunted by the continual fear that some capable general might of his own motion proclaim himself Augustus, or like Silvanus be hounded into rebellion. A military triumph often advantaged the captain more than his master and might have but little influence towards kindling anew the allegiance of the provincials. A prince of the royal house could alone with any hope of success attempt to raise the imperial prestige in Gaul. It was thus statecraft and no sinister machination against his cousin's life which led Constantius to listen to his wife's entreaties. He determined to banish suspicion and disregard the interested insinuations of the Court eunuchs: he would make of the philosopher scholar a Caesar, in whose person the loyalty of the West should find a rallying-point and on whom its devotion might be spent. In the Emperor's absence Julian once more arrived in Milan (summer 355), but to him imperial favour seemed a thing more terrible than royal neglect; Eusebia's summons to be of good courage was of no avail, only the thought that this was the will of Heaven steeled his purpose. Who was he to fight against the Gods? — After some weeks on 6 November 355 Julian was clothed with the purple by Constantius and enthusiastically acclaimed as Caesar by the army. Before leaving the Court the Caesar married Helena, the youngest sister of Constantius; the union was dictated by policy and she would seem never to have taken any large place in the life or thought of Julian. The position of affairs in Gaul was critical. Magnentius had withdrawn the armies of the West to meet Constantius, and horde after horde of barbarians had swept across the Rhine. In the north the Salii had taken possession of what is now the province of Brabant; in the south the Alemanni under Chnodomar had defeated the Caesar Decentius and had ravaged the heart of Gaul. The rumour ran that Constantius had even freed the Alemanni from their oaths and had given them a bribe to induce them to invade Roman territory, allowing them to take for their own any land which their swords could win. The story is probably a fabrication of Julian and his friends, but the fact of the barbarian invasion cannot be doubted. In the spring of 354 Constantius crossed the Jura and marched to the neighbourhood of Basel, but the Alemanni under Gundomad and Vadomar withdrew and a peace was concluded. In 355 Arbitio was defeated near the Lake of Constance and the fall of Silvanus had for its immediate consequence the capture of Cologne by the Franks. Forty-five towns, not to speak of lesser posts, had been laid waste and

the valley of the Rhine was lost to the Romans. Three hundred stades, from the left bank of the river the barbarians were permanently settled and their ravages extended for three times that distance. The whole of Elsass was in the hands of the Alemanni, the heads of the municipalities had been carried into slavery, Strassburg, Brumath, Worms, and Mainz had fallen, while soldiers of Magnentius, who had feared to surrender themselves after their leader's death, roamed as brigands through the country-side and increased the general disorder. On 1 December 355, Julian left Milan with a guard of 360 soldiers; in Turin he learnt of the fall of Cologne and thence advanced to Vienne where he spent the winter training with rueful energy for his new vocation of a soldier. For the following year a combined scheme of operations had been projected: while the Emperor advancing from Rhaetia attacked the barbarians in their own territory, Julian was to act as lieutenant to Marcellus with directions to guard the approaches into Gaul and to drive back any fugitives who sought to escape before Constantius. The neutrality of the Alemannic princes in the north had been secured in 354, while internal dissension among the German tribes favoured the Emperor's plans. The army in Gaul was ordered to assemble at Rheims and Julian accordingly marched from Vienne, reaching Autun on 24 June. That the barbarians should have constantly harried the Caesar's soldiers as they advanced through Auxerre and Troyes only serves to show how completely Gaul had been flooded by the German tribesmen. From Rheims, where the scattered troops were concentrated, the army started for Elsass pursuing the most direct route by Metz and Dieuze to Zabern. Two legions of the rear-guard were surprised on the march and were only with difficulty saved from annihilation. At this time Constantius was doubtless advancing upon the right bank of the Rhine, for Julian at Brumath drove back a body of the Alemanni who were seeking refuge in Gaul. The Caesar then marched by Coblenz through the desolated Rhine valley to Cologne. This city he recovered and concluded a peace with the Franks. The approach of winter brought the operations to a close and Julian retired to Sens. Food was scarce and it was difficult to provision the army; the Caesar's best troops — the Scutarii and Gentiles — were therefore stationed in scattered fortresses. The Alemanni had been driven by hunger to continue their raids through Gaul and hearing of the weakness of the garrison they suddenly swept down upon Sens. In his heroic defence of the town Julian won his spurs as a military commander. For thirty days he withstood the attack, until the Alemanni retired discomfited. Marcellus had probably already experienced the ambition and vanity of the Caesar, his independence and intolerance of criticism: an imperial prince was none too agreeable a lieutenant. The general may even have considered that the Emperor would not be deeply grieved if the fortune of war removed a possible menace to the throne. Whatever his reasons may have been, he

treacherously failed to come to the relief of the besieged. When the news reached the Court he was recalled and deprived of his command. Eutherius, sent by Julian from Gaul, discredited the calumnies of Marcellus, and Constantius silenced the malignant whispers of the Court; accepting his Caesar's protestations of loyalty, he created him supreme commander over the troops in Gaul. The actual gains won by the military operations of the year 356 may not have been great but that their moral effect was considerable is demonstrated by the campaign of 357 and by the spirit of the troops at the battle of Strassburg; above all, Julian was no longer an imperial figure-head, he now begins an independent career as general and administrator.

In the spring of 357 Constantius, wishing to celebrate with high pomp and ceremony the twentieth year of his rule since the death of Constantine, visited Rome for the first time (28 April-29 May). The city filled him with awe and wonder and he caused an obelisk to be raised in the Circus Maximus as a memorial of his stay in the capital. But to the historian the main interest of this visit lies in the fact that as a Christian Emperor Constantius removed from the Senate-house the altar of Victory.¹ To the whole-hearted Pagans this altar came to stand for a symbol of the Holy Roman Empire as they conceived it: it was an outward and visible sign of that bond which none might loose between Rome's hard-won greatness as a conquering nation and her loyalty to her historic faith. They clung to it with passionate devotion as to a time-honoured creed in stone—a creed at once political and religious—and thus again and again they struggled and pleaded for its retention or its restoration. The deeper meaning of what might seem a matter of trifling import must never be forgotten if we are to understand the earnest petition of Symmachus or the scorn of Ambrose. The Pagan was defending the last trench: the destruction of the altar of Victory meant for him that he could hold the fortress no longer.

From Rome the Emperor was summoned to the Danube to take action against the Sarmatians, Suevi, and Quadi; he was unable to co-operate with Julian in person, but dispatched Barbatio, *magister peditum*, to Gaul in command of 25,000 troops. Julian was to march from the north, Barbatio was to make Augst near Basel his base of operations, and between the two forces the barbarians were to be enclosed. The choice of a general, however, foredoomed the plan of campaign to failure. Barbatio, one of the principal agents in the death of Gallus, was the last man to work in harmony with Julian. The Caesar leaving Sens concentrated his forces only 13,000 strong at Rheims, and as in the previous year marched south to Elsass. Finding the pass of Zabern blocked, he drove the barbarians before him and forced them to take refuge in the islands of the Rhine. Barbatio had previously allowed a marauding band of Laeti laden with booty to pass his camp and to cross the Rhine

¹ Symm. *Rel.* III. 6.

unscathed, and later by false reports he secured the dismissal of the tribunes Bainobaudes and the future emperor Valentinian, whom Julian had ordered to dispute the robbers' return. He now refused to supply the Caesar with boats; light-armed troops, however, waded across the Rhine to the islands and seizing the barbarians' canoes massacred the fugitives. After this success Julian fortified the pass of Zabern and thus closed the gate into Gaul; he settled garrisons in Elsass along the frontier line and did all in his power to supply them with provisions, for Barbatio withheld all the supplies which arrived from southern Gaul. Having now secured his position, Julian received the amazing intelligence that Barbatio had been surprised by the Germans, had lost his whole baggage train and had retreated in confusion to Augst, where he had gone into winter quarters. It must be confessed that this defeat of 25,000 men by a sudden barbarian foray seems almost inexplicable, unless it be that Barbatio was determined at all costs to refuse in any way to co-operate with the Caesar and was surprised while on the march to Augst. Julian's position was one of great danger: the Emperor was far distant on the Danube, the Alemanni previously at variance among themselves, were now re-united, Gundomad, the faithful ally of Rome, had been treacherously murdered and the followers of Vadomar had joined their fellow-countrymen. Barbatio's defeat had raised the enemy's hopes, while Julian was unsupported and had only some 13,000 men under his command. It was at this critical moment that a host of Alemannic tribesmen crossed the Rhine under the leadership of Chnodomar and encamped, it would seem, on the left bank of the river, close to the city of Strassburg which the Romans had apparently not yet recovered. On the third day after the passage of the stream had begun, Julian learned of the movement of the barbarians, and set out from Zabern on the military road to Brumath, and thence on the highway which ran from Strassburg to Mainz towards Weitbruch; here after a march of six or seven hours the army would reach the frontier fortification and from this point they had to descend by rough and unknown paths into the plain. On sight of the enemy despite the counsels of the Caesar, despite their long march and the burning heat of an August day, the troops insisted on an immediate attack. The Roman army was drawn up for battle, Severus on rising ground on the left wing, Julian in command of the cavalry on the right wing in the plain. Severus from this point of vantage discovered an ambush and drove off the barbarians with loss, but the Alemanni in their turn routed the Roman horse; although Julian was successful in staying their flight, they were too demoralised to renew the conflict. The whole brunt of the attack was therefore borne by the Roman centre and left wing, and it was a struggle of footmen against footmen. At length the stubborn endurance of the Roman infantry carried the day, and the Alemanni were driven headlong backwards toward the Rhine. Their losses were enormous — 6000 left dead on the field of battle and

countless others drowned : Chnodomar was at last captured, and Julian sent the redoubtable chieftain as a prisoner to Constantius. The victory meant the recovery of the upper Rhine and the freeing of Gaul from barbarian incursions. There would even seem to have been an attempt after the battle to hail Julian as Augustus, but this he immediately repressed. The booty and captives were sent to Metz and the Caesar himself marched to Mainz, being compelled to subdue a mutiny on the way; the army had apparently been disappointed in its share of the spoil. Julian at once proceeded to cross the Rhine opposite Mainz and to conduct a campaign on the Main. His aim would seem to have been to strike still deeper terror into the vanquished, and to secure his advantage in order that he might feel free to turn to the work which awaited him in the north. Three chieftains sued for peace after their land had been laid waste with fire and sword, and to seal this success Julian rebuilt a fortress which Trajan had constructed on the right bank of the Rhine. The great difficulty which faced the Caesar was the question of supplies, and one of the terms of the ten months' armistice granted to the Alemanni was that they should furnish the garrison of the *Munimentum Trajani* with provisions. It was this pressing necessity which demanded both an assertion of the power of Rome among the peoples dwelling about the mouths of the Meuse and Rhine, and also the re-establishment of the regular transport of corn from Britain. During the campaign on the Main, Severus had been sent north to reconnoitre; the Franks now occupied a position of virtual independence in the district south of the Meuse, and in the absence of Roman garrisons and with the Caesar fully occupied by the operations against the Alemanni a troop of 600 Frankish warriors were devastating the country-side. They retired before Severus and occupied two deserted fortresses. Here for 54 days in December 357 and January 358 they were besieged by Julian who had marched north to support the *magister equitum*. Hunger compelled them at last to yield, for the relief sent by their fellow-tribesmen arrived too late. Julian spent the winter in Paris, and in early summer advanced with great speed and secrecy, surprised the Franks in Toxandria and forced them to acknowledge Roman supremacy. Further north the Chamavi had been driven by the pressure of the Saxons in their rear to cross the Rhine and to take possession of the country between that river and the Meuse. The co-operation of Severus enabled Julian to force them to submission, and it would appear that in consequence they retired to their former homes on the Yssel. The lower Rhine was now once more in Roman hands; the generalship of Julian had achieved what the praefect Florentius had deemed that Roman gold could alone secure, and the building of a fleet of 400 sea-going vessels was at once begun. The lower Rhine secured, Julian forthwith (July-August) returned to his unfinished task in the south. It was imperative that the ravaged provinces of Gaul should be repeopled: their desolation and the honour of

the Empire alike demanded that the prisoners in the hands of the barbarians should be restored. The remorseless ravaging of his land compelled Hortarius to yield, to surrender his Roman captives and to furnish timber for the rebuilding of the Roman towns. The winter past, Julian once more left Paris and with his new fleet brought the corn of Britain to the garrisons of the Rhine. Seven fortresses, from *Castra Herculis* in the land of the Batavi to Bingen in the south, were reconstructed, and then in a last campaign against the most southerly tribes of the Alemanni, those chieftains who had taken a leading part in the battle of Strassburg were forced to tender their submission. It was no easy matter to secure the release of the Roman prisoners, but Julian could claim to have restored 20,000 of these unfortunates to their homes. The Caesar's work was done: Gaul was once more in peace and the Rhine the frontier of the Empire.

When we turn to Julian's action in the civil affairs of the West, our information is all too scanty. It is clear that he approached his task with the passionate conviction that at all costs he would relieve the lot of the oppressed provincials. He took part in person in the administration of justice and himself revised the judgments of provincial governors; he refused to grant "indulgences" whereby arrears of taxation were remitted, for he well knew that these imperial acts of grace benefited the rich alone, for wealth when first the tribute was assessed could purchase the privilege of delay and thus in the end enjoy the relief of the general rebate. He resolutely opposed all extraordinary burdens, and when Florentius persistently urged him to sign a paper imposing additional taxation for war purposes he threw the document indignantly to the ground and all the remonstrances of the *præfect* were without avail. In Belgica the Caesar's own representatives collected the tribute and the inhabitants were saved from the exactions alike of the agents of the *præfect* and of the governor. So successful was his administration that where previously for the land-tax alone twenty-five aurei had been exacted seven aurei only were now demanded by the State. But reform was slow and in Julian's character there was a strain of restless impatience: he was intolerant of delays and of the irrational obstacles that barred the highway of progress; it galled him that he could not appoint as officials and subordinates men after his own heart. Admitted that Constantius sent him capable civil servants, yet these men who were to be the agents of reform were themselves members of the corrupt bureaucracy which was ruining the provinces. Indeed, might these nominees of his cousin be withstood? The undefined limits of his office might always render it an open question whether the assertion of the Caesar's right were not aggression upon imperial privilege. Julian's conscious power and burning enthusiasm felt the cruel curb of his subordination. Constantius wished loyally to support his young relative, had given him the supreme command in Gaul after the first trial year and was determined that he

should be supported by experienced generals, but Julian was far distant and his enemies at Court had the Emperor's ear; for them his successes and virtues but rendered him the more dangerous; the eunuch gang, says Ammianus, only worked the harder at the smithies where calumnies were forged. At times they mocked the Caesar's vanity and decried his conquests, at others they played upon the suspicions of Constantius: Julian was victor to-day, why not another Victorinus — an upstart Emperor of Gaul — to-morrow. Imperial messengers to the West were careful to bring back ominous reports, and Julian, who knew how matters stood and was not ignorant of his cousin's failings, may well have feared the overmastering influence of the Emperor's advisers. Thus constantly checked in his plans of reform alike religious and political, already, it may be, hailed as Augustus by his soldiery and dreading the machinations of courtiers, he began, at first perhaps in spite of himself, to long for greater independence; in 359 he was dreaming of the time when he should be no longer Caesar. The war in the East gave him his opportunity.

While Julian had been recovering Gaul, Constantius had been engaged in a series of campaigns on the Danube frontier, and for this purpose had removed his court from Milan to Sirmium. An unimportant expedition against the Suevi in Rhaetia in 357 was followed in 358 by lengthy operations in the plains about the Danube and the Theiss against the Quadi and various Sarmatian tribes who had burst plundering across the border. The barbarian territory was ravaged, and through the Emperor's successful diplomacy one people after another submitted and surrendered their prisoners. They were in most cases left in possession of their lands under the supremacy of Rome, but the Limigantes were forced to settle on the left instead of the right bank of the Theiss, while the Sarmatae Liberi were given a king by Constantius in the person of their native prince Zizais, and were themselves restored to the district which the Limigantes had been compelled to leave. The latter however in the following year (359), discontented with their new homes, craved that they might be allowed to cross the Danube and settle within the Empire. This Constantius was persuaded to permit, hoping thus to gain recruits for the Roman army and thereby to lighten the burdens of the provincials. The Limigantes, once admitted upon Roman territory, sought to avenge themselves for the losses of the previous year by a treacherous onslaught upon the Emperor. Constantius escaped and a general massacre of the faithless barbarians ensued. The pacification of the northern frontier was now complete.

Meanwhile in the East hostilities with Persia had ceased on any large scale since 351, and in 356-7 the praefect Musonianus had been carrying on negotiations for peace (through Cassianus, military commander in Mesopotamia) with Tampsapor a neighbouring satrap. But the moment was inopportune. Sapor himself had at length effected an alliance with the Chionitae and Gelani and now (spring 358) in a letter to the Emperor

demanded the restoration of Mesopotamia and Armenia; in case of refusal he threatened military action in the following year. Constantius proudly rejected the shameful proposal, but sent two successive embassies to Persia in the hope of concluding an honourable peace. The effort was fruitless. Court intrigue deprived Ursicinus, Rome's one really capable general in the East, of the supreme command, and in spite of the prayers of the provincials he was succeeded by Sabinianus, who in his obscure old age was distinguished only by his wealth, inefficiency and credulous piety. During the entire course of the war inactivity was the one prominent feature of his generalship. On the outbreak of hostilities in 359 the Persians adopted a new plan of campaign. A rich Syrian, Antoninus by name, who had served on the staff of the general commanding in Mesopotamia, was threatened by powerful enemies with ruin. Having compiled from official sources full information alike as to Rome's available ammunition and stores and the number of her troops he fled with his family to the court of Sapor; here, welcomed and trusted, he counselled immediate action: men had been withdrawn from the East for the campaigns on the Danube, let the King no longer be content with frontier forays, let him without warning strike for the rich province of Syria unravaged since the days of Gallienus! The deserter's advice was adopted by the Persians. On the advance of their army, however, the Romans, withdrawing from Charrae and the open countryside burned down all vegetation over the whole of northern Mesopotamia. This devastation and the swollen stream of the Euphrates forced the Persians to strike northward through Sophene; Sapor crossed the river higher in its course and marched towards Amida. The city refused to surrender, and the death of the son of Grumbates, king of the Chionitae, provoked Sapor to abandon his attack on Syria and to press the siege. Six legions formed the standing garrison, a force which probably numbered some 6000 men in all. But at the time of the Persian advance the country-folk had all assembled for the yearly market, and when the peasantry fled for refuge within the city walls Amida was densely overcrowded. None however dreamed of surrender; Ammianus, one of the besieged, has left us a vivid account of those heroic seventy-three days. In the end the city fell (6 Oct.) and its inhabitants were either slain or carried into captivity. Winter was now approaching and Sapor was forced to return to Persia with the loss of 30,000 men.

The sacrifice of Amida had saved the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, but the fall of the city also convinced Constantius that more troops were needed if Rome was to withstand the enemy. Accordingly the Emperor sent by the tribune Decentius his momentous order that the auxiliary troops, the *Aeruli Batavi Celtae* and *Petulantes*, should leave Gaul forthwith, and with them 300 men from each of the remaining Gallic regiments. The demand reached Julian in Paris where he was spending the winter (January ? 360); for him the serious feature of the

despatch was that the execution of the Emperor's command was entrusted to Lupicinus and Gintonius,¹ while Julian himself was ignored. The transference of the troops was probably an imperial necessity, but this could not justify the form of the Emperor's despatch. The unrelenting malice of the courtiers had carried the day; Constantius seems to have lost confidence in his Caesar. At first Julian thought to lay down his office, then he temporised: he professed that obedience to the Emperor would imperil the safety of the province, he raised the objection that the barbarians had enlisted on the understanding that they should never be called upon to serve beyond the Alps, Lupicinus was in Britain fighting the Picts and Scots, while Florentius, to whose influence rumour ascribed the Emperor's action, was absent in Vienne. Julian summoned him to Paris to give his advice, but the praefect pleaded the urgency of the supervision of the corn supply and remained where he was. While Julian played a waiting game, a timely broadsheet was found in the camp of the Celtæ and Petulantes. The anonymous author complained that the soldiers were being dragged none knew whither, leaving their families to be captured by the Alemanni. The partisans of Constantius saw the danger; should Julian still delay, they insisted, he would but justify the Emperor's suspicions. His hand was forced; he wrote a letter to Constantius, ordered the soldiers to leave their winter quarters and gave permission for their families to accompany them; Sintula, the Caesar's tribune of the stable, at once set out for the East with a picked body of Gentiles and Scutarii. Unwisely, as events proved, the court party demanded that the troops should march through Paris: there, they thought, any disaffection could be repressed. Julian met the men outside the city and spoke them fair, their officers he invited to a banquet in the evening. But when the guests had returned to their quarters, there suddenly arose in the camp a passionate shout, and crowding tumultuously to the palace the soldiers surrounded its walls, raising the fateful acclamation, "*Julianus Augustus.*" Without the army clamoured, within his room its leader wrestled with the gods until the dawn, and with the break of a new day he was assured of Heaven's blessing. When he came forth to face his men he might attempt to dissuade them, but he knew that he would bow to their will. Raised upon a shield and crowned with a standard bearer's torque, the Caesar returned to his palace an Emperor. But now that the irrevocable step was taken, his resolution seemed to have failed, and he remained in retirement—perhaps for some days. The adherents of Constantius took heart and a group of conspirators plotted against Julian's life. But the secret was not kept, and the soldiers once more encircled the palace and would not be contented until they had seen their Emperor alive and well. From this moment Julian stifled his scruples and accepted accomplished fact. After the flight of Decentius and Florentius he despatched Eutherius

¹ Or Sintula. *Amm.* xx. 4 3

and his *magister officiorum* Pentadius as ambassadors to Constantius, while in his letter he proposed the terms which he was prepared to make the basis of a compromise. He would send to the East troops raised from the *deditionii* and the Germans settled on the left bank of the Rhine — to withdraw the Gallic troops would be, he professed, to endanger the safety of the province — while Constantius should allow him to appoint his own officials, both military and civil, save only that the nomination of the praetorian praefect should rest with the elder Augustus, whose superior authority Julian avowed himself willing to acknowledge. When the news from Paris reached Caesarea, Constantius hesitated: should he march forthwith against his rebellious Caesar and desert the East while the Persians were threatening to renew the attack of the previous year, or should he subordinate his personal quarrel to the interests of the State? Loyalty to his conception of an Emperor's duty carried the day and he advanced to Edessa. The fact that the Persians in this year were able to recover Singara, once more fallen into Roman hands, and to capture and garrison Bezabde, a fortress on the Tigris in Zabdicene, while the Emperor remained perforce inactive, serves to show how very earnest was his need of troops. Even the attempt to recover Bezabde in the autumn was unsuccessful. Meanwhile Constantius, ignoring Julian's proposals, made several nominations to high officers in the West, and despatched Leonas to bid the rebel lay aside the purple with which a turbulent soldiery had invested him. The letter, when read to the troops, served but to inflame their enthusiasm for their general, and Leonas fled for his life. But Julian still hoped that an understanding between himself and Constantius was even now not impossible. To save his army from inaction he led them — not towards the East, but against the Alamanic Franks on the lower Rhine. The barbarians, unwarned of the Roman approach, were easily defeated and peace was granted on their submission. The campaign lasted three months, and thence by Basel and Besançon Julian returned to winter at Vienne, for Paris, his beloved Lutetia, lay at too great a distance from Asia. Letters were still passing between himself and Constantius, but his task lay clear before him: he must be forearmed alike for aggression and defence. By a display of power he sought to wrest from his cousin recognition and acknowledgment, while, with his troops about him, he could at least sustain his cause and escape the shame of his brother's fate. Recruits from the barbarian tribes swelled his forces, and large sums of money were raised for the coming campaign. In the spring of 361 Julian by the treacherous capture and banishment of Vadomar removed all fears of an invasion by the Alemanni, and about the month of July set out from Basel for the East. By this step he took the aggressive and himself finally broke off the negotiations; this was avowed by his appointment of a praefect of Gaul in place of Nebridius, the nominee of Constantius, who had refused to take the oath of allegiance

to Julian. Germanianus temporarily performed the praefect's duties but retired in favour of Sallust, while Nevitta was created *magister armorum* and Jovius *quaestor*.

As soon as he was freed from the Persian War, Constantius had thought to hunt down his usurping Caesar and capture his prey while Julian was still in Gaul; he had set guards about the frontiers and had stored corn on the Lake of Constance and in the neighbourhood of the Cottian Alps. Julian determined that he would not wait to be surrounded, but would strike the first blow, while the greater part of the army of Illyricum was still in Asia. He argued that present daring might deliver Sirmium into his hands, that thereupon he could seize the Pass of Succi, and thus be master of the road to the West. Jovius and Jovinus were ordered to advance at full speed through North Italy, in command, it would appear, of a squadron of cavalry. They would thus surprise the inhabitants into submission, while fear of the main army, which would follow more slowly, might overawe opposition. Nevitta he commanded to make his way through Rhaetia Mediterranea, while he himself left Basel with but a small escort and struck direct through the Black Forest for the Danube. Here he seized the vessels of the river fleet, and at once embarked his men. Without rest or intermission Julian continued the voyage down the river, and reached Bononia on the eleventh day. Under the cover of night, Dagalaiphus with some picked followers was despatched to Sirmium. At dawn his troop was demanding admission in the Emperor's name; only when too late was the discovery made that the Emperor was not Constantius. The general Lucilianus, who had already begun the leisurely concentration of his men for an advance into Gaul, was rudely aroused from sleep and hurried away to Bononia. The gates of Sirmium, the northern capital of the Empire, were opened and the inhabitants poured forth to greet the victor of Strassburg. Two days only did Julian spend in the city, then marched to Succi,¹ left Nevitta to guard the pass and retired to Naissus, where he spent the winter awaiting the arrival of his army. Julian's march from Gaul meant the final breach with Constantius; his present task was to justify his usurpation to the world. Thus the imperial pamphleteer was born. One apologia followed another, now addressed to the senate, now to Athens as representing the historic centre of Hellenism, now to some city whose allegiance Julian sought to win. But he overshot the mark; the painting of the character of Constantius men felt to be a caricature and the scandalous portraiture unworthy of one who owed his advancement to his cousin's favours. Meanwhile Julian strained every nerve to raise more troops for the coming campaign. He was not yet strong enough to advance into Thrace to meet the forces under Count Martianus, and the news from the West forced him to realise how critical his position might become.

¹ Now *Kapulu-Derbend*: Bulgarian, *Trajanova Vrata*.

Two legions and a cohort stationed in Sirmium he did not dare to trust and so gave the command that they should march to Gaul to take the place of those regiments which formed part of his own army. On the long journey the men's discontent grew to mutiny: refusing to advance, they occupied Aquileia and were supported by the inhabitants who had remained at heart loyal to Constantius. The danger was very real; the insurgents might form a nucleus of disaffection in Italy and thus imperil Julian's retreat. He gave immediate orders to Jovinus to return and to employ in the siege of Aquileia the whole of the main force now advancing through Italy.

In the East Constantius had marched to Edessa (spring 361), where he awaited information as to the plans of Sapor. It was only on the news of Julian's capture of the pass of Succus that he felt that the war in the West could be no longer postponed. At the same time Constantius learned of Sapor's retreat, since the auspices forbade the passage of the Tigris. The Roman army assembled at Hierapolis greeted the Emperor's harangue with enthusiasm, Arbitio was despatched in advance to bar Julian's progress through Thrace, and when Constantius had made provision in Antioch for the government of the East he started in person against the usurper. Fever however attacked him in Tarsus and his illness was rendered still more serious by the violent storms of late autumn. At Mopsucrenae, in Cilicia, he died on 3 November 361 at the age of 44. Ammianus Marcellinus has given us a definitive sketch of the character of Constantius. His faults are clear as day. To guard the Emperor from treason, Diocletian had made the throne unapproachable, but this severance of sovereign and people drove the ruler back on the narrow circle of his ministers. They were at once his informants and his advisers: their lord learned only that which they deemed it well for him to know. The Emperor was led by his favourites; Constantius possessed considerable influence, writes Ammianus in bitter irony, with his eunuch chamberlain Eusebius. The insinuations of courtiers ultimately sowed mistrust between his Caesar Julian and himself. They played upon the suspicious nature of the Emperor, their whispers of treason fired him to senseless ferocity, and the services of brave men were lost to the Empire lest their popularity should endanger the monarch's peace. Even loyal subjects grew to doubt whether the Emperor's safety were worth its fearful price. To maintain the extravagant pomp of his rapacious ministers and followers, the provinces laboured under an overwhelming weight of taxes and impositions which were exacted with merciless severity, while the public post was ruined by the constant journeyings of bishops from one council to another. Yet though these dark features of the reign of Constantius are undeniable, below his inhuman repression of those who had fallen under the suspicion of treason lay a deep conviction of the solemnity of the trust which had been handed down to him from father and grandfather. For Constantius

the consciousness that he was representative by the grace of Heaven of a hereditary dynasty carried with it its obligation, and the task of maintaining the greatness of Rome was subtly confused with the duty of self-preservation, since a usurper's reign would never be hallowed by the seal of a legitimate succession. With a sense of this responsibility Constantius always sought to appoint only tried men to important offices in the State, he consistently exalted the civil element at the expense of the military and rigidly maintained the separation between the two services which had been one of the leading principles of Diocletian's reforms. Sober and temperate, he possessed that power of physical endurance which was shared by so many of his house. In his early years he served as lieutenant to his father alike in East and West and gained a wide experience of men and cities. Now on this frontier, now on that, he was constantly engaged in the Empire's defence; a soldier by necessity and no born general, he was twice hailed by his men with the title of Sarmaticus, and in the usurpations of Magnentius and of Julian he refused to hazard the safety of the provinces and loyally sacrificed all personal interests in face of the higher claims of his duty to the Roman world. He was naturally cold and self-contained; he fails to awake our affection or our enthusiasm, but we can hardly withhold our tribute of respect. He bore his burden of Empire with high seriousness; men were conscious in his presence of an overmastering dignity and of a majesty which inspired them with something akin to awe.

By the death of Constantius the Empire was happily freed from the horrors of another civil war: Julian was clearly marked out to be his cousin's successor, and the decision of the army did not admit of doubt; Eusebius and the Court party were forced to abandon any idea of putting forward another claimant to the throne. Two officers, Theolaifus and Aligildus, bore the news to Julian; fortune had intervened to favour his rash adventure, and he at once advanced through Thrace by Philippopolis to Constantinople. Agilo was despatched to Aquileia and at length the besieged were convinced of the Emperor's death and thereupon their stubborn resistance came to an end. Nigrinus, the ringleader, and two others were put to death, but soldiers and citizens were fully pardoned. When on 11 December 361 Julian, still but 31 years old, entered as sole Emperor his eastern capital, all eyes were turned in wondering amazement on the youthful hero, and for the rest of his life upon him alone was fixed the gaze of Roman historians; wherever Julian is not, there we are left in darkness, of the West for example we know next to nothing. The history of Julian's reign becomes perforce the biography of the Emperor. In that biography three elements are all-important: Julian's passionate determination to restore the Pagan worship; his earnest desire that men should see a new Marcus Aurelius upon the throne, and that abuses and maladministration should hide their heads ashamed before an Emperor who was also a

philosopher; and, in the last place, his tragic ambition to emulate the achievements of Alexander the Great and by a crushing blow to assert over Persia the pre-eminence of Rome.

Innumerable have been the explanations which men have offered for the apostasy of Julian. They have pointed to his Arian teachers, have suggested that Christianity was hateful to him as the religion of Constantius whom he regarded as his father's murderer, while rationalists have paradoxically claimed that the Emperor's reason refused to accept the miraculous origin and the subtle theologies of the faith. It would be truer to say that Christianity was not miraculous enough — was too rational for the mystic and enthusiast. The religion which had as its central object of adoration the cult of a dead man was to him human, all too human: his vague longings after some vast imaginative conception of the universe felt themselves cabined and confined in the creeds of Christianity. With a Roman's pride and a Roman's loyalty to the past as he conceived it, the upstart faith of despised Galilaean peasants aroused at one moment his scorn, at another his pity: a Greek by education and literary sympathies, the Christian Bible was but a faint and distorted reflex of the masterpieces which had comforted his solitary youth. a mystic who felt the wonder of the expanse of the heavens, with a strain in his nature to which the ritual excesses of the Orient appealed with irresistible fascination, it was easy for him to adopt the speculations of Neoplatonism and to fall a victim to the thaumaturgy of Maximus. The causes of Julian's apostasy lie deep-rooted in the apostate's inmost being.

His first acts declared his policy: he ordered the temples to be opened and the public sacrifices to be revived; but the Christians were to be free to worship, for Julian had learned the lesson of the failure of previous persecutions, and by imperial order all the Catholic bishops banished under Constantius were permitted to return. Those privileges, however, which the State had granted to the churches were now to be withdrawn: lands and temples which had belonged to the older religion were to be surrendered to their owners, the Christian clergy were no longer to claim exemption from the common liability to taxation or from duties owed to the municipal senates. With Julian's accession Christianity had ceased to be the favoured religion, and it was therefore contended that reason demanded alike restitution and equality before the law. Meanwhile a Court was sitting at Chalcedon to try the partisans of Constantius. Its nominal president was Sallust (probably Julian's friend when in Gaul), but the commission was in reality controlled by Arbitio, an unprincipled creature of Constantius. Julian may perhaps have intended to show impartiality by such a choice, but as a result justice was travestied, and though public opinion approved of the deaths of Paul the notary and of Apodemius, who were principally responsible for the excesses committed in the treason trials of the late reign, and may

have welcomed the fate of the all-powerful chamberlain Eusebius, men were horror-struck at the execution of Ursulus, who as treasurer in Gaul had loyally supported Julian when Caesar; his unpopularity with the troops was indeed his only crime, and the Emperor did not mend his error by raising the weak plea that he had been kept in ignorance of the sentence. Julian's next step was the summary dismissal of the horde of minor officials of the palace who had served to make the Court circle under Constantius a very hot-bed of vice and corruption. The purge was sudden and indiscriminate; it was the act of a young man in a hurry. The feverish ardour of the Emperor's reforming energy swept before it alike the innocent and the guilty. Such impatience appeared unworthy of a philosopher, and so far from awaking gratitude in his subjects served rather to arouse discontent and alarm.

But already Julian was burning to undertake his great expedition against Persia, and refused to listen to counsellors who suggested the folly of aggression now that Sapor was no longer pressing the attack. The Emperor's preparations could best be made in Antioch and here he arrived probably in late July 363. On the way he had made a détour to visit Pessinus and Ancyra; the lukewarm devotion of Galatia had discouraged him, but in Antioch where lay the sanctuary of Daphne he looked for earnest support in his crusade for the moral regeneration of Paganism. The Crown of the East (as Ammianus styles his native city) welcomed the Emperor with open arms, but the enthusiasm was short-lived. The populace gay, factious, pleasure-loving, looked for spectacles and the pomp of a Court; Julian's heart was set on a civil and religious reformation. He longed for amendment in law and administration, above all for a remodelling of the old cult and the winning of converts to the cause of the gods. He himself was to be the head of the new state church of Paganism; the hierarchy of the Christians was to be adopted — the country priests subordinated to the high priest of the province, the high priest to be responsible to the Emperor, the pontifex maximus. A new spirit was to inspire the Pagan clergy; the priest himself was to be no longer a mere performer of public rites, let him take up the work of preacher, expound the deeper sense which underlay the old mythology and be at once shepherd of souls and an ensample to his flock in holy living. What Maximin Daza had attempted to achieve in ruder fashion by forged acts of Pilate, Julian's writings against the Galilaean should effect: as Maximin had bidden cities ask what they would of his royal bounty, did they but petition that the Christians might be removed from their midst, so Julian was ready to assist and favour towns which were loyal to the old faith. Maximin had created a new priesthood recruited from men who had won distinction in public careers. his dream had been to fashion an organisation which might successfully withstand the Christian clergy; here too Julian was his disciple. When pest and famine had desolated the Roman East in

Maximin's days, the helpfulness and liberality of Christians towards the starving and the plague-stricken had forced men to confess that true piety and religion had made their home with the persecuted heretics: it was Julian's will that Paganism should boast its public charity and that an all-embracing service of humanity should be reasserted as a vital part of the ancient creed. If only the worshippers of the gods of Hellas were once quickened with a spiritual enthusiasm, the lost ground would be recovered. It was indeed to this call that Paganism could not respond. There were men who clung to the old belief, but theirs was no longer a victorious faith, for the fire had died upon the altar. Resignation to Christian intolerance was bitter, but the passion which inspires martyrs was nowhere to be found. Julian made converts — the Christian writers mournfully testify to their numbers — but he made them by imperial gold, by promises of advancement or fear of dismissal. They were not the stuff of which missionaries could be fashioned. The citizens were disappointed of their pageants, while the royal enthusiast found his hopes to be illusions. Mutual embitterment was the natural result. Julian was never a persecutor in the accepted meaning of that word: it was the most constant complaint of the Christians that the Emperor denied them the glory of martyrdom, but Pagan mobs knew that the Emperor would not be quick to punish violence inflicted on the Galilaeans: when the Alexandrians brutally murdered their tyrannous bishop, George of Cappadocia, they escaped with an admonition; when Julian wrote to his subjects of Bostra, it was to suggest that their bishop might be hunted from the town. If Pessinus was to receive a boon from the Emperor, his counsel was that all her inhabitants should become worshippers of the Great Mother; if Nisibis needed protection from Persia, it would only be granted on condition that she changed her faith. In the schools throughout the Empire Christians were expounding the works of the great Greek masters; from their earliest years children were taught to scorn the legends which to Julian were rich with spiritual meaning. He that would teach the scriptures must believe in them, and given the Emperor's zealous faith, it was but reasonable that he should prohibit Christians from teaching the classic literature which was his Bible. If Ammianus criticised the edict severely, it was because he did not share the Emperor's belief; the historian was a tolerant monotheist, Julian an ardent worshipper of the gods. The Emperor's conservatism and love of sacrifice alike were stirred by the records of the Jews. A people who in the midst of adversity had clung with a passionate devotion to the adoration of the God of their fathers deserved well at his hands. Christian renegades should see the glories of a restored temple which might stand as an enduring monument of his reign. The architect Alypius planned the work, but it was never completed. The earth at this time was troubled by strange upheavals, earthquakes, and ocean waves, and by some such phenomenon Jerusalem

would seem to have been visited; ¹ perhaps during the excavations a well of naphtha was ignited. We only know that Christians, who saw in Julian's plan a defiance of prophecy, proclaimed a miracle, and that the Emperor did not live to prove them mistaken.

Thus in Antioch the relations between the sovereign and his people were growing woefully strained. Julian removed the bones of Saint Babylas from the precinct of Daphne and soon after the temple was burned to the ground. Suspicion fell upon the Christians and their great church was closed. A scarcity of provisions made itself felt in the city and Julian fixed a maximum price and brought corn from Hierapolis and elsewhere, and sold it at reduced rates. It was bought up by the merchants, and the efforts to coerce the senate failed. The populace ridiculed an Emperor whose aims and character they did not understand. The philosopher would not stoop to violence but the man in Julian could not hold his peace. The Emperor descended from the awful isolation which Diocletian had imposed on his successors; he challenged the satirists to a duel of wits and published the *Misopogon*. It was to sacrifice his vantage-ground. The chosen of Heaven had become the jest of the mob, and Julian's pride could have drained no bitterer cup. When he left the city for Persia, he had determined to fix his court, upon his return, at Tarsus, and neither the entreaties of Libanius nor the tardy repentance of Antioch availed to move him from his purpose.

Here but the briefest outline can be given of the oft-told tale of Julian's Persian expedition. Before it criticism sinks powerless, for it is a wonder-story and we cannot solve its riddle. The leader perished and the rest is silence: with him was lost the secret of his hopes. Julian left Antioch on 5 March 363 and on the 9th reached Hierapolis. Here the army had been concentrated and four days later the Emperor advanced at its head, crossed the Euphrates and passing through Batnae halted at Charrae. The name must have awakened gloomy memories and the Emperor's mind was troubled with premonitions of disaster; men said that he had bidden his kinsman Procopius mount the throne should he himself fall in the campaign. A troop of Persian horse had just burst plundering across the frontier and returned laden with booty; this event led Julian to disclose his plan of campaign. Corn had been stored along the road towards the Tigris, in order to create an impression that he had chosen that line for his advance; in fact the Emperor had determined to follow the Euphrates and strike for Ctesiphon. He would thus be supported by his fleet bearing supplies and engines of war. Procopius and Sebastianus he entrusted with 30,000 troops—almost half his army—and directed them to march towards the Tigris. They were for the present to act only on the defensive, shielding the eastern provinces from invasion and guarding his own forces from any Persian attack from the north. When he himself was once at grips

¹ Cf. Vita Artemii Mart. *AS. Boll.* Tom VIII. p. 883, § 66.

with Persia in the heart of the enemy's territory, Sapor would be forced to concentrate his armies, and then, the presence of Julian's generals being no longer necessary to protect Mesopotamia, should a favourable opportunity offer, they were to act in concert with Arsaces, ravage Chiliocomum, a fertile district of Media, and advance through Corduene and Moxoene to join him in Assyria. That meeting never took place: from whatever reason Procopius and Sebastianus never left Mesopotamia. Julian reviewed the united forces — 65,000 men — and then turned south following the course of the Belias (Belecha) until he reached Callinicum (Ar-Rakka) on 27 March.

Another day's march brought him to the Euphrates, and here he met the fleet under the command of the tribune Constantianus and the Count Lucillianus. Fifty warships, an equal number of boats designed to form pontoon bridges, and a thousand transports—the Roman armada seemed to an eyewitness fitly planned to match the magnificent stream on which it floated. Another 98 miles brought the army to Diocletian's bulwark fortress of Circesium (Karkisiya). Here the Aboras (Khabūr) formed the frontier line; Julian harangued the troops, then crossed the river by a bridge of boats and began his march through Persian territory. In spite of omens and disregarding the gloomy auguries of the Etruscan soothsayers, the Emperor set his face for Ctesiphon; he would storm high Heaven by violence and bend the gods to his will. From its formation the invading army was made to appear a countless host, for their marching column extended over some ten miles, while neither the fleet nor the land forces were suffered to lose touch with each other. Some of the enemy's forts capitulated, the inhabitants of Anatha being transported to Chalcis in Syria, some were found deserted, while the garrisons of others refusing to surrender professed themselves willing to abide by the issue of the war. Julian was content to accept these terms and continued his unrelenting advance. Historians have blamed this rash confidence, whereby he endangered his own retreat. It is however to be remembered that a siege in the fourth century might mean a delay of many weeks, that the Emperor's project was clearly to dismay Persia by the rapidity of his onset and that it would seem probable that his plan of campaign had been from the first to return by the Tigris and not by the Euphrates. The Persians had intended a year or two before to leave walled cities untouched and strike for Syria, Julian in his turn refused to waste precious time in investing the enemy's strongholds, but would deal a blow against the capital itself. The march was attended with many difficulties: a storm swept down upon the camp, the swollen river burst its dams and many transports were sunk, the passage of the Narraga was only forced by a successful attack on the Persian rear which compelled them to evacuate their position in confusion, a mutinous and discontented spirit was shown by the Roman troops and the Emperor was forced to exert his personal influence and authority before discipline

was restored; finally the Persians raised all the sluices and, freeing the waters, turned the country which lay before the army into a widespread marsh. Difficulties however vanished before the resource and promptitude of the Emperor, and the advance guard under Victor brought him news that the country up to the walls of Ctesiphon was clear of the enemy. On the fall of the strong fortress of Maiozamalcha, the fleet followed the Naharmalcha (the great canal which united Euphrates and Tigris), while the army kept pace with it on land. The Naharmalcha, however, flows into the Tigris three miles below Ctesiphon, and thus the Emperor would have been forced to propel his ships *up stream* in his attack on the capital. The difficulty was overcome by clearing the disused canal of Trajan, down which the fleet emerged into the Tigris to the north of Ctesiphon. From the triangle thus formed by the Naharmalcha, the Tigris, and the canal of Trajan, Julian undertook the capture of the left bank of the river. Protected by a palisade, the Persians offered a stubborn resistance to the Roman night attack. The five ships first despatched were repulsed and set on fire; on the moment "it is the signal that our men hold the bank," cried the Emperor, and the whole fleet dashed to their comrades' support. Julian's inspiration won a field of battle for the Romans. Underneath a scorching sun the armies fought until the Persians — elephants, cavalry, and foot — were fleeing pell-mell for the shelter of the city walls; their dead numbered some 2500. Had the pursuit been pressed, Ctesiphon might perhaps have been won that day, but plunder and booty held the victors fast. Should the capital be besieged or the march against Sapor begun? It would almost seem that Julian himself wavered irresolute, while precious days were lost. Secret proposals of peace led him to underestimate the enemy's strength, while men, playing the part of deserters, offered to lead him through fertile districts against the main Persian army. Should he weary his forces and damp the spirit of his men by an arduous siege, he might not only be cut off from the reinforcements under Procopius and Sebastianus, but might find himself caught between two fires—Sapor's advance and the resistance of the garrison. To conclude a peace were unworthy of one who took Alexander for his model — better with his victorious troops to strike a final and conclusive blow, and possibly before the encounter effect a junction with the northern army. Crews numerous enough to propel his fleet against the stream he could not spare, and if he were to meet Sapor, he might be drawn too far from the river to act in concert with his ships: they must not fall into the enemy's hands, and therefore they must be burned. The resolution was taken and regretted too late; twelve small boats alone were rescued from the flames. Julian's plans miscarried, for the army of the north remained inactive, perhaps through the mutual jealousy of its commanders, and Arsaces withheld his support from the foe of Sapor. The Persians burned their fields before his advance, and the rich country-

side which traitorous guides had promised became a wilderness of ash and smoke. Orders were given for a retreat to Corduene; amidst sweltering heat, with dwindling stores, the Romans beheld to their dismay the cloud of dust upon the horizon which heralded Sapor's approach. At dawn the heavy-armed troops of Persia were close at hand and only after many engagements were beaten off with loss. After a halt of two days at Hucumbra, where a supply of provisions was discovered, the army advanced over country which had been devastated by fire, while the troops were constantly harassed by sudden onsets. At Maranga the Persians were once more reinforced; two of the king's sons arrived at the head of an elephant column and squadrons of mailed cavalry. Julian drew up his forces in semicircular formation to meet the new danger; a rapid charge disconcerted the Persian archers, and in the hand-to-hand struggle which followed the enemy suffered severely. Lack of provisions, however, tortured the Roman army during the three days' truce which ensued. When the march was resumed Julian learned of an attack upon his rear. Unarmed he galloped to the threatened point, but was recalled to the defence of the vanguard. At the same time the elephants and cavalry had burst upon the centre, but were already in flight when a horseman's spear grazed the Emperor's arm and pierced his ribs. None knew whence the weapon came, though rumour ran that a Christian fanatic had assassinated his general, while others said that a tribesman of the Taieni had dealt the fatal blow. In vain Julian essayed to return to the field of battle; his soldiers magnificently avenged their Emperor, but he could not share their victory. Within his tent he calmly reviewed the past and uncomplaining yielded his life into the keeping of the eternal Godhead. "*In medio cursu florentium gloriarum hunc merui clarum e mundo digressum.*" Death in mercy claimed Julian. The impatient reformer and champion of a creed outworn might have become the embittered persecutor. Rightly or wrongly after generations would know him as the great apostate, but he was spared the shame of being numbered among the tyrants. He was born out of due time and therein lay the tragedy of his troubled existence; for long years he dared not discover the passionate desires which lay nearest his heart, and when at length he could give them expression, there were few or none fully to understand or sympathise. His work died with him, and soon, like a little cloud blown by the wind, left not a trace behind.

The next day at early dawn the heads of the army and the principal officers assembled to choose an Emperor. Partisans of Julian struggled with followers of Constantius, the armies of the West schemed against the nominee of the legions of the East, Christianity and Paganism each sought its own champion. All were however prepared to sink their differences in favour of Sallust, but when he pleaded ill-health and advanced age, a small but tumultuous faction carried the election of Jovian, the captain of the imperial guard. Down the long line of troops

ran the Emperor's name, and some thought from the sound half-heard that Julian was restored to them. They were undeceived at the sight of the meagre purple robe which hardly served to cover the vast height and bent shoulders of their new ruler. Chosen as a whole-hearted adherent of Christianity, Jovian was by nature genial and jocular, a gourmand and lover of wine and women — a man of kindly disposition and very moderate education. The army by its choice had foredoomed itself to dishonour; its excuse, pleads Ammianus, lay in the extreme urgency of the crisis. The Persians, learning of Julian's death and of the incapacity of his successor, pressed hard upon the retreating Romans; charges of the enemy's elephants broke the ranks of the legionaries while on the march, and when the army halted their entrenched camp was constantly attacked. Saracen horsemen took their revenge for Julian's refusal to give them their customary pay by joining in these unceasing assaults. By way of Sumere, Charcha, and Dara the army retired, and then for four whole days the enemy harassed the rear-guard, always declining an engagement when the Romans turned at bay. The troops clamoured to be allowed to cross the Tigris: on the further bank they would find provisions and fewer foes, but the generals feared the dangers of the swollen stream. Another two days passed — days of gnawing hunger and scorching heat. At last Sapor sent Surenas with proposals of peace. The king knew that Roman forces still remained in Mesopotamia and that new regiments could easily be raised in the Eastern provinces: desperate men will sell their lives dearly and diplomacy might win a less costly victory than the sword. Four days the negotiations continued, and then when suspense had become intolerable the Thirty Years' Peace was signed. All but one of the five satrapies which Rome under Diocletian had wrested from Persia were to be restored, Nisibis and Singara were to be surrendered, while the Romans were no longer to interfere in the internal affairs of Armenia. "We ought to have fought ten times over," cries the soldier Ammian, "rather than to have granted such terms as these!" But Jovian desired (by what means it mattered not) to retain a force which should secure him against rivals — Was not Procopius who, men said, had been marked out by Julian as his successor, at the head of an army in Mesopotamia? Thus the shameful bargain was struck, and the miserable retreat continued. To the horrible privations of the march were added Persian treachery and the bitter hostility of the Saracen tribesmen. At Thilsaphata the troops under Sebastianus and Procopius joined the army, and at length Nisibis was reached, the fortress which had been Rome's bulwark in the East since the days of Mithridates. The citizens prayed with tears that they might be allowed single-handed to defend the walls against the might of Persia; but Jovian was too good a Christian to break his faith with Sapor, and Bineses, a Persian noble, occupied the city in the name of his master. Procopius, who had been content to

acknowledge Jovian, now bore the corpse of Julian to Tarsus for burial, and then, his mission accomplished, prudently disappeared. The army in Gaul accepted the choice of their eastern comrades, but Jovian's success was short-lived. In the depth of winter he hurried from Antioch towards Constantinople and with his infant son, Varronianus, assumed the consulship at Ancyra. At Dadastana he was found dead in his bedroom (16 Feb. 364), suffocated some said by the fumes of a charcoal stove. Many versions of his death were current, but apparently no contemporary suspected other than natural causes. On his accession the Pagan party had looked for persecution, the Christians for the hour of their retaliation. But though the Christian faith was restored as the religion of the Empire, Jovian's wisdom or good nature triumphed and he issued an edict of toleration: he had thereby anticipated the policy of his successor.

CHAPTER III

CONSTANTINE'S SUCCESSORS (TO JOVIAN) AND THE STRUGGLE WITH PERSIA

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[A more complete critical bibliography will be found in N. H. Baynes' forthcoming translation of Ammianus Marcellinus]

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF LEADING EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME

- 284 Election of Diocletian (17 Sept.).
- 297 Peace with Persia : acquisition of the five provinces.
- 303 The Great Persecution (24 Feb.).
- 305 Abdication of Diocletian (1 May).
- 306 Elevation of Constantine at York.
- 309-380 Reign of Sapor II in Persia.
- 311 Edict of Toleration and death of Galerius.
- 312 Battle of Saxa Rubra (28 Sept.)
Edict of Milan.
- 323 Battle of Chrysopolis (Sept.).
- 325 Council of Nicaea.
- 328-373 Athanasius Bishop of Alexandria.
- 330 Foundation of Constantinople.
- 337 Death of Constantine (22 May).
War with Persia.
- 339 Second Exile of Athanasius.
- 341 Council of the Dedication at Antioch.
- 343 Council of Sardica.
- 346 Return of Athanasius.
- 350 Revolt of Magnentius.
- 352 Battle of Mursa.
- 355 Julian made Caesar for Gaul.
- 356 Third Exile of Athanasius.
- 357 Battle of Argentoratum.
- 359 Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia.
- 360 Mutiny at Paris : Julian proclaimed Augustus.
Council of Constantinople.
- 361-363 Julian Emperor.
- 363-364 Jovian Emperor. Peace with Persia : cession of the five provinces.
- 364 Valentinian and Valens Emperors.
- 369 Count Theodosius in Britain
- 374-397 Ambrose Bishop of Milan.
- 375-383 Gratian Emperor in the West.
- 376 Passage of the Danube by the Goths.
- 378 Battle of Hadrianople (9 Aug.).
- 379-395 Reign of Theodosius.

- 381 Council of Constantinople.
- 383-388 Usurpation of Maximus.
- 386 Execution of Priscillian.
- 390 Destruction of the Serapeum.
- 392 Revolt of Arbogast.
- 394 Battle of the Frigidus (6 Sept.).
- 395 Arcadius and Honorius Emperors.
- 400 Revolt of Gainas.
- 402 Battle of Pollentia.
- 406 Passage of the Rhine by the Germans (31 Dec.).
- 407 Withdrawal of the legions from Britain
- 408-450 Reign of Theodosius II in the East
- 408 Mutiny at Pavia. Execution of Stilicho.
- 410 Sack of Rome by Alarie (23 Aug.).
- 412 The Visigoths in Gaul.
- 418 Rescript of Honorius to Agricola
- 425-455 Valentinian III Emperor in the West.
- 429 The Vandals in Africa.
- 430 Death of Augustine.
- 431 Council of Ephesus.
- 433 *Codex Theodosianus*. Legal separation of East and West.
- 439 Capture of Carthage by the Vandals.
- 440-461 Pope Leo I.
- 445 Edict of Valentinian III.
- 449 The *Latrocinium* at Ephesus.
- c. 449 Traditional date of Hengest and Horsa.
- 450-458 Marcian Emperor in the East.
- 451 Council of Chalcedon.
Battle of the Mauriac Plain.
- 452 Destruction of Aquileia by Attila. Embassy of Pope Leo.
- 454 Assassination of Aetius.
- 455 Sack of Rome by Gaiseric.
- 457-461 Reign of Majorian in the West.
- 468 Failure of Basiliscus before Carthage
- 472 Capture of Rome by Ricimer.
- 474-491 Zeno Emperor in the East.
- 476 Deposition of Romulus Augustulus.
Odoacar master of Italy till 493.
- 481 The *Henoticon* of Zeno. Schism in the Church.
- 481-511 Reign of Clovis.
- 486 Clovis defeats Syagrius.
- 491-518 Anastasius Emperor.
- 493-526 Reign of Theodoric in Italy.
- 507 Battle of Vouglé. Clovis conquers Aquitaine.
- 518 Justin Emperor. End of the Schism.
- 533 Conquest of Africa by Belisarius.
- 597 Landing of Augustine.
Death of Columba (9 June).

CHAPTER VIII

THE DYNASTY OF VALENTINIAN AND THEODOSIUS THE GREAT

THE imperial throne was once more vacant (16-17 February 364), but the army had learned the danger of a tumultuous election, and after the troops had advanced by an eight days' march to Nicaea, both the civil and military authorities weighed with anxious deliberation the rival claims of possible candidates. Aequitius, tribune of the first regiment of the *scutarii*, men knew to be harsh and uncultured, Januarius, a relative of Jovian in supreme command in Illyricum, was too far distant, and at length one and all agreed to offer the diadem to Valentinian. The new Emperor had not marched from Ancyra with the army, but had received orders to follow in due course with his regiment, the second *schola* of *scutarii*; thus, while messengers hastened his journey, the Roman world was for ten days without a master. Valentinian was a native of Pannonia; his father Gratian, a peasant rope-seller of Cibalae, had early distinguished himself by his strength and bravery. Risen from the ranks he had become successively *protector*, tribune, and general of the Roman forces in Africa; accused of peculation, he remained for a time under a cloud, only to be given later the command of the legions of Britain. After his retirement, hospitality shewn to Magnentius led to the confiscation of Gratian's property by Constantius, but the services of the father made advancement easy for Valentinian. In Gaul, however, when acting under Julian's orders he was dismissed from the army by Barbatio, but on Julian's accession he re-enlisted. Valentinian's military capacity outweighed even in the eyes of an apostate emperor his pronounced Christianity, and an important command was given him in the Persian War. Later he had been sent on a mission to the West, bearing the news of Jovian's election, and from this journey he had but recently returned. The life story of Gratian and Valentinian is one of the most striking examples of the splendid career which lay open to talent in the Roman army. The father, a peasant unknown and without influence, by his ability rises to supreme command over Britain, while his son becomes Emperor of Rome. It is

hardly surprising that barbarians were ready to enter a service which offered to the capable soldier such prospects of promotion. It may also be noticed in passing that in the council at Nicaea only military officers were considered as successors of Jovian: we do not hear of any civil administrator as a possible candidate for the vacant throne.

From the very day of his accession the character of Valentinian was declared. When the crowd bade him name at once a co-Augustus, he replied that but an hour before they had possessed the right to command, but that right now belonged to the Emperor of their own creation. From the first the stern glance and majestic bearing of Valentinian bowed men to his will. Through Nicomedia he advanced to Constantinople, and here in the suburb of the Hebdomon on 28 March 364 he created his brother Valens co-Emperor; he looked for loyal subjection and personal dependence, and he was not disappointed; with the rank of Augustus, Valens was content in effect to play the part of a Caesar. At Naissus the military forces of the Empire were divided, and many Pannonians were raised to high office. The new rulers were, however, careful to retain in their posts men who had been chosen both by Julian and Jovian; they wished to injure no susceptibilities by open partisanship. But even though Valentinian remained true to his constant principle of religious toleration and refused to favour the nominees either of a Christian or a Pagan Emperor, yet men traced a secret distrust and covert jealousy of those who had been Julian's intimates; Sallust, the all-powerful praefect, was removed, and accusations were brought against the philosopher Maximus. When both Emperors were attacked with fever, a commission of high imperial officials was appointed to examine whether the disease might not be due to secret arts. No shred of evidence of any unholy design was discovered, but the common rumour ran that the only object of the inquiry was to bring into disrepute the memory and the friends of Julian. Those who had been loyal to the old dynasty began to seek a leader.

At Sirmium the brothers parted, Valentinian for Milan, Valens for Constantinople; they each entered on their first consulship in the following year (365), and as soon as the winter was past Valens travelled with all speed for Syria; it would seem that already the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace were giving rise to fresh difficulties; too many questions remained open between Rome and Persia.

But as yet it was not foreign invasion but domestic rebellion which was to endanger the life and throne of Valens. When Procopius had laid the corpse of Julian to rest in Tarsus, he himself discreetly vanished from the sight of kings and courtiers: it was a perilous distinction to have enjoyed the peculiar favour of the dead Emperor.¹ Before long however he grew weary of his fugitive existence: life as a hunted exile in the Crimea was too dearly bought. In desperation he sailed secretly

¹ Cf. p. 85.

for the capital where he found shelter in the friendly house of a senator Strategius, while a eunuch, Eugenius by name, recently dismissed from the imperial service, put unlimited funds at his disposal. As he wandered unrecognised through the streets, on every hand he heard men muttering of the cruelty and avarice of Petronius, the father-in-law of Valens. The Emperor himself was no longer in Constantinople, and popular discontent seemed only to need its champion. The regiments of the Divitenses and the Tungritani Juniores, on their march from Bithynia for the defence of Thrace, were at the moment in the city. For two days Procopius negotiated with their officers; his gold and promises won their allegiance and in their quarters at the Anastasian Baths the soldiers met under cover of night and swore to support the usurpation. "Leaving the inkpot and stool of the notary," so ran the scornful phrase of the Court rhetorician, this stage figure of an emperor, hesitating to the last, assumed the purple and with stammering tongue harangued his followers. Any sensation was grateful to the populace, and they were content to accept without enthusiasm their new ruler. Those who had nothing to lose were ready enough to share the spoils, but the upper classes generally held aloof or fled to the Court of Valens; none of them met Procopius as he entered the deserted senate house. He relied for support upon men's devotion to the family of Constantine; as reinforcements bound for Thrace reached the capital, he came before them with Faustina, the widow of Constantius, by his side, while he himself bore her little daughter in his arms. He pleaded his own kinship to Julian and the troops were won. Gumoarius and Agilo who had served Constantius well were recalled from retirement and put at the head of the army, while to Julian's friend Phronemius was given the charge of the capital. Valentinian had advanced Pannonians, Procopius chose Gauls, for the Gallic provinces had most reason to remember Julian's services to the Empire. Nebridius, recently created praetorian praefect through the influence of Petronius, was held a prisoner and forced to write despatches recalling Julius who was in command in Thrace; the stratagem succeeded and the province was won without a blow. The embassy to Illyricum, however, bearing the newly minted coinage of Procopius, was defeated by the vigilance of Aequitius, every approach, whether through Dacia, Macedonia, or the pass of Succus, being effectually barred.

The news of the revolt reached Valens as he was leaving Bithynia for Antioch, and he was only recalled from abject despair by the counsels of his friends. Procopius with the Divitenses and a hastily collected force had advanced to Nicaea, but before the approach of the Jovii and Victores he retreated to Mygdus on the Sangarius. Once more the soldiers yielded when he appealed to their loyalty to the house of Constantine: the troops of Valens deserting "the degenerate Pannonian," "the drinker of miserable barley beer," went over to the usurper. One success followed

another: Nicomedia was surprised by the tribune Rumitalca, who forthwith marched to the north; Valens who was besieging Chalcedon was taken unawares and forced to fly for his life to Ancyra. Thus Bithynia was won for Procopius. His fleet under Marcellus attacked Cyzicus and when once the chain across the harbour's mouth was broken the garrison surrendered. With the fall of Cyzicus, Valens had lost the mastery of the Hellespont, while he could expect no help from his brother, since Valentinian had determined that the safety of the whole Roman Empire demanded his presence on the western frontier. Thus during the early months of 366, while Procopius endeavoured to raise funds for the future conduct of the war, Valens could only await the arrival of Lupicinus. The Emperor's final victory was indeed mainly due to an ill-considered act of his rival. Arbitio, the retired general of Constantius, had supported the usurper, but had declined an invitation to his court, pleading the infirmities of old age and ill-health. Procopius replied by an order that the general's house should be pillaged, thereby turning a friend into a bitter foe. Arbitio on the appeal of Valens joined the camp of Lupicinus; his arrival at once inspired the Emperor with fresh hope and courage, and gave the signal for wholesale defections from the usurper's forces. In an engagement at Thyatira, Gumoarius procured his own capture and carried with him many of his men. After the march of Valens into Phrygia, Agilo in his turn deserted when the armies met at Nacolia. The soldiers refused to continue the struggle (26 May 366). Procopius was betrayed to the Emperor by two of his own officers and was immediately put to death. Imperial suspicion and persecution had once again goaded a loyal subject to treason and to ruin. His severed head was borne beneath the walls of Philippopolis, and the city surrendered to Aequitius. The ghastly trophy was even carried to Valentinian through the provinces of Gaul, lest loyalty to the memory of Julian should awake treason in the West. Valens could now avenge his terror and sate his avarice. The suppression of the rebellion was followed by a train of executions, burnings, proscriptions, and banishments which caused men to curse the victory of the lawful Emperor.

The plea of kinship with the family of Constantine had induced some thousands of the Gothic tribesmen on the Danube to cross the Roman frontier in support of Procopius. Valens refused to recognise their defence, and depriving them of their weapons settled them in the cities along the northern boundaries of the Empire. When discontent declared itself, in fear of a general attack he acted on his brother's advice, and marched in person to the Danube, and for the three succeeding years (367-369) the Gothic campaign absorbed his attention. With Marci-anople as his base of operations, he crossed the river in 367 and 369; in the latter year he conquered Athanarich, and during the autumn concluded an advantageous peace. The Emperor and the Gothic *judez*

met on a ship in mid-stream, for Athanarich professed himself bound by a fearful oath never to set foot upon Roman soil. During these years Valens, pursuing in the East his brother's policy, strengthened the whole of the Danube frontier line with forts and garrisons.

Valentinian may indeed be styled the frontier Emperor, his title to fame is his restoration of the defences of Rome in the West against the surging barbarian hordes. He was a hard-worked soldier prince, and the one purpose which inspires his reign is his fixed determination never to yield an inch of Roman territory. He had always before his eyes the terrible warning of his predecessor. In the year 364, when the Emperor was still at Milan, ambassadors from the Alemanni came to greet him on his accession, and to receive the tribute which Roman pride disguised under the fairer name of gifts. Valentinian would not squander state funds in bounty to barbarians; the presents were small, while Ursatius, the *magister officiorum*, who took his cue from his master, treated the messengers with scant courtesy. They returned indignant to their homes, and in the early days of the new year, A.D. 365, the Alemanni burst plundering and ravaging across the frontier. Charietto, the count commanding in both Germanies, and the aged general Servianus, stationed at Cabillona (Châlons-sur-Saône), both fell before the barbarian onset. Gaul demanded Valentinian's presence; the Emperor started for Paris in the month of October; and while on the march, news reached him of the revolt of Procopius. The report gave no details—he did not know whether Valens were alive or dead. But with that strong sense of imperial duty which dignifies the characters of the fourth century emperors, he subordinated utterly the personal interest to the common weal: "Procopius is but my brother's enemy and my own," he repeated to himself; "the Alemanni are the foes of the Roman world."

Arrived at Paris, it was from that city that he despatched Dagalaiphus against the Alemanni. Autumn was fast giving place to winter, the tribesmen had scattered, and the new general was dilatory and inactive; he was recalled to become consul with the Emperor's son Gratian (Jan. 366) and Jovinus, as *magister equitum*, took his place at the head of the Roman troops. Three successive victories virtually concluded the campaign; at Scarponna (Charpeigne) one band of barbarians was surprised and defeated, while another was massacred on the Moselle. In negligent security the Alemanni on the river bank were drinking, washing, and dyeing their hair red, when from the fringe of the forest the Roman legionaries poured down upon them. Jovinus then undertook a further march and pitched his camp at Châlons-sur-Marne; here there was a desperate engagement with a third force of the enemy. The withdrawal during the battle of the tribune Balchobaudes seriously endangered the army's safety, but at length the day was won. The Alemanni lost six thousand killed and four thousand wounded; of the Romans two hundred were wounded and twelve hundred killed; in

the pursuit Ascarin in the Roman service captured the barbarian king, and in the heat of the moment he was struck dead. After a few lesser encounters resistance was for the time at an end. It was probably his interest in this campaign which had led Valentinian to spend the early months of 366 at Rheims. He now returned to Paris and from the latter city advanced (end of June 366 ?) to meet his successful general, whom he nominated for the consulship in the succeeding year. At the same time the head of Procopius reached him from the East. But in the high tide of success he was struck down with a serious illness (winter 366-7). The Court was already considering possible candidates for the purple when Valentinian recovered, but, realising the dangers for the West which might arise from a disputed succession, at Amiens on 24 August 367 he procured from the troops the recognition of the seven year old Gratian as co-Augustus. It may well have been the necessity for defending the northern coast against raids of Franks and Saxons which had summoned Valentinian to Amiens; and now on his way from that town to Trier tidings reached him of a serious revolt in Britain. Fullofaudes, the Roman general, together with Nectaridus, the commander of the coast line (count of the Saxon shore?), had both met their deaths. In the autumn of 367 Severus, count of the imperial guards, was despatched to the island only to be recalled. Jovinus, appointed in his place, sent Provertides in advance to raise levies, while in view of the constant reports of fresh disasters the Count Theodosius (the father of Theodosius the Great) was ordered to sail for Britain at the head of Gallic reinforcements. From Boulogne he landed at Rutupiae (Richborough: spring 368) and was followed by the Batavi, Heruli, Jovii, and Victores. Scenes of hopeless confusion met him on his arrival; Dicalydones and Verturiones (the two divisions of the Picts), Attacotti and Scotti (Irish) all ranged pillaging over the countryside, while Frank and Saxon marauders swept down in forays on the coast. Theodosius marched towards London, and it would seem made this city his head-quarters. Defeating the scattered troops of spoil-laden barbarians, he restored the greater part of the booty to the harassed provincials, while deserters were recalled to the standard by promises of pardon. From London, where he spent the winter, Theodosius prayed the Emperor to appoint men of wide experience to govern the island—Civilis as pro-praefect and Dulcitus as general; in this year too, he probably co-operated with imperial troops on the continent in the suppression of Frank and Saxon pirates in the Low Countries and about the mouths of the Rhine and Waal. Valentinian himself advanced as far north as Cologne in the autumn of 368. In the year 369 Theodosius everywhere surprised the barbarians and swept the country clear of their robber bands. Town-fortifications were restored, forts rebuilt, and frontiers regarrisoned, while the Areani, a treacherous border militia, were removed. Territory in the north was recovered, and a new fifth province of Valentia or Valentinia created. The revolt of Valentinus,

who had been exiled to Britain on a criminal charge, was easily crushed by Theodosius, who repressed with a strong hand the treason trials which usually followed the defeat of an unsuccessful usurper. When he sailed for Gaul, probably in the spring of 370, he left the provincials "leaping for very joy." On his return to the Court he was appointed to succeed Jovinus as *magister equitum* (before end of May 370).

While his lieutenant had been restoring order in Britain, Valentinian had been actively engaged in Gaul. The winter of 367-8 the Emperor spent at Rheims preparing for his vengeance upon the disturbers of the peace in the West. But the new year opened with a disaster, for while the Christian inhabitants of Mainz were keeping festival (Epiphany ? 368) the Aleman prince Rando surprised and sacked the town. The Romans, however, gained a treacherous advantage by the murder of King Withicab, and in the summer of the same year the Emperor together with his son invaded the territory between Neckar and Rhine. Our authorities give us no certain information as to his route, perhaps he advanced by the Rhine road and then turned off by Ettlingen and Pforzheim. Solicinum (near Rottenburg on the left bank of the Neckar) was the scene of the decisive struggle. The barbarians occupied a strong position on a precipitous hill; the Romans experienced great difficulty in dislodging them but were at length successful, and the enemy fled over the Neckar by Lopodunum towards the Danube. The advantage thus gained was secured by the building of a strong fort, apparently at Altrip, and for its erection it seems possible that the ruins of Lopodunum were employed. The Emperor spent the winter in Trier, and with the new year (369) began his great work of frontier defence extending from the province of Rhaetia to the ocean. Valentinian even sought to plant his fortresses in the enemy's territory. This was regarded by the Alemanni as a breach of treaty rights, and the Romans suffered a serious reverse at the Mons Piri (Heidelberg ?). The Emperor accordingly entered into negotiations with the Burgundians, who were to attack the Alemanni with the support of the Roman troops. The Burgundians, long at feud with their neighbours over the possession of some salt springs on their borders, gladly accepted the Emperor's overtures and appeared in immense force on the Rhine: the confederate seemed more terrible than the foe. Valentinian was absent superintending the building of his new forts, and feared either to accept or refuse the assistance of such dangerous allies. He sought to gain time by inaction, and the Burgundians, infuriated at this betrayal, were forced to withdraw, since the Alemanni threatened to oppose their homeward march. Meanwhile Theodosius, newly arrived in Gaul from Britain, swept upon the distracted Alemanni from Rhaetia, and after a successful campaign was able to settle his captives as farmers in the valley of the Po. Macrian, king of the Alemanni, had been the heart and soul of his people's resistance to Rome; with the intention therefore of capturing this dangerous enemy by a sudden surprise, in September 371

Valentinian accompanied by Theodosius left Mainz for Aquae Mattiacae; but with the troops the opportunities for pillage outweighed the Emperor's strictest orders. The smoke of burning homesteads betrayed the Roman approach; the army advanced some fifty miles, but the purpose of the expedition was defeated and the Emperor returned disappointed to Trier.

Meanwhile in the East time only served to shew the futility of Jovian's peace with Persia. Rome had sacrificed much but had settled nothing. Sapor claimed that under the treaty he could do as he would with Armenia, which still remained the apple of discord as before, and that Rome had relinquished any right to interfere. But it was precisely this claim that Rome could never in the last resort allow — Armenia under Persian rule was far too great a menace. The chronology of the events which followed the treaty must remain to some extent a matter of conjecture, but from the first Sapor seems to have enforced his conception of his rights, seeking in turn by bribes and forays to reduce Armenia to Persian vassalage. Valens as early as 365 was on his way to the Persian frontier when he was recalled by the revolt of Procopius. At the close of the year 368, or at the beginning of 369, Sapor got possession of King Arsaces, whom he put to death some years later. In 369, it would appear, Persia interfered in the affairs of Hiberia: Sauromaces, ruling under Roman protection, was expelled, and Aspacures, a Persian nominee, was made king. In Armenia the fortress of Artagherk (Artogerassa) where the queen Pharrantsem had taken refuge was besieged (369), while her son Pap, acting on his mother's counsel, fled to the protection of Valens; in his flight he was assisted by Cylaces and Artabannes, Armenian renegades, who now proved disloyal to their Persian master. The exile was well received, and accorded a home at Neocaesarea. But when Muschegh, the Armenian general, prayed that the Emperor would take effective action and stay the ravages of Persia, Valens hesitated: he felt that his hands were tied by the terms of the peace of Jovian. Terentius, the Roman *dux*, accompanied Pap on his return to Armenia, but without the support of the legions the prince was powerless. Artagherk fell in the fourteenth month of the siege (winter 370), Pharrantsem was hurried away to her death, and Pap was forced to flee into the mountains which lay between Lazica and the Roman frontier. Here he remained in hiding for five months; Persian pillage and massacre proceeded unchecked, until Sapor could leave his generals in command of the army, while two Armenian nobles were entrusted with the civil government of the country and with the introduction of the Magian religion. At length Valens took action, and the Count Arinthaëus, acting in concert with Terentius and Addaeus, was sent to Armenia to place Pap upon the throne and to prevent the commission of further outrage by Persia. In May 371 the Emperor himself left Constantinople, slowly journeying towards Syria. Sapor's

next move was an attempt to win Pap by promises of alliance, counseling him to be no longer the puppet of his ministers; the ruse was successful and the king put to death both Cylaces and Artabannes. Meanwhile a Persian embassy complained that the protection of Armenia by Rome was a breach of her obligations under the treaty. In April 372 Valens reached Antioch. His answer to Persia was further interference in Hiberia. While Muschegh invaded Persian territory, Terentius with twelve legions restored Sauromaces as ruler over the country bordering on Lazica and Armenia, Sapor on his side making great preparations for a campaign in the following spring, raising levies from the surrounding tribes and hiring mercenaries. In 373 Trajan and Vadomar marched to the East with a formidable army, having strict orders not to break the peace but to act on the defensive. The Emperor himself moved to Hierapolis in order to superintend the operations from that city. At Vagobanta (Bagavan) the Romans were forced to engage and in the result were victorious. A truce was concluded at the end of the summer, and while Sapor retired to Ctesiphon, Valens took up his residence in Antioch.

Here in the following year 374, so far as we can judge from the vague chronology of our authorities, a widespread conspiracy was discovered in which Maximus, Julian's master, Eutropius the historian, and many other leading philosophers and heathens were implicated. Anxious to discover who was to succeed Valens, some daring spirits had suspended a ring over a consecrated table upon which was placed a round metal dish; about the rim of the dish was engraved the alphabet. The ring had spelt out the letters THEO — when with one voice all present exclaimed that Theodorus was clearly destined for empire. Born in Gaul of an old and honourable family, he had enjoyed a liberal education and already held the second place among the imperial notaries; distinguished for his humanity and moderation, in every post alike his merits outshone his office. Absent from Antioch at the time, he was at once recalled, and the enthusiasm of his friends seems to have shaken his loyalty. The life of Valens had previously been threatened by would-be assassins, and when the conspirators' secret was betrayed the Emperor's vengeance knew no bounds; he swept the whole of the Roman East for victims and, as at the fall of Procopius, so now his avarice ruled unchecked. If the accused's life was spared, proscription in bitter mockery posed as clemency and the banishment of the innocent as an act of royal grace. For years the trials continued: "We all crept about as though in Cimmerian darkness," writes an eyewitness, "the sword of Damocles hung suspended over our heads."

Of Western affairs during those years when the long drawn game of plot and counterplot was being played between Valens and Sapor we know but little. Valentinian remained in Gaul (autumn 371 — spring 373), doubtless busied with his schemes for the maintenance of security

upon the frontiers, but detailed information we have none. Where Valentinian governed in person we hear of no rebellions: the constitutions even shew that a limited relief was granted from taxation and that measures were taken to check oppression, but elsewhere on every hand the Emperor's good intentions were betrayed by his agents. In Britain a disorganised army and a harassed population could offer no effective resistance to the invader: gross misgovernment in the Pannonian provinces made it doubtful whether the excesses of imperial offices or the forays of the barbarian enemy were more to be dreaded, while the story of the woes of Africa only serves to shew how terrible was the cost which the Empire paid for its unscrupulous bureaucracy. Under Jovian (363-4) the Austoriani had suddenly invaded the province of Tripolis, intending to avenge the death of one of their tribesmen who had been burned alive for plotting against the Roman power. They laid waste the rich countryside around Leptis, and when the city appealed for help to the commander-in-chief, Count Romanus, he refused to take any action unless supplied with a vast store of provisions and four thousand camels. The demand could not be met, and after forty days the general departed, while the despairing provincials at the regular annual assembly of their city council elected an embassy to carry statues of victory to Valentinian and to greet him upon his accession. At Milan (364-5) the ambassadors gave (as it would seem) a full report of the sufferings of Leptis, but Remigius, the *magister officiorum*, a relative and confederate of Romanus, was forewarned and contradicted their assertions, while he was successful in securing the appointment of Romanus upon the commission of inquiry which was ordered by the Emperor. The military command was given for a time to the governor Ruricius, but was shortly after once more put into the hands of Romanus. It was not long before news of a fresh invasion of Tripolis by the barbarians reached Valentinian in Gaul (A.D. 365). The African army had not yet received the customary donative upon the Emperor's accession; Palladius was accordingly entrusted with gold to distribute amongst the troops, and was instructed to hold a complete and searching inquiry into the affairs of the province. Meanwhile for the third time the desert clansmen had spread rapine and outrage through Roman territory, and for eight days had laid formal siege to the city of Leptis itself. A second embassy consisting of Jovinus and Pancratius was sent to the Emperor who was found at Trier (winter 367). On the arrival of Palladius in Africa, Romanus induced the officers to relinquish their share of the donative and to restore it to the imperial commissioner, as a mark of their personal respect. The inquiry then proceeded; much evidence was taken and the complaints against Romanus proved up to the hilt; the report for the Emperor was already prepared when the Count threatened, if it were not withdrawn, to disclose the personal profit of Palladius in the matter of the donative. The commissioner yielded

and went over to the side of Romanus; on his return to the Court he found nothing to criticise in the administration of the province. Pancratius had died at Trier but Jovinus was sent back to Africa with Palladius, the latter being directed to hold a further examination as to the truth of the allegations made by the second embassy. Men who on the shewing of the Emperor's representative had given false witness on the inquiry were to have their tongues cut from their mouths. By threats, trickery, and bribes Romanus once more achieved his end. The citizens of Leptis denied that they had ever given any authority to Jovinus to act on their behalf, while he, endeavouring to save his life, was forced to confess himself a liar. It was to no purpose: together with Ruricius the governor and others he was put to death by order of the Emperor (369?).

Not even this sacrifice of innocent lives gave peace to Africa. Firmus, a Moorish prince, on the death of his father Nebul, had slain his brother; that brother however had enjoyed the favour of Romanus, and the machinations of the Roman general drove Firmus into rebellion. He assumed the purple, while persecuted Donatists and exasperated soldiers and provincials gladly rallied round him. Theodosius, fresh from his successes in Britain and Gaul, was despatched to Africa by Valentinian as commander-in-chief, charged with the task of reasserting imperial authority. On examining his predecessor's papers, a chance reference caused the discovery of the plots of the last eight years, but it was not till the reign of Gratian that the subsequent inquiries were concluded. Palladius and Remigius both committed suicide, but the arch-offender Romanus was protected by the influence of Merobaudes. The whole story needs no comment: before men's eyes the powerlessness of the Emperor and the might of organised corruption stood luridly revealed.

For at least two years Theodosius fought and struggled against odds in Africa; at length discipline was restored amongst the troops, the Moors were defeated with great loss, and the usurper driven to take his own life: the Roman commander entered Sitifis in triumph (374?). Hardly however was his master Valentinian removed by death when Theodosius fell a victim to the intrigues of his enemies (at Carthage, A.D. 375-6); baptised at the last hour and thus cleansed of all sin, he walked calmly to the block. We do not know the ostensible charge upon which he was beheaded, nor do our authorities name his accuser. But the evidence points to Merobaudes, the all-powerful minister of Gratian. Theodosius had superseded Romanus and disclosed his schemes, and Romanus was the friend and *protégé* of Merobaudes, while it is clear that Gratian held in his own hands the entire West including Africa, for as yet (376) the youthful Valentinian II was not permitted to exercise any independent authority¹. Possibly Merobaudes may have

¹ Rauschen, *Jahrbucher*, p. 23.

been assisted in the attainment of his ends by timely representations from the East, for the general's name began with the same letters which had only recently (374 ?) proved fatal to Theodorus

In 373 Valentinian had left Gaul for Milan, but returned in the following year (May 374), and after a raid upon the Alemanni, while at the fortress of Robur near Basel, he learned in late autumn that the Quadi and Sarmatae had burst across the frontier. The Emperor with his passion for fortress-building had given orders for a garrison station to be erected on the left bank of the Danube within the territory of the Quadi, while at the same time the youthful Marcellianus through the influence of his father Maximinus, the ill-famed praefect of Illyricum,¹ had succeeded the able general Aequitius as *magister armorum*. Gabinius, king of the Quadi, came to the Roman camp to pray that this violation of his rights might cease. The newly appointed general treacherously murdered his guest, and at the news the barbarians flew to arms, poured across the Danube upon the unsuspecting farmers, and all but captured the daughter of Constantius who was on her journey to meet Gratian her future husband. Sarmatae and Quadi devastated Moesia and Pan-
nonia, the praetorian praefect Probus was stupefied into inactivity, and the Roman legionaries at feud between themselves were routed in confusion. The only successful resistance was offered by the younger Theodosius — the future Emperor — who compelled one of the invading Sarmatian hosts to sue for peace. Valentinian desired to march eastward forthwith, but was dissuaded by those who urged the hardships of a winter campaign and the danger of leaving Gaul while the leader of the Alemanni was still unsubdued. Both Romans and barbarians were, however, alike weary of the ceaseless struggle, and during the winter Valentinian and Macrian concluded an enduring peace. In the late spring of 375 the Emperor left Gaul; from June to August he was at Carnuntum, endeavouring to restore order within the devastated province, and thence marched to Acincum, crossed the Danube, and wasted the territory of the invading tribesmen. Autumn surprised him while still in the field: he retired to Sabaria and took up his winter quarters at Bregetio. The Quadi, conscious of the hopelessness of further resistance, sent an embassy excusing their action and pleading that the Romans were in truth the aggressors. The Emperor, passionately enraged at this freedom of speech, was seized in the paroxysm of his anger with an apoplectic fit and carried dying from the audience hall (17 November 375).

High-complexioned, with a strong and muscular body cast in a noble and majestic mould, his steel-blue eyes scanning men and things with a gaze of sinister intensity, the Emperor stands before us as an imposing and stately figure. Yet his stern and forbidding nature awakes but little sympathy, and it is easy to do less than justice to the character and

¹ For his cruelty when acting as praefect of Rome, cf. Ammianus, xxviii. 1. 5.

work of Valentinian. With a strong hand Diocletian had endeavoured by his administrative system and by the enforcement of hereditary duties to weld together the Roman Empire which had been shattered by the successive catastrophes of the third century; to Valentinian it seemed as though the same iron constraint could alone check the process of dissolution. If it were possible, he would make life for the provincials worth the living, for then resistance to the invader would be the more resolute: he would protect them with forts and garrisons upon their frontiers, would lighten (if he dare) the weight of taxation, would accord them liberty of conscience and freedom for their varied faiths, and would to the best of his power appoint honest and capable men as his representatives: but a spirit of dissatisfaction and discontent among his subjects was not merely disloyalty, it was a menace to the Empire, for it tended to weaken the solidarity of governors and governed: to remove an official for abusing his trust was in Valentinian's eyes to prejudice men's respect for the State, and thus the strain of brutality in his nature declared itself in his refusal to check stern measures or pitiless administration: to save the Roman world from disintegration it must be cowed into unity. Without mercy to others he never spared himself; as a restless and untiring leader with no mean gifts of generalship and strategy it was but natural that he should give preference to his officers, till contemporaries bitterly complained that never before had civilians been thus neglected or the army so highly privileged. It could indeed hardly be otherwise, for with every frontier threatened it was the military captain who was indispensable. The Emperor's efforts to suppress abuses were untiring; simplicity characterised his Court and strict economy was practised. His laws in the Theodosian Code are a standing witness to his passion for reform. He regulated the corn supply and the transport of the grain by sea, he made less burdensome the collection of the taxes levied in kind on the provincials, he exerted himself to protect the curials and the members of municipal senates, he settled barbarians as colonists on lands which were passing out of cultivation, he endeavoured to put a stop to the debasement of the coinage, while in the administration of justice he attempted to check the misuse of wealth and favour by insisting upon publicity of trial and by granting greater facilities for appeals. As a contemporary observes, Valentinian's one sore need was honest agents and upright administrators, and these he could not secure: men only sought for power in order to abuse it. Had the Emperor been served by more men of the stamp of Theodosius, the respect of posterity might have given place to admiration. Even as it was, in later days when men praised Theodoric they compared him with two great Emperors of the past, with Trajan — and Valentinian.

At the time of the Emperor's death, Gratian was far distant at Trier, and there was a general fear that the fickle Gallic troops now encamped

on the left bank of the Danube might claim to raise to the throne some candidate whom they themselves had chosen, perhaps Sebastianus — a man by nature inactive but high in the favour of the army. Merobaudes, the general in command, was therefore recalled as though by order of Valentinian on a pretext of fresh disturbances upon the Rhine, and after prolonged consultation it was decided to summon the late Emperor's four year old son Valentinian. The boy's uncle covered post-haste the hundred Roman miles which lay between Bregetio and the country house of Murocincta, where the young prince was living with his mother Justina. Valentinian was carried back to the camp in a litter, and six days after his father's death was solemnly proclaimed Augustus. Gratian's kindly nature soon dispelled any fear that he would refuse to recognise this hurried election: the elder brother always shewed towards the younger a father's care and affection. No partition of the West however took place at this time, and there could as yet be no question of the exercise of independent power by Valentinian II; Gratian ruled over all those provinces which had been subject to Valentinian I, and his infant colleague's name is not even mentioned in the constitutions before the year 379. Of the government of Gratian however we know but little; its importance lies mainly in the fact that he was determined to be first and foremost an orthodox Christian Emperor, and even refused to wear the robe or assume the title of Pontifex Maximus (probably 375).

Meanwhile in the East the fidelity of Pap grew suspect in the eyes of Rome. The unfavourable despatches of Terentius, the murder of the Katholikos Nerses, and the consecration of his successor by the king without the customary appeal to Caesarea (Mazaca) led Valens to invite Pap to Tarsus, where he remained virtually a prisoner. Escaping to his own country he fell a victim to Roman treachery (375?). Still Rome and Persia negotiated, and at length (376) Valens despatched Victor and Arbicius with an ultimatum; the Emperor demanded that the fortresses which of right belonged to Sauromaces should be evacuated by the beginning of 377. The claims of Rome were ignored, and Valens was planning at Hierapolis (July—August 377) a great campaign against Persia when the news from Europe made it imperative to withdraw the Roman army of occupation from Armenia. For several years the European crisis engaged all the Emperor's energies, and he was unable to interfere effectually in Eastern affairs. The Huns had burst into Europe, had conquered the Alans, subjected the East Goths (Ostrogoths) and driven the West Goths (Visigoths) to crave admission within the territory of Rome. Athanarich and Fritigern had become leaders of two distinct parties among the West Goths; Athanarich, driven before the Huns, had lost much of his wealth, and, as he was unable to support his followers, the greater number deserted their aged leader and joined Fritigern. It seems possible too that religious differences may have

played their part in these dissensions: Athanarich may have stood at the head of those who were loyal to the old religion, Fritigern may have been willing to secure any advantage which the profession of the Christian faith might win from a devout Emperor. Whether this be so or not, it was the tribesmen of Fritigern who appealed to Valens. It was no unusual request: the settling of barbarians as colonists on Roman soil was of frequent occurrence, while the provision of barbarian recruits for the Roman army was a constant clause in the treaties of the fourth century. Valens and his ministers congratulated themselves that, without their seeking, so admirable an opportunity had presented itself of infusing new life and vigour into the northern provinces of the Empire. The conditions for the reception of the Goths were that they should give up their arms and surrender many of their sons as hostages. The church historians add the stipulation that the Goths should adopt the Christian faith, but this would seem to have been only a pious hope and not a condition for the passage of the Danube, although it was only natural that the Goths should affect to have assumed the religion of their new fellow-countrymen. The conditions were stern enough, but the fate which threatened the barbarians at the hands of the Huns seemed even more unrelenting. The Goths accepted the terms: but for the Romans the enforcement of their own requisitions was a work which demanded extraordinary tact and unremitting forethought.

In face of this immense and sobering responsibility, which should have summoned forth all the energy and loyalty of which men were capable, the ministers of Valens (so far as we can see) did nothing — they left to chance alone the feeding of a multitude which none could number. It is not in their everyday peculations, nor in their habitual violence and oppression of the provincials, that the degradation of the bureaucracy of the Empire is seen in its most hideous form: the weightiest count in the indictment is that when met by an extraordinary crisis which imperilled the existence of the Empire itself the agents of the State, with the danger in concrete form before their very eyes, failed to check their lust or bridle their avarice. Maximinus and Lupicinus kept the Goths upon the banks of the Danube in order to wring from them all they had to give — except their arms. Provisions failed utterly: for the body of a dog a man would be bartered into slavery. As for the Goths who remained north of the river, Athanarich, remembering that he had declined to meet Valens on Roman soil, thought it idle to pray for admission within the Empire and retired, it would seem, into the highlands of Transylvania; now however that the imperial garrisons had been withdrawn to watch the passage of the followers of Fritigern, the Greutungi under Alatheus and Saphrax crossed the Danube unmolested, although leave to cross the frontier had previously been refused them. Meanwhile Fritigern slowly advanced on Marcianople, ready if need be to join his compatriots who were now encamped on the south

bank of the river. Still the Goths took no hostile step, but their exclusion from Marcianople led to a brawl with Roman soldiers outside the walls; within the city the news reached Lupicinus who was entertaining Alavio and Fritigern to a feast. Orders were hurriedly given for the massacre of the Gothic guardsmen who had accompanied their leaders. Fritigern at the head of his men fought his way back to camp, while Alavio seems to have fallen in the fray, for we hear of him no more.

The peace was at an end: nine miles from Marcianople Lupicinus was repulsed with loss; the criminal folly of the authorities of Hadrianople forced into rebellion the loyal Gothic auxiliaries who were stationed in the town; barbarians bartered as slaves rejoined their comrades, while labourers from the imperial gold mines played their part in spreading havoc throughout Thrace. Thus at last the Goths took their revenge, and only the walls of cities could resist their onset. From Asia Valens despatched Profuturus and Trajan to the province, and they at length succeeded in driving back the barbarian host beyond the Balkans. The Roman army occupied the passes. Gratian had sent reinforcements from the West under Frigeridus and Richomer, and the latter was associated with the generals of Valens; the barbarians drawing together their scattered bands formed a huge wagon laager (*carrago*) at a spot called Ad Salices, not far from Tomi. The Romans were still much inferior in numbers, and anxiously awaited an opportunity to pour down upon the enemy while on the march: For some time however the Goths made no move; when at length they attempted to seize the higher ground the battle began. The Roman left wing was broken and the legionaries were forced to retreat, but neither side gained any decisive advantage: the Goths remained for seven days longer within the shelter of their camp while the Romans drove other troops of barbarians to the north of the mountain chain (early autumn 377). At this time Richomer returned in order to secure further help from Gratian, while Saturninus arrived from Asia with the rank of *magister equitum*, in command, it would seem, of reinforcements. But the tide of fortune which had favoured the Romans during the previous months now ebbed. The Goths, despairing of breaking the cordon or piercing the Balkan passes, by promises of unlimited booty won over hordes of Huns and Alans to their side. Saturninus found that he could hold his position no longer, and was thus forced to retire on the Rhodope chain. Save for a defeat at Dibaltus near the sea-coast he successfully masked his retreat, while Frigeridus, who was stationed in the neighbourhood of Beroea, fell back before the enemy upon Illyricum, where he captured the barbarian leader Farnobius and defeated the Taifali; as in Valentinian's day the captives were settled in the depopulated districts of Italy. The help however which was expected from the West was long delayed; in February 378 the Lentienses chanced to hear from one of their fellow-tribesmen who

was serving in the Roman army that Gratian had been summoned to the East. Collecting allies from the neighbouring clans, they burst across the border some 40,000 strong (panegyrist said 70,000). Gratian was forced to recall the troops who had already marched into Pannonia, and in command of these as well as of his Gallic legionaries he placed Nannienus and the Frankish king Mallobaudes. At the battle of Argentaria, near Colmar in Alsace, Priarius the barbarian king was slain and with him, it is said, more than 30,000 of the enemy. according to the Roman estimate only some 5000 escaped through the dense forests into the shelter of the hills. Gratian in person then crossed the Rhine and after laborious operations among the mountains starved the fugitives into surrender; by the terms of peace they were bound to furnish recruits for the Roman army. The result of the campaign was a very real triumph for the youthful Emperor of the West.

Meanwhile Sebastian, appointed in the East to succeed Trajan in the command of the infantry, was raising and training a small force of picked men with which to begin operations in the spring. In April 378 Valens left Antioch for the capital at the head of reinforcements drawn from Asia: he arrived on 30 May. The Goths now held the Schipka Pass and were stationed both north and south of the Balkans at Nicopolis and Beroea. Sebastian had successfully freed the country round Hadrianople from plundering bands, and Fritigern concentrating the Gothic forces had withdrawn north to Cabyle. At the end of June Valens advanced with his army from Melanthias, which lay some 15 miles west of Constantinople. Against the advice of Sebastian the Emperor determined upon an immediate march in order to effect a junction with the forces of his nephew, who was now advancing by Lauriacum and Sirmium. The eastern army entered the Maritza Pass, but at the same time Fritigern would seem to have despatched some Goths southwards. These were sighted by the Roman scouts, and in fear that the passes should be blocked behind him and his supplies cut off, the Emperor retreated towards Hadrianople. Fritigern himself meanwhile marched south over the pass of Bujuk-Derbent in the direction of Nike, as though he would intercept communication between Valens and his capital. Two alternative courses were now open to the Emperor: he might take up a strong position at Hadrianople and await the army of the West (this was Gratian's counsel brought by Richomer who reached the camp on 7 August), or he might at once engage the enemy. Valens adopted the latter alternative; it would seem that he under-estimated the number of the Goths, and it is possible that he desired to shew that he too could win victories in his own strength as well as the western Emperor; Sebastian, who had at his own request left the service of Gratian for that of Valens, may have sought to rob his former master of any further laurels. At dawn on the following morning (9 August) the advance began; when about midday the armies came in sight of

each other (probably near the modern Demeranlija) Fritigern, in order to gain time, entered into negotiations, but on the arrival of his cavalry he felt sure of victory and struck the first blow. We cannot reconstruct the battle: Valens, Trajan, and Sebastian all fell, and with them two-thirds of the Roman army. In the open country no resistance could be offered to the victorious barbarians, but they were beaten back from the walls of Hadrianople, and a troop of Saracen horsemen repelled them from the capital. Victor bore the news of the appalling catastrophe to Gratian.

In the face of hostile criticism Valentinian had chosen Valens as his co-Augustus, intending that he should carry out in the East the same policy which he himself had planned for the West. His judgment was not at fault, for in the sphere of religion alone did the two Emperors pursue different ends. Like an orderly, with unfailing loyalty Valens obeyed his brother's instructions. He too strengthened the frontier with fortresses and lightened the burden of taxation, while under his care magnificent public buildings rose throughout the eastern provinces. But Valentinian's masterful decision of character was alien to Valens: his was a weaker nature which under adversity easily yielded to despair. Severity, anxiously assumed, tended towards ferocity, and a consciousness of insecurity rendered him tyrannical when his life or throne was threatened. His subjects could neither forget nor forgive the horrible excesses which marked the suppression of the rebellion of Procopius or of the conspiracy of Theodorus. He was hated by the orthodox as an Arian heretic and by the Pagans as a Christian zealot, while it was upon the Emperor that men laid the responsibility for the overwhelming disaster of Hadrianople. Thus there were few to judge him with impartial justice, and it is probable that even later historians have been unduly influenced by the invectives of his enemies. His imperious brother had made of an excellent civil servant an Emperor who was no match for the crisis which he was fated to meet.

On the news of the defeat at Hadrianople Gratian at once turned to the general who had shewn such brilliant promise a few years before in the defence of Moesia. The young Theodosius was recalled from his retirement in Spain and put in command of the Roman troops in Thrace. Here, it would appear, he was victorious over the Sarmatians, and at Sirmium in the month of January 379 (probably 19 January 379) Gratian created him co-Augustus. It was only after long hesitation that Theodosius accepted the heavy task of restoring order in the eastern provinces, but the decision once taken there was no delay. Before the Emperors parted company their joint forces seem to have defeated the Goths; Gratian then relinquished some of his troops in favour of Theodosius and himself started with all speed for Gaul, where Franks and Vandals had crossed the Rhine. After defeating the invaders Gratian went into winter quarters at Trier. Theodosius was

left to rule the Eastern praefecture, while it must perhaps remain a doubtful question whether eastern Illyricum was not also included within his jurisdiction.

The course of events which led up to the final subjection of the Gothic invaders by Theodosius is for us a lost chapter in the story of East Rome. Some few disconnected fragments can, it is true, be recovered, but their setting is too often conjectural. Many have been the attempts to unravel the confused tangle of incidents which Zosimus offers in the place of an ordered history, but however the ingenuity of critics may amaze us, it rarely convinces. Even so bald a statement as that of the following paragraphs is, it must be confessed, in large measure but a hypothetical reconstruction.

A pestilence had broken out among the barbarians besieging Thessalonica, and plague and famine drove them from the walls. The city could therefore be occupied without difficulty by Theodosius, who chose it for his base of operations. Its natural position made it an admirable centre: from it led the high roads towards the north to the Danube and towards the east to Constantinople. Its splendid harbour offered shelter to merchant ships from Asia and Egypt, and thus the army's stores and provisions could not be intercepted by the Goths; while from this point military operations could be undertaken alike in Thrace and in Illyricum. The first task to which Theodosius directed his commanding energy was the restoration of discipline among his disorganised troops; no longer did the Emperor hold himself aloof — an unapproachable being hedged about with awe and majesty: the conception which had since Diocletian become a court tradition gave place to the liberality and friendliness of a captain in the midst of his men. Early in June Theodosius reached Thessalonica, and despatched Modares, a barbarian of royal blood, to sweep the Goths from Thrace. Falling upon the unsuspecting foe, the Romans massacred a host of marauders laden with the booty of the provinces. The legionaries recovered confidence in themselves, and the main body of the invaders was driven northwards. The Emperor himself, with Thessalonica secured and garrisoned, marched north towards the Danube to Scupi (Uskub: 6 July 379) and Vicus Augusti (2 August). From the first he was determined to win the victory, if it were possible, rather by conciliation than armed force. It would seem probable that even in the year 379 he was enrolling Goths among his troops and converting bands of pillagers into Roman subjects. But in his winter quarters at Thessalonica the Emperor was struck down by disease, and for long his life hung in the balance (February 380). He prepared himself for his end by baptism — the magical sacrament which obliterated all sin and was therefore postponed till the hour when life itself was ebbing. Military action was paralysed, and the fruits of the previous year's campaign were lost. The Goths took fresh courage; Fritigern led one host into

Thessaly, Epirus, and Achaia, another under Alatheus and Saphrax devastated Pannonia, while Nicopolis was lost to the Romans. Gratian hastened perforce to the help of his disabled colleague; Bauto and Arbogast were despatched to check the Goths in the north, and in the summer Gratian himself marched to Sirmium, where he concluded a truce with the barbarians under which the Romans were to supply provisions, while the Goths furnished recruits for the army. It is probable that Gratian and Theodosius met in conference at Sirmium in September. The danger in the south was averted by the death of Fritigern; without a leader the Gothic host turned once more northwards. In the autumn Theodosius was back in Thessalonica, and in November he entered Constantinople in triumph. This fact of itself must signify that the immediate peril was past.

Fortune now favoured Theodosius: Fritigern his most formidable opponent was dead, and, at length, the pride of the aged Athanarich was broken. Wearied out by feuds among his own people he, together with his followers, sought refuge amongst his foes. On 11 January 381 he was welcomed beyond the city walls by Theodosius and escorted with all solemnity and kingly pomp into the capital. Fourteen days later he died, and was buried by the Emperor with royal honours. The magnanimity of Theodosius and the respect paid to their great chieftain did more than many military successes to subdue the stubborn Gothic tribesmen. We hear of no more battles, and in the following year peace was concluded. Saturninus was empowered to offer the Goths new homes in the devastated districts of Thrace, and the victors of Hadrianople became the allies of the Empire,¹ pledged in the event of war to furnish soldiers for the imperial army. Themistius, the Court orator, could express the hope that when once the wounds of strife were healed Rome's bravest enemies would become her truest and most loyal friends.

Peace was hardly won in the East before usurpation and murder threw the West into turmoil. In the early years of the reign of Gratian Christian and Pagan alike had been captivated by the grace and charm of their youthful ruler. His military success against the Lentienses, his heroic efforts to bring help to the East in her darkest hour and the loyal support which he had given to Theodosius only served to heighten his popularity. The orthodox found in him a fearless champion of their cause: the incomes of the vestal virgins were appropriated in part for the relief of the imperial treasury and in part for the purposes of the public post; in future the immemorial sisterhood was to hold no real property whatever. The altar and statue of Victory which Julian had restored to the senate house and which the tolerance of Valentinian had permitted to stand undisturbed were now ordered to be removed (382). Damasus, bishop of Rome, and Ambrose, bishop of Milan, claiming to represent a Christian majority in the senate, prevailed upon the Emperor

¹ The actual word *foederati* first occurs in a document of A.D. 406.

to refuse to receive an embassy, headed by Symmachus, of the leading Pagans in Rome, and the church was overjoyed at the uncompromising zeal of their Emperor. But the radiant hopes which men had formed of Gratian were not fulfilled; his private life remained blameless, and he was still liberal and humane, but affairs of state failed to interest him and he devoted his days to sport and exercise. His love for the chase became a passion, and he would take part in person in the wild-beast hunts of the amphitheatre. Emergencies which, in the words of a contemporary, would have taxed the statesmanship of a Marcus Aurelius were disregarded by the Emperor; he alienated Roman sentiment by his devotion to his German troops, and although he might court popularity amongst the soldiers by permitting them to lay aside breastplate and helm and to carry the *spiculum* in place of the weighty *pilum*, yet the favours shewn to the Alans outweighed all else and jealousy awoke disaffection amongst the legionaries. The malcontents were not long in finding a leader. Magnus Clemens Maximus, a Spaniard who claimed kinship with Theodosius and had served with him in Britain, won a victory over the Picts and Scots. In spite of his protests the Roman army in Britain hailed him as Augustus (early in 383?) and leaving the island defenceless he immediately crossed the Channel, determined to strike the first blow. From the mouth of the Rhine where he was welcomed by the troops Maximus marched to Paris, and here he met Gratian. For five days the armies skirmished, and then the Emperor's Moorish cavalry went over to the usurper in a body. Gratian saw his forces melting away, and at length with 300 horsemen fled headlong for the Alps; nowhere could he find a refuge, for the cities of Gaul closed their gates at his approach. The accounts of his death are varied and inconsistent, but it would seem that Andragathius was sent by Maximus hot-foot after the fugitive; at Lugdunum by a bridge over the Rhone Gratian was captured by means of a stratagem and was murdered within the city walls. Assured of his life by a solemn oath and thus lulled into a false security, he was treacherously stabbed by his host while sitting at a banquet (25 August 383). The murderer (who was perhaps Andragathius himself) was highly rewarded by Maximus.

Forthwith the usurper sent his chamberlain to Theodosius to claim recognition and alliance. The historian notices as a remarkable exception to the customs of the time that this official was not a eunuch, and further states that Maximus would have no eunuchs about his court. Theodosius had planned a campaign of vengeance for the death of the young ruler to whom he owed so much, but on the arrival of the embassy he temporised. It would be dangerous for him to leave the East: in Persia Ardaschir (379-383) had just died and the policy of the new monarch Sapor III (383-388) was quite unknown; troubles had arisen on the frontier: the nomad Saracens had broken their treaty of alliance with Rome, and Richomer had marched on a punitive expedition. Although the Goths

were now peacefully settled on Haemus and Hebrus and had begun to cultivate their allotted lands, although it was once more safe to travel by road and not only by sea, yet for many years the Scyri, the Carpi, and the Huns broke ever and again across the boundaries of the Empire and gave work to the generals of Theodosius; the newly won quiet and order in Thrace might easily have been imperilled by the absence of the Emperor. With the deliberate caution that always characterised his action save when he was seized by some gust of passion, Theodosius acknowledged his co-Augustus and ordered statues to be raised to him throughout the East. Africa, Spain, Gaul, and Britain, it would seem, acknowledged Maximus, while even in Egypt the mob of Alexandria shouted for the western Emperor.

Meanwhile upon his brother's death Valentinian II began his personal rule in Italy. For the next few years Ambrose and Justina fight a long-drawn duel to decide whether mother or bishop shall frame the young Emperor's policy: on Justina's death there remained no rival to challenge the influence of Ambrose. The latter was indeed throughout Valentinian's reign the power behind the throne; born probably in 340, the son of a praetorian praefect of Gaul, he had been educated in Rome until in the year 374 he was appointed *consularis* of Aemilia and Liguria. In this capacity he was present at the election (autumn 374) of a new bishop in Milan, while he was taking anxious precautions lest the contest between Arian and orthodox should end in bloodshed, a child's cry (says the legend) of "Bishop Ambrose!" suggested a candidate whom both factions agreed to accept. The city would take no refusal: against his will the statesman governor became the statesman bishop. Thus in the winter of 383-4, although Valentinian looked to Theodosius for help and counsel, Constantinople seemed to the Court at Milan to lie at a hopeless distance, while Maximus in Gaul was perilously near. The Emperor instinctively turned to Ambrose, his one powerful protector, while even Arianism forgot its feud with orthodoxy. At Justina's request the bishop started on an embassy to secure peace between Gaul and Italy. Maximus, however, desired that Valentinian should leave Milan and that together they should consider the terms of their agreement. Ambrose objected that it was winter: how in such weather could a boy and his widowed mother cross the Alps? His own authority was only to treat for peace — he could promise nothing. Accordingly Maximus sent his son Victor (shortly afterwards created Caesar) to Valentinian to request his presence in Gaul. But the net had been spread in the sight of the bird, and Victor returned from his mission unsuccessful; when he arrived at Mogontiacum, Ambrose left for Milan and met on the journey Valentinian's envoys bearing a formal reply to the proposals of Maximus. If the bishop's diplomacy had achieved nothing else, precious time had been gained, for Bauto had occupied the Alpine passes and thus secured Italy from invasion.

In the year 384 the Pagan party in Rome had taken fresh heart; the Emperor had raised two of their number to high office — Symmachus had been made urban praefect and Praetextatus praetorian praefect. Men began to hope for a repeal of the hostile measures of Gratian, and a resolution of the senate empowered Symmachus to present to Valentinian their plea for toleration and in especial for the restoration of the altar of Victory. Gratian had thought (the praefect contended) that he was fulfilling the senate's own desires, but the Emperor had been misled; the senate, nay Rome herself, prayed to retain that honoured symbol of her greatness before which her sons for countless generations had pledged their faith. It was the loyalty to their past and to that Godhead before whom their ancestors had bowed that had made the Romans masters of the world and had filled their lands with increase. It was a high and noble argument, but it availed nothing before the scornful taunts of Ambrose, and Valentinian dismissed the ambassadors with a refusal.

At this time a Persian embassy arrived in Constantinople (384) announcing the accession of Sapor III (383-388), and bringing costly gifts for Theodosius — gems, silk, and even elephants — while in 385 the Emperor secured the submission of the revolted eastern tribes. In the following years the disputed question of predominance in Armenia was revived. Stilicho was sent to represent Rome at the Persian Court and in 387 a treaty between the two great powers was concluded, whereby Armenia was partitioned. Some districts were annexed by Rome and some by Persia, while two vassal kings were in future to govern the country, some four-fifths of which was to acknowledge the supremacy of Persia, and the remaining one-fifth the lordship of Rome. Modern historians have condemned Theodosius for his acceptance of these terms, but he needed peace on the eastern frontier if he were to march against his western rival, and his predecessors had all experienced the extreme difficulty of retaining the loyalty of Armenian kings: better a disadvantageous partition with security, he may have argued, than an independent State in secret alliance with the enemy. The Emperor was, in fact, forced to recognise the strength of Persia's position.¹ In the West Ambrose once more travelled to Gaul at Valentinian's request upon a diplomatic mission probably at the end of 385 or in 386.² He sought the consent of Maximus to the burial of Gratian's corpse in Italian soil, but permission was refused. Maximus was heard to regret that he had not invaded Italy on Gratian's death: Ambrose and Bauto, he muttered, had foiled

¹ It is thus highly improbable that Persia should have agreed to pay tribute to Rome: *ipse ille rex . . . etsi adhuc nomine foederatus, iam tamen tuis cultibus tributarius est* (Pacatus, c. 22 sf) are the words of a court orator addressing the Emperor in Rome when a Persian embassy announcing the accession of Bahram IV was in the city. If Persia had really agreed to the payment of tribute the language of the panegyric would have been less studiously vague.

² Cf. Rauschen, *Jahrbucher*, Appendix x. p. 487.

his schemes. When the bishop returned to Milan he was convinced that the peace could not endure.

Indeed, events shewed the profound suspicion and mistrust which underlay fair-seeming concord. Bauto was still holding the Alpine passes when the Juthungi, a branch of the Alemanni, entered Rhaetia to rob and plunder. Bauto desired that domestic pillage should recall the tribesmen to their homes. And at his instigation the Huns and Alans who were approaching Gaul were diverted and fell upon the territory of the Alemanni. Maximus complained that hordes of marauders were being brought to the confines of his territory, and Valentinian was forced to purchase the retreat of his own allies.

Preparations for the coming struggle with Maximus absorbed the attention of Theodosius in the East, and the exceptional expenditure placed a severe strain upon his resources. In one and the same year, it would seem (January 387), the Emperor celebrated his own decennalia and the quinquennalia of his son Arcadius who had been created Augustus in the year 383. On the occasion of this double festival heavy sums in gold were needed for distribution as donatives among the troops. In consequence, an extraordinary tax was laid upon the city of Antioch, and the magnitude of the sum demanded reduced the senators and leading citizens to despair. But with the inherited resignation of the middle classes of the Roman Empire they yielded to inexorable fate. Not so the populace: turbulent spirits with little to lose and led by foreigners clamoured round the bishop Flavian's house; in his absence, their numbers swollen by fresh recruits from the city mob, they burst into the public baths intent on destruction, and then overturning the statues of the imperial family dashed them to pieces. One house was already in flames and a move had been made towards the imperial palace when at length the authorities took action, the governor (or *comes orientis*) interfered and the crowd was dispersed.

Immediately the citizens were seized with hopeless dismay as they realised the horror of their crime. A courier was forthwith despatched with the news to the Emperor, while the authorities, attempting to atone by feverish violence for past neglect, began with indiscriminate haste to condemn to death men, women, and even children: some were burned alive and others were given to the beasts in the arena. The glory of the East saw her streets deserted and men awaited in shuddering terror the arrival of the imperial commissioners. While Chrysostom in his Lenten homilies endeavoured to rouse his flock from their anguish of dread, while Libanius strove to stay the citizens from headlong flight, the aged Flavian braving the hardships of winter journeyed to Constantinople to plead with Theodosius. On Monday of the third week of the fast the commissioners arrived — Caesarius *magister officiorum* and Hellebicus *magister militiae* — bearing with them the Emperor's edict: baths, circus, and theatres were to be closed,

the public distribution of grain was to cease, and Antioch was to lose her proud position and be subjected to her rival Laodicea. On the following Wednesday the commission began its sittings; confessions were wrung from the accused by torture and scourgings, but to the unbounded relief of all no death sentences were passed, and judgment upon the guilty was left to the decision of Theodosius. Caesarius himself started with his report for the capital: sleepless and unresting, he covered the distance between Antioch and Constantinople in the incredibly short space of six days. The prayers of Flavian had calmed the Emperor's anger and the passionate appeal of Caesarius carried the day: already the principal offenders had paid the forfeit of their lives, the city in its agony of terror had drained its cup of suffering: let Theodosius have mercy and stay his hand! The news of a complete amnesty was borne hot-foot to Antioch, and to the joy of Easter were added the transports of a pardoned city.

At length in the West the formal peace was broken, and in 387 the army of Gaul invaded Italy. Of late Justina's influence had gained the upper hand in Milan, and the Arianism of Valentinian afforded a laudable pretext for the action of Maximus; he came as the champion of oppressed orthodoxy: — previous warnings had produced no effect on the heretical Court; it must be chastened by the scourge of God. It would seem that Valentinian's opposition to Ambrose had for the time alienated the bishop, and the Emperor no longer chose him as his ambassador. Domninus sought to strengthen good relations between Trier and Milan, and asked that help should be given in the task of driving back the barbarians who threatened Pannonia. The cunning of Maximus seized the favourable moment; he detached a part of his own army with orders to march to the support of Valentinian. He himself however at the head of his troops followed close behind, and was thus able to force the passes of the Cottian Alps unopposed. This treacherous attack upon Valentinian was marked by the murder of Merobaudes, the minister who had carried through the hasty election at Bregetio (autumn 387). From Milan Justina and her son fled to Aquileia, from Aquileia to Thessalonica, where they were joined by Theodosius, who had recently married Galla, the sister of Valentinian II. Here it would seem that the Emperor of the East received an embassy from Maximus, the latter doubtless claiming that he had only acted in the interests of the Creed of Nicaea, of which his co-Augustus was so staunch a champion. The action of Theodosius was characteristic; he gave no definite reply, while he endeavoured to convert the fugitive Emperor to orthodoxy. The whole winter through he made his preparations for the war which he could no longer honourably escape. Goths, Huns, and Alans readily enlisted; Pacatus tells us that from the Nile to the Caucasus, from the Taurus range to the Danube, men streamed to his standards. Promotus, who had recently annihilated

a host of Greutungi under Odothaeus upon the Danube (386), commanded the cavalry and Timasius the infantry; among the officers were Richomer and Arbogast. In June Theodosius with Valentinian marched towards the West; he could look for no support from Italy, for Rome had fallen into the hands of Maximus during the preceding January, and the usurper's fleet was cruising in the Adriatic. Theodosius reached Stobi on June 14 and Scupi (Uskub) on June 21. It would seem that emissaries of Maximus had spread disaffection among the Germans in the eastern army, but a plot to murder Theodosius was disclosed in time and the traitors were cut down in the swamps to which they had fled for refuge. The Emperor advanced to Siscia on the Save; here, despite their inferiority in numbers, his troops swam the river and charged and routed the enemy. It is probable that in this engagement Andragathius, the foremost general on the side of Maximus, met his death. Theodosius won a second victory at Poetovio, where the western forces under the command of the usurper's brother Marcellinus fled in wild disorder. Many joined the victorious army, and Aemona (Laibach), which had stubbornly withstood a long siege, welcomed Theodosius within its walls. Maximus retreated into Italy and encamped around Aquileia. But he was allowed no opportunity to collect fresh forces wherewith to renew the struggle. Theodosius followed hard on the fugitive's track. Maximus with the courage of despair fell upon his pursuers, but was driven back into Aquileia and forced to surrender. Three miles from the city walls the captive was brought into the Emperor's presence. The soldiers anticipated the victor's pity and hurried Maximus off to his death (probably 28 July 388). Only a few of his partisans, among them his Moorish guards, shared their leader's fate. His fleet was defeated off Sicily, and Victor who had been left as Augustus in Gaul was slain by Arbogast. A general pardon quieted unrest in Italy, and Theodosius remained in Milan during the winter. Valentinian was restored to power, and with the death of his mother Justina his conversion to orthodoxy was completed.

Maximus had fallen, and for a court orator his character possessed no redeeming feature. But from less prejudiced authorities we seem to gain a picture of a man whose only fault was his enforced disloyalty to Theodosius, and of an Emperor who shewed himself a vigorous and upright ruler, and who could plead as excuse for his avarice the pressure of long-threatened war with his co-Augustus. From these exactions which were perhaps unavoidable Gaul suffered severely, and on his departure from the West, while Nannienus and Quintinus were acting as joint *magistri militum*, the Franks burst across the Rhine under Genobaudes, Marcomir, and Sunno and threatened Cologne. After a Roman victory at the Silva Carvonaria (near Tournai?) Quintinus invaded barbarian territory from Novaesium, but the campaign was a disastrous failure. On the fall of Victor Arbogast remained, under the

vague title of *Comes* or Count, the virtual ruler of Gaul, while Carietto and Syrus succeeded as *magistri militum* the nominees of Maximus. Arbogast on his arrival counselled a punitive expedition, but it would seem that Theodosius did not accept the advice. A peace was concluded, Marcomir and Sunno gave hostages, and Arbogast himself retired to winter quarters in Trier.

Valentinian remained with Theodosius in Milan during the winter of 388-9 and was with him on 13 June 389 when he made his solemn entry into Rome, accompanied by his five year old son Honorius. On this, apparently his only visit to the western capital he anxiously endeavoured to weaken the power and influence of Paganism, while he effected reforms both in the social and municipal life of the city. To the stern and haughty Diocletian the familiarity of the populace had been insufferable: Theodosius was liberal with his gifts, attended the public games, and won all hearts by his ready courtesy and genial humanity. In the autumn of 389 he returned to Milan, and there he remained during 390 — that memorable year in which Church and State met as opposing powers and a righteous victory lay with the Church. In fact, he who would write of affairs of state during the last years of the fourth century must ever go borrowing from the church historians; he dare not at his peril omit the figure of the counsellor of Emperor after Emperor, the fearless, tyrannous, passionate, and loving bishop of Milan. Though the conduct of Ambrose may at times be arbitrary and repellent, the critic in his own despite admits perforce that he was a man worthy of a sovereign's trust and confidence. The facts of the massacre of Thessalonica are well known. Popular discontent had been aroused by the billeting upon the inhabitants of barbarian troops, and resentment sought its opportunity. Botherich, captain of the garrison, imprisoned a favourite charioteer for gross immorality and refused to free him at the demand of the citizens. The mob seized the occasion: disappointed of its pleasure, it murdered Botherich with savage brutality. The anger of Theodosius was ungovernable, and the repeated prayers of Ambrose for mercy were of no avail. The court circle had long been jealous of the bishop's influence and had endeavoured to exclude him from any interference with state policy. Ambrose knew well that he no longer enjoyed the full confidence of the Emperor. Theodosius listened to his ministers who urged an exemplary punishment, and the order was issued for a ruthless vengeance upon Thessalonica. The message cancelling the imperial command arrived too late to save the city. The Emperor had decreed retribution and his officers gave rein to their passions. Upon the people crowded in the circus the soldiers poured and an indiscriminate slaughter ensued; at least 7000 victims fell before the troops stayed their hand. Ambrose, pleading illness, withdrew from Milan and refused to meet Theodosius. With his own hand he wrote a private letter to the Emperor, acknowledging his zeal

and love for God, but claiming that for such a crime of headlong passion there must be profound contrition : as David listened to Nathan, so let Theodosius hear God's minister ; until repentance he dare not offer the sacrifice in the Emperor's presence. The letter is the appeal of undaunted courage to the essential nobility of the character of Theodosius. The gusts of fury passed and remorse issued in penitence. With his subjects around him in the Cathedral of Milan the Emperor, stripped of his royal purple, bowed himself in humility before the offended majesty of Heaven. Men have sought to heighten the victory of the Church and fables have clustered round the story, but the dignity of fact in its simplicity is far more splendid than the ornate fancies of any legend. Bishop and Emperor had proved each worthy of the other.

In 391 Theodosius returned to Constantinople by way of Thessalonica and Valentinian was left to rule the West. He did not reach Gaul till the autumn of 391 ; it was too late. Three years of undisputed power had left Arbogast without a rival in Gaul. It was not the troops alone who looked to their unconquered captain with blind admiration and unquestioning devotion : he was surrounded by a circle of Frankish fellow-countrymen who owed to him their promotion, while his honourable character, his generosity, and the sheer force of his personality had brought even the civil authorities to his side. There was one law in Gaul, and that was the will of Arbogast, there was only one superior whom Arbogast acknowledged, and he was the Emperor Theodosius who had given the West into his charge. From the first Valentinian's authority was flouted : his legislative power was allowed to rust unused, his orders were disobeyed and his palace became his prison : not even the imperial purple could protect Harmonius, who was slain by Arbogast's orders at the Emperor's very feet. Valentinian implored support from Theodosius and contemplated seeking refuge in the East ; he solemnly handed the haughty Count his dismissal, but Arbogast tore the paper in pieces with the retort that he would only receive his discharge from the Emperor who had appointed him. A letter was despatched by Valentinian urging Ambrose to come to him with all speed to administer the sacrament of baptism ; clearly he thought his life was threatened. He hailed the pretext of barbarian disturbances about the Alpine passes and himself prepared to leave for Italy, but mortification and pride kept him still in Vienne. The Pagan party considered that at length the influence of Arbogast might procure for them the restoration of the altar of Victory, but the disciple of Ambrose refused the ambassador's request. A few days later it was known that Valentinian had been strangled. Contemporaries could not determine whether he had met his death by violence or by his own hand (15 May 392). Ambrose seems to have accepted the latter alternative, and the guilt of Arbogast was never proven ; with the longed-for rite of baptism so near at hand suicide certainly appears improbable, but perhaps the strain and stress of those days of waiting

broke down the Emperor's endurance, and the mockery of his position became too bitter for a son of Valentinian I. His death, it must be admitted, did not find Arbogast unprepared. He could not declare himself Emperor, for Christian hatred, Roman pride, and Frankish jealousy barred the way; thus he became the first of a long line of barbarian king-makers: he overcame the reluctance of Eugenius and placed him on the throne.

The first sovereign to be at once the nominee and puppet of a barbarian general was a man of good family; formerly a teacher of rhetoric and later a high-placed secretary in the imperial service, the friend of Richomer and Symmachus and a peace-loving civilian — he would not endanger Arbogast's authority. Himself a Christian, although an associate of the Pagan aristocrats in Rome, he was unwilling to alienate the sympathies of either party, and adopted an attitude of impartial tolerance; he hoped to find safety in half measures. Rome saw a feverish revival of the old faith with strange processions of oriental deities, while Flavianus, a leading pagan, was made praetorian praefect. The altar of Victory was restored, but Eugenius sought to respect Christian prejudices, and the temples did not recover their confiscated revenues; these were granted as a personal gift to the petitioners. But in the fourth century none save minorities would hear of toleration, and men drew the inference that he who was no partisan was little better than a traitor. The orthodox Church in the person of Ambrose withdrew from Eugenius as from an apostate. The new Emperor naturally recognised Theodosius and Arcadius as co-Augusti, but in all the transactions between the western Court and Constantinople the person of Arbogast was discreetly veiled; his name was not suggested for the consulship, and it was no Frankish soldier who headed the embassy to Theodosius: the wisdom of Athens in the person of Rufinus and the purity of Christian bishops attested the king-maker's innocence, but the ambiguous reply of Theodosius hardly disguised his real intentions. The nomination of Eugenius was, it would seem, disregarded in the East, while in West and East alike diplomacy was but a means for gaining time before the inevitable arbitrament of war. To secure Gaul during his absence Arbogast determined to impress the barbarians with a wholesome dread of the power of Rome; in a winter campaign he devastated the territories of Bructeri and Chamavi, while Alemanni and Franks were forced to accept terms of peace whereby they agreed to furnish recruits for the Roman armies. Thus freed from anxiety in the West, Arbogast and Eugenius left with large reinforcements for Italy, where it seems that the new Emperor had been acknowledged from the time of his accession (spring 393?). In the following year Theodosius marched from Constantinople (end of May 394); Honorius, who had been created Augustus in January 393, was left behind with Arcadius in the capital. The Emperor appointed Timasius as general-in-chief with Stilicho for

his subordinate ; immense preparations had been made for the campaign — of the Goths alone some 20,000 under the leadership of Saul, Gainas, and Bacurius had been enlisted in the army. Arbogast, either through the claim of kinship or as virtual ruler of the West, could bring into the field large forces of both Franks and Gauls, but he was outnumbered by the troops of Theodosius. Eugenius did not leave Milan till 1 August. Flavianus, as augur, declared that victory was assured ; he had himself undertaken the defence of the passes of the Julian Alps, where he placed gilded statues of Jupiter to declare his devotion to Paganism. Theodosius overcame all resistance with ease and Flavianus, discouraged and ashamed, committed suicide. At about an equal distance between Aemona and Aquileia, on the stream of the Frigidus (Wipbach), the decisive battle took place. The Western army was encamped in the plain, awaiting the descent of Theodosius from the heights ; Arbogast had posted Arbitio in ambush with orders to fall upon the unsuspecting troops as they left the higher ground. The Goths led the van and were the first to engage the enemy. Despite their heroic valour, the attack was unsuccessful ; Bacurius was slain and 10,000 Goths lost their lives. Eugenius, as he rewarded his soldiers, considered the victory decisive, and the generals of Theodosius counselled retreat. Through the hours of the night the Emperor prayed alone and in the morning (6 September) with the battle-cry of “Where is the God of Theodosius ?” he renewed the struggle. Arbitio played the traitor’s part and leaving his hiding-place joined the Eastern army. But it was no human aid which decided the issue of the day. A tempestuous hurricane swept down upon the enemy : blinded by clouds of dust, their shields wrenched from their grasp, their missiles carried back upon themselves, the troops of Eugenius turned in panic flight. Theodosius had called on God, and Heaven had answered. The moral effect was overwhelming. Eugenius was surrendered by his own soldiers and slain ; Arbogast fled into the mountains and two days later fell by his own hand.

Theodosius did not abuse his victory ; he granted a general pardon — even the usurper’s ministers lost only their rank and titles, which were restored to them in the following year. But the fatigues and hardships of the war had broken down the Emperor’s health ; Honorius was summoned from Constantinople and was present in Milan at his father’s death (17 January 395)

From the invective of heathen critics and the flattery of court orators it is no easy task rightly to estimate the character and work of Theodosius. To the Christians he was naturally first and foremost the founder of an orthodox State and the scourge of heretics and pagans, while to the worshippers of the older faith it was precisely his religious views and the legislation inspired by them which inflamed their furious resentment. The judgment of both parties on the Emperor’s policy

as a whole was determined by their religious preconceptions. Rome at least was his debtor; in the darkest hour after the disaster at Hadrianople he had not despaired of the Empire, but had proved himself at once statesman and general. The Goths might have become to the provinces of the East what the Alemanni had long been to Gaul; the fact that it was otherwise was primarily due to the diplomacy of Theodosius. Retrenchment and economy, a breathing space in which to recover from her utter exhaustion, were a necessity for the Roman world; a brilliant and meteoric sovereign would have been but an added peril. To the men of his time the unwearying caution of Theodosius was a positive and precious virtue. His throne was supported by no hereditary dynastic sentiment, and he thus consciously and deliberately made a bid for public favour; he abandoned court tradition and appealed with the directness of a soldier to the sympathies of his subjects. In this he was justified. throughout his reign it was only in the West that usurpers arose, and even they would have been content to remain his colleagues, had he only consented. But this was not the only result of his refusal to play the demigod; Valentinian had often been perforce the tool of his ministers, but Theodosius determined to gather his own information and to see for himself the abuses from which the Empire suffered. His legislation is essentially detailed and practical: the accused must not be haled off forthwith on information laid against him, but must be given thirty days to put his house in order; provision is to be made for the children of the criminal, whether he be banished or executed, for they are not to suffer for their father's sins, and some share of the convict's property is to pass to his issue; men are not to be ruined by any compulsion to undertake high-priestly offices, as that of the high-priesthood of the province of Syria which entailed the holding of costly public games; provincials should not be driven to sell corn to the State below its market price, while corn from sea-coast lands is to be shipped to neighbouring sea-coast towns and not to distant inland districts, in order that the cost of transport may not ruin the farmer. Fixed measures in metal and stone must be used by imperial tax collectors, that extortion may be made more difficult, while *defensores* are to be appointed to see to it that through the connivance of the authorities robbers and highwaymen shall not escape unpunished. Theodosius himself had superintended the work of clearing Macedonia from troops of brigands, and he directed that men were to be permitted to take the law into their own hands if robbed on the high-roads or in the villages by night, and might slay the offender where he stood. Examples might be increased at will, but such laws as these suffice to illustrate the point. In a word, Theodosius knew where the shoe pinched, and he did what he could to ease the pain. Even when claims of Church and State conflicted, he refused to sacrifice justice to the demands of orthodox intolerance; in one case the tyrannous insistence

of Ambrose conquered, and Christian monks who had at Callinicum destroyed a Jewish synagogue were at last freed from the duty of making reparation; but even here the stubborn resistance of the Emperor shews the general principles which governed his administration. Though naturally merciful, so that contemporaries wondered at his clemency towards the followers of defeated rivals, yet when seized by some sudden outburst of passion he could be terrible in his ferocity. He himself was conscious of his great failing, and when his anger had passed, men knew that he was the readier to pardon: *Praerogativa ignoscendi erat indignatum fuisse*. But with every acknowledgment made of his weaknesses he served the Empire well; he brought the East from chaos into order; and even if it be on other grounds, posterity can hardly dispute the judgment of the Church or deny that the Emperor has been rightly styled “Theodosius the Great.”

CHAPTER VIII

VALENTINIAN TO THEODOSIUS

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These are generally the same as those for ch. III.

To the list there given add:

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF

LEADING EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME

- 284 Election of Diocletian (17 Sept.).
- 297 Peace with Persia : acquisition of the five provinces.
- 303 The Great Persecution (24 Feb.).
- 305 Abdication of Diocletian (1 May).
- 306 Elevation of Constantine at York.
- 309-380 Reign of Sapor II in Persia.
- 311 Edict of Toleration and death of Galerius.
- 312 Battle of Saxa Rubra (28 Sept.)
Edict of Milan.
- 323 Battle of Chrysopolis (Sept.).
- 325 Council of Nicaea.
- 328-373 Athanasius Bishop of Alexandria.
- 330 Foundation of Constantinople.
- 337 Death of Constantine (22 May).
War with Persia.
- 339 Second Exile of Athanasius.
- 341 Council of the Dedication at Antioch.
- 343 Council of Sardica.
- 346 Return of Athanasius.
- 350 Revolt of Magnentius.
- 352 Battle of Mursa.
- 355 Julian made Caesar for Gaul.
- 356 Third Exile of Athanasius.
- 357 Battle of Argentoratum.
- 359 Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia.
- 360 Mutiny at Paris : Julian proclaimed Augustus.
Council of Constantinople.
- 361-363 Julian Emperor.
- 363-364 Jovian Emperor. Peace with Persia : cession of the five provinces.
- 364 Valentinian and Valens Emperors.
- 369 Count Theodosius in Britain
- 374-397 Ambrose Bishop of Milan.
- 375-383 Gratian Emperor in the West.
- 376 Passage of the Danube by the Goths.
- 378 Battle of Hadrianople (9 Aug.).
- 379-395 Reign of Theodosius.

- 381 Council of Constantinople.
- 383-388 Usurpation of Maximus.
- 386 Execution of Priscillian.
- 390 Destruction of the Serapeum.
- 392 Revolt of Arbogast.
- 394 Battle of the Frigidus (6 Sept.).
- 395 Arcadius and Honorius Emperors.
- 400 Revolt of Gainas.
- 402 Battle of Pollentia.
- 406 Passage of the Rhine by the Germans (31 Dec.).
- 407 Withdrawal of the legions from Britain
- 408-450 Reign of Theodosius II in the East
- 408 Mutiny at Pavia. Execution of Stilicho.
- 410 Sack of Rome by Alarie (23 Aug.).
- 412 The Visigoths in Gaul.
- 418 Rescript of Honorius to Agricola
- 425-455 Valentinian III Emperor in the West.
- 429 The Vandals in Africa.
- 430 Death of Augustine.
- 431 Council of Ephesus.
- 433 *Codex Theodosianus*. Legal separation of East and West.
- 439 Capture of Carthage by the Vandals.
- 440-461 Pope Leo I.
- 445 Edict of Valentinian III.
- 449 The *Lutrocinum* at Ephesus.
- c. 449 Traditional date of Hengest and Horsa.
- 450-458 Marcian Emperor in the East.
- 451 Council of Chalcedon.
Battle of the Mauriac Plain.
- 452 Destruction of Aquileia by Attila. Embassy of Pope Leo.
- 454 Assassination of Aetius.
- 455 Sack of Rome by Gaiseric.
- 457-461 Reign of Majorian in the West.
- 468 Failure of Basiliscus before Carthage
- 472 Capture of Rome by Ricimer.
- 474-491 Zeno Emperor in the East.
- 476 Deposition of Romulus Augustulus.
Odoacar master of Italy till 493.
- 481 The *Henoticon* of Zeno. Schism in the Church.
- 481-511 Reign of Clovis.
- 486 Clovis defeats Syagrius.
- 491-518 Anastasius Emperor.
- 493-526 Reign of Theodoric in Italy.
- 507 Battle of Vouglé. Clovis conquers Aquitaine.
- 518 Justin Emperor. End of the Schism.
- 533 Conquest of Africa by Belisarius.
- 597 Landing of Augustine.
Death of Columba (9 June).

CHAPTER IX

THE SUCCESSORS OF JUSTINIAN

WITH the death of Justinian we enter on a period of transition. The magnificent dream of extending the Roman Empire to its ancient limits seemed all but realised, for by the campaigns of Belisarius and Narses, Africa, Spain, and Italy had been recovered. But the triumph had crippled the conqueror: already ruinous overdrafts had anticipated the resources which might have safeguarded the fruits of victory. Rome relaxed her grasp exhausted. Time was ringing out the old and ringing in the new. The next century was to fix in broad outlines the bounds within which for the future the empire was to be contained. Now, if we will, the Roman world becomes Byzantine. The secular struggle with Persia ends in the exaltation of the Cross over the worship of the sacred fire, the Sassanids fall before the Arab enthusiasts, and in the East Constantinople must meet changed conditions and an unexpected foe. In the West, while Spain is lost and but a harassed fraction of Italy remains, the outstanding fact is the settlement of the Slav tribes in the lands south of the Danube and their recognition of the overlordship of the Empire. A new Europe and a new Asia are forming: the period marks at once a climax and a beginning.

During his lifetime Justinian had clothed no colleague with the purple, but he had constantly relied upon Justin's counsel,¹ and his intended succession was indicated by his appointment to the post of *curopalates*. Even on his lonely death-bed the Emperor made no sign, but the senators were agreed. It was their secret that Justinian's days were numbered, and they kept it well, prepared to forestall every rival. Through the long winter night Justin and his consort Sophia, seated at their window, looked over the sea and waited. Before the dawn the message came: the Emperor was dead and the Roman world expected a new monarch. The court poet paints Justin's tears as he refused the throne which the senators offered him — *Ibo paternas tristis in exsequias*

¹ *Nil ille peregit Te (= Justinus) sine.* Corippus, *In Laudem Justinus*, l. 140.

regalia signa recuso ; the formalities satisfied, he was easily overpersuaded, and walked through the silent city to the palace which was closely guarded by the household troops under the future emperor Tiberius (14 Nov. 565). Later, with the purple over his shoulders and wearing the gems which Belisarius had won from the Goths, Justin was raised aloft on the shield as the elect of the army ; then the Church gave its approval : crowned with the diadem and blessed by the patriarch, he turned to the senate — during the old age of his uncle much had been neglected, the treasury exhausted and debts unpaid : all Justinian's thought and care had been set upon the world to come : the Empire shall rejoice to find the old wrongs righted under Justin's sway. In the company of Baduarius his son-in-law, newly appointed *curopalates*, and escorted by the senate, the Emperor then entered the circus where gifts were distributed, while the populace acclaimed their chosen ruler. The proceedings appear to have been carefully planned : Justin met the debts of those who had lent money to his uncle, and set free all prisoners. At midday he returned to the palace. The last honours to the dead had yet to be paid ; in solemn procession, with candles burning and the choir of virgins answering to the chanting of the priests, the embalmed body of Justinian was borne through mourning crowds to its golden sepulchre in the church of the Twelve Apostles. Forthwith the city gave itself to rejoicing in honour of the Emperor's accession : amidst greenery and decorations, with dance and gaiety, the cloud of Justinian's gloomy closing years was dispelled, while Corippus sang, "The world renews its youth."

The *In Laudem Justinii* of this poet laureate is indeed a document of great interest, for it paints the character and policy of Justin as he himself wished them to be portrayed. His conception of his imperial duty was the ideal of the unbending Roman whom nothing could affright. This spirit of exalted self-possession had been shewn at its height when the senate was leader of the State, and it was not without a definite purpose that the rôle of the senate is given marked prominence in the poem of Corippus. Unfortunately for this lofty view of the Empire's task and of the obligations of the nobility, it was precisely in the excessive power of the corrupt aristocracy that the greatest dangers lay. Office was valued as an opportunity for extortion, and riches gained at the expense of the commonwealth secured immunity from punishment. When all the armies of the Empire were engaged in the struggle with Persia, the government was forced to permit the maintenance in the European provinces of bodies of local troops ; this was apparently also the case in Egypt, and again and again we see from the pages of John of Nikiou that the command of such military force was employed as an engine of oppression against helpless provincials. An unscrupulous captain would openly defy law and authority, and had no hesitation in pillaging unoffending villagers. While freely admitting

that these accounts of the condition of affairs in Egypt hardly justify inferences as to the character of the administration in other parts of the Empire, yet stories related by chroniclers who wrote in the capital suggest that elsewhere also the ordinary course of justice was powerless to prevent an aristocracy of office from pursuing unchecked its own personal advantage. Justin, who scorned to favour either of the popular parties amongst the demes, looked to the nobles to maintain his high standard — and was disappointed. Similar views underlay all his foreign policy: Rome could make no concessions, for concessions were unworthy of the mistress of the world before whom all barbarian tribes must bow in awe. "We will not purchase peace with gold but win it at the sword's point":

Justini nutu gentes et regna tremescunt,
Omnia terrificat rigidus vigor...
— Fastus non patimur.

Here lies the poignant tragedy of his reign. He would have had Rome inspired anew with the high ardours of her early prime; and she sank helpless under the buffets of her foes. For himself his will was that men should write of him:

Est virtus roburque tibi, praestantior aetas,
Prudens consilium, stabilis mens, sancta voluntas,

and yet within a few years his attendants, to stay his frenzied violence, were terrifying him, as a nurse her naughty child, with the dread name of a border sheikh upon the Arabian frontier. It is in fact of cardinal importance to realise that Justin at first shared the faith of Shakespeare's Bastard, "Come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock them."

But if this policy were to be realised there must be no internal dissension and the theological strife of Justinian's last years must be set at rest. In concert with John, his courtier patriarch,¹ Justin strove long and anxiously for union. John the patrician, on his embassy to Persia, was charged with the reconciliation of the Monophysites; exiled bishops were in due course to return to their sees, and Zechariah, archdeacon and court physician, drew up an edict which should heal the divisions between the friends and foes of the Council of Chalcedon. But the fanaticism of the monks at Callinicum defeated John's diplomacy, and the renewed efforts of the Emperor were rendered fruitless when Jacob Baradaeus refused to accept an invitation to the capital. Justin's temper could no longer brook opposition, and in the seventh year of his reign (571-572) he began in exasperation that fierce persecution of the Monophysites which is depicted for us by one of the sufferers in the pages of John of Ephesus.

¹ Cf. J. Haury, "Johannes Malalas identisch mit dem Patriarchen Johannes Scholastikos?" *B. Z.* ix. (1900), pp. 337-356.

Such then were the aims and policy of the new monarch. With the haughty pride of a Roman aristocrat, with his ill-timed obstinacy and imperious self-will, Justin flung defiance at his enemies ; and he failed to make good the challenge.

Seven days after his accession he gave audience to Targasiz, an Avar ambassador, who claimed the annual payment which Justinian had granted. Did they not merit a reward, the envoy argued, for driving from Thrace the tribes which had endangered the capital ? — would it not indeed be perilous to refuse their request ? Plea and threat were alike of no avail. Surrounded by the gorgeous pageantry of a court reception, Justin offered the barbarians the choice of peace or war : tribute he would not pay ; it were prodigality to lavish on barbarians the gold which the Empire could ill spare. He met their murmurs with immediate action, shipped the Avars across the strait to Chalcedon, and only after six months dismissed them — three hundred strong — to their homes. For a time indeed the Emperor's proud words appeared to have had their effect, but in truth the Avars were busy in Thuringia waging successful war with the Frankish Sigebert ; their revenge for Rome's insult was perforce postponed, and Justin was free to turn his attention to the East.

John Comentiolus, who bore to the Persian court the news of Justinian's death and of his nephew's accession, was given instructions to raise the question of Suania. Under the terms of the Fifty Years' Peace which had been concluded between the two empires in 561, Chosroes had agreed to evacuate Lazica ; the Romans contended that Suania was part of Lazica and must also be relinquished. Persia had not admitted this construction of the agreement, and the question still remained undecided. Suania indeed was in itself of no particular value ; its importance lay in its strategic situation, for through it the Persians could attack the Roman frontier in Colchis. The possession of Suania would secure Rome's position in the east of the Euxine. The embassy was detained upon its journey and John found that Saracen tribesmen who acknowledged Persia's overlordship had arrived before him at the court of Madain ; Justinian had granted them money payments on condition that they should not ravage the Roman frontiers, but these payments Justin had discontinued, contending that they were originally voluntary gifts or that, even if they had been made under a binding engagement, the obligation ceased with the death of the giver. The unwisdom of the dead, even though he were an emperor, could not bind the living, and the days of weakness were now past. The Saracen claims were supported by Chosroes, but the matter was allowed to drop, while the Emperor by his envoy expressed his strong desire for peace with Persia and for the maintenance of the treaty between the two peoples. John casually remarked that, if Lazica was evacuated, Suania by right should also fall to Rome. The king apparently accepted this view, but professed himself bound to refer the question to his ministers. The latter were

willing to yield the territory for a price, but added conditions so humiliating to the Empire that John felt himself unable to accept the proposed terms. The king's counsellors in fact sought by diplomatic delays to force Rome to take action in Suania, so that they might then object that the people themselves refused to be subject to the Empire. The plan succeeded, and John foolishly entered into correspondence with the king of Suania. By this intervention Persia had secured a subject for negotiation, and now promised that an ambassador should be sent to Constantinople to discuss the whole situation. Justin disgraced his envoy, and Zich, who, besides bearing the congratulations of Persia, was charged with proposals as to Suania, was stopped at Nisibis. Justin returned thanks for the greetings of Chosroes, but stated that as to any other matters Rome could not admit discussion. On Zich's death Mebodes was sent to Constantinople, and with him came the Saracen chiefs for whom he craved audience. Justin shewed himself so arbitrary and unapproachable that Mebodes, though abandoning his patronage of the Saracens, felt that no course was open to him save to ask for his dismissal. The question of Suania was not debated, and Ambros, the Arab chieftain, gave orders to his brother Camboses to attack Alamoundar, the head of the Saracen tribesmen who were allied to Rome. From the detailed account of these negotiations given by Menander the reader already traces in Justin's overbearing and irritable temper a loss of mental balance and a wilful self-assertion which is almost childish in its unreasoning violence.

Meanwhile the Emperor could not feel secure so long as his cousin Justin, son of the patrician Germanus, was at the head of the forces on the Danube, guarding the passes against the Avars; the general was banished to Alexandria and there assassinated. It seems probable that Justin's masterful wife was mainly responsible for the murder. About the same time Aetherius and Addaeus, senators and patricians, were accused of treason and executed (3 Oct. 566¹).

In the West the influence of the quaestor of the palace, Anastasius (a native of Africa), would naturally direct the Emperor's attention to that province. Through the praefect Thomas, peace was concluded with the Berber tribesmen and new forts were erected to repel assaults of the barbarians. But these measures were checked² by the outbreak of

¹ There is some doubt as to the precise date of the murder of Justin. Johannes Biclaensis assigns it to the same year as the conspiracy of Addaeus and Aetherius (i.e. 566, in John's reckoning = Ann. II. Justini) and Evagrius clearly places it before the trial of Addaeus and Aetherius (Evagr. v. 1-3). Theophanes, it would appear wrongly, records it (p. 244, 3) under the year 570.—For the prominent position occupied by Sophia, cf. Warwick Wroth, *Catalogue of the Imperial Byzantine Coins in the British Museum*, London (1908), I. p. XIX.

² For three subsequent invasions by the Moors in which one praefect and two *magistri militum* were killed, see Joh. Bicl., M.G.H. *Chronica Minora* (ed. Mommsen), II. (1894), p. 212, and Diehl, *L'Afrique byzantine*, pp. 459-460.

hostilities in Europe between the Lombards and the Gepids. In the war which ensued the Lombards gained the advantage, and the Gepids then sought to win the alliance of Justin by the splendour of their gifts. Baduarius, commanding in Scythia and Moesia, received orders to aid Kunimund, and the Roman forces won a victory over Alboin. The latter, looking around for allies in his turn, appealed to Baian, the Khagan of the Avars, who had just concluded a peace with Sigebert. The Lombards, Alboin urged, were fighting not so much against the Gepids as against their ally Justin, who but recently had refused the tribute which Justinian had conceded. Avars and Lombards united would be irresistible: when Scythia and Thrace were won, the way would be open for an attack upon Constantinople. Baian at first declined to listen to the Lombard envoys, but he finally agreed to give his assistance on condition that he should at once receive one-tenth of all the animals belonging to the Lombards, that half the spoil taken should be his, and that to him should fall the whole territory of the conquered Gepids. The latter were accused before Justin by a Lombard embassy of not having kept the promises which had been the price of the Roman alliance; this intervention secured the neutrality of the Emperor.

We know nothing of the struggle save its issue; the Gepids were defeated on the Danube and driven from their territory, while Kunimund was slain. But his grandson, Reptilianus carried the royal treasure in safety to Constantinople, while it would seem that the Roman troops occupied Sirmium before the Avars could seize the city. Justin dispatched Vitalian, the interpreter, and Komitas as ambassadors to Baian. They were kept in chains while the Avar leader attacked Bonus in Sirmium: this city, Baian claimed, was his by right; it had been in the hands of the Gepids, and should now devolve upon him as spoils of the victory. At the same time he offered conditions of peace which were remarkable for their extreme moderation — he only demanded a silver plate, some gold, and a Scythian toga; he would be disgraced before his allies if he went empty-handed away. These terms Bonus and the bishop of Sirmium felt that they had no authority to accept without the Emperor's approval. For answer Baian ordered 10,000 Kotrigur Huns to cross the Save and ravage Dalmatia, while he himself occupied the territory which had formerly belonged to the Gepids. But he was not anxious for war, and there followed a succession of attempts at negotiation; the Roman generals on the frontier were ready to grant the Avar's conditions, but the autocrat in the capital held fast to his doctrinaire conceptions of that which Rome's honour would not allow her to concede. Targitius and Vitalian were sent to Constantinople to demand the surrender of Sirmium, the payment to Baian of sums formerly received from Justinian by the Kotrigur and Utigur Huns who were now tributary to the Avars, and the delivery of the person of Usdibad, a Gepid fugitive. The Emperor met the proposals with high-sounding

words and Bonus was bidden to prepare for war. No success can have attended the Roman arms, for in a second embassy Targitius added to his former demands the payment of arrears by the Empire. Bonus was clearly incapable, argued Justin, and Tiberius was accordingly sent to arrange terms. After some military successes, it would seem, he concurred with Apsich in a proposal that land should be furnished by the Romans for Avar settlement, while sons of Avar chieftains should be pledged for the good faith of their fellow-countrymen. Tiberius went to Constantinople to urge the acceptance of these terms, but Justin was not satisfied: let Baian surrender his own sons as hostages, he retorted, and once more dispatches to the officers in command ordered vigorous and aggressive action. Tiberius returned to be defeated by the Avars, and when yet another mission reached the palace, the Emperor realised that the honour of Rome must give place to the argument of force. Peace was concluded, and the Avars retired (end of 570?). The course of the negotiations throws into clear relief the views and aims of Justin, while the experience thus gained by Tiberius served to mould his policy as emperor.

For the rest of the reign the East absorbed the whole energy of the State. In order to understand clearly the causes which led to the war with Persia it is necessary to return to the year 568, when Constantinople was visited by an embassy from the Turks. This people, who had only recently made their appearance in Western Asia, had some ten years before overthrown the nation of the Ephthalites and were now themselves the leading power in the vast stretch of country between China and Persia. The western Chinese kingdom was at times their tributary, at other times their ally; with a vision of the possibilities which their geographical position offered they aspired to be the intermediaries through whose hands should pass the commerce of West and East. Naturally enough they first appealed to Persia, but the counsels of a renegade Ephthalite prevailed: the Turks were, he urged, a treacherous people, it would be an evil day for Persia if she accepted their alliance. Dizabul however, Khan of the Western Turks under the suzerainty of the great Mo-kan,¹ only relinquished the project when he discovered that the members of a second embassy had been poisoned by Persian treachery. Then it was that his counsellor Maniach advised that envoys should be sent to the Roman capital, the greatest emporium for the silk of China. It was a remarkable proposal; the emperors had often sought to open up a route to the East which would be free from Persia's interference — Justinian, for example, had with this object entered into relations with the Ethiopian court — but no great success had attended their efforts, and now it was a Turk who unfolded a scheme whereby the products of East and West should pass and repass without

¹ Silziboulos (Šil-Čybul-baŷa-qaŷan).

entering Persian territory, while the Turks drew boundless wealth as the middlemen between China and Rome. Obviously such a compact would not be acquiesced in by Persia, but Persia was the common foe: Turk and Roman must form an offensive and defensive alliance. Rome was troubled in her European provinces by the raids of Avar tribes and these tribesmen were fugitives from the Turk: Roman and Turk united could free the Empire from the scourge. Such was the project. The attitude of Rome's ministers was one of benevolent interest. They desired information but were unwilling to commit themselves; an embassy was accordingly dispatched to assure Dizabul of their friendship, but when the Khan set off upon a campaign against Persia, Zemarchus with the Roman forces began the long march back to Constantinople.¹ On the journey he was forced to alter his route through fear of Persian ambushes in Suania; suspicions were clearly already aroused and it would seem that for a time the negotiations with the Turks were dropped.² More than this was needed to induce Chosroes to declare war.

In 571 Persian Armenia revolted and appealed to the Empire. It would seem that Justin had been attempting to force upon his Armenian subjects acceptance of the orthodox Chalcedonian doctrine, and Chosroes in turn, on the advice of the magi, determined to impose the worship of the sacred fire upon the whole of Persarmenia. The Surena with 2000 armed horsemen was sent to Dovin with orders to establish a fire temple in the city. The Catholicos objected that the Armenians, though paying tribute to their Persian overlord, were yet free to practise their own religion. The building of the temple was however begun in spite of protests, but ten thousand armed Armenians implored the Surena to lay the matter before Chosroes, and in face of this force he was compelled to withdraw. Meanwhile, it appears, the Armenians had secured from Justin a promise that they would be welcomed within the boundaries of the Empire, and that religious toleration would be granted them. On the return of the Surena in command of 15,000 men with directions to carry into execution the original design, 20,000 Armenians scattered the Persian forces and killed the Surena, and his severed head was carried to the patrician Justinian who was in readiness on the frontier at Theodosiopolis. At the same time the Iberians, with their king Gorgenes, went over to the Romans. The fugitives were well received; the nobles were given high positions and estates, while the Roman province was excused three years' tribute.

It was just at this time (571-572) that a new payment to Persia fell due under the terms of the peace of 561-562, Chosroes having insisted that

¹ The embassy of Zemarchus is dated 572-573 by John of Ephesus, vi. 23.

² The later embassy of Valentinus in 575-576 produced no lasting result. On these missions see J. Marquart, "Historische Glossen zu den alttürkischen Inschriften," *Vienna Oriental Journal*, xii. (1898), pp. 157-200.

previous instalments should be paid in advance. Sebocthes arrived (probably early in 572) to remind the Emperor of his obligations. In the judgment of Chosroes it was to Persia's present advantage that the peace should remain unbroken. The disagreeable question of Suania was shelved for the time, and Rome's claims were quietly ignored. Sebocthes preserved a studied silence in relation to the disturbances in Armenia and, when Justin mentioned that country, even appeared willing to recognise the rights of the Christian inhabitants. On dismissal, however, he was warned by the Emperor that if a finger was raised against Armenia it would be regarded as a hostile act. Justin indeed seems to have been anxious to force Persia to take the aggressive. He chose this moment of diplomatic tension to send the *magistrinus* Julian on a mission to Arethas, then reigning in Abyssinia over the Axumite kingdom. The envoy persuaded Arethas to break faith with his Persian suzerain, to send his merchandise through the country of the Homerites by way of the Nile to Egypt and to invade Persian territory. At the head of his Saracens the king made a successful foray, and dismissed Julian with costly gifts and high honour.¹ Evidently Justin considered that Chosroes was only waiting until the Roman gold had been safely received, and that he would then declare war on the first favourable opportunity.

The Emperor determined to strike the first blow. The continuance of the peace entailed heavy periodical payments, and throughout his reign Justin was consistently opposed to enriching the Empire's enemies at the expense of the national treasury. Though the subsidies paid to Persia were to be devoted to the upkeep of the northern forts and the guarding of the passes against eastern invaders, it was easy for any unkindly critic to represent them as tribute paid by Rome to her rival.² Again Justin had welcomed the Turkish overtures: the power which had overthrown the Ephthalites would, he thought, be a formidable ally in the coming struggle. Further, through the mistakes in diplomacy of his own envoy, Suania had remained subject to Chosroes, and it was now additionally necessary that the country should belong to the Empire, since Persian ambushes rendered insecure the trade route to Turkish territory from which so much was hoped. But above all the capital had been deeply stirred by the oppression of the Armenians: Justin was resolved to champion their cause and, as a Christian monarch, to challenge the persecutor in their defence. When the ambassadors of the Frankish Siebert returned to Gaul early in 575 they were full of the sufferings of the Armenians; it was to this cause, they told Gregory of Tours, that the war with Persia was due.

¹ This invasion is assigned by Theophanes (244-245) to the year 572. On this account cf. G. Hertzsch, *De Scriptoris Rerum Imp. Tiberii Constantini* (Leipsic, 1892), p. 38.

² Cf. the story in John of Ephesus, vi. 23.

The decisive step was taken in the late summer of 572 when, without warning, Marcianus,¹ a first cousin of the Emperor on his mother's side, invaded Arzanene. Justin had given orders for an immediate attack on Nisibis, but precious time was wasted in fruitless negotiations with the Persian *marzpan*, while Chosroes was informed of the danger, Nisibis virtualled and the Christians expelled. Very early in 573 Marcianus, at the head of troops raised from Rome's Caucasian allies, won some slight successes, but dispatches from the capital insisted on the immediate investment of Nisibis; the army encamped before the city at the end of April 573. The Emperor however, suspecting his cousin's loyalty, appointed Acacius Archelaus² as his successor. Although Nisibis was about to capitulate, the new commander on his arrival brutally overthrew the tent and standard of Marcianus, while the general himself with rude violence was hurried away to Dara. The army, thinking itself deserted, fled in wild confusion to Mardes, while Chosroes, who had hastened to relieve Nisibis, now advanced to besiege Dara. At the same time Adarmaanes marched into the defenceless province of Syria, captured Antioch, Apamea, and other towns, and rejoined Chosroes with a train of 292,000 prisoners. After an investment of more than five months, on 15 Nov. 573, Dara fell through the negligence or treachery, men said, of John, son of Timostratus. The city had been regarded as impregnable; men seeking security in troublous times had made it the treasure house of the Roman East, and the booty of the victors was immense.

On the news of this terrible disaster Justin ordered the shops to be shut and all trade to cease in the capital; he himself never recovered from the shock, but became a hopeless and violent imbecile. It seems that for five years (presumably since 569) Justin had been ailing and suffering from occasional mental weakness, but it was now clear that he was quite incapable of managing the Empire's affairs. Through the year 574 the Empress in concert with Tiberius, the *comes excubitorum*, carried on the government. They were faced with a difficult problem: Rome had been the aggressor, could she be the first to propose terms of peace? Persia however intervened, and sent a certain Jakobos, who knew both Greek and Persian, to conclude a treaty. Rome, Chosroes argued, could not be further humbled: she must accept the victor's conditions. The letter was sent to the Empress owing to Justin's incapacity, and it was her reply that Zacharias bore to the Persian court.³ Rome would pay 45,000 *nomismata* (metal value about £25,000) to secure peace for a year in the East, though Armenia was not included in this arrangement. If the Emperor recovered, a plenipotentiary should be sent to

¹ Called Martinus in Theoph. 245, 25.

² Theophanes of Byzantium is mistaken in thinking that the new commander was Theodore, the son of Justinian.

³ Evagrius v. 12 (p. 208) must be regarded as a confusion with the later embassy of A.D. 575.

determine all matters in dispute and to end the war. But Justin did not recover, and by the masterful will of the Empress, Tiberius was adopted as the Emperor's son and created Caesar in the presence of the patriarch John and of the officials of the Court (Friday, 7 Dec. 574). It was a scene which deeply impressed the imagination of contemporary historians. Justin in a pathetic speech confessed with sincere contrition his failure, and in this brief interval of unclouded mental vision warned his successor of the dangers which surrounded the throne.

Tiberius, his position now established, at once busied himself with the work of reorganisation. His assumption of power marks a change of policy which is of the highest importance. The new Caesar, himself by birth a Thracian, had seen service on the Danube, and realised that from the military standpoint the *intransigent* imperialism of Justin was too heroic an ideal for the exhausted Empire. Years before he had approved of terms of peace which would have given the Avars land on which to settle within Rome's frontiers. Greek influence was everywhere on the increase; at all costs it was the Greek-speaking Asiatic provinces which must be defended and retained. Persia was the formidable foe and it was her rivalry which was the dominating factor in the situation. Tiberius had indeed with practical insight comprehended Rome's true policy. Syrian chroniclers of a later day rightly appreciated this: to them Tiberius stands at the head of a new imperial line, they know him as the first of the Greek emperors. But if in his view the Empire, though maintaining its hold on such bulwark cities as Sirmium, was in the future to place no longer its chief reliance on those European provinces from which he had himself sprung, the administration must scrupulously abstain from arousing the hostility of the eastern nationalities: religious persecution must cease and it must be unnecessary for his subjects to seek under a foreign domination a wider tolerance and a more spacious freedom for the profession of their own faith. The Monophysites gratefully acknowledged that during his reign they found in the Emperor a champion against their ecclesiastical oppressors. This was not all: there are hints in our authorities which suggest that he regarded as ill-timed the aristocratic sympathies of Justin, and strove to increase the authority of the popular elements in the State. It is possible that the demesmen, suppressed by Justinian after the Nika sedition and cowed by Justin, owed to the policy of Tiberius some of the influence which they exercised towards the close of the reign of Maurice. Even at the risk of what might be judged financial improvidence, the autocrat must strive to win the esteem, if not the affection, of his subjects. Tiberius forthwith remitted a year's taxation and endeavoured to restore the ravages which Adarmaanes had inflicted on Syria. At the same time he began to remodel the army, attracting to the service of the State sturdy barbarian soldiers wherever such could be found.¹

¹ Is not Theophanes 251, 24 really summarising the Persian war as carried on by
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Obviously the immediate question was the state of affairs in the East. In the spring of 575 Tiberius sent Trajan, quaestor and physician, with the former envoy Zacharias to obtain a cessation of hostilities for three years both in the East and Armenia; if that was not possible, then in the East excluding Armenia. Persia however insisted that no truce could be granted for any less period than five years, and the ambassadors therefore consented, subject to the approval of the Emperor, to accept a truce of five years in the East alone, Rome undertaking to pay annually 30,000 gold *nomismata*. These terms Tiberius rejected: he wanted a truce for two years if possible, but in no event would he accept an agreement which would tie his hands for more than three years: by that time he hoped to be able successfully to withstand Persia in the field. At last Chosroes agreed to a three years' treaty which was only to affect the East and was not to include Armenia. Meanwhile, before the result of the negotiations was known, Justinian, son of the murdered Justin, was appointed general of the East. Early in the summer, however, Chosroes with unexpected energy marched north and invaded Armenia; Persarmenia returned to its allegiance, and by way of the canton of Bagrevand he advanced into the Roman province and encamped before Theodosiopolis. This city, the key of Persarmenia and Iberia, he resolved to capture, and thence to proceed to Caesarea, the metropolis of Cappadocia. The siege, however, was soon abandoned, and near Sebaste the Persians met the Roman army under Justinian, who had now assumed command in Armenia. Personal jealousies paralysed the action of the imperial troops, and the enemy was thus able to capture and burn Melitene. Then the fortune of war turned. Chosroes was forced to flee across the Euphrates and, with the Romans in hot pursuit, only escaped with great loss over the mountains of Karcha. Justinian followed up this advantage by spending the winter on Persian soil. His troops pillaged and plundered unchecked, and in the spring of 576 he took up his position on the frontier.

The shame of the flight from Melitene was a severe shock to Persian pride, and there seemed every prospect that now at last peace would be concluded. At Athraelon, near Dara, Mebodes met Rome's envoys John and Peter, patricians and senators, together with Zacharias and Theodore, count of the treasury. During the negotiations however Tamchosro defeated Justinian in Armenia (576). Elated by this victory, the Persians withdrew the concessions which they had already made. Still all through the years 576-577 the plenipotentiaries discussed terms; two points stood in the way of a final settlement: Persia claimed the right

Tiberius II and does not *ἐς δρομα ἴδιον* = his position was now legalised, and as Caesar he could raise troops in his own name? Finlay sees in the passage the creation of a troop of *Buccellarii*.

to punish those Armenian fugitives who in 571 had fled to the Empire, and these Rome absolutely declined to surrender, while Chosroes in turn persisted in his refusal to consider the cession of Dara which Tiberius demanded. In 578, when the three years' truce had all but expired, a new embassy headed by Trajan and Zacharias began the task afresh.

Meanwhile, in 578, to put a stop to the mutual dissensions of the Roman generals Tiberius appointed as commander-in-chief of the eastern troops Maurice, a Cappadocian of Arabissus, descended, it was said, from the aristocracy of old Rome,¹ who had formerly served as the Emperor's, *notarius* and whom, on becoming Caesar, he had created *comes excubitorum*. With the means supplied to him by Tiberius, Maurice at once began to raise a formidable army; he enrolled men from his own native country, and enlisted recruits from Syria, Iberia, and the province of Hanzit. With these forces he successfully invaded Arzanene, captured the strong fortress of Aphoumon, and carried back with him thousands of Persians and much spoil.

In the autumn of this year (578) Justin, who had temporarily recovered his reason, crowned Tiberius Emperor (26 Sept.) and eight days later, on 4 Oct., his troubled life was ended.

Tiberius now as ever sought military triumphs only as a means to diplomatic ends. In consequence of the victories of the summer he had in his hands numerous important captives, some of them even connexions of the royal house. He at once dispatched Zacharias and a general, Theodore by name, giving them full powers to conclude peace and offering to return the prisoners of war. The Emperor professed himself prepared to surrender Iberia and Persarmenia (but not those refugees who had fled to the shelter of the Empire), to evacuate Arzanene and to restore the fortress of Aphoumon, while in return Dara was to be given back to the Empire. Tiberius was desirous of arriving at a speedy agreement, so that the enemy might not gain time for collecting reinforcements. Despite the delay of a counter mission from Persia there was every prospect that Rome's conditions would be accepted, when in the early spring of 579 Chosroes died and was succeeded on the throne by Ormizd. Though the Emperor was willing to offer the same terms, Ormizd procrastinated, while making every effort to provision Dara and Nisibis and to raise fresh levies. At length he definitely refused to surrender Dara and stipulated anew for an annual money payment (summer, 579). The military and diplomatic operations of the years 579-581, though interesting enough in themselves, did not really alter the general position of affairs.

Thus inconclusively dragged on the long hostilities between the rival powers in the East, but in Europe the Avars had grown discontented

¹ A later tradition connects him with Armenia: cf. *B. Z.* XIX. (1910), p. 549.

with the Empire's subsidies. Targitius was sent in 580 to receive the tribute, but immediately after the envoy's departure Baian started with his rude flotilla down the Danube and, marching over the neck of country between that river and the Save, appeared before Sirmium and there began to construct a bridge. When the Roman general in the neighbouring fortress of Singidunum protested at this violation of the peace the Khagan claimed that his sole aim was to cross the Save in order to march through the territory of the Empire, recross the Danube with the help of the Roman fleet, and thus attack the common enemy, the Slav invaders, who had refused to render to the Avars their annual tribute. Sirmium was without stores of provisions and had no effective garrison. Tiberius had relied upon the continuance of the peace and all his available troops were in Armenia and Mesopotamia. When Baian's ambassador arrived in the capital, the Emperor could only temporise: he himself was preparing an expedition against the Slavs, but for the present he would suggest that the moment was ill-chosen for a campaign, since the Turks were occupying the Chersonese (Bosporos had fallen into their hands in 576) and might shortly advance westward. The Avar envoy was not slow to appreciate the true position, but on the return journey he and the attendant Romans were slain by a band of Slav pillagers — this fact casually mentioned gives us some idea of the condition at this time of the open country-side in the Danubian provinces. Meanwhile Baian had been pressing forward the building of the bridge over the Save, and Solachos, the new Avar ambassador, now threw off the mask and demanded the evacuation of Sirmium. "I would sooner give your master," Tiberius replied, "one of my two daughters to wife than I would of my own free will surrender Sirmium." The Danube and the Save were held by the enemy, and the Emperor had no army, but through Illyria and Dalmatia officers were sent to conduct the defence. On the islands of Casia and Carbonaria Theognis met the Khagan, but negotiations were fruitless. For two years, despite fearful hardships, the city resisted, but the governor was incompetent, and the troops under Theognis inadequate, and at last, some short time before his death, Tiberius, to save the citizens, sacrificed Sirmium. The inhabitants were granted life, but all their possessions were left in the hands of the barbarians, who also exacted the sum of 240,000 *nomismata* as payment for the three years' arrears (580-582) due under the terms of the former agreement which was still to remain in force.

It was during the investment of Sirmium that the Slavs seized their golden hour. They poured over Thrace and Thessaly, scouring the Roman provinces as far as the Long Walls—a flood of murder and of ravage: the black horror of their onset still darkens the pages of John of Ephesus.

In the year which saw the fall of Sirmium (582) Tiberius died. Feeling that his end was near, on 5 Aug. he created Maurice Caesar and gave

to him the name of Tiberius;¹ at the same time the Emperor's elder daughter was named Constantina and betrothed to Maurice. Eight days later, before an assemblage of representatives of army, church, and people, Tiberius crowned the Caesar Emperor (13 Aug.) and on 14 Aug. 582, in the palace of the Hebdomon, he breathed his last. The marriage of Maurice followed hard on the funeral of his father-in-law. We would gladly have learned more of the policy and aims of Tiberius. We can but dimly divine in him a practical statesman who with sure prescience had seen what was possible of achievement and where the Empire's true future lay. He fought not for conquest but for peace, he struggled to win from Persia a recognition that Rome was her peer, that on a basis of security the Empire might work out its internal union and concentrate its strength around the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. "The sins of men," says the chronicler, "were the reason for his short reign. Men were not worthy of so good an emperor."

"Make your rule my fairest epitaph" were the words of Tiberius to Maurice, and the new monarch undertook his task in a spirit of high seriousness. At his accession Maurice appointed John Mystakon commander-in-chief of the eastern armies, and this position he held until 584, when he was superseded by Philippicus, the Emperor's brother-in-law. The details of the military operations during the years 582-585 cannot be given here; it may be sufficient to state that their general result was indecisive—most of the time was spent in the capture or defence of isolated fortresses or in raids upon the enemy's territory.² No pitched battle of any importance occurred till 586. Philippicus had met Mebodes at Amida in order to discuss terms of peace, but Persia had demanded a money payment, and such a condition Maurice would not accept. The Roman general, finding that negotiations were useless, led his forces to Mount Izala, and at Solochon the armies engaged. The Persians were led by Kardarigan, while Mebodes commanded on the right wing and Aphraates, a cousin of Kardarigan, on the left. Philippicus was persuaded not to adventure his life in the forefront of the battle, so that the Roman centre was entrusted to Heraclius, the father of the future emperor. Vitalius faced Aphraates, while Wilfred, the praefect of Emesa, and Apsich the Hun opposed Mebodes. On a Sunday morning the engagement began: the right wing routed Aphraates, but was with

¹ It would seem that Germanus was also created Caesar but declined the responsibilities which Maurice was prepared to assume.

² A short chronological note may however be of service. 582, autumn: John Mystakon commander-in-chief in Armenia: Roman success on Nymphius turned into a rout through jealousy of Kours. 583: Capture of fort of Akbas, near Martyropolis, by Rome. Peace negotiations between Rome and Persia. 584: Marriage of Philippicus to Gordia, sister of Maurice: Philippicus appointed to succeed John in the East. He fortifies Monokarton and ravages country round Nisibis. 585: Philippicus ill: retires to Martyropolis. Stephanus and the Hun Apsich successfully defend Monokarton.

difficulty recalled from its capture of the Persian baggage; the defeated troops now strengthened the enemy's centre and some of the Roman horse were forced to dismount to steady the ranks under Heraclius. But during a desperate hand-to-hand struggle the cavalry charged the Persians and the day was won: the left wing pursued the troops under Mebodes as far as Dara. Philippicus then began the siege of the fortress of Chlomara, but his position was turned by the forces under Kardarigan; a sudden panic seized the Roman commander, who fled precipitately under cover of night to Aphoumon. The enemy, suspecting treachery, advanced with caution, but encountered no resistance, while the seizure of the Roman baggage-train relieved them from threatened starvation. Across the Nymphius by Amida to Mount Izala Philippicus retreated: here the forts were strengthened and the command given to Heraclius, who in late autumn led a pillaging expedition across the Tigris.

The flight of Philippicus may well have been due, at least in part, to a fresh attack of illness, for in 587 he was unable to take the field, and when he started for the capital, Heraclius was left as commander in the East and at once began to restore order and discipline among the Roman troops.

Maurice's well-intentioned passion for economy had led him to issue an order that the soldiers' pay should be reduced by a quarter; Philippicus clearly felt that this was a highly dangerous and inexpedient measure — the army's anger might lead to the proclamation of a rival emperor; he delayed the publication of the edict, and it was probably with a view of explaining the whole situation to his master that, despite his illness, he set out for Constantinople. On his journey, however, he learned that he had been superseded and that Priscus had been appointed commander-in-chief. If Maurice had ceased to trust his brother-in-law let the new general do what he could: Philippicus would no longer stay his hand. From Tarsus he ordered Heraclius to leave the army in the hands of Narses, governor of Constantina, and himself to retire to Armenia; he further directed the publication of the fatal edict.

Early in 588 Priscus arrived in Antioch. The Roman forces were to concentrate in Monokarton; and from Edessa he made his way, accompanied by the bishop of Damascus, towards the camp with the view of celebrating Easter amongst his men. But when the troops came forth to meet him, his haughtiness and failure to observe the customary military usages disgusted the army and at this critical moment a report spread that their pay was to be reduced. A mutiny forced Priscus to take refuge in Constantina, and the fears of Philippicus proved well founded. Germanus, commander in the Lebanon district of Phoenicia, was against his own will proclaimed emperor, though he exacted an oath that the soldiers would not plunder the luckless provincials. A riot at Constantina, where the Emperor's statues were overthrown, drove the fugitive Priscus to Edessa, and thence he was hounded forth to seek shelter in the capital.

Maurice's only course was to reappoint Philippicus to the supreme command in the East, but the army, which had elected its own officers, was not to be thus easily pacified: the troops solemnly swore that they would never receive the nominee of an emperor whom they no longer acknowledged. Meanwhile, as was but natural, Persia seized her opportunity and invested Constantina, but Germanus prevailed upon his men to take action and the city was relieved. The soldiers' resentment was lessened by the skilful diplomacy of Aristobulus, who brought gifts from Constantinople, and Germanus was able to invade Persia with a force of 4000 men. Though checked by Marouzas, he retired in safety to the Nymphius, and at Martyropolis Marouzas was defeated and killed by the united Roman forces: three thousand captives were taken, among them many prominent Persians, while the spoils and standards were sent to Maurice. This was the signal that the army was once more prepared to acknowledge the Emperor, and all would have been well had not Maurice felt it necessary to insist that Philippicus should again be accepted by the troops as their general. This however they refused to do, even when Andreas, captain of the imperial shield-bearers, was sent to them; and only after a year's cessation of hostilities (588-589) was the army, through the personal influence of Gregory, bishop of Antioch, persuaded to obey its former commander (Easter 590). Philippicus did not long enjoy his triumph. About this time Martyropolis fell by treachery into Persian hands, and with the spring of 590¹ the Roman forces marched into Armenia to recover the city. When he failed in this Philippicus was superseded by Comentiolus, and although the latter was unsuccessful, Heraclius won a brilliant victory and captured the enemy's camp.

It is at first sight somewhat surprising that the Persians had remained inactive during the year 589, but we know that they were fully engaged with internal difficulties. The violence of Ormizd had, it seems, caused a dangerous revolt in Kusistan and Kerman, and in face of this peril Persia accepted an offer of help from the Turks. Once admitted into Khorasan, Schaweh Schah disregarded his promises and advanced southwards in the direction of the capital, but was met by Bahram Cobin, the governor of Media, and was defeated in the mountains of Ghilan. The power of the Turks was broken: they could no longer exact, but were bound to pay, an annual tribute. After this signal success Bahram Cobin undertook an invasion of Roman territory in the Caucasus district; the Persians encountered no resistance, for the imperial forces were concentrated in Armenia. Maurice sent Romanus to engage the enemy in Albania, and in the valley of one of the streams flowing into the Araxes Bahram was so severely worsted that he was in consequence removed from his command by Ormizd. Thus disgraced he determined to seize the

¹ This is not the usually accepted chronology. The present writer hopes shortly to support the view here taken in a paper on the literary construction of the history of Theophylactus Simocatta.

crown for himself but veiled his real plan under the pretext of championing the cause of Chosroes, Ormizd's eldest son.¹ At the same time a plot was formed in the palace, and Bahram was forestalled: the conspirators dethroned the king and Chosroes was crowned at Ctesiphon. But after the assassination of Ormizd the new monarch was unable to maintain his position: his troops deserted to Bahram, and he was forced to throw himself upon the mercy of the Emperor. As a helpless fugitive the King of kings arrived at Circesium and craved Rome's protection, offering in return to restore the lost Armenian provinces and to surrender Martyropolis and Dara. Despite the counsels of the senate, Maurice saw in this strange reversal of fortune a chance to terminate a war which was draining the Empire's strength: his resolve to accede to his enemy's request was at once a courageous and a statesmanlike action. He furnished Chosroes with men and money, Narses took command of the troops, and John Mystakon marched from Armenia to join the army. The two forces met at Sargana (probably Sirgan, in the plain of Ushnei²) and in the neighbourhood of Ganzaca (Takhti-Solefman) defeated and put to flight Bahram, while Chosroes recovered his throne without further resistance. The new monarch kept his promises to Rome and surrounded himself with a Roman body-guard (591). By this interposition Maurice had restored the Empire's frontier³ and had ended the long-drawn struggle in the East.

In 592 therefore he could transport his army into Europe, and was able to employ his whole military force in the Danubian provinces. Maurice himself went with the troops as far as Anchialus, when he was recalled by the presence of a Persian embassy in the capital. The chronology of the next few years is confused and it is impossible to give here a detailed account of the campaigns. Their general object was to maintain the Danube as the frontier line against the Avars and to restrict the forays of the Slavs. In this Priscus met with considerable success, but Peter, Maurice's brother, who superseded him in 597, displayed hopeless incompetency and Priscus was reappointed.⁴ In 600 Comentiolus, who was, it would appear, in command against his own will, entered into communications with the Khagan in order to secure the discomfiture of the Roman forces: he was, in fact, anxious to prove that the attempt to defend the northern frontier was labour lost. He ultimately fled headlong to the capital and only the personal interference of the Emperor stifled the inquiry into his treachery. On this

¹ There seems no sufficient evidence for the theory that Bahram Cobin relied on a legitimist claim as representing the pre-Sassanid dynasty.

² See H. C. Rawlinson, "Memoir on the site of the Atropatenian Ecbatana," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* (1840), pp. 71 ff.

³ See maps by H. Hübschmann in "Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen," *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xvi. (1904), and in Gelzer's *Georgius Cypricus*.

⁴ For the siege of Thessalonica in this year, cf. Wroth, *op. cit.* i. p. xxi.

occasion the panic in Constantinople was such that the city guard — the *ἐπίμοι* — were sent by Maurice to man the Long Walls.¹

On the return of Comentiolus to the seat of war in the summer of 600, Priscus, in spite of his colleague's inactivity, won a considerable victory, but the autumn of 601 saw Peter once again in command and conducting unsuccessful negotiations for a peace. Towards the close of 602 the outlook was brighter, for conditions had changed in favour of Rome. The Antae had acted as her allies, and when Apsich was sent by the Khagan to punish this defection, numbers of the Avars themselves deserted and joined the forces under Peter. Maurice would seem to have thought that this was the moment to drive home the advantage which fortune offered, for if the soldiers could support themselves at the expense of the enemy, the harassed provincials and the overburdened exchequer might be spared the cost of their maintenance. Orders were sent that the troops were not to return, but should winter beyond the Danube. The army heard the news with consternation: barbarian tribes were ranging over the country on the further side of the river, the cavalry was worn out with the marches of the summer, their booty would purchase them the pleasures of civilised life. The Roman forces mutinied and, disobeying their superiors, crossed the river and reached Palastolum.

Peter withdrew from the camp in despair but meanwhile the officers had induced their men to face the barbarians once again, and the army had returned to Securisca (near Nikopol). Floods of rain, however, and extreme cold renewed the discontent; eight spokesmen, among whom was Phocas, covered the twenty miles between Peter and the camp and demanded that the army might return home to winter quarters. The commander-in-chief promised to give his answer on the following day: between the rebellious determination of the troops and the imperative dispatches of his brother he could see no loophole of escape; of one thing alone he was assured: that day would start a train of ills for Rome. True to his promise he joined his men and to their representatives he read the Emperor's letter. Before the tempest of opposition which this evoked the officers fled, and on the following day, when the soldiers had twice assembled to discuss the situation, Phocas was raised upon a shield and declared their leader. Peter carried the news with all speed to the capital; Maurice disguised his fears and reviewed the troops of the demes. The Blues, on whose support he relied, numbered 900, the Greens 1500. On the refusal of Phocas to receive the Emperor's ambassadors, the demesmen were ordered to man the city walls. Phocas had been chosen as champion of the army, not as emperor: the army had refused allegiance to Maurice personally but not to his house;

¹ It seems probable that in some source hostile to Maurice the treachery of Comentiolus was transferred to the Emperor himself and to this was added the story of the failure to ransom the prisoners. The basis of fact from which the story sprang may perhaps be discerned in Theophylact, *o.g.* p. 247, 18 (edn. de Boor).

accordingly the vacant throne was offered to Theodosius, the Emperor's eldest son, or, should he decline it, to his father-in-law Germanus, both of whom were hunting at the time in the neighbourhood of the capital. They were at once recalled to Constantinople. Germanus, realising that he was suspected of treason, armed his followers and surrounded by a body-guard took refuge in the Cathedral Church. He had won the sympathies of the populace, and when the Emperor attempted to remove him by force from St Sophia, riots broke out in the city, while the troops of the demes deserted their posts on the walls to join in the abuse of Emperor and patriarch. Maurice was denounced as a Marcianist and ribald songs were shouted against him through the streets. The house of the praetorian praefect, Constantine Lardys, was burned to the ground, and at the dead of night, with his wife and children, accompanied by Constantine, the Emperor, disguised as a private citizen, embarked for Asia (22 Nov. 602). A storm carried him out of his course and he only landed with difficulty at the shrine of Autonomus the Martyr; here an attack of gout held him prisoner, while the praetorian praefect was despatched with Theodosius to enlist the sympathy of Chosroes on behalf of his benefactor. The Emperor fled, the Greens determined to espouse the cause of Phocas and rejected the overtures of Germanus, who now made a bid for the crown and was prepared to purchase their support; they feared that, once his end was gained, his well-known partiality for the Blues would reassert itself. The disappointed candidate was driven to acknowledge his rival's claims. Phocas was invited to the Hebdomon (Makrikeui) and thither trooped out the citizens, the senate, and the patriarch. In the church of St John the Baptist the rude half-barbarian centurion was crowned sovereign of the Roman Empire, and entered the capital "in a golden shower" of royal gifts.

But the usurper could not rest while Maurice was alive. On the day following the coronation of his wife Leontia, upon the Asian shore at the harbour of Eutropius five sons of the fallen Emperor were slain before their father's eyes, and then Maurice himself perished, calling upon God and repeating many times "Just art thou, O Lord, and just is thy judgment." From the beach men saw the bodies floating on the waters of the bay, while Lilius brought back to the capital the severed heads, where they were exposed to public view.

Maurice was a realist who suffered from an obstinate prejudice in favour of his own projects and his own nominees; he could diagnose the ills from which the Empire suffered, but did not always choose aright the moment for administering the remedy. He had served a stern apprenticeship in the eastern wars, and saw clearly that while Rome in many of her provinces was fighting for existence, the importance of the leader of armies outweighed that of the civil governor. In some temporary instances Justinian had entrusted to the praefect the duties of a general, and had thus broken through the sharp distinction between the two

spheres drawn by the Diocletio-Constantinian reforms. Maurice however did not follow the principle of Justinian's tentative innovations: he chose to give to the military commander a position in the hierarchy of office superior to that of the civil administration, conferring on the old *magistri militum* of Africa and Italy the newly coined title of exarch: this supreme authority was to be the Emperor's vicegerent against Berber and Lombard. It was the first step towards the creation of the system of military themes.¹ It was doubtless also considerations of practical convenience and a recognition of the stubborn logic of facts which led to Maurice's scheme of provincial redistribution. Tripolitana was separated from Africa and joined like its neighbour Cyrenaica to the diocese of Egypt; Sitifensis and Caesariensis were fused into the single province of Mauretania Prima, while the fortress of Septum and the sorry remnants of Tingitana were united with the imperial possessions in Spain and the Balearic Isles to form the province of Mauretania II, thus solidifying under one government the scattered Roman territories in the extreme West. Similar motives probably determined the new arrangements (after the treaty with Persia in 591) on the Eastern frontier. It was again Maurice the realist who disregarded the counsels of his ministers and made full use of the unique opportunity which the flight of Chosroes offered to the Empire.

In Italy the incursion of the Lombards presented a problem with which the wars on the Danube and in Asia rendered it difficult for Maurice to cope. Frankish promises of help against the invaders were largely illusory, even though the young West-Gothic prince Athanagild was held in Constantinople as a pledge for the fulfilment by his Merovingian kinsfolk of their obligations. It was further unfortunate that the relations between pope and Emperor were none of the best; many small disagreements culminated in the dispute concerning the title of oecumenical patriarch which John the Faster had adopted. The contention between Gregory and Maurice has certainly been given a factitious importance by later historians—the over-sensitive Gregory alone seems to have regarded the question as of any vital moment and his successors quietly acquiesced in the use of the offending word—but the disagreement doubtless hampered the Emperor's reforms; when he endeavoured to prevent soldiers from deserting and retiring into monasteries, the pope seized on the measure as a new ground of complaint and raised violent protest in the name of the Church.

As general in Asia Maurice had restored the morale of the army, and throughout his life he was always anxious to effect improvements in military matters. He was the first Emperor to realise fully the importance of Armenia as a recruiting ground,² and it may well be from

¹ See Ch. xiii.

² When an Emperor is at great cost transporting men from Armenia to the Danube provinces, is the story probable that he sacrificed thousands of prisoners of war through refusal to pay to the Khagan their ransom?

this fact that late tradition traced his descent from that country. It was just in this sphere of military reform, however, that he displayed his fatal inability to judge the time when he could safely insist on an unpopular measure; his demand that the army should winter beyond the Danube cost him alike throne and life. It was further an ill-advised step when Maurice in his later years (598 or 599) reverted, as Justin had done before him, to a policy of religious persecution. By endeavouring to force Chalcedonian orthodoxy on Mesopotamia he effected little save the alienation of his subjects. It was left to Heraclius to follow Tiberius in choosing the better part and endeavouring by conciliation to introduce union amongst the warring parties. But the great blot on the reign of Maurice is his favouritism towards incapable officials; the ability of men like Narses and Priscus had to give place to the incompetency of Peter and the treachery of Comentiolus. Time and again their blunders were overlooked and new distinctions forced upon them. The fear that a victorious general of to-day might be the successful rival of to-morrow gave but a show of justification to this ruinous partiality.

But despite all criticisms Maurice remains a high-minded, conscientious, independent, hard-working ruler, and if other proof of his worth were lacking it is to be found in the universal hatred of his murderer.

Other executions followed those of Maurice and his sons: Comentiolus and Peter were slain, while Alexander dragged Theodosius from the sanctuary of Autonomus and killed both him and the praefect Constantine. Constantina and her three daughters were confined in a private house. Phocas was master of the capital. But elsewhere throughout the Empire men refused to ratify the army's choice: through Anatolia and Cilicia, through the Roman province of Asia and in Palestine, through Illyricum and in Thessalonica civil war was raging:¹ on every side the citizens rose in rebellion against the assassin whom Pope Gregory and the older Rome delighted to honour; even in Constantinople itself a plot hatched by Germanus was only suppressed after a great part of the city had been destroyed by fire. The ex-empress as a result of these disorders was now immured with her daughters in a convent, while Philippicus and Germanus were forced to become priests.

A persistent rumour affirmed that Theodosius was still alive; for a time Phocas himself must have believed the report, for he put to death his agent Alexander; furthermore Chosroes was thus furnished with a fair-sounding pretext for an invasion of the Empire: he came as avenger of Maurice to whom he owed his throne, and as restorer of Maurice's heir. When in the spring of 603 Phocas despatched Lilius to the Persian court to announce his accession, the ambassador was thrown into chains, and in an arrogant letter Chosroes declared war on Rome. About this time ¹

¹ Cf. H. Felzer, *Die Genesis*, etc., pp. 36 ff.

also (603) Narses revolted, seized Edessa, and appealed to Persia for support. Germanus, now in command of the eastern army,¹ marched to Edessa with orders to recover the city. In the spring of 604 Chosroes led his forces against the Empire, and while part encamped round Dara, he himself made for Edessa to attack the Romans who were themselves besieging Narses. As day broke the Persians fell upon Germanus, who was defeated and eleven days later died of his wounds in Constantina; his men fled in confusion. Chosroes, it would appear, entered Edessa, and (according to the Armenian historian Sebeos) Narses introduced to the Persian king a young man whom he represented to be Theodosius; the pretender was gladly welcomed by Chosroes, who then retired to Dara, where the Romans still resisted the besiegers. On the news of the death of Germanus Phocas realised that all the forces which he could raise were needed for the war in Asia. He increased the annual payments to the Avars, and withdrew the regiments from Thrace (605?). Some of the troops under the command of the eunuch Leontius were ordered to invest Edessa, though Narses soon escaped from this city and reached Hierapolis; the rest of the army marched against Persia, but at Arxamon, between Edessa and Nisibis, Chosroes won a great victory and took numerous captives; about this time, after a year and a half's siege, the walls of Dara were undermined, the fortress captured, and the inhabitants massacred. Laden with booty the Persian monarch returned to Ctesiphon, leaving Zongoes in command in Asia. Leontius was disgraced, and Phocas appointed his Cousin Domentiolus *curopalates* and general-in-chief. Narses was induced to surrender on condition that no harm should be done to him; Phocas disregarded the oath and Rome's best general was burned alive in the capital.

Meanwhile Armenia was devastated by civil war and Persian invasion: Karin opened its gates to the pretended son of Maurice, and Chosroes established a *marzpam* in Dovin. In the year after the siege of Dara (606) Sahrbarâz and Kardarigan entered Mesopotamia and the country bordering on the frontier of Syria; among the towns which surrendered were Amida and Resaina. In 607 Syria, Palestine, and Phœnicia were overrun; in 608 Kardarigan, in conjunction it seems with Sahtn, marched north-west and while the latter occupied Cappadocia, spending a year (608-609) in Caesarea which was evacuated by the Christians, the former made forays into Paphlagonia and Galatia, penetrating even as far west as Chalcedon. In fact the Roman world at this time fell into a state of anarchy, and passions which had long smouldered burst into flame. Blues and Greens fought out their feuds in the streets of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, while on every side men easily persuaded themselves that Theodosius yet lived. Even in Constantinople Germanus thought

¹ Appointed to supersede Narses shortly before Maurice's death, the Emperor being anxious to meet the objections of Persia.

that he could turn to his own profit the popular belief. Our authorities are unsatisfactory but it would seem that two distinct plots with different aims were set on foot. There was a conspiracy among the highest court officials headed by the praetorian praefect of the East, Theodorus : Elpidius, governor of the imperial arsenal, was willing to supply arms, and Phocas was to be slain in the Hippodrome. Theodorus himself would then be proclaimed emperor. Of this plan Germanus obtained warning, and for his part determined to anticipate the scheme by playing upon the public sympathy for the house of Maurice. While nominally championing the cause of Theodosius, he doubtless intended to secure for himself the supreme power. Through a certain Petronia he entered into communication with Constantina, but Petronia betrayed the secret to Phocas. Under torture Constantina accused Germanus of complicity and he in turn implicated others. The rival plot met with no better success. Anastasius, who had been present at the breakfast council where the project was discussed, repented of his treason and informed the Emperor. On 7 June 605 Phocas wreaked his vengeance on the court officials, and about the same time Germanus, Constantina, and her three daughters met their deaths.

Alarms and suspicions haunted the Emperor and terror goaded him to fresh excesses. In 607, it would seem, his daughter Domentzia was married to Priscus, the former general of Maurice, and when the demesmen raised statues to bride and bridegroom, Phocas saw in the act new treason and yet another attempt upon his throne. It was in vain that the authorities pleaded that they were but following long-established custom ; it was only popular clamour that saved the demarchs Theophanes and Pamphilus from immediate execution. Even loyalty was proved dangerous, and anxiety for his personal safety made of a son-in-law a secret foe. The capital was full of plague and scarcity and executions : Comentiolus and all the remaining kindred of Maurice fell victims to the panic fear of Phocas. The Greens themselves turned against the Emperor, taunting him in the circus with his debauchery, and setting on fire the public buildings. Phocas retorted by depriving them of all political rights. He looked around for allies : at least he would win the sympathies of the orthodox in the East, as he had from the first enjoyed the support of Rome. Anastasius, Jacobite patriarch of Alexandria, was expelled : Syria and Egypt, he decreed, should choose no ecclesiastical dignitary without his authorisation. Before the common attack, Monophysite Antioch and Alexandria determined to sink their differences. In 608 the patriarchs met in the Syrian capital. The local authorities interfered, but the Jacobite populace was joined by the Jews in their resistance to the imperial troops. The orthodox patriarch was slain and the rioters gained the day. Phocas despatched Cotton and Bonosus, count of the East, to Antioch ; with hideous cruelty their mission was accomplished, and the Emperor's authority with difficulty re-established.

Thence Bonosus departed for Jerusalem, where the faction fights of Blues and Greens had spread confusion throughout the city.

The tyrant was still master within the capital, but Africa was preparing the expedition which was to cause his overthrow. In 607, or at latest 608, Heraclius, formerly general of Maurice and now exarch, with his *ὑποστράτηγος* Gregory, was planning rebellion. The news reached the ears of Priscus, who had learned to fear his father-in-law's animosity, and negotiations were opened between the Senate and the Pentapolis: the aristocracy was ready to give its aid should a liberator reach the capital. Obviously such a promise was of small value, and Heraclius was forced to rely upon his own resources. But he was at this time advanced in life, and to his son Heraclius and to Gregory's son Nicetas was entrusted the execution of the plot. It is only of recent years, through the discovery of the chronicle of John of Nikiou, that we have been able to construct the history of the operations. First Nicetas was to invade Egypt and secure Alexandria, then Heraclius would take ship for Thessalonica, and from this harbour as his base he would direct his attack upon Constantinople.

During the year 608, 3000 men were raised in the Pentapolis, and these, together with Berber troops, were placed under the command of Bonákis (a spelling which doubtless hides a Roman name) who defeated without difficulty the imperial generals. Leontius, the praefect of Mareotis, was on the side of Heraclius, and the governor of Tripolis arrived with reinforcements. High officials were conspiring to support the rebels in Alexandria itself, when the plot was revealed to Theodore, the imperialist patriarch. When the news reached Phocas he forthwith ordered the praefect of Byzantium to convey fresh troops with all speed to Alexandria and the Delta fortresses, while Bonosus, who was contemplating a seizure of the patriarch of Jerusalem, was summoned to leave the Holy City and to march against Nicetas. On the latter's advance, Alexandria refused to surrender, but resistance was short-lived, and the patriarch and general met their deaths. Treasure, shipping, the island and fortress of Pharos, all fell into the hands of Nicetas,¹ while Bonákis received the submission of many of the Delta towns. At Caesarea, where Bonosus took ship, he heard of the capture of Alexandria, and while his cavalry pursued the land route, his fleet in two divisions sailed up the Nile by the Pelusiac channel and by the main eastern arm of the river. At first Bonosus carried all before him and inflicted a crushing defeat near Manûf on the generals of Heraclius, thereby reconquering the Delta for Phocas, but he was repulsed from Alexandria with heavy loss and suffered so severely in a fresh advance from his base at Nikiou that he was forced to abandon Egypt

¹ According to Theophanes the corn-ships of Alexandria were prevented from reaching the capital from 608 onwards.

and to flee through Asia to Constantinople.¹ The imperialist resistance was at an end and the new rule was established in Egypt (apparently end of 609).

We have no certain information as to what the younger Heraclius was doing during the year 609, but it seems not unlikely that it was at this time that he occupied Thessalonica, for here he could draw reinforcements from the European malcontents. It is at least clear that, when he finally started in 610 on his voyage to Constantinople, he gathered supporters from the sea-side towns and from the islands on his route. At the beginning of September, it would seem, he cast anchor at Abydus in Mysia, where he was joined by those whom Phocas had driven into exile. Crossing the Propontis he touched at Heraclea and Selimbria, and at the small island of Calonymus the Church, through the bishop of Cyzicus, blessed his enterprise. On Saturday, 3 Oct., the fleet, with images of the Virgin at the ships' mastheads, sailed under the sea-walls of the capital. But in face of the secret treachery of Priscus and the open desertion of the demesmen of the Green party, the cause of Phocas was foredoomed; Heraclius waited upon his ship until the tyrant's own ministers dragged his enemy before him on the morning of 5 Oct. "Is it thus, wretch, that you have governed the State?" asked Heraclius. "Will you govern it any better?" retorted the fallen Emperor. He was forthwith struck down, and his body dismembered and carried through the city. Domentiolus and Leontius, the Syrian minister of finance, shared his fate and their bodies, together with that of Bonosus, were burned in the Ox Forum. In the afternoon of the same day Heraclius was crowned emperor by Sergius the patriarch: people and senate refused to listen to his plea that Priscus should be their monarch: they would not see in their liberator merely the avenger of Maurice, nor suffer him to return whence he came. On the same day Heraclius married Eudocia (as his betrothed, Fabia, daughter of Rogatus of Africa, was re-named) who became at once bride and empress. Three days later, in the Hippodrome, the statue of Phocas was burned and with it the standard of the Blues.

During 610 the Persians had been advancing westwards in the direction of Syria: Callinicum and Circesium had fallen and the Euphrates had been crossed. After his accession Heraclius sent an embassy to Persia: Maurice was now avenged, and peace could be restored between the two empires. Chosroes made no reply to the embassy: he had proved all too conclusively Rome's weakness and was not willing to surrender his advantage. Meanwhile Priscus was appointed general and sent to Cappadocia to undertake the siege of Caesarea, which was at this time in the occupation of the Persians. For

¹ For further details see John of Nikiou, and for a map of the Delta cf. Butler, *The Conquest of Egypt*, etc.

a year the enemy resisted, but at last, in the late summer of 611, famine drove them to evacuate the city. They cut their way through the Roman troops, inflicting serious loss, and retired to Armenia where they took up winter quarters. In the same year Emesa was lost to the Empire. In 612, on the news that the Persians were once more about to invade Roman territory in force, Heraclius left the capital to confer with Priscus in Caesarea. The general pleaded illness and treated the Emperor with marked coolness and disrespect. His ambitions were thwarted: he had gained nothing by the revolution and objected that the Emperor's place was in Constantinople: it was no duty of his to intermeddle personally with the conduct of the war. For the moment Heraclius had no forces with which to oppose Priscus; he was condemned to inaction and compelled to await his opportunity. In the summer Sahîr led his army to Karin, and reduced Melitene to submission, afterwards joining Sahrbarâz in the district of Dovin. The Persians were masters of Armenia. In 611 Eudocia had given birth to a daughter and in May 612 a son was born, but on 13 Aug. the Empress died. In 613 the Emperor, despite the protests of the Church, married his niece Martina. In the autumn of 612 Nicetas came to Constantinople, doubtless to confer with Heraclius as to the methods which were to be adopted in the government of Egypt. Priscus also made his way to the capital to honour the arrival of the Emperor's cousin, and was invited by Heraclius to act as sponsor at his son's christening which took place, it would seem, on 5 Dec. 612. Here the Emperor charged his general with treason, and forced him to enter a monastery. In Constantinople Priscus could no longer rely on the support of an army and resistance was impossible. Heraclius appealed to the troops then in the capital, and was enthusiastically greeted as their future captain. Nicetas succeeded Priscus as *comes excubitorum*, while the Emperor appointed his brother Theodore *curopalates*; he also induced Philippicus to leave the shelter of a religious house and once more to undertake a military command.

In the following year (613)¹ Heraclius was free to carry out his own plan of campaign: he determined to oppose the enemy on both their lines of attack. Philippicus was to invade Armenia, while he himself and his brother Theodore would check the Persian advance on Syria. The aim of Chosroes was clearly to occupy the Mediterranean coast line. A battle took place under the walls of Antioch, and there, after their army had been strengthened by reinforcements, the Persians succeeded in routing the Greeks: the road was now open for the southward march, and in this year Damascus fell. Further to the north the Roman troops held the defiles which gave access to Cilicia: though at first victorious,

¹ This chronology, which is not that adopted by recent authorities, the present writer hopes to justify in a detailed account of the campaigns of Heraclius which will shortly appear in the *United Service Magazine*.

in a second engagement they were put to flight; Cilicia and Tarsus were occupied by the enemy. Meanwhile in Armenia Philippicus had encamped at Valarsapat, but was compelled to beat a hurried retreat before the Persian forces. The Romans were repulsed on every side.

But the worst was not yet: with the year 614 came the overwhelming calamity of the fall of the Holy City. Advancing from Caesarea along the coast the Persians under Sahrbarāz arrived before Jerusalem in the month of April. Negotiations were put an end to by the violence of the circus factions, and the Roman relief force from Jericho, which was summoned by Modestus, was put to flight. The Persians pressed forward the siege, bringing up towers and rams, and finally breaching the walls on the twenty-first day from the investment of the city (? 3 or 5 May 614). For three days the massacre lasted, and the Jews joined the victors in venting their spite on their hated oppressors. We hear of 57,000 killed and 35,000 taken captive. Churches went up in flames, the patriarch Zacharias was carried into Persia and with him, to crown the disaster, went the Holy Cross. At the news Nicetas seems to have hastened to Palestine with all speed, but he could do no more than rescue the holy sponge and the holy lance, and these were despatched for safe custody to the capital. It was true that, when once Jerusalem was in his power, Chosroes was prepared to pursue a policy of conciliation: he deserted his former allies and the Jews were banished from the city, while leave was accorded to rebuild the ruined churches; but this did little to assuage the bitterness of the fact that a Christian empire had not been able to protect its most sacred sanctuary from the violence of the barbarian fire-worshipper.

In 615 the Persians began afresh that occupation of Asia Minor which had been interrupted by the evacuation of Caesarea in 611. When Sahrn marched towards Chalcedon, Philippicus invaded Persia, but the effort to draw off the enemy's forces proved unsuccessful. Asia Minor however was not Syria, and Sahrn realised that his position was insecure. He professed himself ready to consider terms of peace. Heraclius sailed over to the enemy's camp and from his ship carried on negotiations with the Persian general. Olympius, praetorian praefect, Leontius, praefect of the city, and Anastasius, the treasurer of St Sophia, were chosen as ambassadors, while the Senate wrote a letter to the Persian monarch in support of the Emperor's action. But as soon as Sahrn had crossed the frontier, the Roman envoys became prisoners and Chosroes would hear no word of peace.

Thus while Syria was lost to the Empire and while Slavs were ranging at will over the European provinces, Heraclius had to face the overwhelming problem of raising the necessary funds to carry on the war. Even from the scanty records which we possess of this period we can trace the Emperor's efforts towards economy: he reduced the number of the clergy who enjoyed office in the capital, and if any above

this authorised number desired residence in Constantinople, they were to buy the privilege from the State (612). Three years later the coins in which the imperial largess was paid were reduced to half their value. But in June 617 (?) yet another disaster overtook Heraclius. The Khagan of the Avars made overtures for peace, and Athanasius the patrician and Kosmas the quaestor arranged a meeting between the Emperor and the barbarian chief at Heraclea. Splendid religious rites and a magnificent circus display were to mark the importance of the occasion, and huge crowds had poured forth from the city gates to be present at the festivities. But it was no longer increased money payments that the Khagan sought: he aimed at nothing less than the capture of Constantinople. At a sign from his whip the ambushed troops burst forth from their hiding-places about the Long Walls. Heraclius saw his peril: throwing off his purple, with his crown under his arm, he fled at a gallop to the city and warned its inhabitants. Over the plain of the Hebdomon and up to the Golden Gate surged the Avar host: they raided the suburbs, they pillaged the church of Saints Cosmas and Damian in the Hebdomon, they crossed the Golden Horn and broke in pieces the holy table in the church of the Archangel. Fugitives who escaped reported that 270,000 prisoners, men and women, had been swept away to be settled beyond the Danube, and there was none to stay the Khagan's march. In 618 those who were entitled at the expense of the State to share in the public distribution of loaves of bread were forced to make a contribution at the rate of three *nomismata* to the loaf, and a few months later (Aug. 618) the public distribution was entirely suspended. Even such a deprivation as this was felt to be inevitable: the chronicle of events in the capital does not record any popular outbreak.

It was probably in the spring of 619 that the next step was taken in the Persian plan of conquest, when Sahrbarâz invaded Egypt. He advanced by the coast road, capturing Pelusium and spreading havoc amongst its numerous churches and monasteries. Babylon, near Memphis, fell, and thence the Persians, supported by a strong flotilla, followed the main western branch of the Nile past Nikiou to Alexandria and began the siege of the Egyptian capital. All the Emperor's measures were indeed of little avail when Armenia, Rome's recruiting ground, was occupied by Persia, and when Sahrbarâz, encamped round Alexandria, had cut off the supply of Egyptian grain so that the capital suffered alike from pestilence and scarcity of food. The sole province which appeared to offer any hope to the exhausted treasury was Africa, and here only, it seemed, could an effective army be raised. It was with African troops that Nicetas had won Egypt in 609: even now, with Carthage as a base of operations, the Persians might surely be repelled and Egypt regained. Thus reasoning, Heraclius prepared to set sail from Europe (619?). When his determination became known,

Constantinople was in despair; the inhabitants refused to see themselves deserted and the patriarch extracted an oath from the Emperor that he would not leave his capital. The turbulence of New Rome itself seems to have been silenced in this dark hour.

In Egypt Nicetas, despairing of the defence of Alexandria, had fled from the city, and Persians, disguised as fisher-folk, had entered the harbour at dawn with the other fishing-boats, cutting down any who resisted them, and had thrown open the gates to the army of Sahrbarāz (June 619). It did indeed seem that Chosroes was to be the master of the Roman world. About this time too (we do not know the precise year) the Persians, having collected a fleet,¹ attacked Constantinople by water: it may well have been that this assault was timed to follow close upon the raid of the Avar horde. But upon the sea at least the Empire asserted its supremacy. The Persians fled, four thousand men perished with their ships, and the enemy did not dare to renew the attempt.

Heraclius realised that in order to carry war into Asia there must at all costs be peace in Europe. He sacrificed his pride and concluded a treaty with the Khagan (619). He raised 200,000 *nomismata* and sent² as hostages to the Avars his own bastard son John or Athalarich, his cousin Stephanus, and John the bastard son of Bonus the *magister*. Sergius had forced Heraclius to swear that he would not abandon Constantinople, and the Church now supplied the funds for the new campaign. It agreed to lend at interest its vast wealth in plate that the gold and silver might be minted into money; for this was no ordinary struggle: it was a crusade to rescue from the infidel the Holy City and the Holy Cross. Christian State and Christian Church must join hands against a common foe. While Persian troops overran Asia, penetrating even to Bithynia and the Black Sea, Heraclius made his preparations and studied his plan of campaign. From Africa he had been borne to empire under the protection of the Mother of God, and now it was with a conviction of the religious solemnity of his mission that he withdrew into privacy during the winter of 621 before he challenged the might of the unbeliever. He himself, despite the criticism of his subjects, would lead his forces in the field: in the strength of the God of Battles he would conquer or die.

On 4 April 622 Heraclius held a public communion; on the following day he summoned Sergius the patriarch and Bonus the *magister*, together with the senate, the principal officials and the entire populace of the capital. Turning to Sergius, he said: "Into the hands of God and of His Mother and into thine I commend this city and my son." After solemn prayer in the cathedral, the Emperor took the sacred image of the Saviour and bore it from the church in his arms. The troops

¹ These may have been Roman ships captured at Tarsus and other harbours at this time occupied by Persia.

² So modern historians: but perhaps these hostages were given in 623.

then embarked and in the evening of the same day, 5 April, the fleet set sail. Despite a violent storm on 6 April the Emperor arrived in safety at the small town of Pylae in the Bay of Nicomedia. Thence Heraclius marched "into the region of the themes," *i.e.* in all probability Galatia and perhaps Cappadocia. Here the work of concentration was carried out: the Emperor collected the garrisons and added to their number his new army. In his first campaign the object of Heraclius was to force the Persian troops to withdraw from Asia Minor: he sought to pass the enemy on the flank, to threaten his communications, and to appear to be striking at the very heart of his native country. The Persians had occupied the mountains, hoping thus to confine the imperial troops within the Pontic provinces during the winter, but by clever strategy Heraclius turned their position and marched towards Armenia. Sahrbaráz endeavoured to draw the Roman army after him by a raid on Cilicia; but, realising that Heraclius could thus advance unopposed through Armenia into the interior of Persia, he abandoned the project and followed the Emperor. Heraclius at length forced a general engagement and won a signal victory. The Persian camp was captured and Sahrbaráz's army almost entirely destroyed. Rumours of impending trouble with the western barbarians in Europe recalled Heraclius to the capital, and his army went into winter quarters. The Emperor had freed Asia Minor from the invader.

Chosroes now addressed a haughty letter to Heraclius which the Emperor caused to be read before his ministers and the patriarch: the despatch itself was laid before the high altar and all with tears implored the succours of Heaven. In reply to Chosroes Heraclius offered the Persian monarch an alternative: either let him accept conditions of peace, or, should he refuse, the Roman army would forthwith invade his kingdom. On 25 March 623 the Emperor left the capital, and celebrated Easter in Nicomedia on 15 April, awaiting, it would seem, the enemy's answer. Here, in all probability, he learned that Chosroes refused to consider terms and treated with contempt the threat of invasion. Thus (20 April) Heraclius set out on his invasion of Persia, marching into Armenia with all speed by way of Caesarea, where he had ordered his army to assemble.¹ Chosroes had commanded Sahrbaráz to make a raid upon the territory of the Empire, but on the news of the sudden advance of Heraclius he was immediately recalled, and was bidden to join his forces to the newly raised troops under Sahln. From Caesarea Heraclius proceeded through Karin to Dovin: the Christian capital of the province of Ararat was stormed, and after the capture of Nachčavan he made for Ganzaca (Takhti-Solefmán), since he heard that Chosroes was here in person at the head of 40,000 men. On the defeat of his guards,

¹ The reader is warned that this paragraph rests upon an interpretation of the authorities which is peculiar to the present writer. This he hopes to justify in his special study (to appear in *B.Z.* June 1912) on the date of the Avar surprise.

however, the Persian king fled before the invaders; the city fell, while the great temple which sheltered the fire of Ušnasp was reduced to ruins. Heraclius followed after Chosroes, and sacked many cities on his march, but did not venture to press the pursuit: before him lay the enemy's country and the Persian army, while his rear might at any moment be threatened by the united advance of Sahrbarāz and Sahln. Despite opposition, extreme cold, and scarcity of provisions he crossed the Araxes in safety, carrying some 50,000 prisoners in his train. It was shrewd policy which dictated their subsequent release; it created a good impression and, as a result, there were fewer mouths to feed.

It was doubtless primarily as a recruiting ground that Heraclius sought these Caucasian districts — the home of hardy and warlike mountaineers — for the sorely harried provinces of Asia Minor were probably in no condition to supply him with large contingents of troops. This is not however the place to recount in detail the complicated story of the operations of the winter of 623 and of the year 624. Sahln was utterly discomfited at Tigranokert, but Heraclius was himself forced to retire into Armenia before the army of Sahrbarāz (winter, 623). With the spring of 624 we find Lazcs, Abasges, and Iberians as Roman allies, though they subsequently deserted the Emperor when disappointed in their expectations of spoil and plunder. Heraclius was once more unable to penetrate into Persia, but was occupied in Armenia, marching and countermarching between forces commanded by Sarablangas, Sahrbarāz and Sahln. Sarablangas was slain, and late in the year Van was captured, and Sarbar surprised in his winter quarters at Arces or Arsissa (at the N.E. end of Lake Van). The Persian general was all but taken prisoner, and very few of the garrison, 6000 strong, escaped destruction.

With the new year (625) Heraclius determined to return to the West, before he once more attempted a direct attack upon Persia. We can only conjecture the reasons which led him to take this step, but it would seem probable that the principal inducement was a desire to assert Roman influence in the south of Asia Minor and in the islands. The Persians had occupied Cilicia before the capture of Jerusalem; in 623 it would appear that they had made a raid upon Rhodes, had seized the Roman general and led off the inhabitants as prisoners, while in the same year we are told that the Slavs had entered Crete. There is some evidence which points to the conclusion that the Emperor was at this time very anxious to recover the ground thus lost. There was considerable doubt however as to which route should be pursued — that through Taranda or that by way of the Taurus chain. The latter was chosen despite its difficulty, as it was thought that provisions would be thus more plentiful. From Van the army advanced through Martyropolis and Amida, where the troops rested. But meanwhile Sahrbarāz, in hot pursuit, had arrived first at the Euphrates and removed the bridge of boats. The Emperor however crossed by a ford and reached Samosata

before March was out. As to the precise route which he followed on his march to the Sarus there is considerable dispute,¹ but there is no doubt that after a hotly contested engagement on that river Heraclius forced the Persian general to beat a hasty retreat under cover of night. It seems probable that the Emperor remained for a considerable time in this district, but our sources fail us here, and we know only that he ultimately marched to Sebastia, and crossing the Halys spent the winter in that Pontic district where he had left his army at the end of the first campaign.

The following year (626) is memorable for the great siege of the capital by the united hordes of Avars, Bulgars, Slavs, and Gepids, acting in concert with a Persian force, which endeavoured to co-operate with them from the Asiatic side of the strait. Sarbar's ill success on the Sarus led Chosroes, we are told, to withdraw from his command 50,000 men and to place them, together with a new army raised indiscriminately from foreigners, citizens, and slaves, under the leadership of Sahñ. Sahrbaráz, with the remainder of his army, took up his position at Chalcedon with orders to support the Khagan in his attack on Constantinople. Heraclius in turn divided his forces: part were sent to garrison the capital, part he entrusted to his brother Theodore who was to meet the "Golden Lances" of Sahñ, and the rest the Emperor himself retained. Of Theodore's campaign we know nothing save the result: with the assistance of a timely hail-storm and by the aid of the Virgin he so signally defeated Sahñ that the latter died of mortification. Of the operations in Europe we are better informed. From the moment that Heraclius had left the capital on his crusade against Persia the Khagan had been making vast preparations, in the hope of capturing Constantinople. It was the menace from the Danubian provinces which had recalled Heraclius in the winter of 623, and now at last the Avar host was ready. On Sunday, 29 June, on the festival of St Peter and St Paul, the advance guard, 30,000 strong, reached the suburb of Melanthias and announced that their leader had passed within the circuit of the Long Walls. Early in the year, it seems, Bonus and Sergius had sent the patrician Athanasius as an ambassador to the Avar chief, virtually offering to buy him off at his own terms. But since the spring the walls had been strengthened, reinforcements had arrived from Heraclius, and his stirring letters had awakened in the citizens a new spirit of confidence and enthusiasm. Athanasius, who had been kept a prisoner by the Khagan, was now sent from Hadrianople to learn the price at which the capital was prepared to purchase safety. He was amazed at the change in public feeling, but volunteered to carry back the city's proud reply. On 29 July 626 the Avars and the countless forces of their subject tribesmen encamped

¹ There are difficulties in accepting the emendations of the text of Theophanes proposed by J. G. C. Anderson, "The Road-System of Eastern Asia Minor," *J. H. S.* xvii. (1897), pp. 33-34.

before New Rome. The full story of the heroic defence cannot be related in this place, but one consideration is too important to be omitted. Had the Romans not been masters of the sea, the issue might well have been less favourable; but the small Slav boats were all sunk or overturned in the waters of the Golden Horn, while Sahrbarâz at Chalcedon was doomed to remain inactive, for Persia possessed no transports and the Roman fleet made it impossible for the besiegers to carry their allies across the straits. Thus at the very time that the barbarian attack by sea collapsed in hopeless failure, the citizens had repulsed with heavy loss the assault on the land walls which was directed mainly against that section where the depression of the Lycus valley rendered the defences most vulnerable. At length, on the eleventh day after his appearance before Constantinople, the Khagan destroyed by fire his engines of war and withdrew, vowing a speedy return with forces even more overwhelming. As the suburbs of the city and the churches of Saints Cosmas and Damian and St Nicholas went up in flames, men marked that the shrine of the Mother of God in Blachernae remained inviolate: it was but one more token of her power—her power with God, with her Son, and in the general ordering of the world. The preservation of the city was the Virgin's triumph, it was her answer to the prayers of her servants, and with an annual festival the Church celebrated the memory of the great deliverance. Bonus and Sergius had loyally responded to their Emperor's trust.¹

This was indeed the furthest advance of the Avars. They had appeared in the Eastern Alps as early as 595-596, and had formally invested Thessalonica in 597; it would seem that the city was only saved through an outbreak of pestilence amongst the besiegers.² After 604 there was no Roman army in the Danube provinces, and in the reign of Phocas and the early years of Heraclius must be placed the ravaging of Dalmatia by Avars and Slavs and the fall of Salonae and other towns. At this time fugitives from Salonae founded the city of Spalato, and those from Epidaurus the settlement which afterwards became Ragusa. A contemporary tells how the Slavs in those dark days of confusion and rage plundered the greater part of Illyricum, all Thessaly, Epirus, Achaia, the Cyclades, and a part of Asia. In another passage the same author relates how Avars and Slavs destroyed the towns in the provinces of Pannonia, Moesia Superior, the two Dacias, Rhodope, Dardania, and Praevalis, carrying off the inhabitants into slavery. Fallmerayer's famous contention that the Greek people was virtually exterminated is certainly an exaggeration, though throughout Hellas there must have been Slav forays, and many a barbarian band

¹ The date of the composition of the *Hymnus Acathistus* would appear, despite an enormous literature on the subject, to remain still undetermined.

² Pestilence had also served the city well when besieged by the Goths. For the siege, cf. W. Wroth, *op. cit.* i. p. xxi.

must have planted itself on Greek soil. But when all is said, the remarkable fact remains that while in the Danube provinces Roman influence was submerged, Hellenism within its native territory asserted its supremacy over the Slav invader and maintained alike its natural language and character. Thus towards the close of our period amongst the chaos of peoples making good their independence of the Avar overlordship there gradually emerged certain settlements which formed the nucleus of nations yet to be. Not that Heraclius invited into the Empire Croats and Serbs from a mythical Servia and Croatia somewhere in the North — Croats and Serbs had already won by force their own ground within the Roman frontier — but rather he recognised and legalised their position as vassals of the Empire, and thus took up the proud task of educating the southern Slavs to receive civilisation and Christianity.

In 626, while the capital played its part, the Emperor was making provision for striking a conclusive blow at Persia. He needed allies and reinforcements, and he once more sought them among the tribesmen of the Caucasus. It is probable that as early as the autumn of 625 he had sent a certain Andrew as envoy to the Chazars,¹ and in 626 a force of 1000 men invaded the valley of the Kur and pillaged Iberia and Eger, so that Chosroes threatened punishment and talked of withdrawing Sahlūn from the West. The Chazars even took ship and visited the Emperor, when mutual vows of friendship were interchanged. In the early summer of 627 the nephew of Dzubukhan (Ziebel) ravaged Albania and parts of Atrpatakan. Later in the year (after June 627), envious of the booty thus won, the Chazar prince took the field in person with his son, and captured the strongly fortified post of Derbend. Gashak, who had been despatched by Persia to organise the defence of the north, was unable to protect the city of Partav and fled ignominiously. After these successes Dzubukhan joined the Emperor (who took ship from Trebizond²) in the siege of Tiflis. The Chazar chieftain, irritated by a pumpkin caricature of himself which the inhabitants had displayed upon the walls, was eager for revenge and refused to abandon the investment of the city, though he agreed to give the Emperor a large force raised from his subjects when the Roman army started on the last great campaign in the autumn of 627.³

¹ The chronology of this paragraph rests in part upon the view that Moses of Kagankaitukh Kal has effected some transpositions in the apparently contemporary source which was used by him in this part of his work.

² Our sources are agreed that Heraclius went to the Chazar country by ship. The departure from Trebizond is on conjecture based on Eutychius, ed. Pococke, II. p. 231. For a discussion of the authorities, cf. Gerland, *B. Z.* III., pp. 341 ff.

³ Tiflis subsequently fell: on the peace of 628 Iberia became once more Roman, and Heraclius set Adarnase I upon the throne; cf. J. Marquart, *Osteuropäische und asiatische Streifzüge*, pp. 400 ff.

Heraclius advanced through Sirak to the Araxes, and, crossing the river, entered the province of Ararat. He now found himself opposed by Râhzâdh, a Persian general who was probably advancing to the relief of Tiflis. But though the Chazar auxiliaries, dismayed by the approach of winter and by the attacks of the Persians, returned to their homes, the Emperor continued his march southward through Her and Zarewand west of the Lake of Urmijah and reached the province of Atrpatakan. Pressing forward, he crossed the mountain chain which divides Media from Assyria, arriving at Chnaitha 9 Oct., where he gave his men a week's rest. Râhzâdh had meanwhile reached Ganzaca and thence followed the Emperor across the mountains, suffering severely on his march from scarcity of supplies. By 1 Dec. the Emperor reached the greater Zab and, crossing the river (*i.e.* marching north-west), took up his position at Nineveh. Here (12 Dec.) he won a decisive victory over Râhzâdh. The Persian general himself fell, and his troops, though not completely demoralised, were in no condition to renew the struggle. On 21 Dec. the Emperor learned that the defeated Persians had effected a junction with the reinforcements, 3000 strong, sent from the capital; he continued his southern march, however, crossing the lesser Zab (28 Dec.) and spending Christmas on the estates of the wealthy superintendent of provincial taxation, Iesdem. During the festival, acting on urgent despatches from Chosroes, the Persian army crossed the Zab higher up its course, and thus interposed a barrier between Heraclius and Ctesiphon. The Emperor on his advance found the stream of the Torna (probably the N. arm of the Nahr Wân canal) undefended, while the Persians had retreated so hurriedly that they had not even destroyed the bridge. After the passage of the Torna he reached (1 Jan. 628) Beklal (? Beit-Germa), and there learnt that Chosroes had given up his position on the Berâzrûd canal, had deserted Dastagerd and fled to Ctesiphon. Dastagerd was thus occupied without a struggle and three hundred Roman standards were recovered, while the troops were greeted by numbers of those who had been carried prisoners from Edessa, Alexandria, and other cities of the Empire. On 7 Jan. Heraclius advanced from Dastagerd towards Ctesiphon, and on 10 Jan. he was only twelve miles from the Nahr Wân; but the Armenians, who had been sent forward to reconnoitre, brought back word that in face of the Persian troops it was impossible to force the passage of the canal. Heraclius after the battle of Nineveh had been, it would seem, ready to make terms, but Chosroes had rejected his overtures. In an enemy's country, with Persian troops in a strong defensive position blocking his path, with his forces in all probability much reduced and with no present opportunity of raising others, knowing that Sahrbarâz was still in command of a Persian army in the West with which he could attack his rear, while the severity of winter, though delayed, was now threatening, Heraclius was compelled to retreat. Chosroes had at least been driven to inglorious

flight: the disgrace might well weaken his subjects' loyalty, and any such lessening of the royal prestige could only strengthen the position of the Romans; the Emperor even by his enforced withdrawal might not thereby lose the fruits of victory. By Shehrizûr he returned to Baneh, and thence over the Zagros chain to Ganzaca, where he arrived 11 March — only just in time, for snow began to fall 24 Feb. and made the mountain roads impassable.

But with the spring no new campaign was necessary; on 3 April 628 an envoy from the Persian court reached Ganzaca announcing the violent death of Chosroes and the accession of his son Siroes; the latter offered to conclude peace, and this proposal Heraclius was willing to accept. On 8 April the embassy left for Ctesiphon, while on the same day the Emperor turned his face homeward and in a despatch to the capital, announcing the end of the struggle, expressed the hope that he would soon see his people again. It is uncertain what were the precise terms of the peace of 628, but they included the restoration of the Cross and the evacuation of the Empire's territory by the armies of Persia. It is probable that the Roman frontier was to follow the line agreed upon in the treaty of 591. These conditions were, it would seem, accepted by Siroes (Feb.-Sept. 628), but Sahrbarâz had never moved from Western Asia since 626 and it was doubtful whether he would comply with such terms. Thus when the Cross was once more in Roman hands, Heraclius was able to distribute portions of the Holy Wood amongst the more influential Christians of Armenia — a politic prelude to his schemes of church union — but felt it necessary to remain in the East to secure the triumph which he had so hardly won. After a winter spent at Amida, in the early spring the Emperor journeyed to Jerusalem and (23 March 629) amidst a scene of unbounded religious enthusiasm restored to the Holy City the instrument of the world's salvation. On the feast of St Lazarus (7 April) the news reached Constantinople, and Christendom celebrated a new resurrection from the power of its oppressors; a fragment of the true Cross sent from Jerusalem served but to deepen the city's exultation.¹

Sahrbarâz however refused to withdraw his army from Roman soil, and in June 629 Heraclius met him at Arabissus and purchased his concurrence by a promise to support him with imperial troops in his attempt to secure the Persian throne. Sahrbarâz marched to Ctesiphon, only to perish after a month's reign, and thus the Empire was freed from the invader. In September Heraclius returned to the capital and after six years' campaigning enjoyed a well-earned sabbath of repose. It is an important moment in Roman history: the King of kings, the Empire's only rival, was humbled and Heraclius could now for the first time add

¹ This chronology differs widely from that adopted by recent authors (*e.g.* Bolotov and Marr).

to the imperial style the proud title of βασιλεύς. The restoration of the Cross suggested the sign which had been given to the great Constantine, and Africa adopted (629) the first Greek inscription to be found on the imperial coinage—the motto ἐν τούτῳ νίκα. This may stand for us as a symbol of the decline of the Latin element within the Empire: from the reign of Phocas the old Roman names disappear and those of Graeco-Oriental origin take their place.

With these campaigns the period of the successors of Justinian has reached its end and a new epoch begins. The great contest between the Empires has weakened both combatants and has rendered possible the advance of the invaders from the South. Spain has driven out her last imperial garrisons, the Lombards are settled in Italy, the Slavs have permanently occupied the Danubian provinces—Rome's dominions take a new shape and the statesmen of Constantinople are faced with fresh problems. Imperialist dreams are past, and for a time there is no question of expansion: at moments it is a struggle for bare existence. In his capital the old Emperor, broken in health and harassed by domestic feuds, watches the peril from the desert spreading over the lands which his sword had regained and views the ruin of his cherished plans for a united Empire.

The character of Heraclius has fascinated the minds of historians from the time of Gibbon to the present day, but surely much of the riddle rests in our scanty knowledge of the early years of his reign: the more we know, the more comprehensible does the Emperor become. At the first Priscus commanded the troops and Priscus was disaffected: Heraclius was powerless, for he had no army with which to oppose his mutinous general. With the disappearance of Priscus the Emperor was faced with the problem of raising men and money from a ruined and depopulated empire. After the ill-success of his untrained army in 613, by the loss of Syria and Egypt the richest provinces and even the few recruiting grounds that remained fell into the enemy's hands. Heraclius was powerless: the taunt of Phocas must have rung in his ears: "Will you govern the Empire any better?" Africa appeared the sole way of escape: among those who knew him and his family he might awake sacrifice and enthusiasm and obtain the sinews of war. The project worked wonders—but in other ways than he had schemed. Men were impressed by the strength of his sincerity and the force of his personality—more, the Church would lend her wealth. Then came the Khagan's treachery—the loss of thousands of men who might have been enrolled in the new regiments which he was raising: the peace with the Avars and after two more years had been spent in further preparations, including probably the building of fresh fortifications for the capital which he was leaving to its own resources, the campaigns against Persia. At last, through long-continued hardships in the field, through ceaseless labours that defied ill-health, his physical strength gave way and he

became a prey to disease and nervous fears. Do we really need fine-spun psychological theories to explain the reign with its alternations of failure and success? It may at least be doubted.

Yet it is not in these last years of gloom and suspicion that we would part with Heraclius: we would rather recall in him despite all his limitations the successful general, the unremitting worker for the preservation and unity of the Empire which he had sailed from Africa to save, an enthusiast with the power to inspire others, a practical mystic serving the Lord Christ and the Mother of God—one of the greatest of Rome's Caesars.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(1) The following abbreviations are used for titles of periodicals:

AARAB.	Annales de l'Académie royale d'archéologie de Belgique. Antwerp.
AB.	Analecta Bollandiana. Brussels.
ABe.	Archives belges. Liège.
AHR.	American Historical Review. New York and London.
AKKR.	Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht. Mainz.
AM.	Annales du Midi. Toulouse.
AMur.	Archivio Muratoriano. Rome.
ASAK.	Anzeiger für schweizerische Alterthumskunde. Zurich.
ASHF.	Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France. Paris.
ASI.	Archivio storico italiano. Florence.
ASL.	Archivio storico Lombardo. Milan.
ASRSP.	Archivio della Società romana di storia patria. Rome.
BCRH.	Bulletins de la Commission royale d'histoire. Brussels.
BHisp.	Bulletin hispanique. Bordeaux.
BRAH.	Boletin de la R. Academia de la historia. Madrid.
BZ.	Byzantinische Zeitschrift. Leipsic.
CQR.	Church Quarterly Review. London.
CR.	Classical Review. London.
CRSA.	Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. Paris.
DZG.	Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. Freiburg-i.-B.
DZKR.	Deutsche Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht. Leipsic.
EHR.	English Historical Review. London.
FDG.	Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte.
HJ.	Historisches Jahrbuch. Munich.
Hm.	Hermes. Berlin.
HVJS.	Historische Vierteljahresschrift. Leipsic.
HZ.	Historische Zeitschrift (von Sybel). Munich and Berlin.
JA.	Journal Asiatique. Paris.
JB.	Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft im Auftrage der historischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin. 1878 ff. Berlin.
JHS.	Journal of Hellenic Studies. London.
JRAS.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. London.
JRGS.	Journal of the Royal Geographical Society. London.
JSG.	Jahrbuch für schweizerische Geschichte. Zurich.
JTS.	Journal of Theological Studies. London.
MA.	Le moyen âge. Paris.
MIOGF.	Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung. Innsbruck.

NAGDG.	Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde. Hanover and Leipsic.
NRDF.	Nouvelle Revue historique du droit français. Paris.
QFIA.	Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken. Rome.
RA.	Revue archéologique. Paris.
RBAB.	Revue des bibliothèques et des archives de la Belgique. Brussels.
RBén.	Revue bénédictine. Maredsous.
RCel.	Revue celtique. Paris.
RCHL.	Revue critique d'histoire et de littérature. Paris.
RH.	Revue historique. Paris.
RHD.	Revue d'histoire diplomatique. Paris.
RHE.	Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique. Louvain.
Rhein.	
Mus.	Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Frankfurt-a.-M.
RN.	Revue de numismatique. Paris.
ROC.	Revue de l'Orient chrétien. Paris.
RQCA.	Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte. Rome.
RQH.	Revue des questions historiques. Paris.
RSH.	Revue de synthèse historique. Paris.
RSI.	Rivista storica italiana. Turin.
RSS.	Rivista di scienze storiche. Pavia.
SKAW.	Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vienna. [Phil. hist. Classe.]
SPAW.	Sitzungsberichte der kön. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin.
SS.	Studi Storici. Pavia.
TQS.	Theologische Quartalschrift. Tübingen.
TRHS.	Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. London.
TSK.	Theologische Studien und Kritiken. Gotha.
VV.	Vizantiiskii Vremennik. St Petersburg.
ZCK.	Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst. Düsseldorf.
ZKG.	Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte. Gotha.
ZKT.	Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie. Gotha.
ZR.	Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte. Weimar. 1861-78. Continued as
ZSR.	Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtswissenschaft. Weimar. 1880 ff.
ZWT.	Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie. Frankfurt-a.-M.

(2) Among other abbreviations used (*see General Bibliography*) are :

AcadIBL.	Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
AcadIP.	Académie Impériale de Pétersbourg.
AllgDB.	Allgemeine deutsche Biographie.
ASBoll.	Acta Sanctorum Bollandiana.
BEC.	Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes.
BGen.	Nouvelle Biographie générale.
BHE.	Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études.
BUniv.	Biographie universelle.
CIG.	Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum.
CIL.	Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
CSCO.	Corpus scriptorum christianorum orientalium.
CSEL.	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum.
CSHB.	Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae.
DCA.	Dictionary of Christian Antiquities.

DCB.	Dictionary of Christian Biography.
DNB.	Dictionary of National Biography.
EefrAR.	École française d'Athènes et de Rome. Paris.
EETS.	Early English Text Society.
EncBr.	Encyclopædia Britannica.
FHG.	Müller's Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum.
KAW.	Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vienna.
MGH.	Monumenta Germaniae Historica.
MPG.	Migne's Patrologiae cursus completus. Ser. graeca.
MPL.	Migne's Patrologiae cursus completus. Ser. latina.
PAW.	Königliche preussische Akademie d. Wissenschaften. Berlin.
RAH.	Real Academia de la Historia. Madrid.
RE ³ .	Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie, etc.
RGS.	Royal Geographical Society.
RHS.	Royal Historical Society.
SHF.	Société d'histoire française.

In the case of many other works given in the General Bibliography abbreviations as stated there are used.

Abh.	Abhandlungen.	kais.	kaiserlich.
J.	Journal.	kön.	königlich.
Jahrb.	Jahrbuch.	mem.	memoir.
R.	Review, Revue.	mém.	mémoire.
Viert.	Vierteljahrschrift.	n.s.	new series.
Z.	Zeitschrift.	publ.	publication.
antiq.	antiquarian, antiquaire.	roy.	royal, royale.
coll.	collections.	ser.	series.
hist.	history, historical, historique, historisch.	soc.	society.

CHAPTER IX

THE SUCCESSORS OF JUSTINIAN

[This Bibliography does not deal with Spain, Italy, the conquests of the Arabs, Monothelitism, the system of military Themes, nor with the literature upon the Hymnus Acathistus. A more complete critical bibliography will be given in the author's forthcoming "Bibliography for the History of the Roman Empire from Anastasius to Heraclius."]

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- 410 Sack of Rome by Alaric.
- 429 Mission of Germanus and Lupus to Britain.
- 430 Death of Augustine.
- 432-461 St Patrick in Ireland.
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- 455 Sack of Rome by the Vandals.
- 481-511 Reign of Clovis.
- 482 The *Henoticon* of Zeno.
- 493 Traditional date of Cerdic.
- 493-526 Reign of Theodoric in Italy.
- 506 Issue of the *Breviarium Alarici*.
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- 511 Division of the Frankish kingdom by the sons of Clovis.
- 518 Justin I Emperor.
- 527-565 Reign of Justinian.
- 529 The Schools of Athens closed.
- 532 The *Nika* riot.
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- 534 Frankish conquest of the Burgundians.
- 535-553 The Gothic War.
- 537-538 The great siege of Rome by the Goths.
- 540 Capture of Ravenna by Belisarius.
- 541 Abolition of the Consulships.
- 548 Death of Theodora.
- 552 Battle of Taginae.
- 553 Battle of the Lactarian Mount.
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- 554 Conquest of Southern Spain by the Imperial forces.
- 558 The Huns before Constantinople.
- 560-616 Reign of Aethelberht in Kent.
- 561 Division of the Frankish kingdom by the sons of Chlotar I.
- 565 Justin II Emperor.
- 568 Invasion of Italy by the Lombards.
- c. 570 Birth of Mahomet.

- 575 Assassination of Sigebert.
 578 Tiberius II Emperor.
 582 Maurice Emperor.
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 794 Diet of Frankfort.
 795 Capture of the Avar Ring.
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915 Saracens driven from the Garigliano.
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1061-1091 Norman conquest of Sicily.

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Notes and Documents

The Restoration of the Cross at Jerusalem

IN an elaborate paper recently published Bolotov has studied the chronology of the years 628–30 of our era. In the present note I desire to show that the Russian scholar's suggested reconstruction is untenable and, further, to propose a different solution.¹ The crucial point in the discussion is the date of the restoration of the Cross, which had been captured by the Persians on the fall of Jerusalem in 614. Bolotov's reconstruction of the chronology² may be roughly outlined as follows: After the preliminary negotiations of Heraclius with Persia in the spring of 628, of which an account is given in the Paschal chronicle, Sheroe (or Kobad) sent the newly appointed Catholicos Ishoyab on an embassy to the emperor (August–September 628). The Persian king was mortally ill at the time, and was anxious that Heraclius should protect his infant son Ardeshir:³ he would choose a Christian to influence a Christian, and the mission was the more

¹ See V. Bolotov, *K Istarii Imperatora Irakliya*, in *Vizantiiskii Vremennik*, xiv (1907), St. Petersburg, 1908, pp. 68–124; E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of Governors, The Historia Monastica of Thomas Bishop of Marga A.D. 840*, 2 vols., London, 1893; J. Labourt, *Le Christianisme dans l'Empire perse sous la dynastie Sassanide*, in *Bibliothèque de l'Enseignement de l'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 2^{me} édition, Paris, 1904; N. Marr, *Antiokh Stratig, Plyenienie Ierusalima Persami v 614 g.*, St. Petersburg, 1909; *Tekstui i Razuiskaniya po armyano-gruzinskoi Philologii*, Kniga viii, *Izdaniya Fakulteta Vostochnykh yazykov imperatorskago S. Peterburgskago Universiteta* (if Marr's work should be inaccessible, see Archimandrit Kallistos, 'Ἀντίοχος Στρατήγιος, Ἰεροσολίμους τῆς Ἱερουσαλὴμ ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν τῇ 614 Γεωργιανὸν κείμενον, &c., ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις. τύποις Π. Τάφου 1910, reprinted from *Néa Σιών ΣΤ καὶ Ζ' ἔτους*, which gives a résumé of Marr's work and a Greek translation of the Georgian text, and compare also F. C. Conybeare, *ante*, xxv. 502, 1910); Th. Nöldeke, *Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sassaniden, aus der arabischen Chronik des Tabari*, &c., Leyden, 1879 (cited hereafter as *Geschichte*), and *Die von Guidi herausgegebene syrische Chronik, in Sitzungsberichte der kaiserl. Akad. der Wissenschaften in Wien*, cxxviii, Abh. ix, 1893; A. Pernice, *L'Imperatore Eraclio, Saggio di Storia Bizantina (Pubblicazioni del reale Istituto di Studi Superiori Pratici e di Perfezionamento in Firenze, 1905)*; L. Sternbach, in *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejetnosci. Wydział Filologiczny*, Serya ii, tom. xv, Krakow, 1900, and *Georgii Pisidae Carmina Inedita (Wiener Studien*, xiii (1891), pp. 1–62; xiv (1892), pp. 51–68); W. A. Wigram, *An Introduction to the History of the Assyrian Church or the Church of the Sassanid Persian Empire*, London, 1910.

² *Op. cit.* pp. 77–94.

³ Compare the confused notice in Nicephorus 20²¹, ed. de Boor.

likely to succeed if Ishoyab bore with him the Holy Cross. The delay in sending this may well have been due to the difficulty of discovering the sacred relic, which might have been placed, Bolotov suggests,⁴ in one of the monasteries, either Nestorian or Monophysite, favoured at different times by Sirin, the Christian wife of Chosroes;⁵ its precise location might have been thus uncertain.⁶ The solemnity of the occasion and the fact that Ishoyab was unaccompanied by other Nestorian bishops serve to explain why the Catholicos ventured to attend a celebration of the eucharist in the emperor's presence, probably at Theodosiopolis.⁷ Heraclius then held the synod of Karin (i.e. Theodosiopolis) and effected a union with the Armenian church (in the winter of 628-9), after which he distributed pieces of the true Cross among the notables of Armenia and thence proceeded to Caesarea.⁸ From Caesarea, it would seem, Heraclius sent the true Cross to Constantinople,⁹ and in June the Persians began to evacuate Roman territory, while in July 629 the emperor finally concluded terms of peace with Sahrbarâz at Arabissos Tripotamos.¹⁰ He returned to Constantinople, probably in September 629, and in the spring of 630, in the month of March, bore the Cross to Jerusalem, where it was restored to the place from which it had been carried in 614. In this year Heraclius assisted Sahrbarâz in his successful attack on the Persian capital, where Ardashir had been reigning since October 629.¹¹ This reconstruction of the chronology has been accepted by Professor Marr,¹² who therefore

⁴ *Op. Cit.* pp. 79-81.

⁵ On her change from the Nestorian to the Monophysite allegiance compare Wigram, pp. 253, 259.

⁶ This is in itself improbable: and further, compare the definite assertion (overlooked by Bolotov) of *Chron. Guidi*, ed. Nöldeke, p. 32, mentioning the Cross of Christ, 'das sie von Jerusalem gebracht hatten und das im persischen Schatzhause niedergelegt war'.

⁷ That Ishoyab was dispatched by Sheroe on a mission to Heraclius unaccompanied by any metropolitans or bishops is purely conjectural. Thomas of Marga, who alone (Budge, ii, pp. 125 *seqq.*) places this embassy in the reign of Sheroe (though cf. Barhebraei, *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum*, ed. Abbeloos and Lamy, Paris, 1877, vol. iii, coll. 114-16—the patriarch a *rege Persarum missus est legatus ad Graecorum imperatorem*), states that there went with him the metropolitans of Nisibis and Adiabene and other influential bishops of the Nestorian church. For Bolotov's reasons for his conjectural reconstruction see *Viz. Vrem.*, loc. cit., pp. 86 *seqq.* The mission of which Thomas of Marga speaks was almost certainly dispatched by Bôrân, who became queen in 630. Cf. Budge, loc. cit., n. 2; *Chron. Guidi*, pp. 32-3; H. Gismondi, *Maris Amri et Slibae de Patriarchis Nestorianorum Commentaria*, pars i, Romae, 1890, p. 54; pars ii, Romae, 1896, p. 31; Nöldeke, *Geschichte*, p. 392, n. 1; Labourt, pp. 242-3; Wigram, pp. 300 *seqq.*

⁸ John Mamikonian, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, ed. Muller, v. ii. 380.

⁹ Niceph. 22.

¹⁰ *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Scriptores Syri*, Varsio, Series tertia, tomus iv, *Chronica Minora*, pars secunda, Paris, 1904, pp. 108, 113, 114.

¹¹ This summary will serve our present purpose; the student will consult Bolotov's paper for the elaborate argumentation by which he seeks to support his conclusions.

¹² Marr, p. 5.

concludes that the Cross was restored to its place in Jerusalem on 21 March 630, adopting the date 21 March from Antiochus Strategos.

But Bolotov has not paid sufficient attention to the western authorities, and he has altogether neglected two important sources—the chronicle of Agapius of Hierapolis and the *Carmina Inedita* of George of Pisidia. We can best take these for the starting-point of our criticism.

(i) The text of that part of the chronicle of Agapius with which we are concerned is not yet published, but a Russian translation by Baron von Rosen appeared in 1884 in the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment*. As this periodical is to be found in but few libraries in the west of Europe, I may be pardoned for giving an English rendering from the Russian of the two relevant passages.¹³ (p. 72) After the accession of Sheroe—

Then Heraclius departed on his way back and stopped at the village called Semanen. This is the same village where the ark stopped in the flood in the days of Noah: and he went up to the mountain called Al-Djûdi, and looked upon it at the place of the ark and gazed on all four sides. And then he went in the direction of Amid and there he spent the whole of that winter. And Sheroe the son of Kisre [Chosroes] sent ambassadors to Heraclius asking for peace. And Heraclius agreed thereto on condition that all the towns and villages which his father [i.e. Chosroes] had taken from the Greeks should be restored and that Heraclius should send into Persia all the Persians which were in his power. [Here follows a mention of certain philosophers of the time.] . . . Then Heraclius determined to depart for Mesopotamia and Syria, and he summoned to him his brother Theodore and ordered him to grant the Persians who were to be found in the whole of Mesopotamia and Syria permission to retire from his empire and to return into Persia. And Theodore started forth at the head of the advance-guard, and Heraclius began to go into each town one after another and to settle his representatives in them, until he had gone round them all, and then returned to his kingdom to Constantinople. [Then follows an account of Theodore's difficulties at Edessa and Heraclius' subsequent attempts to introduce orthodoxy there. Further, evidently from another source, on p. 64 we read: In the 18th year of Heraclius] Kesra [Chosroes] son of Hormizd emperor of the Persians was killed, after he had reigned 38 years. Then after him his son Kobad reigned, and concluded peace with the Greeks, and returned to them the towns which he and others had captured up to Dara which is above Nisibin. [A comet appears.] Then Heraclius gave orders to the Greeks that they should leave the territory [of the Persians (*e coniectura*)] and should go to the territory of the Greeks in

¹³ Baron von Rosen, *Zamyetki o Lyetopisi Agapiya Manbidzhskago*, in *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosvyeshcheniya*, pt. ccxxxi, February 1884, pp. 47-75; and for information on Agapius see A. Vasiliev, *Agapy, Manbidzhsky kristiansky arabsky Istorik X Vyeka*, in *Viz. Vrem.* xi (1904), pp. 574-87.

accordance with the terms of the peace which Greeks and Persians had concluded with each other. And Sahrbaz [Sahrbarâz] gave orders to all the Persians that they should return to their own land, each to his own town and family, and that they should not raise disturbances in the land, but they did not attend to his words. And in the end of the 20th year of Heraclius the Persians made an expedition to the Euphrates, and Shahrbaraz [Sahrbarâz] took [into captivity] many warriors of the Greeks, and many of the Persian [read Greek] generals and their followers were killed.¹⁴ And in the 21st year of Heraclius Shahrbaraz [Sahrbarâz] died who had grasped at empire over the Persians, and Burân his daughter [the relationship is of course incorrect] reigned. And she concluded peace with the Greeks and then died.

From this we learn that Heraclius did retire into Armenia in 628, and thus we gain a confirmation of the account of John Mamikonian, who may be reasonably trusted at this point, as Bolotov has truly observed (p. 90), since he is here recording local traditions and copying from a local chronicle of the year 681. He writes as follows (I employ the translation of Emine as I am unfortunately unable to read the original Armenian):¹⁵ Heraclius after his victory over Persia

ramena la Sainte Croix avec les captifs. Il passa sans s'arrêter devant beaucoup de localités, distribua beaucoup de morceaux [de la Croix] dans le pays d'Arménie et aux grands seigneurs. Lorsqu'il se rendit à Eveznavan¹⁶ le serviteur en coups un grand morceau et voulut s'enfuir.¹⁷ Mais quelqu'un, l'ayant su, en informa le roi qui lui reprit ce morceau, et lui trancha la tête. Étant ensuite allé à Césarée avec son armée, Héraclius remit ce fragment au patriarche de Césarée qui s'appelait Jean et lui-même gagna sa ville capitale de Constantinople.

Then follows the subsequent history of this piece of the Cross, which after many vicissitudes was treasured at Dzidzarn in Armenia.

But we gain from Agapius the further important fact that Heraclius spent the whole winter at Amida: this, apart from the further arguments adduced by Owsepian in his *Entstehungsgeschichte des Monothelitismus*,¹⁸ disproves Bolotov's view that Heraclius remained at Theodosiopolis (Karin) and held the famous

¹⁴ So Baron von Rosen: but this is a mistaken translation; the authority which Agapius is transcribing is referring to the fact that Roman troops acted in concert with Sahrbarâz in his invasion of Persia; cf. Sebeos, Macler's translation, Paris, 1904 *Chron. Guidi*, pp. 30 *seqq.* We should therefore, I doubt not, translate 'and Sahrbarâz took [as his allies] many warriors of the Greeks, and many of the Persian generals and their followers were killed'.

¹⁵ *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, ed. Müller, v. ii. 380.

¹⁶ Eveznavan is apparently only mentioned in this passage; its precise position seems to be unknown: cf. H. Hübschmann, *Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen*, &c., in *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xvi (1904), p. 424.

¹⁷ 'Relics are fair game—things that the most honourable and conscientious of men may blamelessly annex:' Wigram, p. 303.

¹⁸ Leipzig, 1897

synod there during the winter of 628–9. The emperor's difficulties were in fact by no means surmounted: Sahrbarāz was still in Asia Minor with his army, and refused to recognize the authority of Ardeshir.¹⁹ At Amida Heraclius occupied a strong position on the frontier from which he could best take effective action.

(ii) The cardinal confusion, however, in Bolotov's account arises from the fact that he, with Sternbach, places Heraclius's return to the capital before the restoration of the Cross in Jerusalem.²⁰ This is shown to be wrong by the carefully dated account of Nicephorus, p. 22, which we must shortly consider, and, as Pernice²¹ has seen, by an important passage in the *Carmina Inedita* of George of Pisidia: in the poet's *Αὐτοσχέδιοι πρὸς τὴν γενομένην ἀνάγνωσιν τῶν κελεύσεων*²² *χάριν τῆς ἀποκαταστάσεως τῶν τιμίων ξύλων* he begins:

ὦ Γολγοθὰ σκίρτησον· ἡ κτίσις πάλιν
ὅλη σε τιμᾷ καὶ καλεῖ θεηδόχον
ἐκ Περσίδος γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀφιγμένος
τὸν σταυρὸν ἐν σοὶ δευκνύει πεπηγμένον.²³

This is confirmed by the unedited chronicle²⁴ contained in Codex Matritensis Palat. 40, at f. 408. Heraclius τὰ τίμια ξύλα ἀπὸ Περσίδος ἀναλαβὼν καὶ εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ παραγενόμενος, κ.τ.λ., and by the whole series of chroniclers who are represented by Georgius Monachus.²⁵ There can, indeed, be no doubt on this point. The text of Theophanes²⁶ can be for the moment reserved for future discussion.²⁷

(iii) But when was it that Heraclius made this journey to Jerusalem? Pernice accepts the traditional date for the restoration of the Cross—14 September—but this is disproved by a hitherto unnoticed passage of George of Pisidia. In the *Carmina Inedita*, no. ii, vv. 104 *seqq.*,²⁸ we read

τούτων παρ' ἡμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡγγελμένων
εἰς καιρὸν εὐπρόσδεκτον, εἰς νικηφόρον,
ὅτε προσελθὼν τοῖς τυράννοις τῶν τάφων
ὁ τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐσίαν ἀναπλάσας
ζωὴν ἐφῆκε τῷ νεκρῷ τοῦ Λαζάρου—

¹⁹ Cf. Sebeos, pp. 86–7.

²⁰ Sternbach (*Rozprawy*, &c., p. 36) in 628, Bolotov in 629.

²¹ Pernice, appendix iii, p. 317.

²² Cf. Sternbach in *Wiener Studien*, xiii (1891), p. 29, n. 12. *κέλευσις* is the technical term for an imperial dispatch. Compare for the use of the word *Chron. Pasch.*, p. 728. 15, 729. 15, 730. 3, &c.; Geo. Pisid., *De Bello Avarico*, 30.

²³ *Carmina Inedita*, ii, in *Wiener Studien*, xiii. 4–5.

²⁴ Falsely attributed to Cyril of Alexandria and George of Pisidia. On the manuscripts of this chronicle cf. Th. Preger, *Die angebliche Chronik des hl. Kyrillos und Georgios Pisides*, in *Byz. Zeitschr.* vii (1898), pp. 129–33.

²⁵ Ed. de Boor, Leipzig, 1904, ii. 672.

²⁶ Ed. de Boor, i. 327–8.

²⁷ Cf. *infra*, pp. 293 *seqq.*

²⁸ Sternbach, p. 8.

ἔδει γὰρ οἶμαι τῇ νεκρῶν ἀναστάσει
σταυροῦ γενέσθαι καὶ πάλιν μηνύματα.
ὅλη συνῆλθεν εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἡ πόλις (? ἑορτὴν οἱ ἀνάκτορ',
e conſe. Sternbach)

ὡς ψάμμος ὡς ροῦς ὡς ἄμετρα κύματα
ποιούντα πολλὰς σωματώδεις ἐκχύσεις·
σπουδὴν γὰρ εἶχον, οἷα δορκὰς ἐν θέρει
δυῶσα καὶ σφύζουσα, συντόμως φθάσαι
τῶν σῶν, κράτιστε, συλλαβῶν τὰς ἱκμάδας.

That is, the news of the triumphant restoration of the Cross reached the capital when the inhabitants were celebrating the festival of the resurrection of Lazarus. But, as Hoffmann has shown,²⁹ this festival was celebrated by the Greek church on the Saturday before Palm Sunday.³⁰ Therefore the generally received September date for the restoration of the Cross is untenable.³¹ But Antiochus Strategos gives 21 March:³² is this then 21 March of 629 or, as Bolotov and Marr maintain, March 630?³³ In 629 the 'Saturday of Lazarus'³⁴ fell on 9 April, but in 630 on 30 March. That the news of the restoration of the Cross should travel from Jerusalem to Constantinople in eight days is, considering the confused state of the empire after the protracted Persian war, surely impossible. We are compelled to adopt the year 629, and thus the contemporary poem of George agrees with and supports the dating of Antiochus Strategos.

(iv) From Jerusalem the emperor turned to recover the towns which had been captured by the Persians. We know from Thomas the Presbyter that Alexandria and the towns of Syria were evacuated in June 629, and in July 629 Heraclius, marching north, met Sahrbarâz at Arabissos, and concluded an agreement with him whereby the Euphrates was to be the boundary between the two realms.³⁵ Thence it would appear he marched to Caesarea.³⁶ We are now in a position to consider the evidence of Nicephorus. After describing the restoration of the Cross in Jerusalem, he continues:³⁷

ὑψωθέντων δὲ αὐτῶν (i. e. τὰ ζωποιαῖα ξύλα) ἐκεῖσε εὐθὺς ἐς τὸ Βυζάντιον ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐξέπεμψεν. ἃ δὴ Σέργιος ὁ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ἱεράρχης ἐκ Βλαχερνῶν

²⁹ In a learned note in H. Feige, *Die Geschichte des Mär 'Abdishô'*, Kiel, 1890, Nachträge zu Anmerkung 23, pp. 56-7.

³⁰ Cf. Nilles, *Calendarium utriusque Ecclesiae*, &c., ed. 2, Innsbruck, 1897, ii, pp. 195 seqq.

³¹ Theophanes is in fact quite right when he states, 629: τούτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἅμα ἔαρι . . . ἐπὶ τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα ἐπορεύετο ἀπαγαγὼν τὰ τίμια καὶ ζωποιαῖα ξύλα τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι τῷ θεῷ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν, 328,¹²⁻¹⁵; for a further proof cf. Geo. Pisid. *Carmina Inedita*, ii. 1. 7 νέους προευντρέπει φοινίκων κλάδους | πρὸς τὴν ἀπαντὴν τοῦ νέου νικηφόρου: the fresh young shoots appear in spring, not in September.

³² Cf. Conybeare, *ante*, xxv. 516.

³³ Cf. Labourt, p. 242, who dates the return of the cross after 27 April 630.

³⁴ Cf. Budge, i, p. xx.

³⁵ Cf. John Mamikonian, *supra*, p. 290.

³⁶ Cf. *supra*, p. 288.

³⁷ p. 22, ed. de Boor.

(ἱερὸν δὲ αἱ Βλαχέρναι τῆς θεομήτορος) λιτανεύων ὑπαδέξατο, καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἐκκλησίαν ἀγαγὼν ταῦτα ἀνέψωσε· δευτέρα δὲ ἦν ἰνδικτιὼν ἥνικα ταῦτα ἐπράττοντο. μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειος πρὸς τὸ Βυζάντιον ἐχθραί, ἰπὸ πολλῆς εὐφημίας καὶ δόξης ὑπερβαλλούσης παρὰ τῶν ἐκεῖσε δεχθεῖς.

The order of events is thus exaltation of the Cross in Jerusalem, then a similar exaltation in Constantinople, and after this the return of the emperor to his capital. But the Cross itself must have remained in Jerusalem : ³⁸ the passage of John Mamikonian above quoted enables us to offer an explanation of the difficulty. Just as Heraclius had given fragments of the true Cross to Armenian nobles, and as another fragment was later given to the church in Caesarea, so doubtless he dispatched from Jerusalem a piece of the sacred relic to Constantinople.³⁹ This reached the capital during the second indiction, i.e. before 1 September 629, and soon after, i.e. directly he had concluded the peace with Sahrbaráz, the emperor himself made a triumphal progress to Constantinople (probably in August 629).

(v) There remains the extremely difficult problem of the text of Theophanes. The order of events as given by him is as follows : 628 : Theodore is dispatched to superintend the return of the Persians from Roman territory and from the cities of the empire. Heraclius enters the capital thus celebrating a *μυστικὴ θεωρία* : as God at creation had toiled for six days and then enjoyed the Sabbath of His rest, so Heraclius after six years of warfare was at length at peace. 629 : Heraclius leaves the capital in the spring for Jerusalem and restores the Cross. How are we to explain this error in the order of events ? We may at once notice that the material used by Theophanes contradicts his own chronology : the six years of warfare are 623 ⁴⁰ to 628 ; the 'Sabbatic year' is therefore 629, and not as Theophanes gives, 628. The following paragraph is only offered tentatively as a contribution towards a possible solution.⁴¹

Emphasizing this qualification, I suggest that Theophanes had before him two sources, each of which was thoroughly well informed. He attempted to combine them and to fit them into his annalistic scheme, and the result has been confusion. One source (B) is represented for us by Georgius Monachus, Leo Grammaticus, Theodosius Melitenus, the unpublished Pseudo-Pisides, the unedited Constantinus Lascaris, and, apparently in a very abbreviated form by Michael Glycas ; further, in part

³⁸ Until the capture of the city by Saladin.

³⁹ Cf. Sergy, *Poizny Myesyatseslov Vostoka*, 2nd ed., Vladimir (1901), II. ii. 375-6.

⁴⁰ That the second campaign of Heraclius began in 623 and not (as Gerland maintains) in 624 I have endeavoured to prove in a paper on 'The Date of the Avar Surprise' which will shortly appear in the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*.

⁴¹ For the unedited texts used by me for the following paragraph I am indebted to Sternbach, *Rozprawy*, &c., pp. 36 seqq.

by Theophanes, Cedrenus, and the unedited Codex Parisinus Gr. 1712. The other source (A) can only be reconstructed from Theophanes himself and from the shorter and slightly different version in Cedrenus. Some subsequent chronicler made a conflation of A and B, and this conflation is represented in different ways by the unedited Symeon Magister, by Ephraemius, and in an individual form by Zonaras.⁴² Source A was probably of eastern origin, and was not concerned with the affairs of Constantinople and the west; it had close affinities with the authority used (probably mediately) by Agapius of Hierapolis (cited above). Source B would seem to have been written in the capital, and to have made use of some part of the *Heraclias* of George of Pisidia now lost to us.⁴³ Source A contained a full account of the restoration of the Cross to Jerusalem, carefully dating the event—and, as we have seen, rightly—to the spring of 629. Theophanes determined to follow source A for Heraclius's visit to the holy city. It has, however, long been recognized that Theophanes has confused his chronology by placing the accession of Sheroe and the conclusion of peace in 627. Kretschmann's attempt to follow the chronology of Theophanes at this point was foredoomed to failure.⁴⁴ Owing to this antedating of the accession of Sheroe, and the Cross being restored only in 629, Theophanes was in difficulties as to how to fill up the year 628—what was the emperor doing during these twelve months? As he wrote, he had before him the western source (B), which after a summary mention of the setting up of the Cross in Jerusalem dealt at length with the return of Heraclius to Constantinople. He saw in this account an activity of the emperor which would provide material for the awkward hiatus in the chronological scheme which he had himself created by antedating events under the year 627. Clearly in 628, he argued, Heraclius returned to the capital. He accordingly adopted the western source (B) for his chronicle of the year 628, but having previously rightly determined to follow source A in placing the restoration of the Cross in the spring of 629, he naturally omitted the brief reference to that event which stood in source B before the account of the emperor's return to the capital. Thus when using source A for the year 629 he adapted it to his own composite scheme by

⁴² The Synopsis Sathae (K. N. Sathas, *Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη, τόμος ζ'* Venice, 1894, p. 108) stands alone, but has considerable resemblances to Theophanes.

⁴³ H. C. Rawlinson, 'The Site of the Atropatenian Ecbatana,' *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, x (1840), pp. 65-158, long ago showed that the *Heraclias*, as it has come down to us, extends only to the capture, not of Dastagero, but of Ganzaca (Takhti-Solefman) in the first year of the second Persian campaign in 623. On the lost cantos of the *Heraclias* cf. Pernice, *op. cit.* xiii-xiv. I accept his arguments.

⁴⁴ Kretschmann, *Die Kämpfe zwischen Heraclius I und Chosroes II*, Teil i, Programm, Domschule zu Güstrow, 1875, Teil ii, 1876.

adding the words ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλευούσης πόλεως (328¹³⁻¹⁴), thus making Heraclius depart for Jerusalem from Constantinople, in which he was, of course, in error.

Before tracing the two sources in our authorities it is only right to note a possible consequence of this hypothesis. As we have seen, source B states fully the theory of the *μυστικὴ θεωρία*. Those who have studied long and closely the style and thought of George of Pisidia must, I think, agree with Sternbach⁴⁵ that this whole conception can only have arisen in the pious fancy of the court poet, and, following Pernice's argument, almost as certainly must have appeared in the lost cantos of the *Heraclias*. If this were so, a source of Theophanes had already used the poems of George as material for a prose chronicle. We might thus be led to the conclusion that the account given by Theophanes of the Persian campaigns was derived by him only mediately from George of Pisidia, and that he was here transcribing the work of an earlier historian.

Traces of A and B in the Byzantine Historians

Source A. Its reconstruction for the purpose of this note (with which cf. Agapius, p. 72).

Theophanes, 327¹⁹, εἰρήνης (δὲ) γενομένης μεταξὺ Περσῶν καὶ Ῥωμαίων, ἀπέστειλεν ὁ βασιλεὺς Θεόδωρον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφὸν (τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Cedr. I 735 Bonn) μετὰ γραμμάτων καὶ ἀνθρώπων Σιρῶου, τοῦ βασιλέως Περσῶν (μετὰ γ. Σιρῶη τῷ βασιλεῖ Περσῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῦ Cedr.), ὅπως τοὺς ἐν Ἑδέσῃ καὶ Παλαιστίνῃ καὶ Ἱεροσολύμοις (κ. Ἱερ. om. Cedr.) καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς πόλεσι τῶν Ῥωμαίων (τ. Ῥω. om. Cedr.) Πέρσας μετὰ εἰρήνης (μετ' εἰρήνης Cedr.) ἀποστρέψωσιν ἐν Περσίδι καὶ ἀβλαβῶς παρέλθωσι τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων γῆν. (ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐννεακαίδεκάτῳ ἔτει τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ) Theoph. 328¹³ ἀπάρas ὁ βασιλεὺς ἅμα ἔαρι [ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλευούσης πόλεως secludendum, cf. supra] ἐπὶ τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα ἐπαρεῦετο ἀπαγαγὼν τὰ τίμια καὶ ζωποιά ξύλα τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι τῷ θεῷ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν. ἐλθόντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐν Τιβεριάδι, κ.τ.λ. usque ad 328²³: [haec omnia semper ab inferioris aetatis scriptoribus omissa] εἰσελθὼν δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις καὶ ἀποκαταστήσας Ζαχαρίαν τὸν πατριάρχην καὶ τὰ τίμια καὶ ζωποιά ξύλα εἰς τὸν ἴδιον τόπον καὶ πολλὰ εὐχαριστήσας τῷ θεῷ ἀπήλασε τοὺς Ἑβραίους ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγίας πόλεως . . . usque ad πλησιάζειν. καταλαβὼν δὲ τὴν Ἑδέσαν ἀπέδωκε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῖς ὀρθοδόξοις, κ.τ.λ. Theoph. 328¹³ sqq. = Cedrenus τῷ ἰθ' ἔτει ἅμα ἔαρι ἀπάρas ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς βασιλίδος ἐπὶ τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα ἐπορεύθη καὶ ἀπήγαγε τὰ τίμια καὶ ζωποιά ξύλα καὶ ἀποδοῦναι τῷ θεῷ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν ἀποκατέστησε τὸν πατριάρχην Ζαχαρίαν. [sequuntur Iudaeorum exclusio et Nestorianorum ex Edessa expulsio].

Source A appears otherwise only to be found in a conflation with source B; cf. *infra*.

Source B. Its reconstruction for the purpose of this note.

A good representative of source B is Georgius Monachus:⁴⁶ there are

⁴⁵ *Rozprawy*, &c., pp. 35 seqq.

⁴⁶ Ed. De Boor, ii. 672.

only slight verbal differences between the text of Georgius Monachus and that of Leo Grammaticus⁴⁷ and Theodosius Melitenus.⁴⁸ I have, however, inserted in brackets () the most important variations of the chronicle of Pseudo-Pisides, Codex Matritensis Palat. 40, f. 408 *seqq.*

(Heraclius) οὐκ ἐφείσατο κατασφάζων καὶ πυρπολῶν καὶ καταστρέφων πᾶσαν τὴν Περσίδα ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑξ. τῷ δὲ ἐβδόμῳ ἔτει τὰ ζωποιοῦ ξύλα τοῦ πανσέπτου σταυροῦ ἀναλαβὼν εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ παραγενόμενος (τὰ τίμια ξύλα ἀπὸ Περσίδος ἀναλαβὼν καὶ εἰς Ἱερ. παραγ.) καὶ ταῦτα καθυψώσας μετὰ πολλῆς χαρᾶς καὶ εἰρήνης ἐπὶ τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν ὑπέστρεψε μυστικὴν τινα θεωρίαν ἐν τούτῳ πληρώσας· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἡμέραις ἑξ ὁ θεὸς πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν δημιουργήσας τὴν ἐβδόμην ἀναπαύσεως ἡμέραν ἐκάλεσεν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ οὗτος ἐν τοῖς ἑξ χρόνοις πολλοὺς διανύσας πολέμους⁴⁹ καὶ κοπιᾶσας, ἐν τῷ ἐβδόμῳ ἔτει μετ' εἰρήνης ὑποστρέψας ἀνεπαύσατο. οἱ δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὴν ἔλευσιν αὐτοῦ γνόντες ἀκατασχέτῳ πόθῳ πάντες εἰς τὴν Ἱερίαν ἐξήλθον (ἐν τοῖς παλατίοις τῆς Ἡρίας ἐξήλθον), σὺν τῷ πατριάρχῃ καὶ Κωνσταντίνῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ νιῷ αὐτοῦ, βαστάζοντες κλάδους ἐλαιῶν καὶ λαμπάδας εὐφημοῦντες αὐτὸν μετὰ πολλῆς εὐφροσύνης. καὶ ὁ μὲν νιὸς αὐτοῦ προσελθὼν ἔπεσεν εἰς τοὺς πόδας τοῦ πατρός, ὁ δὲ πατὴρ περιπλακεὶς τῷ νιῷ κατέβρεξαν ἀμφότεροι τὴν γῆν τοῖς δάκρυσιν· ὅπερ θεασάμενος ὁ λαὸς εὐχαριστηρίους ὕμνους τῷ θεῷ σὺν δάκρυσιν ἀνέπεμπον καὶ οὕτω λαβόντες τὸν βασιλέα χαίροντες εὐφημοῦντες κροτοῦντες εἰσῆλθον ἐν τῇ πόλει (εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὸ παλάτιον).

Later traces of this hypothetical source (B).

Theophanes, 327²⁴, treats source B thus :

628 : ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐν ἑξ ἔτεσι καταπολεμήσας τὴν Περσίδα τῷ ζ' ἔτει εἰρηνεύσας μετὰ χαρᾶς μεγάλης ἐπὶ Κωνσταντινούπολιν ὑπέστρεψε (omni crucis mentione omissa et restitutione crucis in annum 629 translata) μυστικὴν τινα θεωρίαν ἐν τούτῳ πληρώσας. ἐν γὰρ ἑξ ἡμέραις πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν δημιουργήσας ὁ θεὸς τὴν ἐβδόμην ἀναπαύσεως ἡμέραν ἐκάλεσεν· οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ἑξ χρόνοις πολλοὺς πόνους διανύσας⁴⁹ τῷ ἐβδόμῳ ἔτει μετ' εἰρήνης καὶ χαρᾶς ἐν τῇ πόλει ὑποστρέψας ἀνεπαύσατο. ὁ δὲ λαὸς τῆς πόλεως τὴν ἔλευσιν αὐτοῦ μαθόντες ἀκατασχέτῳ πόθῳ πάντες εἰς τὴν Ἱερίαν ἐξήλθον εἰς συνάντησιν αὐτοῦ σὺν τῷ πατριάρχῃ καὶ Κωνσταντίνῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ νιῷ αὐτοῦ, βαστάζοντες κλάδους ἐλαιῶν καὶ λαμπάδας, εὐφημοῦντες αὐτὸν μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ δακρύων· προσελθὼν δὲ ὁ νιὸς αὐτοῦ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ καὶ περιπλακεὶς αὐτῷ ἔβρεξαν ἀμφότεροι τὴν γῆν τοῖς δάκρυσιν. τοῦτο θεασάμενος ὁ λαὸς ἅπαντες εὐχαριστηρίους ὕμνους τῷ θεῷ ἀνέπεμπον· καὶ οὕτω λαβόντες τὸν βασιλέα σκιρτῶντες εἰσῆλθον ἐν τῇ πόλει.

Cedrenus, i. 735, represents an abbreviated form of Theophanes.

Following on καὶ ἀβλαβῶς παρελθοῦσι τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων γῆν of the hypothetical source (A) he proceeds μυστικὸν δὲ τι ἐνταῦθα θεωρεῖται· τὴν γὰρ κτίσιν πᾶσαν ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἑξ ἡμέραις ἐποίησε καὶ τῇ ζ' ἀνεπαύσατο καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐν ἑξ ἔτεσι τὴν Περσίδα καταπολεμήσας τῷ ζ' εἰρήνευσε καὶ μετὰ χαρᾶς τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν καταλαμβάνει. ὁ δὲ λαὸς τῆς πόλεως μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Κων-

⁴⁷ Pp. 152 *seqq.* (Bonn).

⁴⁸ Ed. Tafel, in *Monumenta Saecularia*, published by the Königl. bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich, 1859, pp. 105 *seqq.*

⁴⁹ Here Theophanes represents more nearly than Georgius Monachus the original text of B = George of Pisidia. αὐτός for the emperor is a peculiarity of the style of the poet, and George does not use πόλεμος save in one place, *Exp. Pers.* iii. 63, which Sternbach has emended; *Rozprawy*, &c., p. 18.

σταντίνου τοῦ νιού τοῦ Ἑρακλείου καὶ τοῦ πατριάρχου Σεργίου, μετὰ κλάδων ἐλαιῶν καὶ λαμπάδων τοῦτον ὑποδεξάμενος εὐχαριστοῦντες τῷ θεῷ εἰς τὰ βασιλεια εἰσήγαγον.

The text of the unpublished Codex Parisinus Gr. 1712, f. 180^v *seqq.* is extremely instructive and deserves careful study. It represents the effort of an unskilful scribe to combine the text of Theophanes with the shorter version of Cedrenus. It is, I should imagine, but rarely that one has so good an opportunity of watching a conflation in the making. The manuscript is by Sternbach denoted II, and I reproduce from him the actual text, of which he himself has not noted the full significance.

ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐν ἑξ ἔτεσι τὴν Περσίδα καταπολεμήσας τῷ ζ' ἔτη εἰρηνεύσας μετὰ χαρᾶς μεγάλης ἐπὶ (sine accentu) Κωνσταντινουπόλεις ὑπέστρεψε μυστικὴν τινὰ θεωρίαν ἐν τούτῳ πληρώσας· ἐν γὰρ ἑξ ἡμέραις πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν δημιουργήσας ὁ θεὸς τὴν ἐβδόμην ἀναπαύσας ἡμέραν ἐκάλεσεν· οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ἑξ (inc. f. 181^r.) χρόνοις πολλοὺς πόνους διανοίσας τῷ ἐβδόμῳ ἔτει μετ' εἰρήνης καὶ χαρᾶς ἐν τῇ πόλει ὑποστρέψας ἀνεπαύσατο. ὁ δὲ λαὸς τῆς πόλεως μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ νιού Ἑρακλείου καὶ τοῦ πατριάρχου Σεργίου μαθόντες τὴν ἔλευσιν τοῦ βασιλέως ἐξῆλθεν εἰς συνάντισιν αὐτοῦ σὺν τῷ πατριάρχῃ καὶ Κωνσταντίνῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ νιῷ αὐτοῦ βαστάζοντες κλάδους ἐλαιῶν καὶ λαμπάδων εὐφημοῦντες αὐτὸν μετὰ χαρᾶς. προσελθὼν δὲ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ καὶ περιπλακέει αὐτῷ ἔβρεξαν ἀμφότεροι τὴν γῆν τοῖς δάκρυσι. τοῦτο θεασάμενος ὁ λαὸς πάντες εὐχαριστηρίους ὕμνους τῷ Θεῷ ἀνέπεμπον· καὶ οὕτω λαβόντες τὸν βασιλέα σκυρτώντες εἰς τὰ βασιλεια εἰσήγαγον.

It is impossible, so far as I am aware, to follow further the hypothetical source (B) in the form which it took in the hands of Theophanes, Cedrenus, and the scribe of II. But the unedited Constantinus Iscariot of Codex Matritensis, iv. 72 (f. 170^r) represents another and independent abbreviation of B. He writes:

καὶ ἑξ ἔτη τοὺς Πέρσας ἐδῆον· τῷ δὲ ἐβδόμῳ ἀναλαβὼν τὸ ζῳοποιὸν ἅγιον ξύλον καὶ ἄλλα καὶ εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ παραγενόμενος ὕψωσε· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπανῆκεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ᾧ ὑπήντησαν πάντες περὶ χαρᾶς μετὰ κλάδων ἐλαιῶν καὶ λαμπάδων δορυφορουμένῳ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ Κωνσταντίνος.

It will be noted that the proper order of events as it stood in the original form of B before Theophanes operated upon it is here restored.

I am further inclined to think, though this might be disputed, that Michael Glycas⁵⁰ represents another independent, original, and highly abbreviated form of B (with reminiscences from other parts of B?):

ἐν ἑξ ἔτεσι πᾶσαν καθελὼν τὴν Περσίδα καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Χοσρόην, ὃς ἑαυτὸν ἀπεθέωσε, πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ τὸ τίμιον ξύλον ἐπανασώσας (ἔτιχε γὰρ ἀπὸ Ἱεροσολύμων σκυλευθῆναι) λαμπρῶς ἐπανάεζεν.

We have now reached the last stage of this inquiry. Some later authority attempted to combine sources A and B, and we have now to seek the traces of this conflation.

We find it in the unedited Symeon Magister of the Codex Escorialensis, Y. 1. 4, f. 62^v.

Τὰ ζῳοποιὰ ξύλα καὶ τὸν πατριάρχην Ζαχαρίαν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ἀπεκατέστησε μεγαλοπρεπῶς ὑποστρέψας ἐν τῇ βασιλίδι τῶν πόλεων· ὃν ὁ πατριάρχης Σέργιος καὶ Κωνσταντίνος ὁ [υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ] βασιλεὺς καὶ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ σὺν παντὶ τῷ λαῷ μεθ' ὅσης τῆς ἡδονῆς ὑπεδέξαντο, ἐλαίων (sic) κλάδους καὶ λαμπάδας ἀπέχοντες.

⁵⁰ p. 512. 12 (Bonn).

The unmistakable conjunction of the restoration of Cross and patriarch can only represent A, and the now familiar text of B reappears.

The same fusion, with alterations demanded by the exigencies of a metrical form, appears in Ephraemius, vv. 1395-1400 :⁵¹

ταῦτ' ἐν χρόνοις ἐξ Ἡράκλειος ἀνύσας
ξύλα τε σεπτὰ καὶ Σιών ἀρχιεϋτήν
Ἱερουσαλήμ ἐγκαταστήσας πόλει
πρὸς βασιλίδα καθυποστρέφει πόλιν
ἐν ἐβδόμῃ κάλλιστα χαίρων τῷ χρόνῳ
ὑμνούμενος στόμασιν ἀστῶν μυρίων.

We have yet another representative of this class in Zonaras, xiv. 16. 22,⁵² together with what is probably an addition by Zonaras himself :

ταῦτα ἐν ἐξ ἔτεσιν ἀνύσας Ἡράκλειος καὶ ἀποκαταστήσας τῇ Ἱερουσαλήμ τὰ τίμια ξύλα καὶ τὸν πατριάρχην αὐτόν, τῷ ἐβδόμῳ ἐπανήλθεν εἰς τὰ βασίλεια μετ' εὐφημίας καὶ κρότων δεχθεὶς καὶ λαμπρότητος παρὰ τε τῆς γεροσύνης (a Zonara interpositum ?) καὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῆς πόλεως.

Notice that the true order of events is restored, and that therefore this fusion was not made through consulting the chronicle of Theophanes or Cedrenus.

(vi) With regard to the contradictions in the eastern authorities,⁵³ it should be borne in mind that the terms of the peace with Persia were (1) evacuation of Roman territory by the Persians and on each side the surrender of prisoners of war, and (2) the restoration of the Holy Cross. Thus as each successive ruler of Persia entered into treaty relations with Rome it was concluded that these were the terms agreed upon between the two empires, the chroniclers thus ignoring the fact that the Cross had reached the hands of Heraclius by the close of the year 628.⁵⁴ The negotiations were begun by Sheroe, the Cross itself was perhaps restored under Ardeshir (ascended the throne October 628), Sahrbarâz ultimately accepted (July 629) the condition that Roman territory should be evacuated, and when with the aid of Roman troops he had overthrown Ardeshir only to fall a victim to assassination after a forty-days' rule, his successor, the Queen Bôrân, felt it imperative to placate the emperor through an imposing embassy of Christian prelates.⁵⁵ The terms accepted in each case were apparently the same, and thus the restoration of the Cross has been attributed to each sovereign in turn,⁵⁶ although as a matter of fact neither Sahrbarâz nor Bôrân was concerned in the matter.

⁵¹ p. 65 (Bonn).

⁵² Vol. iii, pp. 211-12 (Bonn).

⁵³ Most of these are tabulated and classified by Bolotov in a note on p. 84.

⁵⁴ 'Die verschiedenen Unterhandlungen und Gesandtschaften der rasch wechselnden (persischen) Fürsten konnten schon von den Zeitgenossen leicht verwechselt werden,' Nöldeke, *Chron. Guidi*, p. 32, n. 1.

⁵⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 288, n. 7.

⁵⁶ An interesting parallel to this confusion may be seen in Nicephorus, who although he knows that the Cross was restored in 629 yet attributes that restoration to Sahrbarâz, who only ascended the Persian throne in 630; cf. 21st with 22nd.

(vii) Lastly, there remains an unexplained difficulty. The eastern church had long observed a festival in honour of the invention of the Cross,⁵⁷ celebrated on 14 September,⁵⁸ and did not apparently introduce a new celebration to commemorate its restoration, but joined this to the older rite. This new celebration was, however, introduced in the west, and such a commemorative festival can be traced as early as c. 650.⁵⁹ This was observed on 3 May. Why was this date chosen? Is it possible that the fragment of the true Cross sent by the emperor to Constantinople reached the capital on this date?⁶⁰

We are at the end of our discussion, and as a result it would appear that we may safely accept the date given by Antiochus Strategos for the solemn restoration of the Cross in Jerusalem, viz. 21 March, and further that this took place in the year 629.

NORMAN H. BAYNES.

Burgundian Notes

II. CISALPINUS AND CONSTANTINUS¹

FLODOARD of Rheims is conspicuous among medieval annalists for his orderliness and precision. He relates facts as they came to his knowledge. He does not think it his business to examine the relations of cause and effect: he simply sets down the in-

⁵⁷ So rightly the pilgrim Theodosius about 530: P. Geyer, *Itinera Hierosolymitana Saeculi IIII-VIII*, Vindobonae, 1898 (*Corpus Scriptorum Eccles. Lat.* xxxix. 149). More usually the festival is known as the *ἐξέλιξις τοῦ τιμίου καὶ ζωοποιοῦ σταυροῦ* or *τῶν ὁρίων ξύλων*; thence its western name *Exaltatio Crucis*: cf. Arculf in Adamnanus, *De locis Sanctis*, 3. 3; Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 286. 22, 287. 3 *seqq.*, 288. 11, 295. 21, 322. 14.

⁵⁸ This festival was only known in the west in the eighth century, and won its way to acceptance slowly and partially. It was received quite late in many churches, e.g. in Milan in 1035.

⁵⁹ Cf. K. A. Heinrich Kellner, *Heortology*, London, 1908, pp. 333-41; and for further information on the subject see von Maltzew, *Myesyatseslov pravoslavnoi Katholicheskoi Vostochnoi Tserkvi*, pt. i, pp. 81, 93, Berlin, 1900; G. Debol'sky, *Dni Bogosluzheniya prav. Kath. Vost. Tserkvi*, Kniga i, pp. 84, 91, St. Petersburg, 1846. It is interesting to notice that in the west the festival celebrated for the victory of Heraclius on 12 December 627 continued to be observed for a longer period than in the east, and was kept on the same day as the commemoration of the exaltation of the Cross. For the evidence of this compare S. A. Morcelli, *Μηρολόγιον τῶν Εὐαγγελίων 'Εορταστικόν sive Calendarium Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, Rome, 1788, i. 266-7; and Sergy, *Poinny Myesyatseslov Vostoka*, Moscow, 1876, ii. i. 327; and Zamyetki, ii. 289 *seqq.*, 2nd ed., Vladimir, 1901, ii. i. 383, ii. ii. 374 *seqq.*

⁶⁰ I am unable to offer any suggestion why the Egyptian and Abyssinian Synaxaria give for 6 March a *Manifestatio S. Crucis per Heraclium Imp.*

¹ The first of these notes appeared last year (xxvi. 310-17). The present paper was in part written very long ago, but I have only recently had the opportunity of putting my materials into shape. I am again under great obligations to my friend the Rev. W. A. B. Coolidge, who has directed me to a good deal of evidence which would probably have otherwise eluded me; but I have no reason to suppose that he shares the views which I here advocate.

Notes and Documents.

The First Campaign of Heraclius against Persia.

THE study of the Armenian historians has of late years done much to increase our knowledge of the campaigns of Heraclius against Persia, but there still remain many difficulties awaiting solution. Among these the operations of the year 622 have hardly received the attention they merit. The reason for the summary treatment which they have experienced from modern students is that virtually our only authority for this campaign is George of Pisidia, and it has been easy for readers of his involved verse to absolve themselves from any detailed study by pronouncing that he was but a poet and no historian. It may, however, be answered that he was something more—an eye-witness—and that this fact is of the greatest moment. In this paper we shall attempt to understand the account given us in the *Expeditio Persica*, assuming that even the words of a poet are usually intended to be susceptible of some meaning.

The object of the first campaign of Heraclius against Persia is in fact, despite oft-repeated misconceptions, quite clear: it was to force the Persian to withdraw from Asia Minor. The plan of campaign was not to engage the enemy, but, passing him on his flank, to threaten his communications and to appear to be striking at the very heart of his native country. The operations were in the result completely successful.

On 4 April 622 Heraclius celebrated a public communion.¹ On the following day he summoned Sergius, the patriarch, Bonus (or Bonosus), the magister, together with the senate, the principal officials, and the entire populace of the capital.² Turning to Sergius he said, 'Into the hands of God and of his mother and into thine I commend this city and my son.' After solemn prayer in the cathedral the emperor took the sacred image of the Saviour and bore it from the church in his arms. The troops then embarked, and in the evening of the same day (5 April) the fleet set sail. They passed Chalcedon, now in all likelihood occupied by

¹ *Exp. Pers.* i. 132 ff.

² Theoph. p. 466 (Bonn ed.); Niceph. p. 17 (Bonn).

the Persians, and coasted round the promontory of the Heraeum.³ Here the pagan name was changed, and Heraclius gave the headland a Christian title, probably dedicating it, as Drapeyron suggests, to the Virgin Mary: the chief goddess of the old pantheon would be displaced by the flower of womanhood in the new faith. A strong wind, however, sprang up from the south and blew in the teeth of the fleet, while a heavy cloud-rack hid all the stars. The emperor's ship ran on a reef, and it was only through his own enthusiasm that she was eventually saved from being dashed to pieces. The sailors, fastening cables to the boat, dragged her free once more,⁴ and the Romans continued their voyage without further mishap. Heraclius, 'the swift courser of a day,'⁵ arrived at the small town of Pylae, in the Bay of Nicomedia, and there cast anchor without delay or opposition.⁶

Dr. A. J. Butler, in his recent work on *The Arab Conquest of Egypt*, has returned to the identification of Quercius, which was adopted by Gibbon and all subsequent historians down to Tafel's time.⁷ He writes: 'The Roman force landed and camped at Issus and seized the pass of Pylae, on the frontier between Cilicia and Syria. . . . The expedition to Cilicia drove a wedge into the very centre of the vast territory between the Nile and the Bosphorus, now controlled by the Persians.'⁸ But the contention of Tafel⁹ that this account is impossible must, I think, be admitted without hesitation. His arguments may be summarised as follows:—

(i.) George of Pisidia gives no geographical position to the place; it must therefore be not only known to the citizens but near the capital.

(ii.) No place is mentioned after the turning of the promontory of the Heraeum.¹⁰

(iii.) Terms like *λεγόμεναι* are not used of famous places, but applied to towns, &c., which are more or less obscure.

(iv.) The words of George of Pisidia, which are in themselves conclusive:

ἔως διελθὼν τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ρευμάτων
αὐταῖς ἐπέστης ταῖς καλουμέναις Πύλαις
ἐλθὼν ἀπροσδόκητος ἡμεροδρόμος.

(v.) While no one could *sail* to the Cilician Gates¹¹ the sea

³ *Exp. Pers.* i. 156–7.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. *passim*.

⁵ Ἐλθὼν ἀπροσδόκητος ἡμεροδρόμος (*ibid.* ii. 11).

⁶ Ἀπάρas δὲ τῆς βασιλευούσης πόλεως ἐξῆλθεν κατὰ τὰς λεγομένας Πύλας πλοῖ τῆς πορείας ποιησάμενος (*Theoph.* p. 466; cf. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 10.)

⁷ See Professor Bury's edition of Gibbon, v. 79, n. 97.—ED. E. H. R.

⁸ P. 124.

⁹ *Theophanis Chronographia; Probe einer neuen kritisch-exegetischen Ausgabe* (1852), p. 146 sqq.

¹⁰ Drapeyron clearly felt this difficulty (*L'Empereur Héraclius*, p. 154).

¹¹ 'Pylas autem Ciliias intus situs navibus nemo mortalium adit ut hinc in Armeniam superiorem . . . perveniat' (Tafel, p. 149).

passage through the Nicomedian Bay avoided a circuitous coast road.

Gerland¹² has seen an additional argument for Tafel's view in the fact that a south wind blew in the teeth of the fleet: *Νότου πνέυσαντος εἰς τοῦναντίον*.¹³ This would clearly, however, apply equally well if the troops were on their voyage either to the Bithynian or Cilician Pylae. It could be quoted as rendering an identification with the Caspian Pylae impossible, but I am not aware that the latter have ever been seriously suggested in this connexion. There is, however, one other point of importance to be noticed. Pylae was precisely the spot at which the emperors were accustomed to land when going to the east.¹⁴ In the *De Cerimoniis* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus the proper formalities to be observed on such a disembarkation are detailed.¹⁵ Dr. Butler supports the old view by a passage of Sepeos, according to whom 'there was a drawn battle close to Antioch city, with great slaughter on both sides. But the Romans retreated to Pylae, where they defeated the Persians, who, however, recovered and took Tarsus and all Cilicia.'¹⁶ But Sepeos has no chronological framework,¹⁷ and in his account the whole Persian war is apparently fought out in a single campaign. I would suggest that he is here describing events which should be referred to the spring of 626, when Heraclius had undoubtedly marched into Cilicia.

From Pylae the emperor proceeded, Theophanes tells us,¹⁸ 'into the region of the themes,' by which he must mean the heart of Asia Minor, probably Galatia and perhaps Cappadocia. Remembering the march of Philippicus and the route pursued in Heraclius's own second campaign,¹⁹ we might conclude that he now halted at Caesarea, in Cappadocia. To this spot the army was to be collected, and veterans and recruits welded into one force. Speed was necessary and the greatest vigilance, or else the enemy might cut off small sections of the scattered troops and sever them from the main body. But the concentration was carried out successfully,²⁰ and the several mountain streams helped to form

¹² 'Die persische Feldzüge des Kaisers Herakleios,' in the *Byz. Zeitschr.* iii. 341.

¹³ *Exp. Pers.* i. 170.

¹⁴ Cf. Ramsay, *Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, p. 187.

¹⁵ *De Cerim.* i. 474, 493; Ramsay, *op. cit.* p. 201.

¹⁶ Butler, *op. cit.* p. 124.

¹⁷ Gerland, *ubi supra*, p. 335.

¹⁸ 'Ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν θεμάτων χώρας ἀφικόμενος (Theoph. p. 466).

¹⁹ Sepēos, cap. 26.

²⁰ 'Ὅμως συνῆλθον, Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 66; cf. *Hēracles*, ii. 153:

ἡβουλόμεν δὲ καίπερ ὦν βραδύγραφος
τὴν συλλογὴν σου τῶν στρατευμάτων γράφειν.
τὴν εἰς ἅπαν γῆς ἐσκεδασμένον μέρος
βούλαιοι δὲ ταῖς σαῖς ἐν βραχεῖ συνηγμένην
οἱ σοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἦγον ἑκτικοὶ λόγοι
ὥς εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐκ μίας ὑδραργύρου
σύρει τὰ χρυσᾶ συλλέγων σπαράγματα.

that river which was to overflow the Persian land.²¹ As Theophanes says, 'he collected the garrisons, and added to their number his young army.'²² George does not cease to wonder at the way in which the emperor kept all his plans clear and distinct from each other, despite their multiplicity,²³ or at the resource and adaptability he showed in devising others when one failed, or in strengthening a scheme insufficiently developed.²⁴ After the troops had been thoroughly drilled and exercised in mimic combats,²⁵ Heraclius continued his march. The first aggressive operation was to send out skirmishing parties of picked horsemen. These captured many small bands of the enemy who were ravaging the country-side. The leaders were set at liberty, and the emperor's motto, 'Pardon rather than the sword,' brought, we are told, many even of 'the faithless barbarians' to his side.²⁶

Heraclius had, apparently, down to this time been pursuing a line of march running due east from Caesarea—that is to say, through the north of Cappadocia. Thus the capture of a Saracen leader is said by Theophanes to have taken place when the emperor was drawing near to the districts on the frontier of Armenia.²⁷ He does not say—as some have translated him—that the emperor was *in* Armenia, where he certainly was not.²⁸ Heraclius now struck in a north-easterly direction into the province of Pontus. The summer was over; before the Romans lay the mountains and the forces of the enemy. The passes had been seized by the Persians; the road to the east was blocked. Sarbar intended to keep Heraclius where he now was during the winter, and to besiege his quarters in Pontus.²⁹

²¹ *Exp. Pers.* ii. 66-9.

²² Theoph. *loc. cit.*

²³ *Exp. Pers.* ii. 70 ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 60 ff.

²⁵ The poet assures us that he was anxious to see the pleasant prelude of the war, but that this mock battle was a most terrible sight.

²⁶ Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 235-238.

²⁷ Γενόμενος δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη Ἀρμενίας (Theoph. p. 468). Gerland appears (p. 347) to think this barely possible.

²⁸ Theophanes, p. 469, makes this quite clear when he says of Sarbar, Φοβηθεὶς μὴ διὰ τῆς Ἀρμενίας εἰς τὴν Περσίδα ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰσβαλὼν αὐτὴν ταράξῃ. From the narrative itself we see that the words εἰς τὴν Περσίδα εἰσβάλλει must be regarded as an expression of direction; as such they are correct. To the Persians who had been out-maneuvred he seemed to be striking at their country (*contra* Tafel, p. 55, note on l. 13).

²⁹ Cedrenus, i. 720: ἀποκλίνας ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Ποντίου κλίμα. Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 256:

ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰς χειμῶνα πρὸς τὸ πόντιον
κλίμα διατρίψας συντόμως ὁ βάρβαρος
τὰς εἰσβολὰς κατέσχε τῆς ὁδοῦ φθάσας.

Read with Tafel Πόντιον and διέτριψας. Manuscripts of Theophanes, p. 468, have ἀποκλείσας, 'absque sensu,' says Tafel. We should read ἀποκλίνας, i.e. he strikes north-east. I adopt (following De Boor) the interpretation of the *Hist. Misc.*: 'visum est barbaris obsidere illum in hoc hiemantem.' A manuscript of Theophanes has ἔδοξε τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐν τούτῃ αὐτὸν παραχειμάζειν, for which Tafel reads, ἔδοξε τοῖς βαρβάροις πολιορκεῖν

Heraclius was thus forced to adopt a stratagem in order to turn the enemy's position. For this manœuvre our only authority is George of Pisidia.³⁰ The obscurity of his description has, however, deterred historians from any detailed consideration of the passage.³¹ The fighting was evidently very slight. In fact the poet is most anxious that we should understand that the operation was a successful feint: *ἐπαινετὴ πλαστοουργία, σοφὴ πλαστοουργία, σοφὴ ὑπόκρισις, τοῦτο τὸ ποικίλον, εὐμηχάνως* (not *ἀνδρείως*, or the like), &c. The enemy were entrenched in a strong position, and were determined not to abandon it. At the same time they would be keeping a keen watch over the movements of the Roman army. To divert their attention Heraclius in person made a sudden frontal attack,³² as though about to storm the passes to the east. Meanwhile the army, under cover of this diversion, probably marched to the north, and soon struck east, where they got possession of the hills, either meeting no force of the enemy or preventing any from escaping. The Persians, thinking that the body led by the emperor was the main force, came out from their entrenchments.³³ Immediately Heraclius, as though finding a more serious opposition than he had expected, gave the signal for retreat. The Persians, knowing the love for feints which was proverbial in Byzantine military tactics, were afraid to pursue to any distance, fearing that they might lose their position by a secret flanking attack, and accordingly retired to their fortified encampment (*ἐκ σου σκελισθεὶς δυστυχῶς ὑποστρέφει*). As, however, the Roman army did not return to the attack, the Persians, concluding that it was as demoralised as its predecessors, relaxed all vigilance, and Heraclius was able to follow in the track of his main force.³⁴

ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸν παραχειμάζοντα. If we accept the reading of the manuscript we must take it as an excuse for the ease with which Heraclius turned the Persian position.

³⁰ I am not aware that any writer has attempted to explain this passage of George. Le Beau does not mention it; Drapeyron's account (p. 170) is even more mysterious than the Greek original; Gerland (p. 347) simply gives the result of the manœuvre and does not hazard a suggestion as to method; Tafel has no note on the subject, and the general historians are silent. Professor Bury's remarks (*Later Roman Empire*, ii. 228, note 3) are useful, but he was at that time (1889) apparently unaware of Tafel's work. It is noticeable that the movement cannot be explained even by such a formation as an *oblique echelon*, for the flanking movement was not only *unsuspected* by the enemy but absolutely unknown to them, which implies a wider *détour* than a mere formation in *echelon*.

³¹ Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 256 sqq.

³² This is apparently the meaning of *ἐκδρομή* in l. 264.

³³ Cf. *ἐξωρμηκότος, προεκτρέχειν*.

³⁴ I retain the manuscript text in ll. 276, 277, *καὶ τοῦτο μᾶλλον τοῦ σκοποῦ τὸ ποικίλον τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνήκεν εἰς ῥαθυμίαν*. Tafel says it reads 'inepte,' and emends *ἄθυμίαν*. But the poet clearly implies that the Persians considered themselves victorious; why *ἄθυμία*? Theophanes has preserved the true word (*λαθὼν δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας καὶ ἐπιστραφεὶς εἰς τὴν Περσίδα εἰσβάλλει. Τοῦτο μαθόντες οἱ βάρβαροι εἰς ῥαθυμίαν ἦλθον τῷ ἀπροσδοκῆτῇ τῆς τούτου εἰσοδοῦ*), but in his abbreviated form has missed the

Thus at the time of the feint his army was marching *διπροσώπῳ σχήματι* (i.e. east and north), and on his retreat the emperor, from being leader of the van, at once took the second place in the line of march (*καὶ πρῶτος εὐθὺς ἡγρέθης ὁ δεύτερος*). Formerly he had been going almost at right angles to the direction taken by the army (*τὰς ἡνίας λόξας προδείκνυς*), but turning³⁵ he went straight after his force (*ὀξέως παρέρχεται*); and, taking up a position exactly opposite to that previously held (*ἐξ ἀντιστροφῶν, εἰς ἀντιστάδην*),³⁶ had thus passed the enemy on their right flank³⁷ (*παρέρχεται, παρήλθε*). George sums up the operation thus:—

*καὶ τὸν παραβάτην βαλὼν πλασμῷ ξένῳ
πρὸ τῆς μάχης ἀφήκας εἰς ἀντιστάδην.*

These lines have been hopelessly misunderstood. The note in the Bonn edition opens thus:—

Παραβάτην duplici sensu vocat Persam tum quia locum aptiorem ad pugnam praeoccupaverat, tum etiam quia a religione Christiana defecerat. *Παραβάτης* enim est tam is qui currum moderans alios praevertit quam qui legem violavit.

In the first place it is, I think, clear that the word *παραβάτης* means 'transgressor,' and that alone. Elsewhere George applies the same term to Chosroes: *ὡς καθεῖλες (τὸν) παραβάτην Χοσρόην*.³⁸ Indeed, the *παραβάτης* is he who stands beside the warrior in the battle chariot, and has no connexion with skill in chariot-racing. In the second place we are not to read *πλαστῶ ξένῳ* (with Kusterus), and certainly neither to translate *et transgressorem coniectum in planitiem ignotam ante pugnam in adversam partem compulisti* nor *Parabaten cum ficto hospite committens ante pugnam in adversarium* (*ἀντιστάτην*, Suidas) *immisisti*. We must deny that *πλασμός* *idem est ac πλατυσμός, planities*. *πλασμός* (*πλάζω*) is, in fact, only another word for *πλαστουργία*.³⁹ *πλασμός* *ξένος* is the newly invented stratagem of the emperor. As for the reading⁴⁰ to be adopted, the manuscript of George of Pisidia has *καὶ τὸν παραβάτην βαλὼν πλασμῷ ξένῳ κ.τ.λ.* Those of Suidas have *τὸν πᾶρᾶβᾶτην παραβαλὼν*, or *συμβαλὼν*, or *τὴν πᾶράβᾶσιν συμβαλὼν*. I believe that we have here one of those verbal conceits which are of such frequent

precise meaning of the poet. The *Historia Miscella* reads 'in rancorem . . . devenerunt.' Tafel proposes 'angorem'; I would suggest 'languorem' (= *ῥαθυμία*)

³⁵ In l. 283 I read *ὑποστρέφων* with all the editions.

³⁶ This latter phrase must here mean 'opposite' and not 'in hand-to-hand fight,' as Liddell and Scott.

³⁷ If, as is probable, he marched to the north of the enemy's position.

³⁸ *Heracl.* i. 206.

³⁹ Cf. *ἐπαινετὴ πλαστουργία, σοφὴ πλαστουργία*, above, p. 698.

⁴⁰ See Hilberg, *Wiener Studien*, ix. 211.

occurrence in the poems of George. I suggest that we should read—

τῷ παραβατῇ γὰρ συμβαλὼν, πλάσμῳ ξένῳ
πρὸ τῆς μάχης ἀφῆκας εἰς ἀντιστάδην,

i.e. 'for though you had engaged with the transgressor, yet before the fight, by a novel stratagem, you reversed the relative position of the two armies.'

The enemy, having retired to their entrenchments, made no further movement, but waited quietly for six days. It was only then⁴¹ that the unexpected report was brought them that the emperor had outflanked them and was now in their rear. As George says,⁴² it was a matter of the greatest import to the Persians that the Roman army should have gained this advantage. The country lying between the hostile forces was mountainous and difficult; the Persians themselves were invaders, who could only look for opposition from the native population; they were threatened by famine, as the Romans could carry off all provisions in the line of march; they would be forced to be continually on their guard against ambushes in the rough districts of Pontus towards the east, while all the most favourable positions would be seized in advance by the imperial army. While Heraclius apparently marched east at a leisurely pace, Sarbar was at a loss to know what policy to adopt. At first he determined to follow hard on the tracks of the emperor, to overtake him and fight a battle forthwith. But should he suffer a reverse in such country his retreat would be beset with dangers and difficulties. Rather would he turn southwards; by so doing he would draw off the emperor from Pontus; by rendering him anxious for his southern provinces he would turn the Roman into the pursuer and would frustrate his well-planned strategy. Sarbar set out accordingly for Cilicia. The Persian tactics, however, met with signal failure. Heraclius refused to abandon the position he had won, while the Roman fleets were undisputed masters of the Euxine and the Archipelago. Once more Sarbar hesitated. He suddenly realised that since his southern march the passes into Armenia were left unguarded. What if the enemy should thus strike at the very heart of Persia? 'And so he leapt from one plan to another like a rolling stone, which, falling down a precipice, crashes on to a projecting point and rebounds, only to be tossed back from the opposing crag.'⁴³

But the prospect of the emperor entering Armenia unopposed was insupportable, and so at last the Persian general determined

⁴¹ Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* ii. 286.

⁴² *Ibid.* l. 293 ff. Drapeyron (p. 170) is clearly in error in his explanation of these lines, which show a keen perception of the real strategic importance of the emperor's manoeuvre.

⁴³ *Ibid.* ll. 338–56.

to march north-east, through Cappadocia, into the region of the upper streams of the Halys. He was thus dragged after the emperor against his will, like a dog on a chain, as George vividly puts it.⁴⁴ But while Heraclius had improved his position, and had inspired the new Roman army with his own enthusiasm, the Persian troops were disheartened by their arduous and fruitless manœuvres. Clinging to the hills, they feared to venture on an open assault upon the imperial camp, pitched in the plain below. Sarbar had planned a secret attack under cover of darkness, but the moon was nearly at the full, and the clear wintry nights were cloudless. An eclipse of the moon when the attempt was on the point of being made further discouraged the enemy (23 Jan. 623). Thus passed fifteen days. The Persians were rapidly becoming demoralised; constant skirmishes invariably resulted in a victory for the Romans, the emperor himself 'doing all things instead of all before the whole host,' while deserters brought news of the desperate state of affairs in the Persian camp. Sarbar was forced to take the decisive step. Just before dawn he drew up his forces in three divisions facing the imperial position. A picked body of men, however, he had set in ambush on the wing between the two armies. They were fully concealed by the hollows of the broken country in which the battle was fought; during the engagement they were to charge upon the Roman flank and throw it into confusion. Sarbar's hope was that as it had been in the past so would it be now. But 'the times of cowardice were past;' before the night was half over Heraclius was aware of the danger and took his measures to guard against it. He also drew up his army in three divisions to meet the disposition of the enemy, and himself took the initiative by sending out a body of men 'armed rather with good counsels than with weapons.' As soon as they were on a line with the ambuscade they made a feigned retreat, as though terror-stricken by the strength of their opponents. The Persians in hiding, thinking this to be the very moment to strike, poured out upon the supposed fugitives. Relying rather on the surprise and suddenness of their onset than on order or combination, they found drawn up against them the three divisions of the Roman force. Heraclius immediately led out a body of his most trusted soldiers, and the Persians, themselves ensnared, broke and fled. When Sarbar ordered a general advance it was too late: the army was seized with sudden panic. In the utter rout which ensued but few escaped.⁴⁵ The Romans fearlessly entered the Persian camp, and did not even strike the enemy's tents, but wherever a man found a shelter still standing he left the canvas as it was and appropriated

⁴⁴ Geo. Pisid. *Exp. Pers.* l. 357-8.

⁴⁵ Σφάζουσι δὲ ἅπαν τὸ Περσικὸν πληθὸς ὀλίγων τινῶν διαδράντων (Cedr.)

the spoil.⁴⁶ Thus ended the first campaign of Heraclius against Persia. The army went into winter quarters; the emperor set out for Byzantium, and with him went the poet to whom we owe the *Expeditio Persica*.

NORMAN H. BAYNES.

London and the Commune.

THE word 'commune,' as is well known, was used in the middle ages, like many words in the feudal vocabulary, both in a vague, popular sense and in one strictly defined and technical. In the former sense it might be applied to any union of citizens for the purpose of securing freer conditions of local government; in the latter it was applied only to a town that was formally constituted in its corporate capacity a feudal person, a vassal of its lord, a lord perhaps of other vassals, with the rights, obligations, and freedom of that station in the feudal society, a *seigneurie collective populaire*, as it has been termed by Luchaire.¹ That London was called a commune in the former sense has long been known.² The most interesting of the early instances of the fact is the passage in William of Malmesbury where, in recording the events of 1141, he mentions *omnes barones qui in eorum communionem iam dudum recepti fuerant*.³ The question whether London was ever a commune in the stricter sense has been raised by Mr. J. H. Round in connexion with the events that occurred there in 1191 and the light thrown on them by two documents of a little later date which he has printed for the first time.⁴ The language of the chroniclers in describing the occurrences of 1191 clearly indicate that with reference to a commune of London something unusual was done,

⁴⁶ The lines of George are as follows (*Exp. Pers.* iii. 281, 899) :—

πάντες γὰρ οἱ πρὶν μῆδε Περσικὴν κόνιν
 ἰδεῖν στέγοντες, οὐδὲ τὰς σκηναὶς τότε
 καθεῖλον ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ἦν εἶχε σκέπην
 οὕτως ἀφῆκεν ὥσπερ ἦν πεπηγμένη.

I believe that the poet is here speaking of the occupation by the Romans of the Persian camp; and he was thus understood by Theophanes. Quercius refers *σκηναὶς* to the Romans' own tents, which, usually struck before a battle, were, he thinks, on this occasion left standing. The interpretation is improbable; it is the sense of security *after* the victory of which George is speaking, not of that *before* the battle. Further we must not translate *σκέπη* with Quercius by 'scutum' or 'armatura.' It means simply 'shade.' The Romans after an arduous pursuit come back spent and weary; nearer than their own camp, on the flank of the hill is that of the Persians. So great was the assurance of their complete safety that the soldiers, not troubling to dismantle the enemy's camp, occupied it, and any shelter from the midday sun which each man discovered he left standing as it was and turned to his own use.

¹ *Communes Françaises*, p. 97.

² Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* i. 407, first ed.

³ *Hist. Nov.* c. 495.

⁴ *The Commune of London, and other Studies* (1899), pp. 219 ff.

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TWO NOTES ON THE GREAT PERSECUTION.

I. THE FOURTH EDITION.—A SUGGESTION.

WHO was the author of the Fourth Edict in the great persecution of Diocletian's reign we do not know. Its precise terms are not recorded; of the date of its issue we are not informed. It is true that Mr. Kidd has recently written:¹ 'On April 30, 304, Maximian put out the Fourth Edict in the name of himself and his co-Augustus,' but he discreetly forbears to give the reader any hint of the source on which he bases that statement. It may be doubted whether he has any better authority in mind than the ambiguous *Passio S. Sabini*, which, as even Mr. Mason admitted many years ago,² 'is not in the highest class of the historical relics of its age.' If, indeed, this supposition does not do Mr. Kidd an injustice, it would have been well to have given some reasoned defence of the document. Dufourcq³ regards the *Passio S. Sabini* as a product of the Ostrogothic period, and contends that its picturesque exordium does not depend upon any earlier source. Until his detailed criticism of the *Passio* is answered, we can hardly use it for the reconstruction of the history of the fourth century.

As is well known, the two really distinctive phases of the persecution are respectively marked by the issue of the First and Fourth Edicts. That distinction is preserved in the records of the African Church by the two terms *dies traditionis* and *dies thurificationis*—the surrender of Christian writings and of church furniture, and the compulsion to sacrifice. Lactantius, it will be remembered, does not distinguish clearly in his account between the different edicts, and combines the *dies traditionis* and the *dies thurificationis*; Eusebius, after a date clause, which marks that the second year of the persecution has begun⁴ (*ca.* Easter, 304), relates the arrival of Urbanus as governor of Palestine: after this the imperial edict ordering *general* sacrifice and libation is published, and the narrative then proceeds to recount the contemporaneous deaths of Timotheos in Gaza, and of Agapios, Thekla, and six others in Caesarea on March 24—i.e. in the year 305.

Is there any earlier date than this for the application of the Fourth Edict in the provinces immediately subject to Diocletian? I do not profess to be able to find my way in the maze of Egyptian martyrologies,⁵ but, so far as I know, the only relevant document for our present purpose is the *Acta Phileae et Philoromi*. The martyrdom of Phileas and Philoromus took place under the praefect Culcianus. The dates of the praefects of Egypt at the time of the great persecution have been hotly disputed.⁶ Eusebius names Culcianus (*H.E.* IX. 11. 4) and Hierocles (*Mart. Pal.* V. 3, long recension; *An. Boll.* XVI., p. 127; ed. Schwartz, p. 919). Culcianus appears as praefect in a document of the year 303 (*Pap. Ox.* I., p. 132; cf. Cantarelli,

¹ *A History of the Church to A.D. 461*, I., pp. 520-521, Oxford, 1922.

² A. J. Mason, *The Persecution of Diocletian*, p. 213, Cambridge, 1876.

³ Albert Dufourcq, *Études sur les Gesta Martyrum romains*, II., pp. 91-97, Paris, 1907.

⁴ Eusebius, *De Mart. Pal.* c. III. 1. I am not sure of the precise meaning of the words *δευτέρου δ' έτους διαλαβόντος*.

⁵ Cf. H. Delehay, *Les Martyrs d'Égypte. An. Boll.* XL., pp. 5-154, 299-364.

⁶ Cf. Seymour de Ricci, *Proceedings of Society of Biblical Archaeology*, XXIV. (1902); Cantarelli, in *Memorie of the Accademia of the Lincei*, Ser. V., T. XIV.; C. Schmidt, in *Texte und Untersuchungen* XX. (1901), Heft IV., Part II., pp. 47-50; M. Delehay, *An. Boll.*, XL. (1922), pp. 27 sqq.

Memorie. XIV., p. 324). Hierocles at the beginning of the persecution was consularis of Bithynia (Lact. *De Mort Pers.* XVI. 4), and must therefore have succeeded Culcianus. Epiphanius (*Haer.* LXVIII.; Migne, P.G. XLII., pp. 184-5) must be in error in stating that Culcianus was governor of the Thebaid while Hierocles was praefect of Alexandria. The doubtful point is therefore the date at which Hierocles entered on his office. P. Delehayé has recently argued that Hierocles must have become praefect of Egypt in the year 305. I believe that this contention cannot be supported. Hierocles was praefect of Egypt at the time of the martyrdom of Aedesius, who was executed shortly after (σμεκρὸν τῷ χρόνῳ ὕστερον, Schwartz, p. 919) the martyrdom of his brother Aphianus, who suffered on April 2. Of what year? P. Delehayé supposes this to be April 2, 305. But the succession of events in Eusebius, *Mart. Pal.* is: Second year of the persecution begins (ca. Easter, 304)—Fourth Edict published; March 24, 305, martyrdom of Timotheos and others—abdication of Diocletian; in the course of the *third* year of persecution Maximin sends out letters ordering universal sacrifice; on April 2 Aphianus suffers martyrdom, and 'a little later' Aedesius appears before Hierocles. The year must be 306.¹ Hierocles need not, therefore, have entered upon his office until some time after April 2, 306. The martyrdom of Phileas and Philoromus on February 2 at the hands of Culcianus may fall in the spring of 306.²

For our present purpose we cannot make use of the Acta of Claudius, Asterius, and Neon. For the two Latin recensions of these Acta cf. (i.) Surius [1573] IV., pp. 873-875; (ii.) Ruinart [1859], pp. 309-311; and cf. *Synaxarium eccl. Constantino-polit.*, col. 178; *Menologium* of Basil, p. 151 [1727]. For a discussion of these Acta cf. Franchi de' Cavalieri, *Note agiografiche*, Fasc. 5 (= *Studi e Testi* 27, Roma, 1915), pp. 107-118, in whose view, until earlier texts are found, it is impossible 'precisare con sicurezza il valore storico' of the Acts. The memory of the martyrs was preserved at various dates—August 23, August 30, and January 27.

The martyrdom of S. Theodotus of Ancyra presents great difficulties. The text has been published by Franchi de' Cavalieri in *Studi e Testi* VI., Roma, 1901, pp. 61-87; its historical value he has defended at length, *ibid.*, pp. 9-57. But our present text of the *Martyrium* can scarcely have been composed before the reign of Julian (cf. προστάτης τῶν Γαλιλαίων); the account is full of miraculous elements, while the date of the martyrdom is uncertain. Hunziker would place it in the persecution of Maximin between 308 and 311, *Zur Regierung und Christenverfolgung des Kaisers Diokletian*, p. 233, n. 4, and with this Harnack agrees (*Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* II. 2, p. 480) on account of the order (c. 7 of the *Martyrium*) to contaminate the bread and wine with *idolothuta* (cf. Eusebius, *Mart. Pal.* 9. 2, and Franchi de' Cavalieri's criticism, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32). Franchi de' Cavalieri himself would date it to the spring of 303 (pp. 28 sqq.), but it would appear that since the governor orders Theodotus—an innkeeper—to sacrifice (p. 75. 14), the martyrdom, if historical, must be placed after the publication of the Fourth Edict. The whole story, however, contains wildly improbable details. Can it be conceived e.g. that to a provincial innkeeper a Roman judge should promise that if he sacrificed τῆς ἡμετέρας πρὸ πάντων ἀπολαύσεις φιλίας καὶ τῶν καλλινίκων δὲ βασιλέων ἔσῃ φίλος ὅπως καὶ γραμμάτων ἀξιοθῆσῃ παρ' αὐτῶν τιμῆς σοι μεγίστης ἕνεκεν καὶ γράψῃς αὐτοῖς ὅτε χρεία καλίστη (75. 15 sqq.). We are surely in the world of the Arabian Nights. Following P. Delehayé, I cannot but regard the *Martyrium* as a pious romance, even though, with Harnack, we admit that it may preserve 'einen Kern alter Über-

¹ P. Delehayé's argument as against Schmidt, who would place the martyrdom of Aedesius in A.D. 308, is to my mind conclusive. The words of Eusebius (σμεκρὸν τῷ χρόνῳ ὕστερον)

in this connexion cannot cover an interval of years.

² The Acta are printed in Ruinart (edition of 1859), p. 519-521.

lieferung' (*Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* II. 2, p. 481; cf. H. Delehaye, *An. Boll.* XXII. [1903], pp. 320-328).

In a word, so far as I know, there is no *certain* date for the application of the Fourth Edict in the provinces directly subject to Diocletian before March 24, 305.

To turn to the western provinces governed by Maximian. The *Passio Maximae, Secundae et Donatillae An. Boll.*, IX. (1890), pp. 110-116, despite its opening words, 'In illis diebus Maximianus et Gallienus imperatores litteras miserunt per omnem illam provinciam ut Christiani sacrificarent' (*An. Boll.* IX., p. 110), may be regarded as belonging to the persecution of Diocletian and Maximian,¹ and, if so, it certainly falls in the period after the issue of the Fourth Edict. The date of martyrdom is July 30,² and thus the year is 304. The *Passio* of S. Fabius also speaks of the *turificationis nefas*, and as it is dated to July 31 under Diocletian, Maximian, Constantius, and Maximian, this date must = July 31, 304.³ The *Passio Crispinae*,⁴ though the date has been disputed,⁵ falls in the same year on December 5. Thus in Africa the first *certain* date for the application of the Fourth Edict would seem to be July 30, 304; it was, on the other hand, not yet being enforced in Africa on February 12, 304, as is shown by the *Acta Saturnini, Dativi, et aliorum*.⁶

This dating for Africa is confirmed for Sicily by the *Acta S. Eupli*.⁷ Saint Euplus, deacon of Catania, desirous of martyrdom, brings into court on August 12, 304, a copy of the Gospels. It is manifest that he had not been called upon as yet to sacrifice. In court he is met by the demand to sacrifice according to the imperial order. It certainly looks as though the edict commanding general sacrifice had only just reached Sicily.

The *Acta Typasii*⁸ are, it would appear, irrelevant for our present purpose. Typasius suffered under the application of the Fourth Edict (*An. Boll.*, IX., p. 119. 12) in the month of January ('tertio iduum ianuari[ar]um,' p. 123. 18), shortly before (p. 122. 33) the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian: this points to January, 305.

I am not aware of any martyrdoms in Rome or Italy, of which we have such accounts that they can be used as a basis for this enquiry. Thus in respect of the provinces directly subject to Maximian, our conclusion would be that there is no clearly established case of the application of the Fourth Edict before the month of July, 304. It will be unnecessary to consider its application in the provinces subject to Constantius, as it is well known that the Fourth Edict was not enforced there.

We pass to the provinces subject to Galerius. The Greek original of the *Acta* of Agape, Irene, and Chione, from which Sirleto made his Latin translation (Ruinart [1859], pp. 424-427), was published by Franchi de' Cavalieri in *Studi e Testi* IX. (1902), pp. 15-19. In their case the First Edict had already been enforced and their Christian literature taken from them, though it appears that Irene had subsequently collected in her house the Christian MSS. belonging to others (cf. *Studi e Testi* IX., pp. 11-12); there then follows the application of the Fourth Edict—the order to sacrifice and probably to taste the sacrificial food (cf. *ibid.*, p. 8). Irene's two sisters were first martyred; later Irene also is burned to death. As Franchi de' Cavalieri has shown, to the primitive interrogatory has been added a later introduction and epilogue. The author of the introduction and epilogue has at times misrepresented the statements elicited by the interrogatory, but there is, it would seem, no reason to question the date given for the martyrdom

¹ Though we can no longer use the reference to these martyrs in the *Acta S. Crispinae* in support of this view. Cf. Franchi de' Cavalieri in *Studi e Testi* IX. (1902), p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³ *An. Boll.*, IX. (1890), pp. 123-134; at pp. 123-5, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

⁴ Franchi de' Cavalieri, *Studi e Testi*, IX.,

pp. 32-35.

⁵ See reff. in *Studi e Testi* IX., p. 26, n. 2.

⁶ Ruinart [1859], pp. 414-422. On these *Acta*, cf. H. Delehaye, *Les Passions des Martyrs et les Genres littéraires*, Brussels, 1921, pp. 114 sqq.

⁷ Ruinart [1859], pp. 436-439.

⁸ *An. Boll.* IX., pp. 116-123.

of Irene—April 1, 304. Since there is an interval of some days at least between the martyrdom of Agape and Chione and the death of Irene (*ibid.*, pp. 4-5), the Fourth Edict, we conclude, was in application at Salonica (*ibid.*, p. 5) in February, 304.

Probus, a governor under Galerius, must have been a man after the Caesar's own heart: his persecuting energy is quite exceptional. The *Passio S. Pollionis*, § 1 (Ruinart [1859], p. 435), states 'Quo tempore [i.e. under Diocletian and Maximian] haec praeceptio cum uenisset ad Sirmiensem ciuitatem Probus praeses imperata sibi persecutione a clericis sunsit exordium et comprehensum sanctum Montanum presbyterum ecclesiae Singidunensis . . . iussit necari. Irenaeum quoque episcopum Sirmiensem ecclesiae . . . temporalis morti tradidit.' Comparing the *Passio S. Irenaei* (Ruinart [1859], p. 433) we see from the command of Probus, *Sacrifica*, that *haec praeceptio* is the Fourth Edict. Irenaeus of Sirmium, after repeated hearings before Probus, was martyred on April 6 (for the date cf. Ruinart [1859], note on p. 432). Since Montanus was martyred before Irenaeus, the Fourth Edict would seem to have reached Probus in the month of February; as this date is borne out by the *Acta* of Agape, Irene, and Chione, there can hardly be any doubt that the year is 304. Probus, still unsatisfied (*Passio S. Pollionis*, § 1), 'uicinas peragrandas esse credidit ciuitates, et cum sub specie publicae necessitatis ad urbem Cibalitarum peruenisset,' he immediately ('eodem die') arrests Pullio, Primicerius Lectorum of the church at Cibalis. Pullio suffered martyrdom on April 27. Under Maximus, governor of Moesia, at Dorostorum, the veteran Julius was put to death. In the earlier form of the *Acta S. Iulii Veterani*, published in *An. Boll.*, X. 50-52, no date is given for the martyrdom, but his *natale* was commemorated on May 27 (and for the date cf. the *Acta* in Ruinart [1859], p. 570). Julius is ordered to sacrifice to the gods, and his martyrdom probably falls, not under the early military persecution, but under the application of the Fourth Edict. Valentio had previously suffered martyrdom, and his memory is preserved on May 25. If these martyrdoms took place under Diocletian and under the terms of the Fourth Edict, the dates must necessarily belong to May, 304. The *Acta SS. Marciani et Nicandri* together with the *Acta S. Iulii* and those of SS. Pasicrates and Valentio, of which we only possess the *résumé* of the synaxaria, probably originally formed parts of a single account, which, like the *Acta* of SS. Marcian and Nicander, was written in Greek. Thus as victims of Maximus we have the list: Valentio and Pasicrates, Julius, Marcian, and Nicander, while the Hesychius mentioned in the *Acta S. Iulii* is to be found in the entry of the *Martyrolog. hieron.* under June 15 (17), 'in Dorostoro natalis sancti Isici.' (On June 17 as the date of the martyrdom of SS. Marcian and Nicander, cf. *A. SS.*, June 17, p. 215.) For our present purpose it is unnecessary to consider the difficult questions connected with the names of SS. Marcian and Nicander; it will be enough to refer to Franchi de' Cavalieri, *Nuovo Bullettino di archeologia cristiana* X. (1904), pp. 22-26, and *Note agiografiche* (= *Studi e Testi* XXIV.), Fasc. IV., Roma, 1912; *I SS. Marciano e Nicandro d' Egitto e gli omonimi di Mesia*, pp. 141-157; H. Delehay, *Saints de Thrace et de Mésie*, *An. Boll.*, XXXI. (1912), at pp. 268-272, and *Les Martyrs d'Égypte*, *An. Boll.*, XL. (1922), at pp. 54-60.

Later in the year 304, in the month of September, Philippus, Bishop of Heraclea, was martyred at Hadrianople (Ruinart [1859], pp. 439-448). On the *Passio Philippi* cf. Franchi de' Cavalieri in *Studi e Testi* XXVII. (1915), pp. 97-103.

The result of our enquiry can be thus formulated:

The Fourth Edict in the provinces subject to Galerius is already enforced in February, 304;

In those subject to Maximian such enforcement cannot be proved before July, 304;

In those subject to Diocletian it cannot be proved before March, 305.

In the *De Mortibus Persecutorum* of Lactantius, c. 18, there is a curious statement which, so far as I know, has not been noticed in this connexion by any modern writer. On the eve of Diocletian's abdication in May, 305, Galerius arrives in Asia 'non ut patri [sc. Diocletiano] gratularetur, sed ut eum cogeret imperio cedere. *Iam conflixerat nuper <cum> Maximiano sene cumque terruerat iniecto armorum civilium metu.*' I would suggest that in this passage is mirrored the origin of the Fourth Edict. Diocletian falls ill on leaving Rome in December, 303; Galerius takes his opportunity, and in the provinces directly subject to himself issues the Fourth Edict (February, 304). Maximian, always loyal to Diocletian and Diocletian's policy, refuses to acknowledge the edict; but, owing to Diocletian's illness, he can no longer rely on the support of the senior Augustus. Holding the Danubian recruiting grounds, Galerius threatens Maximian with civil war; to this threat Maximian is forced to yield. At the end of July the Fourth Edict has reached Africa; in August it begins to be enforced in Sicily. Early in 305 Galerius goes to the court of Diocletian and faces the shattered emperor with a *fait accompli*. Diocletian feels that it is too late to resist his Caesar's fatal policy; in March, 305, the Fourth Edict is being enforced in the eastern provinces. But that enforcement should be left to its author. In May Diocletian abdicates, and Galerius is master of the East.

II. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE NINTH BOOK OF THE *HISTORIA ECCLESIASTICA* OF EUSEBIUS.

Professor Lawlor has devoted a chapter in his *Eusebiana*¹ to this subject, and since it would appear difficult to accept his conclusions it may be worth while very briefly to reconsider the data. Professor Lawlor unfortunately bases his reconstruction of the chronology on one of the most doubtful sections of the ninth book of the *Historia Ecclesiastica*. In *H.E.* IX. 9. 12 Eusebius states that after Constantine's victory at the Milvian Bridge (October 28, 312) both he and Licinius *μὲ βουλῇ καὶ γνώμῃ νόμον ὑπὲρ Χριστιανῶν τελεώτατον πληρέστατα διατυπώνται, καὶ τὸν πεπραγμένων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ παράδοξα τὰ τε τῆς κατὰ τοῦ τυράννου [i.e. Maxentius] νίκης καὶ τὸν νόμον αὐτὸν Μαξιμίνῳ . . . διαπέμπονται*. The result of this communication was the issue by Maximin of his letter to Sabinus, which Professor Lawlor would date to January-February, 313 (p. 219), since he identifies the *νόμος τελεώτατος* of Eusebius with the 'Edict of Milan.' Eusebius himself would, it is true, appear to have made this identification; but the statement of Eusebius in this passage is doubtless due to a confusion of the 'Edict of Milan' with the communication sent to Maximin by Constantine—now Senior Augustus²—directly after his victory demanding a cessation of persecution in the eastern provinces.³ We cannot, therefore, use this passage in order to date to February, 312, the letter of Maximin to Sabinus.

Let us, rather, start from the certain date of the 'Palinode' of Galerius, published in Nicomedia on April 30, 311 (*Lactantius, De Mort. Pers.* 35. 1). Maximin, wherever he was at the time—perhaps in Antioch—would receive it in May.⁴ On its receipt his Praetorian Praefect Sabinus wrote to the provincial governors permitting a cessation of the persecution; this permission was liberally interpreted—the prisons were emptied, the exiles returned. Meanwhile Maximin

¹ Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1912, pp. 211-234.

² Lactantius, *De Mort. Pers.* 44. 11.

³ Cf. Hermann Hülle, *Die Toleranzverlässe römischer Kaiser für das Christentum bis zum Jahre 313*. Greifswald Diss., Berlin, 1895, pp. 63 sqq. The attempt of Valerian Şesan (*Kirche und Staat im römisch-byzantinischen Reiche*, etc., I., Czernowitz, 1911) to prove that Con-

stantine issued in the autumn of 312 a general edict of toleration is misconceived (cf. *Konstantin der Grosse und seine Zeit. Festgabe zum Konstantins-Jubiläum*, 1913, ed. F. S. Dölger; Joseph Wittig, *Das Toleranzreskript von Mailand 313*, pp. 40-65 at p. 64).

⁴ Cf. Otto Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste* I., p. 53.

forestalled Licinius by his seizure of the dioceses of Asia and Pontus, and while in Nicomedia received a petition from the pagans asking that the Christians might be excluded from the city. This was in 311, as is shown by the fact that this visit is referred to as having taken place 'last year' in a rescript issued in the summer of 312.¹ The memorial from the pagans of Nicomedia—possibly (as Professor Lawlor suggests, p. 222) August, 311—gave Maximin his pretext for changing his religious policy. The period of peace did not last 'six whole months';² this would take us to October-November, 311. And in the month of November, if we may trust the Syriac *Martyrology*, Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, was suddenly and without warning martyred in Egypt (November 24, 311);³ 'about the same time'⁴ Silvanus suffered death at Emesa, while on January 7, 312, Lucian was martyred at Nicomedia. Other cities followed the example of Nicomedia and memorialized Maximin. All these memorials are answered in a rescript of 312.⁵ When this rescript was composed the corn was ripe in the fields;⁶ this would, I suppose, give us the date *ca.* June, 312. In November of 312 Maximin would receive news of Constantine's victory, and as a result he issues the letter to Sabinus, permitting Christian worship, late in 312.⁷ Early in 313 he marches against Licinius, and is defeated on April 30, 313: he flees to Nicomedia. Here he was allowed time to collect new forces. If, indeed, a rescript of toleration was issued by Constantine and Licinius from Milan towards the end of January, 312,⁸ Maximin would doubtless while in Europe have learned of this. To secure the Christian population from deserting to the side of Licinius he issues his edict of toleration.⁹ 'Last year,' he states, 'he had decreed by letters sent to the governors of every province that if anyone wished to follow the custom [of the Christians] or the observance of that religion' he should be at liberty to do so, but that his commands had been misunderstood.¹⁰ This passage, which obviously refers to the letter to Sabinus, proves that that letter dates from the year 312. But the edict of toleration was itself penned 'not a whole year' after the rescript of *ca.* June, 312:¹¹ it was doubtless issued in May, 313. Licinius only published his edict in Nicomedia on June 13, 313.¹² Maximin retreated to Tarsus before the advance of Licinius, and must have died *ca.* August, 313.

Provided that we do not identify the message of Constantine of the autumn of 312 with the 'Edict of Milan,' the chronology of the ninth book of the *Historia Ecclesiastica* is consistent with itself and with our other authorities.

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¹ Eusebius, *H.E.* IX. 9. 17.

² *Ibid.* 2. 1.

³ If the month is right the martyrdom must be in 311 (not 312, as Professor Lawlor, p. 268), for it is dated to the ninth year of the persecution (*H.E.* VII. 32. 31) = *ca.* Easter 311 - *ca.* Easter 312.

⁴ *H.E.* IX. 6. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.* 7. 2 sqq. Inscription of Arykanda in Osa von Gebhardt: *Acta Martyrum Selecta*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 184-6.

⁶ *Ibid.* 7. 10.

⁷ *Ibid.* 9a. For motive, cf. Hülle, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁸ Despite the able article of John R. Knipfing—*Das angebliche 'Mailänder Edikt' v. J. 313 im Lichte der neueren Forschung. Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* XL., pp. 206-218—I am not convinced that there was no such rescript.

⁹ *H.E.* IX. 10. 7 sqq.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 10. 8.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 10. 12.

¹² Lactantius, *De Mort. Pers.* 48. 1.

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The Chronology of Eusebius: Reply

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THE CHRONOLOGY OF EUSEBIUS.

REPLY.

MR. NORMAN H. BAYNES thinks that the conclusions which I reached in my essay on the 'Chronology of the Ninth Book of the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius' are 'difficult to believe.' That is due, he says, to the fact that I based my reconstruction 'on one of the most doubtful sections of that book'—that in which Eusebius states that the Emperor Maximin wrote his letter to Sabinus after he received the 'Edict of Milan.' From it I inferred that the letter was dispatched early in 313. No doubt Eusebius' assertion raises difficulties. But when a contemporary witness of high authority speaks it may be wise not to reject his evidence before the difficulties which seem to overthrow it are scrutinized. In the present instance the difficulties seem to me to vanish on examination. But Mr. Baynes appears to have overlooked my attempt to deal with them. His own view of the date of the letter is expressed in a single sentence 'In November of 312 Maximin would receive news of Constantine's victory [at the Milvian Bridge], and as a result he issues the letter to Sabinus permitting Christian worship late in 312.' But where is his evidence? All I can find is that in his edict of toleration Maximin affirms that 'last year' he wrote the letter. 'This passage proves that that letter dates from the year 312.' Yes, if Maximin's year began in January. But is that certain? In the East, New Year's Day was not uncommonly in September.

Mr. Baynes agrees with me in supposing that the period of peace ended in October-November. But he goes further. He will have it that the persecution reached a violent stage a few weeks later, six months before the rescript to the cities. This seems highly improbable. Yet, 'if we may trust the Syriac *Martyrology*, Peter Bishop of Alexandria was martyred' on 24 November, 311—not at Nicomedia, but in far-away Egypt! But the *Martyrology* does not give the year. So we have a footnote of explanation: 'If the month is right the martyrdom must be in 311 (not 312, as Professor Lawlor, p. 268), for it is dated to the ninth year of the persecution (*HE*. VIII. 32. 31) = *ca.* Easter 311 — *ca.* Easter 312.' My reply is that it cannot be in 311, for 312 *is* the ninth year. Mr. Baynes apparently did not read the essay in my *Eusebiana* which immediately precedes the one which he criticizes. In it I tried to prove that Eusebius' persecution years began *ca.* January 1, and ended *ca.* December 31, the first year ending at the close of 304. I cannot summarize my argument here. But if the persecution years ran from Easter to Easter, the first year ending at Easter 304, it is 'difficult to accept' some statements of Eusebius. For example: the abdication of the Emperors (1 May, 305) is placed by him in the second year (*HE*. VIII. 13. 10 f.; *MP*. 3. 5; *Chron.*, Fotheringham, p. 310); the proclamation of Constantine as Emperor (July, 306) in the third (*Chron.* l.c.); and the toleration edict of Galerius (30 April, 311) in the eighth (*HE*. VIII. 16. 1; cp. *MP*. 13. 11).

I confess an error in my essay on the ninth book. I pointed out that IX. 7. 10 indicates the time of year at which the rescript to the cities was drawn up; and I suggested that the passage pointed to the month of August. Further investigation has led me to believe that I should have said May. I have, therefore, no quarrel with Mr. Baynes' '*ca.* June.' But his inference therefrom is another matter. 'The edict of toleration was itself penned "not a whole year" after the rescript of *ca.* June, 312:

it was doubtless issued in May, 313.' But what Eusebius says (*HE.* IX. 10, 12) is: 'These are the words of the tyrant that came not a whole year after the ordinances against the Christians *were set up by him on tablets.*' The earliest inscriptions must have been later than the composition of the rescript. And Eusebius evidently believed that in some places they were not set up till September or October (IX. 7. 16; 8. 1).
H. J. LAWLOR.

REJOINDER.

I SEE no reason to suppose that Maximin dated the beginning of the year from September. Dr. Lawlor, *Eusebiana*, p. 221, refers to Professor Turner in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, I. 188, in support of his view. Professor Turner writes: 'No doubt the Roman year began on January 1; but Eusebius was an Eastern and not a Roman, and in the East the year almost universally commenced about September.' But in the present case it is not the practice of Eusebius, but of a Roman Emperor, which is in question, and the citation only reinforces the argument of my paper.

I cannot accept Dr. Lawlor's translation of *H.E.* IX. 10. 12. The words of Eusebius are: αὐται τοῦ τυράννου φωναί, οὐδ' ὅλον ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν κατὰ Χριστιανῶν ἐν στήλαις ἀνατεθειμένων αὐτῷ διαταγμάτων ὑστερήσαι, κ.τ.λ.—i.e. the διατάγματα are qualified by a clause of definition referring the reader back to *H.E.* IX. 7. 1: ἀνὰ μέσας γέ τοι τὰς πόλεις, ὁ μὴδὲ ἄλλοτέ ποτε, ψηφίσματα πόλεων καθ' ἡμῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν πρὸς ταῦτα διατάξεων ἀντιγραφὰι στήλαις ἐντετυπωμένα χαλκαῖς ἀνωρθοῦντο, κ.τ.λ., with which cf. IX. 7. 15: ταῦτα δὲ καθ' ἡμῶν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἐπαρχίαν ἀνεστηλίτευτο, κ.τ.λ. The words will not bear the interpretation put upon them by Dr. Lawlor. Whether the highly rhetorical passage *H.E.* IX. 7. 16-8. 1 can be pressed as far as Dr. Lawlor would press it is immaterial for my argument: the interval between the issue of a rescript by an emperor and its publication by a provincial governor is at times of astonishing length—in one instance eleven months intervene between the two dates (cf. O. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste*, pp. 9-10).

Before writing my paper I had carefully considered and rejected Dr. Lawlor's view of the chronology of the 'persecution years' of Eusebius. Mr. G. W. Richardson, before his appointment as Lecturer in Ancient History at the University of Leeds, had been studying with me the Eusebian account of the persecution of Diocletian, and I have asked him to state the case against Dr. Lawlor's view. With his conclusions I concur, and it will therefore be sufficient for me to refer briefly to the three specific instances adduced by Dr. Lawlor in support of his chronological scheme:

(i.) The abdication of Diocletian and Maximian in the second year of the persecution. This Eusebius would appear to have ante-dated; cf. *infra*, p. 99.

(ii.) The proclamation of Constantine as Emperor—July, 306—in the third persecution year. *Chronicon*, ed. Fotheringham, p. 310.

The entry of Eusebius under the third year of the persecution runs as follows:

Maximinus et Seuerus a Galerio Maximiano Caesares facti. Constantius XVI imperii anno diem obiit in Britannia Eboraci, post quem filius eius Constantinus ex concubina Helena procreatus regnum inuadit.

The only conclusion which, it would seem, can be deduced from this passage is that Eusebius was confused in his chronology of events of imperial history. The election of the Caesars—May 1, 305—and the proclamation of Constantine in July, 306, can

on no theory of the Eusebian chronology be included in a single 'persecution year.' The entry cannot be used in support of Dr. Lawlor's view.

(iii.) The Toleration Edict of Galerius (April 30, 311) is placed by Eusebius in the eighth persecution year: for this contention Dr. Lawlor refers to *H.E.* VIII. 16. 1, and *M.P.* 13. 11.

Here I can only say that I do not read Eusebius in this sense. His words are: *Τοιαύτ' ἦν τὰ διὰ πάντος τοῦ διωγμοῦ παρατετακότα, δεκάτῳ μὲν ἔτει σὺν θεοῦ χάριτι παντελῶς πεπαυμένου, λωφᾶν γε μὴν μετ' ὀγδοὺν ἔτος ἐναρξαμένου*—i.e. the abatement of the persecution caused by the publication of the Edict of Galerius began *after the eighth year*: the eighth year of the persecution had ended before the publication of the Edict of Toleration (*H.E.* VIII. 16. 1). The same chronology is implied in *M.P.* 13. 11: *Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ κατὰ Παλαιστίνην ἐν ὅλοις ἔτεσιν ὁκτὼ συμπερανθέντα μαρτύρια, κ.τ.λ.*—the period of persecution lasted eight *complete* years: the Edict of Galerius was issued shortly after the completion of the eighth year of persecution.

I should like to add here that my argument (*C.Q.* XVIII., pp. 189-190) for the date of the entry into office of Hierocles as prefect could have been strengthened by a reference to *Pap. Ox.* VI. 895, which shows that Culcianus was still prefect in May, 305.¹ I see no reason to withdraw any of the conclusions of my paper.

NORMAN H. BAYNES.

ADDENDVM.

EUSEBIUS' *Martyrs of Palestine* is not, and is not intended to be, a history. A variety of questions of supreme importance to the historian are unnoticed. The predominant interest—almost the exclusive interest—is the suffering and death of the martyrs. Even the edicts which occasioned their martyrdom are described in as summary a manner as possible; allusions to other imperial events are merely incidental. One result of this exclusiveness of interest is that though the scheme of the work is, as was natural, chronological, the chronological unit is not the consular year but the 'year of the persecution.' The historian is consequently confronted with the problem of relating Eusebius' 'persecution years' to consular years, or years of the Christian era. A brief tabular summary of the work will help to make the subsequent argument clear. The transition from one year of persecution to the next is indicated wherever it is noticed by Eusebius.² Where several martyrs suffered at the same time the name of the most prominent, or the first mentioned, is given.

April	First edict (cap. 1).
	Second and third edicts.
June 7	Martyrdom of Procopius.
Nov. 17	Alphaeus and Zacchaeus.
2nd year:	Fourth edict (cap. 3).
	Timotheus.
March 24	Timolaus.
3rd year:	Fifth edict (cap. 4).
April 2	Apphianus.

¹ Cf. John R. Knipfing, *The Date of the Acts of Phileas and Philoromus*, *Harvard Theological Review* XVI. (1923), pp. 198-203.

² In the shorter (Greek) version. Where chronological references are given in the *text* of

Cureton's Syriac version, they are in agreement with those of the Greek. In the one instance where the date given in a *heading* in the Syriac conflicts with that given by the Greek text, we must, I think, accept the latter.

4th year :	Nov. 20	Agapius (cap. 6).
5th year :	April 2	Theodosia (cap. 7).
	Nov. 5	Domninus.
6th year :		97 Egyptians (sent to the mines, cap. 8).
	July 25	Paul.
		130 Egyptians (sent to the mines).
		Relaxation of persecution cap. 9).
		Sixth edict.
	Nov. 13	Antoninus.
	Dec. 14	Ares.
	Jan. 10	Paul and Asclepius.
	Feb. 16	Pamphilus.
	March 5 and 7	Adrianus and Eubulus.
8th year :		Peleus.
		Silvanus.

One would naturally suppose that Eusebius, in reckoning a persecution year, would follow one of two methods: either he would regard each such year as beginning at the time of the publication of the first edict in Palestine (in April), or he would regard the first year as ending on December 31, 303, and date the second from January 1, 304, and so forth. In view, however, of certain difficulties presented by both these hypotheses, Professor Lawlor (in his *Eusebiana*)¹ has advocated a third: that Eusebius extended the 'first year of the persecution' from April, 303, to December, 304, and dated the second from January 1, 305. It is the purpose of this paper to show that the first hypothesis—that Eusebius reckoned each persecution year from April—with a slight modification to be suggested later, has the balance of evidence in its favour, and that the arguments advanced against it can be met.

(1) In the third chapter of the *Martyrs of Palestine* it is recorded that Timolaus and others were martyred on March 24, in the second year of the persecution, and about the time of the abdication of Diocletian. That event took place (on the authority of Lactantius) on May 1, 305. The second year of the persecution had not ended, therefore, by March 24, 305.

(2) Apphianus was martyred (cap. 4) on April 2 in the third year of the persecution, and after the accession of Maximin (May 1, 305). His martyrdom must therefore be dated April 2, 306; which means that the third year of the persecution extended to that date.

(3) Pamphilus, the celebrated presbyter of Caesarea and friend of Eusebius, was arrested at least as late as November in the fifth year of the persecution (cap. 7), and martyred on February 16 in the seventh (cap. 11). His imprisonment lasted two years²—a point on which it is inconceivable that Eusebius should have been in error. If we date a persecution year from April, from November in the fifth year to February in the seventh would be twenty-seven months; if from January, fifteen.

(4) A strong argument—to my mind conclusive—is provided by the account of the martyrdom of Theodosia in a fragment of the longer Greek version.³ The story is introduced by the phrase: 'Ἐπὶ πέμπτῳ μὲν ἔτος ἤδη ὁ καθ' ἡμῶν διωγμὸς παρεγγίεντο, μὴν δὲ ἦν Ξανθικός, ἡμέρα τούτου β' . . . 'The persecution was approaching its fifth year. It was the month of April, and the second day of the month . . .'

(5) It is worth while to compare with this a passage at the beginning of the thirteenth chapter which has presented some difficulty: "Ἐβδόμῳ ἔτος τοῦ καθ' ἡμῶν

¹ Oxford, 1912.

² ἐτῶν δύο ἐν δὲ χρόνῳ. The fragment of the longer Greek version has δύο ἐτῶν χρόνον.

³ Published in the edition of the *M.P.* in the Vienna Corpus.

ἀγῶνος ἡνύετο, καὶ πως ἡρέμα τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἡσυχῇ τὸ ἀπερίεργον εἰληφότων, εἰς ὄγδοον τε διαγενομένων ἔτος, ἀμφὶ τὰ ἐν Παλαιστίνῃ χαλκοῦ μέταλλα οὐκ ὀλίγης ὁμολογητῶν συγκεκροτημένης πληθύος . . . ὃ τῆς ἐπαρχίας ἄρχων, δεινός τις ὦν καὶ πονηρὸς . . . ἡνύετο has usually been translated 'was completed'; but, as Professor Lawlor points out, the correct translation is 'was being completed.' How is the apparent contradiction (ἐβδομον . . . ἡνύετο . . . εἰς ὄγδοον . . . διαγενομένων) to be explained? Let me recall the context. At the end of Chapter XI, Eusebius records the death of the last of the martyrs of Caesarea, Eubulus, on March 7. Then follows a short parenthetical chapter on the indignities suffered by the clergy during the persecution. The thirteenth opens with the passage quoted. I suggest that Eusebius is looking back to the last event in his narrative, and that the thought in his mind is this: "At the point we have now reached in our record (the martyrdom of Eubulus) the seventh year was nearing its end. . . . In the course of the eighth year . . ." The apparent inconsistency of the sentence is due to verbal economy and the use of the genitive absolute construction. But for our present purpose the important point is the indication that at the time of Eubulus' martyrdom—March 7—the seventh year of the persecution was nearing its close.

It will be noticed that all the above arguments are operative against the ordinary January theory; the last three are equally valid against the modification proposed by Professor Lawlor.

We must now consider one or two difficulties presented by the view here advocated.¹ The most serious concerns the date of the martyrdom of Apphianus and that of Theodosia. We have seen that Apphianus suffered on April 2 in the third year of the persecution, and that this must be taken to be April 2, 306. Now Theodosia was martyred on April 2, in the fifth year (according to the shorter Greek version). We should expect this to be April 2, 308. But the martyrdom of Domninus is recorded (after that of Theodosia) on November 5, also in the fifth year. Since, if we date a persecution year from April, the fifth year would end in April, 308, Domninus must have suffered in November, 307, and Theodosia, therefore, also in 307. We have arrived at the paradoxical result that April 2, 306, belongs to the third year of the persecution, while April 2, 307, belongs to the fifth. But the paradox can be explained, I think, as follows. It is noticeable that Eusebius not only omits to specify the day on which the first edict appeared, but actually puts it in different months in the two passages in which he mentions it (March in the *Church History*, April in the *Martyrs of Palestine*). The explanation of this vagueness and discrepancy is, no doubt, the fact that the edict was not published everywhere at precisely the same time. In some provinces it was not issued until a month or more after its promulgation at Nicomedia (February 24). And it is obvious that even in the same province it would be likely to appear in some places a day or so earlier than in others. (This was certainly the case in Africa.) This irregularity would tend to prevent the adoption of a definite anniversary. On the other hand, it was a well-remembered fact that the edict appeared (in Palestine) shortly before Easter. I suggest that Eusebius reckoned his persecution years not from a definite date, but, rather vaguely, from 'shortly before Easter.'

Now the martyrdom of Theodosia occurred (according to the shorter Greek text) on Easter Sunday. (This at least is the natural interpretation of the expression ἐν αὐτῇ κυριακῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἀναστάσεως.) If Eusebius reckoned a persecution year from 'shortly before Easter,' he would naturally place the martyrdom at the beginning of a new persecution year, regardless of the fact that the previous April 2 had been assigned to the end of an old one.²

¹ Attention is called to them by Professor Lawlor, *op. cit.*

² As a matter of fact Easter Sunday in 307

fell on April 6, not April 2. There is a similar discrepancy in all cases where the day of the week and the day of the month are both given.

Another difficulty is this. In *H.E.* VIII. 13, Eusebius tells us that 'the revolution in the government' (that is, the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian) occurred before the end of the second year of the persecution. On the system of chronology here advocated this would mean before Easter, 305. In fact, as we know from Lactantius, the abdication took place on May 1, 305. If Eusebius were invariably accurate in his dating of political events this might be a strong argument for Professor Lawlor's theory (though to say that the second year 'was not yet completed' [οὐπω πεπλήρωτο], when in fact it had yet two-thirds of its course to run, would still appear rather odd). But not only does the invariable vagueness of Eusebius' references to political events suggest a corresponding vagueness in his recollection of them; in the present case there are independent grounds for believing that his memory misled him. I submit the following points for consideration:

(1) In *M.P.* 3, after recording the martyrdom of Agapius on March 24 in the second year of the persecution, Eusebius says that 'at this time' (ἐν τούτῳ) a change of rulers took place.

(2) In *M.P.* 13 he tells us that the persecution in the West lasted less than two years (οὐδ' ὅλοις ἔτεσιν δυσι). Yet he cannot have supposed it to have ceased before the accession of Constantius as senior Augustus (May 1, 305).¹

It is apparent from these passages that Eusebius, writing some eight or ten years after the event, antedated the abdication.

So much for the main problem. A minor difficulty of another kind remains to be dealt with. Contrary to his usual practice, and possibly by an oversight, Eusebius omits to notice the transition from the sixth year of the persecution to the seventh. At what point does the seventh year begin?

In the first place, it is certain that Pamphilus was martyred in the seventh year (he was arrested about November in the fifth, and detained in prison for two years). And it may be taken as practically certain that the events of Chapter VIII.—the mutilation and transportation of 97 Egyptians, the similar treatment of a number of Palestinian confessors, and the martyrdom of Paul and Valentina—occurred in the same year—the sixth. We must therefore begin the seventh either with Antoninus, Petrus, or Pamphilus (not with Ares: it is expressly stated that he suffered in the month following that of the martyrdom of Antoninus). This means that an interval of over twelve months must be left either between the martyrdom of Paul and that of Antoninus, or between Antoninus and Petrus, or Petrus and Pamphilus. There can be no doubt which of these is to be preferred. At the beginning of Chapter IX. (that is, after the account of Paul's martyrdom and before that of Antoninus) Eusebius records a relaxation of persecution and the release of the Christian convicts in the Thebaid. This is obviously the point to choose. It might indeed be suggested that this diversion is the explanation of Eusebius'

But the question whether the precise dates given by Eusebius for individual martyrdoms are accurate is for the present purpose immaterial.

The fact that the Syriac and the longer Greek versions state simply that Theodosia was martyred on a Sunday may imply some doubt (at the time when Eusebius wrote) whether it was Easter Sunday or the previous Sunday; and the alteration, if the longer version is to be regarded as a revision of the shorter, may indicate either an avoidance of the dispute or an acceptance of the earlier date. The change of construction from εἰς πέμπτον ἔτος παραταθέντος τοῦ παρελθόντος to εἰς πέμπτον ἔτος παρατελείντος might suggest the latter. The effect of that change is to place the martyrdom of Theo-

dosia at the end of the fourth year instead of in the fifth, or rather, perhaps, in an indeterminate period that could not be precisely assigned either to the fourth or the fifth. The use of such an expression as εἰς πέμπτον ἔτος παρελθόντος might appear in itself to lend support to the hypothesis of indefiniteness in the dating of the persecution year.

¹ Professor Lawlor explains this by his theory that by 'whole years' Eusebius means 'unbroken years, together with parts of the years preceding and following, so that a period, say, from some date in January, 303, to some day in December, 305, would be 'not two whole years'—a theory I cannot accept.

omission to notice the transition to the seventh year. It took place, in fact, during the amnesty.

I may now conclude by repeating the table of martyrs, substituting for the persecution years of Eusebius the years of the Christian era :

303 :	April	First edict (cap. 1).
"		Second and third edicts.
"	June 7	Martyrdom of Procopius.
"	Nov. 17	Alphaeus and Zacchaeus.
305 : (?)		Fourth edict (cap. 3).
305 :		Timotheus.
"	March 24	Timolaus.
306 :	April 2	Apphianus.
"	Nov. 20	Agapius (cap. 6).
307 :	April 2	Theodosia (cap. 7).
"	Nov. 5	Domninus.
308 : (?)		97 Egyptians sent to the mines (cap. 8).
308 :	July 25	Paul.
"		130 Egyptians sent to the mines.
"	(?)	Relaxation of persecution (cap. 9).
309 :		Sixth edict.
"	Nov. 13	Antoninus.
"	Dec. 14	Ares.
310 :	Jan. 10	Paul and Asclepius.
"	Feb. 16	Pamphilus.
"	March 5 and 7	Adrianus and Eubulus.
310 : (?)		Peleus.
"		Silvanus.

G. W. RICHARDSON.



The Early Life of Julian the Apostate

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THE EARLY LIFE OF JULIAN THE APOSTATE

SUPPOSE that you are writing a highly eulogistic obituary notice of a well-known statesman who has recently died, and suppose further that you wish to suppress all reference to one period in that statesman's life which lasted for six years, how are you going to proceed? It is clearly a ticklish matter. But if your hero left X at the beginning of that period of six years to go to Y, and then at its close returned from Y to X, it might be possible to telescope the two residences at X into a single visit, and to cover your suppression of the six years' absence by a discreet lack of definition in your chronological statements. If you are successful, others may follow your lead, and centuries later your evasions may escape the notice of the historical student. I would suggest that this is precisely what has happened in the case of the *ἐπιτάφιος λόγος* of Libanius upon his hero Julian the Apostate. Libanius suppressed all reference to the six years of Julian's banishment to Macellum; Julian as a boy of ten or eleven was at Constantinople: from Constantinople he was sent to Macellum in Cappadocia by Constantius: from Macellum, as a youth of seventeen, he returned to Constantinople. Libanius has telescoped into one these two residences in the capital. Socrates, writing in the following century the history of Julian's early years, has composed his chapter with the *ἐπιτάφιος λόγος* of Libanius before him, and has naturally followed the account of Julian's friend and contemporary. The story told alike by Christian and by Pagan has been accepted by modern writers. But Sozomen, engaged upon his history after the publication of the work of Socrates, followed an independent authority, and thus enables us to reconstruct the true chronology and to detect the artifice which imposed upon his predecessor. That is the thesis which I would seek to justify in this note.

At present it would seem that the chronological scheme of Julian's early years proposed by Seeck bids fair to be generally accepted: it has, for instance, been adopted by Geffcken in his biography of Julian.¹ That scheme may be tabulated as follows:—

Julian's birth at Constantinople.

Early in 338: Murder of his father and removal to Nicomedia.

About 342: He moves to Constantinople, where he begins his studies.

344: Returns to Nicomedia, and—

345: Is banished to Fundus Macelli.

In a review of the fourth volume of Seeck's *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* (1911) I endeavoured (in 1912) to show that his reconstruction

¹ Johannes Geffcken: *Kaiser Julianus* (= *Das Erbe der Alten* Heft viii.), Leipzig, 1914, p. 128.

of the chronology was impossible (*English Historical Review*, xxvii. pp. 755–760); that negative argument may be assumed here, and we can pass at once to the positive reconstruction.²

Julian, it would seem, was born in A.D. 331;³ until the massacre of his relatives by the army he lived in Constantinople. The precise date of that massacre is uncertain: it is to be placed either in the second half of A.D. 337, as I am inclined to think,⁴ or very early in A.D. 338 (so Seeck, *Geschichte*, etc., iv. p. 391; cf. Hieron., *Chron.* 2354). Julian had just begun his education in the Eastern capital (ὅτε τῆς παρ' ὑμῖν ἡρχόμενην παιδείας, Julian, *Ep. ad Them.* 259 B) when the catastrophe occurred. After the massacre he was removed from Constantinople to Nicomedia, where his relative Eusebius was bishop. While in Nicomedia, as is well known, he was entrusted to the care of the eunuch Mardonius, 'his spiritual father.' Eusebius was translated from Nicomedia to the see of Constantinople c. 339–340: his young charge probably returned with him at this time to the capital (cf. Allard, *Julien l'Apostat*, i. 267). When in Constantinople for the second time he is still under παιδαγωγοί (Libanius [Förster], ii. p. 241), and that one of these—the εὐνοῦχος βέλτιστος σωφροσύνης φύλαξ of Libanius—was Mardonius, as Förster states, there can hardly be any doubt. When Julian was banished to Macellum he was parted from Mardonius. On his second visit to Nicomedia there is no mention of Mardonius; we may therefore conclude that it was from Constantinople, and not from Nicomedia, that Julian was exiled to Macellum. I have contended as against Seeck (*English Historical Review*, xxvii. p. 758) that the exile in Macellum terminated about 348: we know that the young princes were still at Macellum in 347 when Constantius paid a brief visit to their place of confinement. The stay at Macellum lasted six years: it thus began about 342. Julian was therefore in Constantinople from c. 339–340 to 342. Libanius was in Constantinople until 344: it is therefore to these years that his confession refers: ἡλθουν οὐ σπείρων αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην ψυχὴν (p. 241). When Julian was torn away from school he was a mere boy (ἐμὲ δὲ κομιδῇ μειράκιον ἔτι τῶν διδασκαλείων ἀπαγαγόντες 271 B)—about eleven years old. During his stay at Macellum, however (eleven to seventeen), he would be quite capable of appreciating the books which he borrowed from the library

² For the fact that Socrates wrote with the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος before him, cf. Socr. iii. 23, p. 200. That his account was composed with the view of combating the representation of the motives of Constantius as given by Libanius in the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος has been already remarked by Förster (see his notes in his edition of Libanius, ii. [1904], pp. 241–242). That the account of Sozomen (v. 1) is independent of both Socrates (iii. 1) and Libanius needs no proof.

³ Apart from the doubtful evidence of the oracle (cf. C. Radinger, *Das Geburtsdatum des Kaisers Julian Apostata*, *Philologus* l. [1891], p. 761; K. J. Neumann, *Das Geburtsjahr Kaiser Julians*, *ibid.* p. 761–

762; O. Seeck, *Das Epigramm des Germanus und seine Ueberschrift*, *Rheinisches Museum*, N.S. lxi. [1914], pp. 565–567), we have Julian's own statement in his letter to the Alexandrians, written in the winter of 362 (cf. Seeck, *Geschichte*, etc., iv. p. 391): οὐχ ἀμαρτήσασθε γὰρ τῆς ὀρθῆς ὁδοῦ πειθόμενοι τῷ πορευθέντι κακείνῃ τῇ ὁδῷ (=Christianity) ἄχρις ἐτῶν εἰκοσι καὶ ταύτην (=the worship of Helios) ἤδη σὺν θεοῖς πορευομένῳ δωδέκατον ἔτος. *Ep.* 51. p. 434 D (=Bidez and Cumont, p. 172).

⁴ Cf. N. H. Baynes, *Athanasiana*; *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* xi. [1925], at p. 67.

of George, later to become bishop of Alexandria (cf. J. Bidez, ' *La Jeunesse de l'empereur Julien*, ' *Académie Royale de Belgique, Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres*, etc., 1921, pp. 197–216 at p. 210). At the end of this banishment (c. A.D. 348) Gallus returned to Ephesus, where he had property (Soz., v. 2. 15; cf. Jul., *Epist. ad Ath.* 273 B), and thereafter was summoned to the Court, where ' he was kept a close prisoner ' (Jul., *ibid.* 271 D) until he was created Caesar. Julian went once more to Constantinople (Soz., *l.c.*), and it is to this period that we should refer his studies under Hecebolius and Nicocles of which Socrates speaks. The reason for the chronological misplacement in Socrates is, as we have seen, the fact that he is writing with the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος of Libanius before him, and is therefore misled by Libanius' suppression of all reference to the stay at Macellum. Julian was now (A.D. 348–349) an attractive youth of seventeen or eighteen: it was no wonder that Constantius, always suspicious of possible rivals, felt that it was dangerous to allow Julian to remain in Constantinople, especially since the emperor was himself absent in Syria at this time (cf. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste*, p. 196). The passage in Libanius (p. 242) and that in Sozomen (v. 2, 15) both have reference to this period: as Libanius says of Julian, ἤδη δὲ πρόσηβος ἦν: he is no longer a child, he is free to pursue his own education: παιδεύεσθαι δὲ δίδωσιν (sc. Constantius) ἔξουσίαν (Lib., p. 242, 12). We know from Eunapius that Julian asked ἐπιτραπήναι οἱ καὶ ῥητορικῶν ἀκροάσασθαι καὶ φιλοσόφων λόγων (Eunap., *Vitae Sophist.* p. 473), and that Constantius consented, περὶ τὰ βιβλία πλανᾶσθαι βουλόμενος αὐτὸν καὶ ἀργεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ γένους καὶ τῆς βασιλείας ὑπομνήσκεσθαι. Julian had ample means (βαθέων καὶ βαρυτάτων ὑποκειμένων κτημάτων, *ibid.*). He was sent to Nicomedia, and one limitation only was imposed upon his freedom: he was not to attend the lectures of Libanius: he was compelled to reinforce his promise ' by many great oaths.' On the chronology of Seeck Julian was a boy of twelve or thirteen at this time: surely at that age even a Roman boy could be restrained by other means than πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις ὅρκοις! Many modern writers have found the prohibition itself somewhat inexplicable; but the explanation is surely not far to seek. Hecebolius, it would seem (cf. Geffcken, *op. cit.* p. 8), accompanied Julian to Nicomedia, and Hecebolius was a sophist of Constantinople: Nicocles had been Julian's teacher; but it was precisely Nicocles and the other professors of Constantinople who had plotted to drive Libanius from the capital (cf. Sievers, *Das Leben des Libanius*, pp. 51–53). Those oaths were inspired, not by any Christian bigotry of Constantius, but by the jealousy of a professorial cabal. Libanius was in Nicomedia from c. 344 to 349: Julian returning from Macellum, probably in 348, may have been sent to Nicomedia in the same year, or early in 349. The fact that Julian was now independent with large means at his disposal fully explains the language of Libanius: Julian by means of costly gifts to an intermediary was able to procure notes of the lectures of the great sophist (πορθμέα τινὰ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν λεγομένων δωρεαῖς μεγάλαις κτησάμενος): this is not the act of a boy of thirteen; however precocious Julian may have been, a boy of thirteen, inflamed with an insatiable passion for the sight of the notes of a

university professor's lectures, is surely a very remarkable phenomenon ! It was here, in Nicomedia, that, according to Sozomen, Julian first met Maximus : it was but natural that he should proceed from Nicomedia to Pergamum, to Aedesius, the philosopher whose disciple Maximus was (Eunapius, *Vitae Sophist.*, p. 474). When he was twenty years old—in 351, the year that Gallus was made Caesar—there followed his conversion to the faith of Hellenism.

I believe that on this chronology we can satisfactorily explain all our own authorities, and can outline a consistent story of Julian's early years.

NORMAN H. BAYNES.



Three Notes on the Reforms of Diocletian and Constantine

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THREE NOTES ON THE REFORMS OF DIOCLETIAN AND CONSTANTINE.

By NORMAN H. BAYNES.

I. THE EFFECT OF THE EDICT OF GALLIENUS.

In 1921 Mr. Léon Homo published an elaborate study in the *Revue Historique*¹ on 'Les privilèges administratifs du Sénat romain sous l'Empire et leur disparition graduelle au cours du III^e siècle.' I have not seen any critical consideration of that study: in the following note I desire to discuss the conclusions of Mr. Homo so far as they are concerned with the edict of Gallienus and its application down to the military reorganisation of Diocletian. Mr. Homo's treatment of the problem is based upon his view of the historical value of the *Historia Augusta*: for a detailed statement of that view the student should consult his earlier paper on 'La grande crise de l'an 238 ap. J.-C. et le problème de l'Histoire Auguste.'² His position he has summarised thus: the *Historia* is not a vast falsification dating from the end of the fourth or the beginning of the fifth century: 'Non. Il s'agit bien d'un recueil authentique de biographies rédigé sous la dynastie dioclétiano-constantinienne, et, par conséquent, l'historien du III^e siècle n'a pas le droit de la rejeter systématiquement. Mais deux réserves capitales sont nécessaires. Tout d'abord, l'Histoire Auguste abonde en anachronismes, dus à l'information médiocre et au manque d'esprit critique de ses auteurs. Deuxièmement, les prétendues pièces d'archives qu'elle contient sont des faux composés en règle générale par les auteurs des biographies eux-mêmes. Ils ne doivent donc pas être utilisés comme des documents authentiques, mais les faits précis qu'ils avancent ne sont pas nécessairement faux, puisque le faussaire peut les avoir empruntés aux sources authentiques qu'il avait à sa disposition. Quant à la nomenclature officielle qui y est donnée, elle ne vaut ni plus ni moins que celle du texte proprement dit, c'est à dire que les erreurs et les anachronismes s'y rencontrent à chaque ligne. En résumé, on n'a le droit ni d'accepter les yeux fermés, ni de rejeter a priori les données de l'Histoire Auguste, mais le premier devoir de l'histoire est de les retenir, au moins provisoirement, pour les soumettre à une critique impartiale et rigoureuse.'³ It may be well to state at the outset that I am unable to accept this favourable view of the *Historia Augusta* as a source for the reconstruction of the history of the later years of the third century.

Mr. Homo's rejection (pp. 165-180)⁴ of the theory of Borghesi

¹ Vol. cxxxvii (July-Aug. 1921), 162-203; cxxxviii (Sept.-Oct. 1921), 1-52.

² *Revue Historique*, cxxxi (1919), 209-264; cxxxii (1919), 1-38.

³ *ibid.*, cxxxvii, 162-3.

⁴ In this section of his paper Mr. Homo's treatment of the use of the title *dux* in the third century (pp. 169-179) contains a valuable discussion of the

(*Oeuvres* v, p. 397) that Alexander Severus divided the traditional *imperium* of the Roman provincial governor by separating the military from the civil power, may be unreservedly accepted, though the arguments by which that conclusion is reached I should formulate differently. The *Vita* of Alexander Severus in my judgment is for the most part pure *Tendenz*, and it is only with extreme caution that it can be used as a historical source for the reign.¹ We can pass at once to Mr. Homo's treatment of the edict of Gallienus. For this he quotes the two passages from Aurelius Victor (*Caesares* 33, 34 and 37, 6) in the following form: 'et patres quidem, praeter commune Romani malum orbis, stimulabat proprii ordinis contumelia, quia primus ipse [*sc.* Gallienus] metu socordiae suae ne imperium ad optimos nobilium transferretur, senatum militia vetuit et adire exercitum'; and 'amissa Gallieni edicto refici militia potuit, concedentibus modeste legionibus, Tacito regnante.' The latter passage he translates: 'La carrière militaire perdue (pour le sénat) à la suite de l'édit de Gallien put être rétablie sous le règne de Tacite, en raison de la modération et de la condescendance des légions.' The issue of the edict he would date to the last months of the year A.D. 261 by arguments which appear to me inconclusive (*Rev. Hist.* cxxxviii, 3-5): *e.g.* 'une mesure aussi décisive, aussi terrible pour le sénat que l'était l'édit de Gallien ne peut avoir été prise qu'à Rome, c'est-à-dire l'empereur étant sur place et ayant les moyens de réduire immédiatement toute tentative de résistance sénatoriale qui viendrait à se produire.' This is, in my judgment, to overestimate the power of the senate. The date of the issue of the edict is, however, relatively unimportant: the essential matter is its interpretation. Mr. Homo points out that the original criterion for the distribution of provinces between *princeps* and senate lay in the character of each individual province and its need of military defence: it was the *provinciae inermes* which fell to the senate. But under Gallienus the whole Roman Empire in its length and breadth was in need of military defence.² The emperor, himself at the mercy of the dictation of the Danube legions, with a resolute logic applied once more that original criterion to the altered circumstances of his day. All the provinces of the Empire were by his edict transformed into imperial provinces. The empire must be preserved, no matter at what cost: it was the hour of the soldier and the capable general. 'It was not, however, in the ranks of the degenerate senatorial aristocracy that one could hope to find capable generals, but only

epigraphic evidence, though the reader misses a reference to Mommsen's *Anhang* to Von Sallet's *Die Fürsten von Palmyra* (*cf. Ges. Schriften*, vi, 204 f.), which first pointed the way to the solution of the problem.

¹ Cf. Norman H. Baynes, 'The Date of the Composition of the *Historia Augusta*,' *Classical*

Review, cxxxviii, 165-169, and the monograph, *The Historia Augusta: its Date and Purpose*, shortly to be published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford.

² Cf. L. Homo, 'L'empereur Gallien et la crise de l'empire romain au III^e Siècle,' *Revue Historique* cxliii (1913), 1-22, 225-267.

amongst professional soldiers formed in the rough school of frontier defence' (p. 6), 'ces chefs, l'empereur ne pouvait les trouver que dans l'ordre équestre' (p. 193). The edict has thus the effect that all senatorial governors—consular or praetorian—are replaced by governors from the equestrian order, while, concludes Mr. Homo, 'il semble très vraisemblable d'admettre que la transformation dans l'administration des provinces sénatoriales a été une réforme d'ensemble, et qu'elle se place précisément' in A.D. 261—the year of the issue of the edict (p. 199).

Under Claudius and Aurelian the edict of Gallienus remained in force: Aurelius Victor 'l'atteste formellement: *Amissa Gallieni edicto refici militia potuit . . . Tacito regnante*. Il a fallu la restauration sénatoriale marquée par le règne de Tacite pour qu'il fût abrogé' (p. 20). But Mr. Homo is forced to admit that there were some exceptions to this rule: Velleius Macrinus (ὁ λαμπρότατος ὑπατικός πρεσβευτῆς καὶ ἀντιστράτηγος τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ *C.I.G.* 3747-3748) under Claudius must have been 'un légat impérial pris, selon l'ancienne règle, dans l'ordre sénatorial' (p. 21), while, though the name is lost, *C.I.L.* iii, 14460 supplies us with a *legatus pro praetore* of Moesia Inferior under Aurelian. Of the reason for these exceptions we are ignorant (p. 22). With the year A.D. 275 we reach the senatorial reaction under Tacitus: for this we possess the direct statement (previously quoted) of Aurelius Victor and, further, the evidence of the *Vita Taciti* 19.2, 'Nos recepimus ius proconsulare,' 19, 3-4, 'Optinuimus quod semper optavimus, in antiquum statum senatus revertit. Nostri ordinis sunt potestates. Gratias exercitui romano, et vere romano; reddit nobis quam semper habuimus potestatem.' From a full discussion of these and other passages of the *Vita Taciti* (pp. 35-39) Mr. Homo concludes that not only was the edict of Gallienus abrogated by Tacitus, but that the senate recovered *all* its traditional rights, save only the privilege of coining bronze money.

Florian returns to the system of Gallienus; Probus comes to a compromise with the senate: *Vita Probi* 13, 1 (pp. 40-49). In senatorial provinces Probus '*permisit* patribus . . . ut proconsules crearent,' i.e. a favour granted in particular cases, but not the recognition of a right; in imperial provinces of consular rank '*permisit . . . ut . . . legatos ex consulibus darent*'—'c'est le droit pour le sénat de fournir, non pas de nommer—la différence est capitale—des légats anciens consuls . . . et non pas *tous* les légats'; it is not a complete return to the position as it had stood before the edict of Gallienus: 'Probus déclare qu'il pourra prendre dans le sénat les gouverneurs des provinces impériales consulaires, mais il se réserve aussi le droit . . . de les recruter en dehors' (p. 42)—I confess that I should not, without assistance, have thus interpreted the text of the *Historia Augusta*—'*Permisit* patribus ut . . . ius praetorium praesidibus darent,' i.e. in imperial provinces of praetorian rank the

governors should continue, as under the edict of Gallienus, to be chosen from the equestrian order (*praesides* = 'l'ensemble des gouverneurs impériaux équestres' p. 43), 'mais avec collation éventuelle du *ius praetorium*' (= 'les emblèmes de l'autorité symbolisés par les cinq faisceaux et le rang de sénateur avec les avantages qui en découlaient') par le sénat' (p. 44).

Carus and Carinus represent a military reaction and a complete reversion to the principles of Gallienus, though here, too, as under Claudius and Aurelian, exception must have been made in favour of individual senators, e.g. Marcus Aurelius Valentinianus, senatorial legate of Hither Spain (*C.I.L.* ii, 4102, 4103).

Such in bare outline is Mr. Homo's reconstruction of the third century constitutional struggle between the senate and the emperor. Of its extreme ingenuity not a moment's doubt is possible, but can it be accepted as history? I venture to think that it cannot be so accepted. The 'foundation-pillars'—to employ a term of von Soden's—of that reconstruction are the two texts of Aurelius Victor, especially the all-important words *anissa Gallieni edicto refici militia potuit*. Unfortunately Mr. Homo has considered those words in isolation: the first step is therefore to restore them to their context. The passage as a whole reads: 'Abhinc (*i.e.* from the death of Probus) *militaris potentia convaluit ac senatui imperium creandique ius principis ereptum ad nostram memoriam, incertum an ipso cupiente per desidiam an metu seu dissensionum odio. Quippe amisso*¹ *Gallieni edicto refici militia potuit concedentibus modeste legionibus Tacito regnante, neque Florianus temere invasisset, aut iudicio manipularium cuiquam, bono licet, imperium daretur amplissimo ac tanto ordine in castris degente. Verum dum oblectantur otio simulque divitiis pavent, quarum usum affluentiamque aeternitate maius putant, munivere militaribus et paene barbaris viam in se ac posteros dominandi*' (c. 37, 4-7). I should translate 'Had the edict of Gallienus become a dead letter, the military service could have been reformed, . . . in that case Florian would never have rashly seized imperial power; the choice of an emperor would not have rested with the rank and file of the army had there been senators permanently stationed in the camp.' In other words: *the edict of Gallienus was in fact never repealed*. But if this essential step in the senatorial programme was never taken, what of the account of the senatorial reaction during the reign of the Emperor Tacitus as given in the *Historia Augusta*, what of the 'compromise' with the senate concluded by the emperor Probus? These are both, in my judgment, unhistorical. The *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, composing their collection of biographies in frantic haste under Julian the

¹ It is common knowledge (cf. Pichlmayr's Preface to his edition of Aurelius Victor, Leipzig, 1911) that both our MSS. of the *Caesares* are

derived from a single archetype. Here the Cod. Parisinus reads *amissa*, the Bruxellensis *amisso*; I prefer the reading of the Bruxellensis.

Apostate, had before them the recently published *Caesares* of Aurelius Victor: of the section of that work devoted to the emperor Probus 'Vopiscus' made generous use, playing upon the theme 'brevi milites frustra fore'; running his eye down the chapter, he caught sight of the words 'refici militia potuit'; he inferred from them, as did Mr. Homo, a senatorial restoration under Tacitus. This gave him his cue, and imagination supplied the rest. The senatorial reaction under Tacitus would thus be limited to the choice by the senate of a successor to Aurelian.

But, if we may conclude that the edict which banished senators from the army remained in force during the whole period from the reign of Gallienus to the accession of Diocletian, how are we to interpret it? Here I should agree with Mr. Keyes¹ that it is impossible to regard all the cases of senatorial governors of provinces vouched for during this period by epigraphic evidence as exceptions from a general rule excluding senators from provincial governorships. We must, in fact, abandon Mr. Homo's interpretation of the edict. The only other possible interpretation of the words of Aurelius Victor—'senatum militia vetuit et adire exercitum'—would seem to be that in the case of senatorial governors Gallienus separated the military from the civil authority, while gradually senatorial provinces, as well as imperial provinces of consular or praetorian rank, were conferred upon governors drawn from the equestrian order. The latter change was in many cases masked, as Mr. Keyes has shown, by representing these equestrian governors as acting on behalf of a non-existent governor of senatorial rank. This subterfuge was in course of time dropped, and the equestrian governor no longer adds to his title the words *agens vices legati*. Thus, if we would formulate a hypothesis in order to picture to ourselves the operation of the edict of Gallienus, we might state it somewhat as follows. In senatorial provinces the governor is—to employ the language of the fourth century—a *praeses*, i.e. he has only civil powers; he may even be superseded altogether in favour of a governor of equestrian rank. In imperial provinces the position of the senatorial *legatus* is similar; he, too, is a *praeses*, and is deprived of his traditional military imperium. In imperial provinces of equestrian rank (and indeed in all provinces where the governor is an *eques*) the position of the governor remains unchanged,² while the number of such provinces steadily tends to increase at the expense of imperial provinces of consular or praetorian rank. It is uncertain on whom the military authority thus withdrawn from senatorial governors was conferred; in provinces where only a single legion was stationed,

¹ C. W. Keyes: *The Rise of the Equites in the third century of the Roman Empire*. Princeton Dissertation (Princeton University Press, 1915), pp. 49-54.

² It is of course possible that even the equestrian

governor before the reign of Diocletian was deprived of his military command; but I know of no evidence which would tend to support the view. Grosse's 'Fingerzeig' (*Römische Militärgeschichte*, Berlin, 1920 p. 11) does not impress me.

Mr. Keyes has suggested that the equestrian *praefectus legionis* was the successor of the senatorial commander¹; in a province where more than one legion was stationed, the command over all the troops of that province was probably entrusted to a *praepositus* [on the inscription of Flavius Aper v(ir) e(gregius) praepositus leg(ionum) V Maced. et XIII gem. cf. Ritterling in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyc.* xii, 2, col. 1340; on Dessau, 9479 and Dessau, 8882 cf. Ritterling *ibid.* 1360]. There is no undoubted reference to the later provincial military commander—the *dux*—until the year 289, when the anonymous author of the Panegyric on Maximian, *Panegyrici* ii (or in the new edition of W. Baehrens, vi), c. 3 writes, ‘qui iustitiam vestram iudices aemulentur, qui virtutis vestrae gloriam *duces* servant,’² for the inscription, *C.I.L.* v, 3329 of the year 265 found at Verona which records the rebuilding of the walls of the Colonia Augusta Verona *insistente Aur. Marcellino v. p. duc. duc.* will hardly bear the weight of the theory which F. Reiche sought to raise upon it.³ The words *duc. duc.* may have been rightly expanded by Mommsen into *duce ducenario*, but even so it is possible that Aurelius Marcellinus ‘n’est pas un *dux limitis* mais un chef de corps, “dux,” délégué à cette tâche particulière’ (Homo, p. 172), while on this inscription Mr. Keyes writes: ‘The stone-cutter may have repeated these letters by mistake [i.e. *duc. duc.*], and the man’s title may have been simply *v.p. ducenarius*, a title which is found in another inscription of a little later date (*C.I.L.* iii, 1805). And the question comes to our mind: what would a *dux limitis* have been doing at Verona? It seems much more likely that Marcellinus was a financial officer.’⁴

In the present state of our evidence I see no direct means of demonstrating this general theory of the effect of the edict of Gallienus; it could, of course, be conclusively disproved if we could show that during this period a senatorial governor exercised distinctively military functions. I have been unable from the inscriptions to discover any such evidence; it is clear e.g. that a purely civil governor might restore the walls of Nicaea.⁵ There are, however, the two peculiar inscriptions *C.I.L.* ii, 4102 and 4103, in which M. Aurelius Valentinianus (cf. *C.I.L.* iii, 3418) is described as ‘virum clarissimum praesidem prov. Hispaniae citerioris legatum Augusti pro praetore.’ On this title Mommsen bade the student observe ‘ut munus civile cum militari videatur coniunctum esse *extra ordinem*,’ and, if this were the true interpretation of the wording, it would point to the fact that in the year A.D. 283 it was unusual for a senatorial governor to possess both military and civil power.

¹ Cf. his remarks upon *C.I.L.* viii, 2572, at p. 54.

² Seeck’s attribution of this Panegyric to Eumenius (cf. O. Seeck, ‘Die Reden des Eumenius,’ *Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie*, cxxvii, 713) in *Geschichte des Untergangs*, etc., ii (1901), p. 507, and P.-W. v, 2, 1869, has misled Mr. Homo, who

quotes the passages as from the speech *pro restaurandis scholios*. Homo, p. 171.

³ Cf. F. Reiche, *Ueber die Teilung der Zivil- und Militärgewalt im dritten Jahrhundert der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Programm. Breslau, 1900.

⁴ p. 51, cf. Grosse, *Römische Militärgeschichte*. Berlin, 1920, p. 10 n².

⁵ *I.G.R.*, 39, 40.

I cannot help thinking, however, that the words 'legatum Augustorum pro praetore' are intended to *define* the preceding title *praesidem*: *praeses* was already becoming the customary qualification of *equestrian* governors; Valentinianus wished to make it quite clear that, though only a *civil* governor, he was yet a legate of senatorial rank.

If this should prove to be the true effect of the edict of Gallienus, Diocletian only needed to complete the process of eliminating the senatorial class from provincial governorships, while on the other hand he would have introduced into the imperial provinces of equestrian rank the same separation between the civil and the military power which since the reign of Gallienus had been practised in provinces, whether imperial or senatorial, which had been governed by men of a rank higher than that of the equestrian order.

2. THE ARMY REFORMS OF DIOCLETIAN AND CONSTANTINE.

The position which the *Journal of Roman Studies* has won for itself in this country carries with it no light responsibility: what the *J.R.S.* says to-day, many historical text-books will repeat to-morrow. The conclusions of Dr. Nischer upon the army reforms of Diocletian and Constantine may thus be readily adopted by readers who are not themselves close students of fourth-century history, and it is well that these should be warned that the results reached by the author cannot be accepted without a careful reconsideration of the evidence upon which they are based. A scholar who possesses an intimate knowledge of the administrative history of the later Roman Empire has already stated his opinion that Dr. Nischer has in the main failed to prove his contentions. 'Those contentions contradict in the most important points the results of methodical research, so that his article for the most part is of no service.'¹

I am not capable of subjecting those conclusions to a detailed criticism; I merely desire to suggest some grounds for caution to readers of Dr. Nischer's paper, and to explain the reasons for my own inability to accept his principal conclusions.

Not a few of the lists of regiments included in Dr. Nischer's paper seem to me to suggest to the reader that we possess better information on Roman military history than is in fact the case. I take as an example the catalogue of legions treated by Dr. Nischer as the creation of Diocletian (pp. 3-4): I Armeniaca, II Armeniaca, I Isaura sagittaria, II Isaura, III Isaura, IV Italica, IV Parthica, V Parthica, VI Parthica, I Pontica, II Noricorum and I Illyricorum. These are ascribed to Diocletian on the authority of Seeck, but Seeck's only ground for the ascription in the case of the ten first named is that the existence of I Pontica in the reign of Diocletian—not its creation by Diocletian—is vouched for by *C.I.L.* iii, 236.

¹ Ernst Stein in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* xxv, p. 387 n. 1.

The name of I Pontica is formed from that of a country, the nine other names are similarly formed, and therefore these ten legions may be inferred to be the creation of Diocletian; in the same fashion Seeck argues that the II Noricorum and the I Illyricorum are creations of Diocletian since he may be presumed to have formed the III Diocletiana Thebaeorum and the I Maximiana Thebaeorum because of the occurrence in their titles of his own name and that of his colleague. But the three Isaurian legions (I-III Isaura) have been regarded by Ritterling as the creation of the Emperor Probus,¹ while the same scholar many years ago expressed the view that Legio I Illyricorum, stationed in Palmyra, owed its formation to the Emperor Aurelian.² Indeed, one would like to know what lies behind the legend *Restitutor Exerciti* on the coinage of Aurelian.³ 'Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen dass noch andere Neueinrichtungen auf dem Gebiet der Grenzverteidigung, namentlich in den von Aurelian dem Reiche wiedergewonnenen orientalischen und gallischen Provinzen, die allgemein als Schöpfungen Diocletians angesehen werden . . . bereits auf des ersteren Initiative zurückgeführt werden müssen.'⁴ In the same way I feel that readers should have been more expressly warned of the uncertainty which attaches to any estimate of the actual numerical strength of the legions; here Ritterling's reminder is salutary: 'it must never be forgotten that the legions created by Diocletian—save those formed at the beginning of his reign—will not have maintained the full strength of the earlier legions.'⁵ Why Dr. Nischer should arbitrarily have reckoned the legions in the West and those in the E. Danube provinces at 4,000 men apiece, those elsewhere in the East at 3,000, I fail to understand. It is in my judgment of the first importance that writers on the military history of the Roman Empire in the fourth century should not play a game of bluff with the reader, or illude him with statistics, unless these are clearly stated to be purely hypothetical estimates.

The two cardinal contentions of Dr. Nischer's paper as I understand it are (a) that Diocletian introduced a general system of divisional reserves, (b) that Constantine was the great military reformer, and that the empire owed to him the introduction of the mobile field army or expeditionary force. The former contention I believe to be unproven, while the latter runs counter to such epigraphic evidence as we possess. I desire very briefly to consider these two points.

¹ P.-W., xii, 2, 1348.

² 'Diese Legion ist somit eine Schöpfung Aurelians, errichtet aus Mannschaften seiner illyrischen Legionen die den Sieg über das orientalische Reich hatten erfechten helfen.' E. Ritterling, 'Zum römischen Heerwesen des ausgehenden dritten Jahrhunderts' in *Hirschfeld Festschrift*, Berlin, 1903, p. 347, and on Legio IV Martia cf. *ibid.*, n⁴. Similarly on IV Italica as a creation of

Alexander Severus or Gordian III, cf. Ritterling in P.-W. xii, 2, 1329 f. and 1337; IV Parthica he would attribute to Diocletian cf. *ibid.* 1329 f. with 1556.

³ Cf. L. Homo, *Essai sur le règne de l'empereur Aurélien*, p. 200.

⁴ Ritterling: P.-W. xii, 2, 1346-7.

⁵ See P.-W. xii, 2, 1350.

For proof of the former contention Dr. Nischer adduces the exceptional position upon the Danube frontier of the two legions III Herculia and IV Jovia as given in the *Notitia Dignitatum*. This is but one instance of Dr. Nischer's peculiar use of the *Notitia* as evidence for the position of troops in the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine. The uninstructed reader might at times almost imagine that the *Notitia*, as we possess it, was compiled in the first quarter of the fourth century. Has Dr. Nischer considered for a moment what must have been the condition of the Roman frontier-defence on the Danube after the crushing defeat of Adrianople and before the victories of Theodosius the Great? There must have been a complete dislocation of the Roman forces, and how Dr. Nischer can simply transfer the position of troops as given in the *Notitia* on this frontier to the reign of Diocletian passes my comprehension. Ritterling rightly remarks of the III Herculia that it must have originally belonged to Diocletian's organisation of the frontier defence, but that from its location in the *Notitia* we have no means of inferring in what province it was first stationed. In general the use made of the *Notitia* by Dr. Nischer in this paper in order to establish the position of troops during the reign of Diocletian appears to me to be indefensible. The second instance adduced to prove the existence of a system of divisional reserves is that of the three legions I-III Julia Alpina. These legions in Dr. Nischer's view were first stationed in the passes of the Julian Alps to act as a second reserve supporting the Danube defence. This is a guess, and as such can hardly claim probative force. We do not know by whom these legions were formed, whence they derived their name, or where they were originally posted. Personally I incline to prefer Ritterling's explanation,¹ but certainty is impossible. The third instance is that of the three Isaurian legions regarded as a divisional reserve for the Euphrates frontier; that an emperor, resident in Nicomedia, should have chosen the inaccessible hill country of Isauria in which to station legions intended to support the Euphrates line seems to me incredible. But it is from evidence such as this that Dr. Nischer feels himself entitled to proceed to the startling generalisation. 'We must suppose therefore that there were also divisional reserves for the Rhine frontier, for the eastern sector of the Danube, for Egypt and for Africa' (p. 7). Such a supposition, unsupported by any shred of evidence, surely carries with it its own condemnation. For such evidence as we possess of the way in which Diocletian recruited an expeditionary force it will suffice to refer to Ritterling in Pauly-Wissowa, xii, 2, 1359-1360, and to K. F. Kinch: *L'Arc de Triomphe de Salonique*, 1890.

The second cardinal contention of Dr. Nischer's paper is that the introduction of a mobile field army was the work of Constantine the Great. But the argument based on *C.I.L.* vi, 2759 (= Dessau,

¹ P.-W. xii, 2, 1404-5.

2045) and Dessau, 2782, when compared with *C.I.L.* iii, 6194 (=Dessau, 2781), advanced by Seeck¹ to prove that at least the beginnings of a field army date from the reign of Diocletian—at latest from the year A.D. 301—appears to me to be unanswerable. As Seeck further pointed out, Dessau, 664 gives us a *praepositus equitibus Dalmatis Aquesianis coritatusibus* in Noricum, and this inscription must be dated to a period before the time when that province passed into the hands of Constantine, ‘womit der unzweideutigste Beweis gegeben ist, dass die Comitatuses vorkonstantinisch sind.’ But, if this be true, it means that Constantine in developing an imperial field army was only elaborating a policy which had been already inaugurated by Diocletian, and that in consequence there is no such sharp cleavage between the two reigns as Dr. Nischer would seek to establish. The inauguration by Diocletian of a mobile field army was indeed the natural result of the experience gained by the war in Egypt and the operations against Persia.

In a word Dr. Nischer has in my judgment failed to establish the two principal contentions of his paper: I still remain an unrepentant disciple of Mommsen, and profess his belief that ‘the army of this period must be described as the joint creation of Diocletian and Constantine.’

3. THE PRAETORIAN PREFECTURE UNDER CONSTANTINE THE GREAT.

An inscription of great interest for the administrative history of the Empire in the fourth century was recently published by Louis Poinssot and Raymond Lantier.² This inscription was found at Aïn-Tebernok.³ For the detailed account of the state of the stone I can refer the reader to the *Comptes Rendus*; the inscription reads:

VIRTVTE · CLEMENTIA MemorANDO PÉ
TATE OMNES AI D · N · FL · CLA
DIO CONS T A n T i n o i u NIORI

AVG

L · PAP · PACATIANVS · FL · ABLABIVS ////
//// C · ANNIVS · TIBERIANVS · NES
to RI u S · TIMONIANVS · VIRI · CLA
r i s s i m i p RAEFECTI · PRETORIO.

As the French scholars point out, the fourth line has been carefully obliterated, and in place of the *nob. caes.* of the original version AVG has been inserted.

Of the four praetorian prefects who dedicated this base three were already known to us:

¹ O. Seeck: *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* (Berlin, 1901) ii, 483-4; cf. R. Grosse *Römische Militärgeschichte*, etc. (Berlin, 1920), p. 59.

Constantin,’ in *Comptes Rendus, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, 1924, pp. 229-233.

³ Cf. *Atlas archéol. de la Tunisie: feuille de Grombalia, s.v. Tubernuc*, no. 2c.

² ‘Quatre Préfets du Prétoire contemporains de

L. Papinius Pacatianus : On 20 Nov., 319 Pacatianus was Vicarius Britanniarum (*C. Th.* xii, 7, 2) ; in 332 he was consul with Maecilius Hilarianus.¹ Laws are addressed to him as prefect on 12 April, 332 (*C. Th.* iii, 5, 4 and iii, 5, 5), on 8 March, 334 (*C. Th.* xiv, 4, 1) on 5 July, 334 (*C. Th.* x, 15, 2) and 17 April, 335 (*C. Th.* viii, 9, 1). A law is addressed to his successor, Felix, on 21 November, 335 (*C. Th.* xvi, 8, 5), while the successor of Felix, Gregorius, published a constitution in Carthage on 21 July, 336 (*C. J.* v, 27, 1), and constitutions addressed to him are issued on 9 October, 336 (*C. Th.* xi, 1, 3), and 4 February, 337 (*C. Th.* iii, 1, 2).

Flavius Ablabius : (cf. Seeck, P.-W. i, col. 103). It is possible that Ablabius was prefect in the West of the Empire in 326, for on 18 September of that year a constitution is addressed to him (*C. Th.* xiii, 5, 5) ; but it is to be noted that while Aemilianus publishes the constitution *C. Th.* xi, 16, 4 in Rome on 9 May, 328, Ablabius was prefect of Italy in 329, for in the constitution of 13 May of that year (*C. Th.* xi, 27, 1), addressed to him, we read ‘per omnes civitates Italiae proponatur lex.’ *C. Th.* xi, 16, 4 is less likely to be wrongly dated than *C. Th.* xiii, 5, 5, since the year 328 was not that of an imperial consulate (*Ianuario et Iusto cons.*) : therefore Seeck would transfer *C. Th.* xiii, 5, 5 of 326 (‘Imp. Constantinus VII, Flavius Constantius Caesar cons.’) to 329 (‘Imp. Constantinus VIII, Flavius Claudius Constantinus Caesar IIII cons.’).² If this is right, Ablabius would have been created prefect of Italy at some date after the issue of *C. Th.* xi, 16, 4. In any event Ablabius was soon transferred to an eastern prefecture, probably before 29 November, 330, on which day *C. Th.* xvi, 8, 2 was addressed to him.³ It will be useful at this point to give a chronological table of the constitutions addressed during this period to praetorian prefects administering provinces in the East of the Empire.

Constantius.

Evagrius.

Ablabius.

324. 16 May (or ? December). *C. Th.* xv, 14, 1 (cf. the note of Mommsen on this constitution).

325. 28 September. *C. Th.* i, 5, 1.
7 October. *C. Th.* xii, 1, 11 ; *C. J.* xi, 68, 1.

326. 28 April. *C. Th.* viii, 4, 1 (?), dating doubtful : cf. Seeck : *Rege-*

326. 3 February. *C. Th.* ix, 3, 2.
15 March. *C. Th.* xii,

¹ Cf. Athanasius *Epist. beort.* 4 : his name is given as *Fabius Pacatianus* by Lietzmann *Fasti Consulares Imperii Romani*, p. 35.

² Seeck : *Regesten*, etc. p. 64, 34.

³ Cf. Seeck : *Regesten*, etc. p. 144, 26 ff.

Constantius.

sten, etc. p. 54, 38.
22 December. *C. Th.*
iv, 4, 1.

Evagrius.

I, I. ? 315, the date is
doubtful (cf. the
erroneous *datum* of
C. Th. xvi, 8, 1 with
Mommsen's note).
25 April. *C. Th.* ix, 7, 2.
17 May. *C. Th.* xii,
1, 13.

Ablabius.

327. 11 June. *C. Th.* ii,
42, 2.

330. 29 November. *C. Th.*
xvi, 8, 2.

331. 17 April. *C. Th.* v, 9, 1
30 June. *C.I.L.* iii,
7000. On this cf.
Seeck: *Regesten*, etc.
pp. 13, 181.

331. 4 August. *C. Th.* vii,
22, 3; xii, 1, 19;
xii, 1, 20 (12 August:
'i m m o 4 Aug.'
Mommsen.)

333. 13 November. *C. Th.*
vii, 22, 5.

336. 22 August. *C. Th.* xii,
1, 22.

Ablabius was still praetorian prefect on the death of Constantine.

Annius Tiberianus: he was *comes Africae* in 325, for *C. Th.* xii, 5, 1 was addressed to him on 30 July of that year, if we accept the suggestion that the *propositum* has dropped out.¹ He still held this office when he published *C. Th.* xii, 1, 15 on 21 April, 327.² He is probably the Tiberianus who was *comes Hispaniarum* in 332 (*C. J.* vi, 1, 6), and the Tiberianus to whom as *vicarius Hispaniarum* a constitution was directed on 15 July, 335 (*C. Th.* iii, 5, 6). He is further to be identified with the Tiberianus of Jerome *Chron.* ad ann. cccxxxvii: 'Tiberianus vir disertus praefectus praetorio Gallias regit.'³

These three are thus the prefects of Italy, the East, and the Gauls; the fourth prefect of our inscription is otherwise unknown to us, but it can hardly be doubted that he administered the complex of provinces which, at least at a later date, was known as the Prefecture of Illyricum.

Our inscription (if we can rely on the subscriptions of the imperial

¹ Cf. Seeck, *Regesten*, etc. p. 83, 5.

³ Cf. *C. J.* xi, 60, 1.

² Cf. Palke de Lessert, *Fastes des provinces africaines*, etc. II (Paris 1901) pp. 178-181.

constitutions) must be dated to the period after 15 July, 335—on which day Tiberianus was still *vicarius Hispaniarum*—and before 21 November, 335 on which day a law is addressed to Felix, the successor of Pacatianus. It is just possible, though highly improbable, that Pacatianus was once more made prefect of Italy after 4 February, 337, and before the death of Constantine in May of that year. In that unlikely event our inscription could be dated to the early months of 337, but a dedication would hardly be made in Africa to the Caesar Constantine II in 337, since by the partition of the Empire in 335 (after September 18) Africa fell to Constans.¹ It can scarcely be doubted that the year of the dedication is 335.² Personally I am inclined to believe that this dedication to the eldest son of Constantine was intended as a tribute of dynastic loyalty on the occasion of the imperial partition of the autumn of 335, but that is a purely subjective impression and incapable of proof.

We can now consider in the light of this inscription the most recent detailed study of the praetorian prefecture, that of Seeck, *Regesten*, etc., pp. 141 sqq. Seeck was of the opinion that under Constantine Africa and Italy formed separate prefectures. He based that opinion upon the wording of *C. Th.* xi, 27, 1, the constitution addressed to Ablabius in 329; he writes: 'Es heisst darin: *per omnes civitates Italiae proponatur lex*. Da es sich hier um Bestimmungen handelt, die ihrer Natur nach nicht auf Italien beschränkt sein konnten, kann diese Beschränkung des Publikationsbefehls nur darin ihren Grund haben, dass die Kompetenz des Präfecten Ablabius . . . nicht über Italien hinausreichte' (p. 144, 22 sqq.). It is clear, however, from our inscription that Pacatianus is named first in the list for the reason that amongst his colleagues it is he who is primarily responsible for this African dedication; but it is equally clear that Italy fell within his prefecture, as can be seen from *C. Th.* xiv, 4, 1 (on the provision of pork for the city of Rome) and *C. Th.* viii, 9, 1 (on the corporations of the city of Rome). Therefore Seeck's inference from the wording of *C. Th.* xi, 27, 1 would appear to be mistaken, and we should, I think, conclude, with Dessau (notes on 1240 and 1241) that L. Aradius Valerius Proculus when proconsul of Africa was, not praetorian prefect of Africa separated from Italy, but rather *vices agens pr. pr.* in the provinces of Africa, a position which in his case was exceptionally united with the proconsulship.

Further, since the fourth prefect of our inscription is probably a prefect of Illyricum, we must regard as very doubtful another inference drawn by Seeck: 'Für Illyricum ist kein Präfect nachweisbar. Da der Kaiser meist selbst in diesem Teil des Reiches oder doch in seiner Nähe residierte, dürfte er für ihn die Bestellung eines *alter ego*—denn das bedeutete ja der Präfect—für überflüssig gehalten

¹ Cf. Maurice, *Numismatique Constantinienne* I, pp. clxvi, sqq.

² And not 336 as the French editors suggest: this would mean that Pacatianus was again Prefect

in the interval between 21 November, 335 and the date on which there was issued in Constantinople the constitution which was published by Gregorius in Carthage, on 21 July, 336.

haben' (p. 144, 40 sqq.) But, if this inference should prove a misconception, there is raised afresh the very difficult question how far a single prefecture was administered in the fourth century as a collegiate office. As shown in the table above, Evagrius appears as a praetorian prefect in the east of the Empire in the years 331 and 336; Seeck therefore concluded that he was continuously the colleague of Ablabius in the Eastern prefecture. But in 335 (if that be the date of our inscription) he is not mentioned, and this certainly suggests that Seeck's inference is without justification. I am inclined to think that Evagrius was in fact Praetorian Prefect 'of Illyricum' (or bore some corresponding title which may have been in use at this period). If this were so, then Constantius will have been Prefect of the East: Ablabius will have succeeded him in that office: after 331 Evagrius retired for a time from the prefecture of Illyricum, his place being taken by the Nestorius Timonianus of our inscription. In 336 he was once more created Prefect of Illyricum, whence after Constantine's death he was transferred to a western prefecture. Antioch would have been the seat of Constantius and Ablabius, while Evagrius, as Constantine's *alter ego*, would live in Constantinople or Nicomedia. It is much to be regretted that so few *proposita* are preserved, for these might readily settle the matter. The evidence of the constitutions is as follows: in the case of Constantius we possess only two constitutions with *proposita*—*C. Th.* xv, 14, 1 and *C. Th.* i, 5, 1—the former *sine loco*, the latter resting upon conjecture. But, if the address of the latter is rightly amended—as I believe to be the case—from *Constantinum pu.* to *Constantium ppo.*, then there can be no doubt that we must make the consequential alteration *pp.* for *dat.*, since Constantine was in Constantinople or its near neighbourhood in September of the year of the Council of Nicaea. This would give us for Constantius a *propositum* in Antioch. For Evagrius also we possess only two constitutions with *proposita*—*C. Th.* xii, 1, 1 and *C. Th.* ix, 7, 2—the former *sine loco*, the latter at Nicomedia. In these cases such evidence as we possess would appear to support the suggestion. For Ablabius we unfortunately have only a single *propositum*, and that tells us little: *C. Th.* vii, 22, 5 is *datum et propositum* on 13 November, 333: Ablabius may well have been summoned to the capital for the nomination of Constans as Caesar which took place in the following month. This suggestion, it must clearly be understood, is a mere hypothesis, but we may at least say that Seeck's theory of the collegiate administration of a single prefecture during these years is not a *necessary* supposition.

Other corrections of Seeck's statements are merely consequential alterations on the discovery of the new inscription: *e.g.* we now know that Maximus was not Prefect of the Gauls continuously from 327 until after the death of Constantine (*Regesten*, etc. p. 143, 27; 145, 22); they need not be detailed here. I have only desired in this note to accentuate the interest and importance of the French publication.

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ALEXANDRIA AND CONSTANTINOPLE: A STUDY IN ECCLESIASTICAL DIPLOMACY

BY NORMAN H. BAYNES

Scholars have often considered the diplomacy of the Pharaohs and of the Ptolemaic kings of Egypt; there is perhaps room for a brief study of the diplomacy of the uncrowned kings of Roman Egypt—the Christian patriarchs of Alexandria. This is the theme of the present paper¹. I am not here concerned with theology, but with the struggle of the

¹ This paper represents the substance of a lecture delivered at a meeting of the Society on January 26, 1926. I have retained its original form, and have accordingly refrained from any elaborate 'documentation.' The following are the principal modern works on which this paper is based:

PIERRE BATIFFOL: *La Paix Constantinienne*, ch. 2. Paris, Gabalda, 1914.

ID.: *Origine du règlement des conciles*, in *Études de liturgie et d'archéologie chrétienne*. Paris, Gabalda, 1919.

FELIX HAASE: *Altchristliche Kirchengeschichte nach orientalischen Quellen*. Leipzig, Harrassowitz, 1925.

HEINRICH GELZER: *Die Konzilien als Reichsparlamente*, in *Ausgewählte kleine Schriften*. Leipzig, Teubner, 1907, 142–155.

ED. SCHWARTZ: *Die Konzilien des 4 und 5 Jahrhunderts*, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, CIV (1910), 1–37.

ID.: *Konzilstudien = Schriften der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Strassburg*, 20 Heft. Strassburg, Trübner, 1914.

P. ROHRBACH: *Die Patriarchen von Alexandrien*, in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, LXIX (1892).

On Greek monasticism:

KARL HOLL: *Über das griechische Mönchtum*, in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, xciv (1898).

ID.: *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum*. Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1898.

J. LEIPOLDT: *Schenute von Atripe und die Entstehung des national-ägyptischen Christentums*. Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1903.

On Chrysostom and the Synod ad Quercum:

UBALDI in *Memorie of the Academy of Turin*: 2nd Series, LII (1903).

For Nestorius:

J. F. BETHUNE-BAKER: *Nestorius and his Teaching: a fresh examination of the evidence*. Cambridge University Press, 1908.

G. R. DRIVER AND LEONARD HODGSON: *Nestorius. The Bazaar of Heracleides*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1925. (My quotations from the *Bazaar of Heracleides* are taken from this translation of the work.)

F. NAU: *Le Livre d'Héraclide de Damas*. Paris, Letouzey et Ané, 1910.

ID.: *Nestorius d'après les Sources orientales*. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 1911.

ED. SCHWARTZ: *Zur Vorgeschichte des ephesinischen Konzils*, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, cxii (1914), 237–263.

ID.: *Die sogenannten Gegenanathetismen des Nestorius*, in *Sitzungsberichte d. Bay. Akad. d. Wiss. Philosoph.-philol. u. hist. Kl.*, Jahrgang 1922, 1 Abhandlung. München, 1922.

For Cyril:

PIERRE BATIFFOL: *Les présents de S. Cyrille à la cour de Constantinople*, in *Études de liturgie et d'archéologie chrétienne*. Paris, Gabalda, 1919, 154–179, and in *Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes*, I (1911), Fasc. 4.

For Dioscoros:

FELIX HAASE: *Patriarch Dioskur I nach monophysitischen Quellen*, in MAX SDRLEK, *Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen*, VI (1908). Breslau, Aderholz.

Bishop of Alexandria to maintain the supremacy of his see against the upstart bishopric of Constantinople. A word is, however, necessary by way of introduction on the development within the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire of the organisation of the Christian Church as an institution.

Christianity took its rise in the *cities* of the Roman East. Paul passes from city to city founding his small Christian communities at strategic points which were to serve as bases from which the world was to be conquered for Christ. It was thus from the provincial capital that Christianity spread to the country-side: thus that in course of time the provincial capital came to be regarded as the mother church and the natural centre of the Christian communities scattered through the province. In this way from the first the Church unconsciously adopted for its organisation the same territorial divisions as those of the civil power: the communities in a civil province are regarded as collectively forming an ecclesiastical unit. While Paul writes his letters to the capital cities of Roman provinces—Ephesus (Asia), Corinth (Achaia), Thessalonica (Macedonia)—the first epistle of Peter is addressed to the congregations of Galatia, Pontus, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia (cf. 2 Cor. i, 1). The problem of organisation in the early Church has to many become a weariness owing to the preoccupation of students with dogmatic questions, such as the origins of the institution of episcopacy and the Apostolic Succession: but in itself the problem of organisation is only one aspect of the intensely human question of the maintenance of intercommunication between the several churches, and of the guardianship of the true faith through such intercommunication. When a travelling apostolate, when the web of a far-flung correspondence both proved inadequate, we hear during the latter half of the second century of the gathering of bishops in councils. And here again these extraordinary gatherings, assembled for the discussion of problems of pressing urgency, were gatherings of the bishops of a civil province within the capital of the province. About the middle of the third century from these extraordinary provincial councils there developed the regular provincial synods meeting annually in the provincial capital. Thus the prestige and authority of the bishop of the provincial metropolis were naturally increased: he tended to become the standing president of the synod: he won influence over the election of all bishops within the province. In 325 the Council of Nicaea determines that in future such provincial councils shall be held regularly twice in the year under the presidency of the metropolitan, and that no episcopal election shall be valid unless the metropolitan has given his approval. Thus in each imperial province by the side of the civil governor there stands the ecclesiastical head of the Christian communities within the province.

This is definitely raised to a principle of Church organisation, and, when the limits of an imperial province are altered, there follows a corresponding alteration of the sphere

And cf. A. WILLE: *Bischof Julian von Kios, der Nunzius Leos des Grossen in Konstantinopel*. Kempten, Kösel, 1910.

KARL GÜNTHER: *Theodoret von Cyrus und die Kämpfe in der orientalischen Kirche vom Tode Cyrills bis zur Einberufung des sogen. Räuber-Konzils*. Programm. Aschaffenburg, Werbrun, 1913.

For the general setting cf. L. DUCHESNE: *Histoire ancienne de l'Église*, Tome III. Paris, Fontemoing, 1911.

This paper was written before I had seen

B. K. STEPHANIDES: *Οἱ παπὰι Κελεστίνος ὁ Α' καὶ Λέων ὁ Α' ἐν ταῖς σχέσεσιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντ. αὐτοκράτορας καὶ τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν συγκαλούμενας οἰκουμ. συνόδους*, in *Ἑπετηρίς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, ἔτος Α'. Athens, 1924, 55–85.

ED. SCHWARTZ: *Aus den Akten des Concils von Chalkedon*, in *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akad. d. Wiss. Philosoph.-philol. u. hist. Kl.*, xxxii Baud, 2 Abhandlung. München, 1925.

of the metropolitan: the Emperor Valens will divide the civil province of Cappadocia in order to strike a blow at the authority of S. Basil. But the provincial councils develop into gatherings of bishops from *many* provinces, and these later councils tend in the same way to centre round the great cities of the Empire: Antioch, Alexandria, Ephesus; and as a result of this development the bishop of one of these great cities stands in relation to the provincial metropolitans in the same position as do the latter to the bishops within their several provinces—*i.e.*, there emerges the position of an over-metropolitan, or, as he came to be known, a patriarch. And these complexes of provinces with a patriarch at their head are identified with the larger divisions of a civil praefecture—the *dioceses* under their *vicarii*: just as the metropolitan has his parallel in the provincial governor, so the patriarch in the ecclesiastical sphere represents the *vicarius* of the praetorian praefect within the civil hierarchy. Just as the metropolitan must approve of the election of the provincial bishops, so the patriarch must give his consent to the elections of metropolitans within the civil diocese. This was the general rule, but the Patriarch of Alexandria exercised extraordinary powers, for *all* elections of bishops within the provinces of Egypt were subject to his approval. Thus had the Church in the Eastern provinces of the Empire adopted as the basis for the organisation of its hierarchy the territorial divisions of the Roman administrative system. From this principle there followed naturally the corollary that the importance and precedence of a bishopric depended upon the importance and precedence within the Empire of the bishop's city. Here again the result of an historical development was raised into a general principle. Byzantium—the humble Greek city—was, as a see, subject to the bishop of Heraclea: but when Byzantium was transformed into Constantinople and in 330 became the seat of the imperial government, this subjection of the capital of the Roman East to the unimportant bishopric of Heraclea was an anomaly: the see of Constantinople was coveted by metropolitans (*e.g.*, Eusebius of Nicomedia), even by patriarchs (*e.g.*, Eudoxius of Antioch); at length the Council of Constantinople (381) by its third canon declared that the bishop of Constantinople should stand second in honour only to the bishop of the old Rome upon the Tiber, *because the city of which he is bishop is New Rome*. Because Constantinople is the capital of the Roman East, it is given the place of honour amongst the Eastern churches: the suffragan becomes the first of the Patriarchs. This is indeed the crowning application of the theory of the Christian East which we have been considering: the rank of churches is determined by the prominence of cities as *civil* capitals—a principle itself deduced from the *facts* of an historical development. But the third canon of the Council of Constantinople was more than that: it was also a challenge to Alexandria. The occasion and the issue of that challenge form the subject of this lecture. But it is essential from the first to realise that this struggle between the Patriarchates is no chance encounter: that indeed it is the result of an historical development which links Paul of Tarsus to the Alexandrian patriarchs. For, if the rank of a bishop depended in principle on the rank of his city, to whom in truth did the pre-eminence belong—to the bishop of the city of Alexander with its six centuries of pagan and Christian history, or to the bishop of the city of Constantine, the city of yesterday, the presumptuous intruder amongst the capitals of the Roman East?

The early history of the spread of Christianity in Egypt is notoriously obscure, but in the last great persecution Egypt had withstood the utmost fury of the imperial agents, and that fury—described for us in the pages of Eusebius—and its failure had left their mark. Egypt had defied the might of Rome, and the Empire of Rome

had acknowledged defeat. That precedent, glorified in Coptic hagiography, became a treasured national possession. The Egyptian loved to be "agin the Government": it was a reassuring conviction that what Egypt had done once, Egypt could do again. We are dealing with the *city* of Alexandria: it is, however, easy to forget and essential to remember that though the opposition to the imperial government was led by Alexandria, though that Alexandrian leadership dazzles us by the great personalities in which it was incorporated, by the spectacular splendours of the vast stage on which the drama was enacted, yet behind the façade of Alexandria lay the Egyptian people. When the last great protagonist of Alexandria had suffered shipwreck at Chalcedon, there still remained the Egyptian people for whom a Monophysite faith stood as sign and symbol of their alienation from Rome and the Roman government: it was the massive resolution of the Egyptian people to remain loyal to that Monophysite faith that yet again defeated all the king's horses and all the king's men. It is perhaps the supreme example in human history of the triumph of non-cooperation. That is the background of the valley folk; there is further the background of the desert, no longer a solitary place, but peopled by anchorites and monks. If Christian asceticism in its origins had been in large measure a protest against a Church which was making too easy terms with the world, it was a patriarch of Alexandria, Athanasius, persecuted by the Church of the Emperor, who brought back to an alliance with the Church of Egypt the protestants of the wilderness. Monasticism in general—though to the generalisation there were many exceptions—was not interested in speculative theology: as Holl has reminded us, the monks were in the main concerned with practical questions of the defence of the forms adopted by Christian piety: so far as they were interested in dogmatic issues, it was in problems of soteriology, and it is, of course, a truism that soteriology from Athanasius onwards dominates the religious thought of Alexandria. The essential fact for Alexandrian piety was the Christ Who was the object of worship, rather than the Christ of logical and metaphysical definition, rather than the Christ Who, as the school of Antioch insisted, was also the man Jesus, and therefore conditioned by a human development in time and space. All conceptions which emphasised the dualism of nature in the God-Man tended to dissipate that unity of the person worshipped which was for the Egyptian a pre-requisite, if the analytic activity of the mind were to be stayed, and the heart freed for the untroubled repose of devotional contemplation. Thus, were the practical issues of cult or soteriology endangered, the monks were readily aroused to opposition, and they who were originally drawn for the most part from the people could, as propagandists, appeal with irresistible force to the people. In the fifth century the voice of the monk was what the press is to-day, and with their religious slogans the monks produced the same effect as modern newspapers with their political war cries. "Cursèd be Nestorius!" "Hang the Kaiser!" The slogan becomes an inebriant, and men are intoxicated with its passionate repetition: "But when they knew that he was a Jew, all with one voice about the space of two hours cried out 'Great is Diana of the Ephesians.'" As it had been in the pagan city, so it was in Christian Ephesus. The patriarchs of Alexandria played upon the emotions of these monks with inherited mastery: the reputation for orthodoxy which Athanasius had won attached itself to the office which Athanasius had held: when the relentless brutality of Theophilus, the foe of Chrysostom, had with fire and sword stamped out the opposition of the Nitrian monks, there was no further room for independence of thought in Egypt; no declaration of papal infallibility was needed: the infallibility of the Papa of Alexandria was for Egypt an axiom. The patriarch was fighting his country's battles, and his despotism was unchallenged. Hence-

forth the treaty of alliance which Athanasius had concluded between the desert and the city was maintained with a loyalty which had behind it the force of an inveterate habit. The monks of Egypt formed the Patriarch's fanatic bodyguard: theirs not to reason why: their clubs were brandished at his nod: their dervish bands would follow him to victory or destruction!

That is the setting: and Egypt's first champion in the duel between Alexandria and New Rome is Athanasius. It was Athanasius who realised the great advantage which distance gave to an Egyptian patriarch. The Bishop of Constantinople lived in the shadow of the imperial palace: but Alexandria lay more than three weeks' journey from the Eastern capital. Here it was much easier to play the essentially Egyptian game of passive resistance—the emperor meanwhile might change his mind! Athanasius, summoned to Caesarea by Constantine, simply stayed where he was—and waited. But passive resistance even in a patriarch had its limits, and that limit was reached when a strong emperor had once made up his mind upon a course of action and refused to change it. There is throughout the apparent vacillations of Constantine's church policy one fixed resolution which provides the key to the emperor's acts: the aim of that resolution was to secure the unity of the Church, and woe to him who opposed its realisation! Arius had withstood the imperial will at Nicaea and he had been exiled: why could Athanasius defy the command to appear at Caesarea and yet after piteous hesitation—as we now know from the papyri of which Mr. Bell has given us so masterly an edition¹—obeyed the command to present himself at Tyre? I believe the reason to be simple: as I have recently ventured to suggest in this *Journal*², the reason is that Arius had recanted, had signed an orthodox creed, and that Athanasius who refused to rejoice over the sinner that repenteth and would not admit Arius to communion was the one man who by his uncharitable bigotry barred the emperor from attaining his heart's desire. Therefore Athanasius was sent into exile in the West. That interview in Constantinople between emperor and patriarch is of profound significance for the course of the whole struggle: when a resolute emperor had once made up his mind, a patriarch of Alexandria could resist no longer: Alexandria won its triumphs against emperors who were irresolute or emperors who played into the hands of the enemy.

The sufferings and triumph of Athanasius raised Alexandria to a position of unchallenged supremacy. Constantinople under the Arian dominance of a Valens was not a serious rival. But when Valens fell on the stricken field of Adrianople, when Gratian's choice had given an orthodox emperor to the Roman East in Theodosius the Great, Alexandria immediately realised that this change might undermine the supremacy of Egypt. Gregory of Nazianzus had been summoned to Constantinople, and there began to re-form a congregation of those loyal to the faith of Nicaea. He had been recognised as bishop of the city by Peter, Patriarch of Alexandria: the latter now repented of this recognition and determined to impose upon the see of New Rome a Cynic philosopher who had been banished from Egypt. Bishops protected by sailors (from the Egyptian corn-ships?) hurriedly performed the rites of consecration under cover of night, and then Maximus together with his consecrators hastened to Salonica to secure the emperor's approval (380). This Theodosius bluntly refused, and the answer to Egyptian intervention was the third canon of the Council of Constantinople which we have previously considered. Gregory of Nazianzus relinquished his office, and Nectarius was consecrated bishop of Constantinople in his place. Alexandria had met an emperor who knew his own mind—and had suffered defeat.

¹ H. I. BELL, *Jews and Christians in Egypt*. London, 1924, 53 sqq.

² XI (1925), 58–69.

Theodosius the Great died in 395, and his sons Arcadius and Honorius were weaklings: Nectarius died in 397, and forthwith Alexandria renewed the struggle. Theophilus, the Egyptian patriarch, was a man of violence who knew no scruples, but he was also a consummate diplomat who knew how to bide his time. His first attempt to control the see of the capital was a failure: he proposed as candidate his personal friend Isidore, but the all-powerful minister, the eunuch Eutropius, with the support of Arcadius carried the election of Chrysostom. Theophilus protested against that election, but in vain. Eutropius threatened him with an accusation for deeds of violence committed in Alexandria: the patriarch's consent to Chrysostom's consecration was the price at which he could purchase immunity from prosecution: he considered it wiser to submit. Chrysostom thus began his ministry in the capital with the patriarch for his foe, but with the support of the emperor and of the empress Eudoxia.

I am not here concerned to describe how Chrysostom aroused the enmity alike of the court and of influential ecclesiastics in Constantinople—it is indeed strange that there is no worthy biography of Chrysostom: we await impatiently that monograph on which, it is understood, for more than a quarter of a century Baur, the profoundest student of Chrysostom's life since Haidacher's death, has been engaged. My purpose in this paper is simply to study the *methods* of Alexandrian diplomacy. In 399 Theophilus had quarrelled with his friend Isidore: the patriarch launched against the blameless octogenarian an odious charge: it was of course quite groundless, but the charge alone sufficed. Isidore was excommunicated, treated with brutal violence, and further accused of heresy. He fled for protection to the Nitrian monks. Massacre and arson scattered the survivors of the Nitrian community throughout the provinces of the Roman East. Some fled to Constantinople and appealed for protection and justice to Chrysostom. The bishop refused to act as judge upon the conduct of his colleague of Alexandria: his appeal to Theophilus for reconciliation remained unanswered: but Egyptian emissaries were despatched to Constantinople with counter-charges. The monks secured the support of the palace: their case was heard in the court of the praetorian praefect: their accusers were condemned to death, though stay of execution of the sentence was granted until the arrival of the Patriarch of Alexandria: Theophilus was summoned to stand his trial in Constantinople with Chrysostom for judge. The foes of Chrysostom within the capital saw their opportunity: they appealed to Theophilus "since," as Palladius, Chrysostom's biographer, writes, "he had experience in such matters." The first step was to discredit the orthodoxy of Chrysostom: then a large synod should assemble in Constantinople, and Chrysostom should be condemned as a heretic. Theophilus determined to secure Chrysostom's deposition and, if possible, his rival's death. He induced Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis in Cyprus, to believe that Chrysostom had favoured Origenism, and thus exploited for his own ends the fiery orthodoxy and pious simplicity of the revered champion of the creed of Nicaea. Epiphanius, in spite of his great age, made the journey to Constantinople as the enemy of Chrysostom: in the capital he learned that he had been but the cat's paw of Alexandrian diplomacy: in his bitter disillusionment he set sail for Cyprus, only to die on the voyage. The foes of Chrysostom were checkmated.

Meanwhile Theophilus, heir to the ecclesiastical stratagems of Athanasius, did not leave Egypt unaccompanied: a regiment of Egyptian bishops preceded him by the short sea route: he himself pursued his leisurely way through the provinces of Asia, encouraging those who were prepared to support Alexandria in the struggle with Constantinople—that

struggle is now a duel between the two patriarchates: the prize of victory supremacy in the Eastern Church. Theophilus no longer appeared as one who was called to meet a serious accusation: already he announced his intention of deposing a heretic bishop. At Chalcedon the foes of Chrysostom were gathered, and the emperor, who still supported the bishop of Constantinople, now called upon Chrysostom to cross to Asia and to examine the charges against Theophilus. This Chrysostom refused to do: he would give the Alexandrian patriarch no ground for his accusation that the bishop of the capital was interfering in matters beyond his jurisdiction. Here Ubaldi in his valuable study of the Synod ad Quercum—a study which has unfortunately been disregarded by English scholars—has made an illuminating suggestion. Arcadius had summoned bishops to a council, the preparations were made, the bishops assembled, and now by Chrysostom's refusal to act as judge the emperor's plans were frustrate: he was like to appear ridiculous. How could he save his face? Theophilus provided the answer: the council could still meet: there was work for it to do. If Chrysostom would not be judge, if he disobeyed the imperial summons, he could *be judged*: the emperor would not have made his preparations in vain. The court turns against its bishop.

During the delay caused by Chrysostom's refusal Theophilus adduced his most cogent arguments. He had come, as Palladius says, like the beetle, laden with the dung of the East, laden with the gold of Egypt, with the salves and the odours of India. Two deacons deposed by Chrysostom—the one for adultery, the other for murder—drew up at the dictation of Theophilus the list of the charges against their bishop: a hasty reconciliation with the Nitrian monks removed the ground for further action against Theophilus: the council could begin its work. To the summons of the council Chrysostom replied that he was ready to appear before any synod in the world, if only his personal enemies would withdraw. In his absence Theophilus, the foe of the accused, his accuser and his judge, condemned him to deposition on the ground of his contumacious refusal to appear before the tribunal. The vacillation of emperor and empress might postpone the execution of that sentence, but not for long: the result was the complete triumph of the patriarch of Alexandria, and Chrysostom's successors in the see of Constantinople took the lesson to heart and were careful not to antagonise the uncrowned king of Egypt. Cyril succeeded his nephew Theophilus on the throne of S. Mark and continued the policy of the dynasty.

In 428 Theodosius II chose the eloquent monk Nestorius to be bishop of Constantinople. An honest, fearless and devout man was head of the Church in the Eastern capital. Cyril saw that here he could count upon no subservient submission, and took his measures accordingly. The tragedy of Chrysostom was to be repeated in the "Tragedy of Nestorius"—the title which Irenaeus gave to the great collection of "*pièces justificatives*" which he compiled in his friend's defence. This new triumph of Alexandria was won by methods which were now traditional with the see of S. Mark. Naturally I shall not attempt here to sketch in detail the *Vorgeschichte* of the Council of Ephesus: I am only anxious to demonstrate that parallelism in the methods of Alexandrian diplomacy. As with Theophilus, so with Cyril: his unscrupulous violence had laid him open to accusations which it would be inconvenient for him to meet: diplomacy demanded that he should be able to pose, in like manner as Theophilus had done, as the defender of threatened orthodoxy. As in the case of Theophilus, however, it was the patriarch and not the bishop of Constantinople who began the attack. The first step of Theophilus had been to secure from an Egyptian synod the condemnation of Origenism in order to charge Chrysostom with that heresy: the

first step of Cyril was to attack Nestorius in his Easter pastoral of 429 and in a circular letter to the Egyptian monks: in both he carefully avoided any mention of the *name* of Nestorius. Copies of these documents reached Constantinople: here there were priests from Alexandria who were ready to provide Nestorius with material for an accusation before a council. That Cyril knew his danger is clear from his protestations contained in his first letter to Nestorius: "let not your Piety doubt for a moment that we are ready to suffer anything even to prison and death": at the same time Cyril wrote to his own agents in Constantinople giving them their instructions: they were to paint Cyril to his Egyptian opponents as the heroic champion of the true faith, while no direct attack was to be lodged against Nestorius with the emperor, lest Nestorius should be able to complain that Cyril was accusing him to Theodosius of heresy¹. Cyril's correspondence indeed proves that this parallelism in method was conscious. To his agents in the Eastern capital he would admit no anxiety. "There is no need for alarm: councils sometimes, every one knows, turn out otherwise than men expect [an obvious allusion to the Synod ad Quercum]. Let not Nestorius, poor man, think that I shall submit to be judged by him, whatever accusers he may suborn against me. The rôles will be reversed: I shall decline his competence to judge me, and I shall know how to force him to defend himself." (Ep. 4.) The letters of Cyril to Nestorius were carefully framed so as to draw statements from the bishop which could be used as evidence against him. They produced the effect which Cyril desired. He could now appeal to Rome; Pope Coelestine should be used as Theophilus had sought to use Epiphanius. Cyril sent to the Pope a lying summary of the course of the controversy: the true chronology was distorted in order to disguise the fact that Cyril had himself been the aggressor. Nestorius, conscious of his honesty and orthodoxy, also sent a report to Rome, but in Greek: this Coelestine was unable to read, while Cyril with subtle diplomacy had caused all his evidence to be translated into Latin. The Pope, who probably hardly realised what the dispute was about—the term "Mother of God" was not in common use in the West at this time—now declared against Nestorius: Nestorius must within ten days of the receipt of the Pope's letter accept the theology of Rome *and Alexandria* and disavow his (unspecified) heretical views. Cyril was constituted the Pope's mouthpiece and representative. It was more than even Cyril himself could have hoped for. He could now with even greater success than Theophilus pose as the champion of orthodoxy. He compiled his famous "Anathemas," and exceeding any authority which he could rightly claim demanded that Nestorius should subscribe to them. "Rechtlich betrachet war dieser dogmatische Erlass des alexandrinischen Patriarchen eine Ungeheuerlichkeit"—a legal monstrosity. Schwartz has pointed out² that in the correspondence between Cyril and the Pope the emperor is never named—so little notice did men take of Theodosius II. Yet even before the Egyptian bishops bearing Cyril's Anathemas had arrived in the Eastern capital the emperor had by a constitution addressed to the bishops summoned a council to meet in the following year at Ephesus, while in an ungracious letter to Cyril he showed that the council would enquire into the conduct of the Patriarch of Egypt (19 Nov. 430). The council met: of the terrorism practised at Ephesus by Cyril's rabble I need not speak: Nestorius had to be guarded by imperial soldiers from assassination, and could not leave his house³. The refusal of Cyril to await the arrival of John of Antioch and the Syrian clergy is well known: his complete disregard of the emperor's instructions, his defiance of the

¹ This letter is quoted by Nestorius. *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 101.

² *Historische Zeitschrift*, cxii (1914), 257.

³ Cf. *Bazaar of Heracleides*, 108, 134-135.

emperor's representative are equally familiar. Cyril *was* in fact the Council. As Nestorius says, Cyril conferred upon himself the office of judge (p. 117). "I was summoned by Cyril who had assembled the Council, even by Cyril who was the chief thereof. Who was judge? Cyril. And who was the accuser? Cyril. Who was bishop of Rome? Cyril. Cyril was everything." Before such a tribunal Nestorius could obviously not appear. Its deliberations were a foregone conclusion and the deposition of Nestorius inevitable.

It was in vain that the distracted emperor confined Cyril: Egyptian gold procured the prisoner's release, and once in Alexandria Cyril was safe. Once in Alexandria his hands were free, and he fought the cause of his Anathemas with the "benedictions"—the *εὐλογίαι*—of Egypt. Details of those *εὐλογίαι* chance has preserved to us in a document which has recently been published for the first time by the great Roman Catholic scholar Pierre Batiffol¹. Theophilus had come to Constantinople, as we have seen, laden with the dung of Egypt: from Egypt Cyril distributed to those who had influence at the Byzantine court amongst other gifts eastern carpets, ivory chairs and tables, fine linen, ostrich eggs and a sum in hard cash which Batiffol in 1911 calculated at over a million francs. The benedictions of Alexandria proved persuasive: though Cyril was forced to approve of an Antiochene creed, he was not constrained to sacrifice his Anathemas.

The parallelism in method between the Alexandrian attack upon Chrysostom and the attack upon Nestorius is striking. Was it even more complete than has been thought? Schwartz has remarked that the summoning of the Council of Ephesus by the emperor was premature, since Theodosius had no considered policy for which negotiation might prepare the way before the assembling of the Council: Schwartz therefore concludes that it must have been the advice of Nestorius which led the emperor to his hasty decision². The nature of this difficulty, first raised, I think, by Schwartz, needs perhaps a word of explanation.

Gelzer and Batiffol have shown that the Church councils of the Christian empire represent the imperial senate so far as *res divinae* are concerned. The senate of pagan Rome had discussed both civil and religious matters, and the *res divinae* as the more important came first upon the agenda. Since the victory of Christianity there only remained for the senate the consideration of profane matters; the Church council, formed on the model of the Roman senate, becomes the supreme authority *in rebus divinis*. The emperor nominates and summons the senators: it is he who determines the composition of Church councils: he bears the expense of the bishops' journeyings, and puts the imperial post at their service. The presidency belongs to the emperor or his delegates: Constantine, I believe, presided in person at the Council of Nicaea: later emperors preferred to send their representatives. In the senate the presiding magistrate does not vote: neither do the imperial delegates in the council. The Gospels take the place of the Altar of Victory. The *senatus consulta* need for their validity the approval of the emperor: without imperial sanction the conclusions of Church councils are of no effect. Gelzer entitled his famous essay *Die Konzilien als Reichsparlamente*: but Church councils are, as Schwartz has reminded us, Imperial Parliaments of a peculiar kind: their members are not the representatives of their congregations or their dioceses: the old conception dating from the days before the triumph of the Church lives on: the councils of the Church are charismatic assemblies: their decisions are revelations of the Holy Ghost—of that Holy Spirit that

¹ Cf. the bibliography on p. 145 *supra*.

² *Historische Zeitschrift*, cxii (1914), 258 sqq.

lives in the bishops through the consecration to their divinely appointed office. There can therefore be no question of a majority or a minority: the decisions must perforce be unanimous: a minority, if it persists in opposition, necessarily creates a schism: the only course open to it is to deny to the council with which it disagrees the operation of the Holy Ghost—to form, as at Sardica or Ephesus, another council through which the Holy Spirit may express the divine will. Of necessity therefore a far-seeing emperor, seeking, as seek he must, the unity of the Church, is bound to prepare by previous negotiation a solution in which this charismatic Parliament will concur: for, if there is no concurrence, the whole is lost, and imperial policy is foredoomed. Constantine in the *Homoeousion* had his solution: what in the mind of Theodosius was to be the principal task of the council when he summoned the bishops to Ephesus? Here I would like to make a suggestion, based upon an obscure phrase in the *Bazaar of Heracleides* which does not seem to have attracted the notice of students.

Addressing Cyril, Nestorius writes (p. 105) "Thou hast stirred up [my friends against me] in order that under pretext of their souls thou mightest show thyself zealous to set them aright, because thou hadst pleasure in them, or that either I might desist from listening to thine accusers and those who were ready to accuse thee, who were already armed against thee, since, if that were to come about, it would then be easy for thee to do whatsoever thou wouldst in regard to the possessions, or otherwise in oppressing me thou wouldst make believe that for the sake of the fear of God I was thine enemy and that *for this cause I had declined mine office as judge*." By oppressing Nestorius, Cyril would create the impression that it was because of the consciousness of his own guilt that Nestorius had declined his office as judge. I would boldly suggest that in this extremely clumsy sentence we possess the key to that premature summons of the council by Theodosius. Arcadius had summoned the Synod ad Quercum to try Theophilus: Chrysostom's refusal to act as judge had disconcerted the emperor's policy. I believe that the Council of Ephesus was called by Theodosius primarily to make inquisition into the conduct of Cyril: that suggestion is indeed borne out by the terms of the emperor's letter to the patriarch: the refusal of Nestorius to act as judge similarly frustrated the policy of Theodosius.

In each case the emperor cuts a sorry figure: and in each case, before the emperor can make up his mind to sacrifice his bishop, it is left to another to shoulder the burden of responsibility. You recall the scene in Chrysostom's case: the bishops who had led the opposition to Chrysostom were determined to force a decision: "in our view," they said to Arcadius, "you, Sire, are appointed by God as absolute ruler, subject to none, superior to all: your will is law. Do not desire to be more lenient than the priests, more holy than the bishops. We have publicly declared before all: on our heads fall the deposition of John. Do not then spare one man to bring us all to ruin." Arcadius hesitated yet a few days longer, and then the imperial order was issued: a notary was despatched to Chrysostom with the message: "Acacius, Antiochus, Severianus and Cyrinus have taken your condemnation upon their own heads. Commend therefore your affairs to God, and leave the Church." From this scene turn to the amazingly vivid account which Nestorius has given of the interview of the archimandrite Dalmatius with Theodosius II (*Bazaar of Heracleides*, pp. 272 ff.). The emperor had just said "Neither do I find any cause of blame in this man [*i.e.*, Nestorius]; I and my empire and my race are guiltless of this impiety" (p. 277), when "Dalmatius and those with him cried out: 'On me let this impiety be, O Emperor; I rebuke thee and thine on account of these things. I will make my defence for these things before the

tribunal of Christ, as having done this very deed.'.....And after [the emperor] [had] received this promise that the responsibility for the impious deeds committed against me should not be [his], he decreed and confirmed the things which had been wrought against me."

Compare these two conversations with the interview between Constantine and Athanasius with which our account began, and you have before you the reason for the success of the diplomacy of Alexandria.

Cyril died (444), and the East heaved a sigh of relief: a letter attributed to Theodoret advises that a heavy stone be put on his grave, lest he should return. The dead would soon have enough of him and try to send him back. The "dynasty" had come to an end, but Dioscoros continued Cyril's policy. The diplomacy of Dioscoros, however, has not the subtlety of a Theophilus or a Cyril: subtlety indeed was unnecessary, for the emperor was now under the control of the eunuch Chrysaphius, and Chrysaphius was a partisan of Dioscoros. Supported by Chrysaphius, and thus secure of imperial favour, the Patriarch of Alexandria could snap his fingers alike at Pope and Western emperor. Pope Coelestine had delegated his authority to Cyril, but Pope Leo the Great would delegate his authority to none. Leo's first letter to Dioscoros on the latter's accession gave to the patriarch his cue. Alexandria, the Pope had said, must be one with Rome. To that demand Dioscoros opposed the determination that Rome should find in the East her match—that the East, too, should have her Pope. That is the meaning of the Second Council of Ephesus: it is this which distinguishes the battle fought by Cyril from the battle fought by Dioscoros. Cyril could exploit a pope against an emperor: Dioscoros played a yet more daring game. He held the emperor a eunuch's slave, and hurled his defiance against the see of Peter. The Patriarch's Coptic biographer expresses the whole situation in a nutshell in his doubt whether Mark were not greater than Peter.

Of the "Brigandage of Ephesus"—the *Latrocinium* of 449—it is unnecessary to speak: an analysis of Alexandrian methods would add little of value to the picture already drawn. Here Alexandrian violence overreached itself: Dioscoros—the Attila of the Eastern Church, as Amelli¹ has styled him (though this is surely an insult to Attila!)—would not even permit the reading of the Papal letters: it was amid scenes of indescribable confusion that Eutyches was reinstated and Flavian, the Bishop of Constantinople, deposed.

But with the fall of Chrysaphius and the accession of Marcian and Pulcheria the tables were turned. Pope and emperor were united, and at Chalcedon the whole structure of Alexandrian supremacy fell like a house of cards. When Marcian's first letter reinstating Ibas and Theodoret, deposed by the *Latrocinium*, reached Alexandria, the clergy of Egypt foresaw their doom: "Death is in this letter, Man of God." The words, reported by the Coptic biographer of Dioscoros, express that conviction. Pulcheria, "the second Eve," had seduced her husband to Egypt's ruin, and the summoning of the Council of Chalcedon in spite of the dissuasion of Leo the Great was the work of the empress. But in the shipwreck of Alexandrian domination the captain never left the bridge: Dioscoros amidst the miserable recantations of the Eastern episcopate never wavered: he could have bought his throne by submission—I accept Haase's defence² of the historicity of the Coptic biography of the Patriarch with its account of the interview between the emperor and Dioscoros before the meeting of the council—but for the successor of Athanasius, of Theophilus and

¹ *S. Leone magno e l' Oriente*. Roma, 1882. I owe the reference to Haase.

² In his monograph on Dioscoros: *cf.* the bibliography on p. 145 *supra*.

Cyril the price was too high. Dioscoros would humble himself neither before Pope nor Emperor. "With me the faith of the fathers is destroyed." These words of Dioscoros as he left the council—he refused to appear at the later sittings—were his challenge, addressed not to the bishops who had deserted him, but to the people of Egypt. The Council of Chalcedon came not to bring peace, but a sword, and the answer of his people to their Patriarch's challenge was the formation of the Egyptian monophysite church. The faith of Cyril, as Egypt understood it, was not destroyed. But for the Patriarchate of Alexandria there was to be no recovery. "God has deposed Dioscoros!" shouted the bishops gathered at Chalcedon. "This Dioscoros," said Bishop Leontios of Askalon, "has become a stumbling block to the whole assembly of the bishops, for it is his will that for his sake all should go into banishment. This 'Saint' contends that he is fighting for the true faith and yet he values his own person higher than God, higher than [Rome, Constantinople and Antioch] and higher than all bishops. Even were Alexandria destroyed, should Dioscoros perish with Alexandria, yet for all that the world would not remain without a bishop." At Chalcedon the Patriarchate of Alexandria, as the world had known it, was indeed destroyed. The melancholy history of the successors of Dioscoros has recently been recounted in Jean Maspero's posthumous work¹. Yet Leontios spoke truly: the Christian East did not remain without a bishop: for the victor at Chalcedon was the patriarch of Constantinople. Henceforth Constantinople is not merely the civil capital of the Eastern Empire: the God-founded city of Constantine is also the undisputed centre of the Church of the East Roman world.

If the figure of the deserted Dioscoros departing for his distant exile in Gangra extorts our reluctant homage, our hearts go out towards a greater exile, Nestorius. In Egypt Nestorius read the Tome of Pope Leo the Great and rejoiced; in his apology he wrote: "My dearest wish is that God should be blessed in heaven and on earth; as for Nestorius let him remain Anathema: God grant that while men curse me, they may be reconciled with Him."

¹ *Histoire des Patriarches d'Alexandrie depuis la mort de l'empereur Anastase jusqu'à la Réconciliation des Églises jacobites* (518–616). Paris, Champion, 1923.



Some Aspects of Byzantine Civilisation

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SOME ASPECTS OF BYZANTINE CIVILISATION.¹

By NORMAN H. BAYNES.

At the outset the question may well be raised whether there is any real justification for the inclusion of a paper on such a theme in the programme of a Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies. Is Byzantine civilisation—in any true sense of the word—Roman at all? To judge from not a few modern studies of the life of the East Roman Empire, the answer to that question could only be in the negative. Take what is perhaps the best known brief presentment of Byzantine history—that of Professor Diehl of Paris—and the reader will not long be left in doubt. The preface proclaims the character of the Empire: Byzantium very quickly became, and was essentially, an oriental monarchy. In the sixth century, before Justinian's accession, one could well believe that the dream of a purely oriental empire was near its realisation. Justinian delayed that consummation, but at the beginning of the eighth century a really Byzantine empire had come into being which grew ever more and more oriental in character. Under the Iconoclast monarchs the Empire had become completely orientalised; at the end of the Iconoclast struggle East Rome was a strictly oriental empire. The words 'oriental,' 'orientalise,' beat upon the mind with throbbing insistence: the monotonous repetition is almost hypnotic in its cumulative effect. The reader may without difficulty fail to note that by this subtle rhetorical device an *Histoire*, which is in fact a veiled *Tendenzschrift*, has charmed him into acquiescence. He will hardly be conscious that the 'blessed word' *oriental* is given little, if any, specific content, that general assertions are not illustrated and controlled by concrete detail, that it is left uncertain *what* Orient is intended—whether Syria, Persia, India or far Cathay. The Orient, thus undifferentiated, is a word not of historical science, but of mysticism; an unkindly critic might add—of mystification. If Professor Diehl were challenged on the point, what, we may ask ourselves, would be his reply? He would doubtless point to the προσκύνησις of a Byzantine court; he would agree with Rostovtzeff that the Byzantine theory of sovereignty as a celestial trust dates from Aurelian's eastern wars and reflects an Iranian conception of the true legitimization of a monarch's authority; he might contend that the later monastic ideal of divine contemplation—of a mystic θεωρία—is cousin-german to Buddhism, while he would remind us that through the wanderings

¹ A paper read at a meeting of the Society on March 5th, 1930.

of a far-travelled tale Buddha himself has been canonised as a Christian saint. The barbarous punishments of Byzantine criminal justice, blinding, nose-slitting and other corporeal mutilations, he would perhaps suggest, were derived from ancient Persian practices which were largely responsible for the Greek view that the Persian was a barbarian. Professor Diehl does in fact point out that the Iconoclast reformers found their inspiration in those Asiatic provinces which bordered upon Armenia, and we may remind ourselves that Armenia is historically a land hostile to an art of 'Darstellung'—a representational art—and enamoured of an art of 'significant form,' to borrow a phrase from Mr. Clive Bell, an art which sought to express its deepest convictions in the symbolism of an ornamentation which went to nature only to borrow from it decorative motives—which never sought in the interest of mere realism to reproduce that nature. Professor Diehl might follow further in the footsteps of Strzygowski and seek to portray the whole Iconoclast controversy as a struggle between two worlds: aesthetically, a struggle between the Mediterranean man and his art of representation on the one hand and the nomad, be he of steppe or desert, with his art of symbolism on the other; architecturally, a struggle in which the congregational basilica and the flat roof of the West were matched against the confined spaces of the cupola constructions of the East; and similarly, in the religious sphere, a struggle where two worlds met in conflict—a world which had raised the iconography of the human to a point where it became a bridge of mediation leading man to the ideal and the super-human, and a world to which such an iconography appeared as *menschlich, allzu menschlich*—a degradation of the Eternal through identification with the transience of the material. And in this Armageddon of the continents Byzantium will stand as the bridge-head, the prize for which Asia and Europe will dispute, the post where the issue is joined.

It might indeed seem as though a Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies had but little reason to concern itself with Byzantine civilisation. And yet I would contend that I do not stand here to-day under any false pretence. I would claim, as a disciple of Freeman and of Bury, that there remains a reason for the use of the term the Later Roman Empire, that there is a Roman element in this Byzantine civilisation. That civilisation represents to my mind the fusion of two traditions, the Greek and the Roman, and I would maintain that what oriental elements there are in its composition are not the essential and characteristic features of the Byzantine world. I would suggest that it is by means of a panoramic survey of East Mediterranean history that we can best picture to ourselves that fusion which *is* East Rome.

As I see the process, the turning-points in the development are marked by four outstanding figures: Alexander the Great, Augustus,

Constantine and the emperor Heraclius. The first period of some three hundred years—from Alexander the Great to Augustus—created the civilisation with which that of East Rome was continuous : its marked feature is that it was a culture shared widely by the men of a world where intercourse was general. Alexander had broken down the separate independence of the Greek city-state, and by so doing had destroyed much of its cherished individuality. The city-state lives on, but with a difference : its significance was necessarily dwarfed when brought into contact with empires and with scientifically organised armies before which its strength was as a very little thing. It may be doubted whether we always realise with sufficient vividness the discomfort of an age when empire-building was the fashion, when any day a Pyrrhus might arrive before the city gates, seeking a field for the satisfaction of a boundless egoism. The sheltering embrace of men's city walls availed little before the relentless individualists who march through Hellenistic history. Man felt himself alone in face of a dangerous world : the poles of Hellenistic thinking are thus the individual and the cosmos. Mr. Tarn has contended that Alexander the Great never dreamed of a world-empire ; but, even if this be true, Alexander did break down the traditional moulds of men's thinking and forced them to deal with problems in the light of the *οἰκουμένη*—as Professor Bury was fond of saying, the 'oecumenical idea' was born. In an age when the might of the gods of the city-state had dwindled before new powers, the agencies which really counted, the forces which could *do* things, were the human rulers of the Hellenistic kingdoms : they were the efficient saviours and benefactors of man. While Euhemerism was reducing to human proportions the ancient deities, men were seeing their rulers as gods. The god-king was born ; the sovran did not ultimately derive his legitimation from the suffrages of his fellow-countrymen, but rather from the possession of a daimonic energy which was more than the potency of any ordinary mortal. You have, you see, these two conceptions—the universe, and the divinity which raises a ruler above his kind : later these conceptions will unite, and the *κοσμικὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* of the East Roman world will be the result.

And together with the oecumenical idea there gradually emerged the common language, the *κοινή*, the necessary medium of communication in a world where the sundering barriers had fallen. And that common Greek language was the natural speech of the missionary, if he would carry his cause throughout Hellenistic society. Even the exclusiveness of the Jew yielded to the compulsion exercised by this common vehicle of thought. We are sometimes tempted to judge of all Judaism from our knowledge of Palestine of the first century of our era ; but that unbending aversion from Hellenism and its ways was forged in the fires of the Maccabaeian reaction, and elsewhere in

the Diaspora a very different spirit reigned. The Septuagint is the permanent memorial of the conquering power of the universal language. It is in a Greek-speaking world that Constantinople was founded, and the efforts of Roman emperors to foster the spread of Latin within the Roman provinces of the East were foredoomed to failure.

Alexander's Asiatic campaigns not only carried Hellenism to the Orient, but from those campaigns was brought back the scientific material which formed the capital of the scholars of Alexandria. Aristotle had lacked that range of knowledge from which, in the Hellenistic age, new sciences were born. But the period during which this scientific renaissance lasted was brief, and Greek scientific curiosity faded away. It was not killed by Christian obscurantism: the scientific age had passed before Christianity was born. This decay of the scientific interest is one of those mysterious changes in human thought which it is so difficult for the historian to explain: the mind of man reverts from the free enquiry of the unfettered reason to the acceptance of the primacy of authority—of oracle or sacred book. Amongst the thinkers of the fourth century of our era, Christian and pagan alike are convinced that the final authority is to be found in the scriptures: Julian, as much as any father of the church, is assured that the plausible hypotheses of the scientists count as nothing when set against the word of God. In their lack of scientific curiosity, in the supremacy accorded to the inspired writing, the Byzantines are the spiritual heirs of the later Alexandrines.

And not in this alone: for it was the scholars of Alexandria who formed the pagan canon of the classical literature. In their work on the texts of the great authors of the past, in the collection and preservation of those texts, the scholars of Alexandria won their position as the librarians of the Greek world. The literature of the Hellenistic period is, I take it, the work of men who consciously wrote as *epigoni*, and the range of their creative originality, as in pastoral or romance, is restricted. They are already custodian-trustees. Here obviously the Byzantines are their successors: they ever sought to read their title clear to the great inheritance which had descended upon them from the past. But the very splendour of that inheritance, while it might inspire imitation, paralysed initiative. For everything had already been achieved, and achieved with final mastery. We know the benediction passed upon the people which has no history. Byzantium had its roots in so glorious a past that its brilliance threw the present into shadow. Heisenberg is, I think, right in his assertion that there was nothing in Byzantine history which can be called a Renaissance in the sense in which the West has used that word, and Bury in his *Romanes Lecture* showed that, even where Byzantine literature seems to appropriate Western models, it is in reality but bringing forth from its own treasure-

house familiar motives. Its literary wealth was so great that there was no incentive to put the talent out to interest. But this is no new phenomenon, the fruit of a supposed sterility amongst the Byzantines: they are but continuing the task of the scholars of Alexandria; in Europe's Middle Age they are the world's librarians.

This Hellenistic culture of the centuries after Alexander's death undoubtedly contains oriental elements, but it is not always easy to isolate those debts of Greece to the East. One of the most striking features of Byzantine life is the omnipresence of demon powers; this general belief in the operation of demonic agency is another legacy from the Hellenistic period. Is this a purely Iranian conception invading a Greek world for which it was a new thing, or did the Iranian conception link itself naturally to ideas which were already widely prevalent on Greek soil though hidden by the majestic façade of the Olympian faith? It is desperately hard to determine what was the working creed of humble folk in the classical age; the literature which we still possess is so urban and so aristocratic. As the great gods lost not a little of their former authority, did the lesser powers of popular belief venture forth from their hiding-places into the light of day? The supremacy of the demons in Greek lands throughout the history of our era might suggest that in some form or another they had long been familiar to the folk of the Eastern Mediterranean.

And against this common civilisation of the Hellenistic East, spread throughout the kingdoms which had taken the place of the single realm of Alexander, there stands in clear relief the power of Rome. That is the result of the wars of the third century: Carthage fallen, there remained no rival to Rome in the Western Sea; Syracuse fallen, there remained no independent centre of Hellenism west of Greece. The Greek had lost his chance of making the Mediterranean a Hellenic lake from shore to shore. Henceforth Hellenism would come to Western Europe through Roman channels. The three centuries before Christ are thus a period of intercourse between two worlds—the Greek and the Roman. One current carries the armed power of Rome to the East, the other carries the culture of Greece to the West. Roman conservatism fights a losing battle, and for a time it might have seemed that, in spite of the victory of Roman arms, Greece would enslave her conqueror, that Rome itself would be transplanted to Alexandria. But Antony was defeated by Octavian, and the second period of our survey, inaugurated by Augustus, meant a reinforcement of the Roman tradition, it meant that Byzantine civilisation could draw upon the riches of a double inheritance: the heir of Hellas was also the guardian of the legacy of Rome.

Attempts have been made to disguise this fact: men have defined Hellenism as the culture of all educated men throughout the Roman world: Otto, for instance, has said that Julius Caesar by his victories

won Gaul for Hellenism. This juggling with words is a dangerous game, for it may easily obscure facts. The principate, formed of Roman materials, is a Roman building, and the culture which Rome brought to Western Europe, whether you like that culture or not, is a Roman product. That I firmly believe, and I confess that modern efforts to belittle that Roman achievement seem to me singularly ill-judged. For our present purpose the significance of the work of Augustus lies in this—that the Greek East could begin to regard Rome in a new light, not merely as an exploiting power, but as one deserving of those epithets of saviour and of benefactor which it had lavished on its own sovrans. The ‘Evangel’ of a Roman emperor was laying the basis for that fusion of traditions which went to the making of East Rome: it was rendering possible the day when the proudest boast of the Greek should be the assertion that he was a Roman. And further, I would repeat, Augustus saved into the new age those Roman traditions which during the last years of the Republic were threatened with dissolution; when the tide which drew Rome to the Eastern Mediterranean reasserted its force, those traditions could be transported, not to an Alexandria where there was every likelihood that they would simply have been submerged, but to a New Rome upon the Bosphoros which was the creation of an emperor who had already ruled the Roman West for many years.

Thus Constantine initiates the third period, the great transition in which East Rome was built, and in his own person Constantine marks a turning point in the history of the Mediterranean lands. He is not merely the result of the past, he is a new beginning. The pictures drawn by modern scholars of Constantine have been many and various, but few, if any, do justice to the boldness and originality of his achievement. Burckhardt and Costa are only representative of many who have sought to explain away Constantine’s Christianity. I confess that, after a lengthy and detailed study of all those edicts and letters of his which have been preserved, I have come to the conclusion that Constantine’s Christianity is indeed the key to his reign. He is the servant of God, the fellow-servant of the bishops, the man of God—a man under a sense of mission: his fortune he owes to the Christian God, and that relation to a Christian God has laid upon him a charge to defend the church, to toil unceasingly for ecclesiastical unity. I feel that to Constantine more than to any other man the Roman world owed the formulation of its Christian theory of sovranty, for with him that theory had sprung spontaneously and vividly from his own experience. The Roman magistrate had traditionally been entrusted with the maintenance of the *Pax Deorum*; the maintenance of that peace was a matter of such vital importance to the commonwealth that the Roman state very early took religion under its efficient charge. It is to the close connexion between Roman religion and the Roman state that Warde Fowler’s masterpiece is devoted. That connexion is not lost with the

passage of the years, and a restoration of the Roman state habitually carries with it a restoration of the Roman religion. Augustus, Justinian, Leo III, the Iconoclast, are all in the Roman tradition ; and it is in this line that Constantine has his place. The calling of the emperor to service, the mission of the emperor, the obligation of a Christian emperor, these are the themes which fill the writings of Constantine. The formal acceptance of an Iranian theory which regards sovereignty as a gift of heaven is one thing, the living conviction of experienced fact is another. When George of Pisidia in the seventh century exclaims of East Roman sovereignty ὡς εὖ κρατοῦσα σὺν Θεῷ μοναρχία—how fair a thing is monarchy with God for guide !—he is but echoing the thought of Constantine.

And one must ever remember that the man who led the crusade of A.D. 323 against the persecutor Licinius was the emperor who had at first left the settlement of the Donatist controversy to the bishops, and only after their failure had been forced himself to pass judgment : that is to say that Constantine came to the Council of Nicæa with the conviction that the emperor was God's chosen mediator in ecclesiastical affairs. When an emperor has issued an order in defence of the truth, a recalcitrant bishop must be taught that it is not seemly for him to disobey the imperial mandate. And because it was Constantine, the champion and protector of the church, who formulated that principle, the church allowed the claim. Constantine admitted the church into full participation in the life of the Roman state : the church—or, at least, each individual church—is recognised as a corporation before the Roman law, bishops become Roman judges, a Christian clergy enjoys the same privileges as the pagan priesthood—many other instances could be cited. And the consequence was that the Christian church accepted the Roman state : it did not fashion a new state for a new—*a Christian—empire*. And with the Roman state the church accepted the law of Rome. The law of Islam was fashioned by the religious consciousness of Islam : religion and law were inextricably intertwined. As we have seen during the last few years, for a divorce to be effectuated a completely new mould must be created for the law of a new society. But the Christian church, professing a creed of altruism, accepted a code of law which, as Mitteis has shown, is logically so completely satisfying because consistently based on the presuppositions of an egoism untroubled by humanitarian scruples. It is once more the personality and the achievement of Constantine which rendered this reception of pagan law as the basis of a Christian state not merely a possibility, but a fact of history.

And Constantine further entertained the vision of a Roman state which should be founded upon the unity of Christian orthodoxy and find in that unity a magnet which should draw the world of barbarian peoples to know and reverence the Christian God. In the early days of the fourth century this was a prophetic vision and its realisation

was delayed, but that vision was realised at length in the Byzantine Empire where orthodox Christianity was the inspiration that sustained, the cement which held together, the East Roman world.

Thus, as I see the story—and I am only attempting here to outline a personal view of the historical development—Constantine was the architect of East Rome. If I am right, the strength and consistency of the emperor's convictions sprang from the immediacy of an individual experience; they were no mere logical deductions from an inherited theory. Those convictions led Constantine, as it were, by a necessity inherent in themselves to divine the fabric of the Christian state which was to be. That Christian state was being constructed within the ancient shell of the doomed pagan building. The pagan walls were already sapped and undermined: in time they would fall of their own decay.

That fall was certain, because it was preordained by the will of the Christian God. For the present man could work—and wait. But with a prescience that was almost uncanny in its accuracy the emperor forecast the lineaments of the Christian edifice which should one day be disclosed. The three centuries which stretch from Constantine to Heraclius are a period of transition, an age in which through religious conflict and domestic disaffection, through foreign menace and barbarian *Völkerwanderung*, East Rome—the Christian state of Constantine's vision—was built. 'And the builders every one had his sword girded by his side, and so builded.'

We have but to state the problems which received their solution in this period, and that can be done in few words. First, there was the fundamental economic question: should the money economy of the old world be carried on into the new, or should the Empire lapse into a natural economy and payment in kind for service rendered? In the early years of the fourth century the Roman state strove resolutely to maintain the latter system in order that it might not be forced to expend its store of precious metal, but the unrelenting opposition of the soldier and the civil servant carried the day, and once more salaries were paid in cash. But this meant that a fluid taxation system must of necessity be retained, and it is on this system that the later empire was based. Only so could a standing army have been kept in being and a fleet in commission: it was through its gold that Byzantine diplomacy won its triumphs. The fact is familiar, but it is not infrequently forgotten. The contrast between the western and the eastern halves of the empire lies precisely here: the West was bankrupt; from unravaged Asia Minor the East consistently drew its taxes and thus remained solvent.

The East, like the West, was threatened with the supremacy of the barbarian: under the menace of Gaius and of Aspar the end of Roman and civilian authority seemed very near. The West had no counterpoise to throw into the scale against Ricimer: the East found within its own territory the barbarian who should meet and overthrow the

barbarian from without. The Isaurian mountaineers saved the empire. The result may be summarised in a sentence: in the West all real power is concentrated in the hands of the barbarian master of the soldiery—in the East the Roman civilian Anastasius reigns unquestioned. Sovranty, the undivided *imperium* of the emperor, and with it the Roman heritage of state supremacy link the East Roman state to the Rome of the Principate.

Alexandria had once challenged Rome: the answer to that challenge was the battle of Actium. And now Alexandria challenged New Rome in the rivalry of the patriarchates. Constantine's conception of the relation of the emperor to the church could never be realised until the pride of the ecclesiastical Pharaoh, the patriarch of Alexandria, was humbled. The story of that struggle I endeavoured to outline in a paper published recently in the *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*¹: it need not be repeated here. At the Council of Chalcedon the patriarchate of Alexandria suffered shipwreck, and henceforth the will of the emperor and of the emperor's bishop, the patriarch of New Rome, was supreme. The vision of Constantine had become an accomplished fact.

Constantinople had been built as a Christian city set in Greek-speaking lands, and the West, forgetting its Greek, drifted apart. In his African and Italian campaigns Justinian made the last great bid to restore the Roman heritage of a Mediterranean empire; he made the last great gesture of a Latin tradition in his codification of the law. Both efforts failed: the West went its own way: the Greek language triumphed, but the law preserved in Greek texts was Roman law: it is a typical example of that fusion of traditions which this paper is written to illustrate.

Constantine had sought, we have seen, to found the empire upon the basis of a common Christian orthodoxy. The work of this period is the elaboration of the content of that orthodoxy. Its final formulation meant that Egypt and Syria were alienated from Constantinople, but through their loss the empire and orthodoxy became conterminous, and a new cohesion was gained.

With the seventh century we find ourselves in a new world: Persia, the hereditary enemy of the Roman state, is overthrown, and the empire's neighbours are the Arab and the Slav. The period of transition has been brought to a close, and the reign of Heraclius marks the beginning of Byzantine history.

There follows the momentous Iconoclast struggle in which the principles formulated during the preceding centuries are directly challenged: in the field of art a challenge to an iconography which was the outcome of Greek traditions; a challenge in the ecclesiastical sphere when eastern monks were supported by the western Papacy in a

¹ 'Alexandria and Constantinople: A Study in Ecclesiastical Diplomacy.' *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, 12 (1926), 145-156.

demand for freedom from the intervention of the civil power; a challenge in the realm of law when Iconoclast emperors made a consistent effort to remodel the legislation of the state and refashion it upon a Christian basis. This triple challenge and its issue are indeed of fundamental significance for any student who would seek to determine the essential character of an empire which was at this time, if we are to believe Professor Diehl, 'étroitement orientalisé.' For in this Iconoclast struggle a movement which, as we saw, took its rise from the extreme eastern provinces of the empire—the lands bordering on Armenia—was given its opportunity to enforce its own convictions, and to that effort, which extended over a century, this eastern empire gave no uncertain answer. It resolutely refused to abandon its icons: despite persecution, it maintained its loyalty to a *Greek* iconography; it rejected the claims of the monks to ecclesiastical freedom: it willingly acquiesced in that interposition of the civil power in religious affairs which has behind it the unbroken tradition of *Roman* history; this Christian state, whose loyalty to the faith of the seven councils was its proudest boast, rejected with anathemas the consciously Christian legislation of the Iconoclasts and unhesitatingly reaffirmed in the code of a Macedonian sovereign the *Roman* law of that intensely Roman monarch Justinian. It reconquered southern Italy, and on that Western soil it created, in Professor Diehl's words, a veritable *Magna Graecia*. What an odd thing for an oriental empire to do. Why not a Magna Syria or a Magna Chaldaea? Further, in its greatest and most self-conscious period East Rome cultivated with ardour a literature which was modelled on that of classical Greece, while an imperial scholar mobilised in the interest of the commonwealth the records of the empire's Greco-Roman past.

And as against the insistence upon the dual tradition of Greece and Rome to what essential characteristics of Byzantine civilisation can one point if one would seek to justify the dogmatic assertions of, let us say, Professor Otto of Munich? 'Here Asia won a decisive victory over Europe'¹; it is easy to make such a statement: how, we may ask, is it proposed to prove it? For myself, I can only say, in the familiar phrase of the lawyers, that I desire further and better particulars. Believe me, I am not trying to make a debating point: I am not merely pleading *pro domo*.² I do really want to know what these oriental elements are which are said to determine the character of East Roman life. Is it contended that the Byzantine empire is oriental because it is Christian, Christianity being in its origin an oriental religion? My difficulty is that Christianity has always meant different things in different surroundings, while the Orthodox Church, identified with a Greek theology, does not seem to me to be adequately characterised by the epithet 'oriental.' Again,

¹ *Kulturgeschichte des Altertums*, p. 93.

² The conception of East Roman civilisation defended in this paper is that of my little book on

The Byzantine Empire published in the Home University Library.

monasticism may be described as an oriental movement but once more, when the general pagan asceticism of the time of monastic origins is remembered, when one considers that the strongest influence in the formulation of the monasticism of the eastern church was so essentially Greek a statesman as was S. Basil, it would appear to me misleading to represent Greek monasticism as distinctively oriental. Or take the etiquette of the East Roman court ; here one may freely admit that there is Persian influence at work, but one is forced to ask the question : which is truly more individual, more characteristic of the Empire, that the *sovrán* is honoured by the prostration of the subject or that with a profoundly Roman passion for efficiency the Byzantine always expected the monarch to lead the armies of the Roman state—that Byzantine absolutism was never permitted permanently to reduce the emperor to the position of a *roi fainéant* ? For me the latter fact is infinitely more significant. One by one I think of the outstanding features of this East Roman civilisation, and I fail to see that they are peculiarly oriental. It is not enough, for instance, simply to adduce the fact that Byzantine *sovranty* was absolute : *as such* absolutism is not oriental. I have even a suspicion that we are inclined to talk somewhat too glibly of the transition from the Principate to the Dominate. We naturally look at the development from an Italian standpoint. But Constantinople was set from the first not in Italy, but in a Greek land. For the folk of the Eastern Mediterranean was there ever any such thing as a Principate ? Is not the interest of the letter of Claudius, recently published by Mr. Bell,¹ from one side at least, just this, that it demonstrates the incomprehension of the Greek world before the unaccountable refusals of a Roman emperor ? If you desire to represent the triumph of absolutism as an oriental encroachment, you must, for the provinces of the Roman East, go back to a very early date, to the foundation of the Principate ; yes, and even beyond that, for this absolutist conception of government was Hellenistic before ever it was Roman. If you would contend that the conception is fundamentally oriental, might it not be answered that it had at least become in the centuries after Alexander the Great so closely woven into the life of the Hellenistic world as itself to form a part of that Greek civilisation to which Rome and Byzantium were the heirs ? The Dominate, even in the West, is there *δυναμει* from the first : it was the interpretation which Augustus put upon his powers which made his *imperium* something other ; for, as soon as the *imperium* is deprived of its temporal limits and its collegiate character, what is the *imperium* itself but practical absolutism—if the holder of the *imperium* choose to make it so ? If you desire *because of its absolutism* to represent the Eastern empire as an oriental state, it will not be necessary to await the coming of the Iconoclast emperors.

I would repeat that until Professor Diehl and Professor Otto come

¹ *Jews and Christians in Egypt*, British Museum, 1924, pp. 1-37.

into the open and put down their cards upon the table for all to see—until then—it is open to us to insist that those characteristic features which seem to us essential in Byzantine civilisation are developments from, and continuous with, the civilisations of Greece and Rome. Let us briefly in closing recapitulate some of those features. First among them is a state which was maintained upon the basis of a money economy: upon that basis alone depended the empire's standing army, its fleet in commission, its constantly adaptable art of war, continuously studied, and still represented in the surviving military manuals—the *στρατηγικά*: to all of which the West stands in striking contrast, for feudalism and a landed economy made all this impossible. Further, a state which resolutely maintained a single system of Roman law; and this maintenance goes right back to the founder of New Rome itself, who because he so unexpectedly offered to the Christians a full and free entry into the Roman state could do so on his own Roman terms, introducing, it is true, a few minor modifications into the law of the state, but essentially leaving the massive building unaltered. M. Maurice, in a recent book which his warmest admirers can only regret, has represented the Constantinian settlement as a Concordat between Roman state and Christian church; but the all-important fact for the student of the later empire to realise is surely this: that the admission of the Christians into the privileges of the state by Constantine was in essentials a unilateral act: thereby was determined the character of the later history of Roman law. When the Iconoclasts attempted to break the traditional moulds, it was already too late, for the Roman Empire had familiarised itself too intimately with the conditions of the Constantinian settlement to tolerate any change. And again in contrast with this state of the single law stands the West with its welter of local courts and systems of local law.

And the one law is maintained by a single sovereignty, the direct continuation of the *imperium* of Rome—the only sovereignty worthy of the name in the Europe of the early Middle Age. By the seventh century the menace of feudalism is broken in the East Roman Empire, and the centralised state is supreme. Here, in this Paradise of the Austinian jurist, all authority is concentrated in and flows from God's vicegerent, the Emperor.

And, as from Rome's earliest days, so now in the Christian empire, the holder of the *imperium* is also charged with the care of religion: the *pax Deorum*, which it was the duty of the Republican magistrate to safeguard, has become a Roman emperor's maintenance of Greek theological orthodoxy, which is indeed but another instance of the fusion which I have sought to illustrate. Only to the traditional duty derived from a Western Rome there has been added a Christian missionary activity amongst the barbarians settled without the empire's frontiers. This, too, is, as we have seen, a heritage from the

founder of New Rome, for Constantine as Christian Emperor gave a new content to the title of *pontifex maximus*: he was 'the bishop of those without the church,' whether heretics or pagans, and to that mission his successors remained loyal.

In a word New Rome did not belie her name: the empire set in Greek lands with its heart in the city of Constantine may still with reason claim the interest of the members of a Society formed for the study of the work of Rome.



The Death of Julian the Apostate in a Christian Legend

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THE DEATH OF JULIAN THE APOSTATE IN A CHRISTIAN LEGEND¹

By NORMAN H. BAYNES

The Emperor Julian stood to the Roman world of the fourth century as the personification of the older faith, and with him died the hopes of a pagan restoration. His death came at a critical moment, and both pagan and Christian felt that it could have been no human hand which dealt the fatal blow. To Kallistos Julian was the victim of a demon: *Κάλλιστος δέ, writes Socrates, ὁ ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τοῦ βασιλέως στρατευόμενος (i.e. as one of the imperial domestic), ἱστορήσας τὰ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐν ἡρωικῷ μέτρῳ, τὸν τότε πόλεμον διηγούμενος ὑπὸ δαίμονος βληθέντα τελευτῆσαι φησίν.*² The comment of the Christian historian is interesting: *ὅπερ τυχὸν μὲν ὡς ποιητῆς ἐπλασε, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἔχει· πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐριννύες μετῆλθον.* Libanius pictures the blessings which men anticipated under Julian's rule and adds *ταῦτα καὶ ἔτι πλείω προσδοκώμενα χορὸς φθονερῶν ἀφείλετο δαυμόνων.*³ To the Christian similarly it was the saints who had fulfilled the will of Heaven in removing the Apostate persecutor of the Church, though a human assassin could hardly have been condemned—*σχολῇ γε ἂν τις καὶ αὐτῷ μέμψαιτο διὰ Θεόν καὶ θρησκείαν ἣν ἐπήγεσεν ἀνδρείῳ γενομένῳ.*⁴ Thus Sozomen wrote somewhat as follows:

‘I have learned (*ἐκπυθόμενῳ*) that one of Julian's friends had a divine vision (*θεία ὄψις*) which I shall now proceed to describe. He had, it is related, started on the journey to Persia with the intention of joining the emperor. While on the road he found himself so far from any habitation that he was obliged one night to sleep in a church.⁵ He saw that night either in a dream or in a vision many of the apostles and prophets assembled together; they were complaining of the injuries which the emperor had inflicted on the Church and were taking counsel concerning what should be done. After long deliberation and while they were still, as it were, in doubt, two of them arose in the midst of the assembly, desired the others

¹ Cf. De Buck in *AASS*, October x, pp. 572–3; G. Reinhardt, *Der Tod des Kaisers Julian nach den Quellen dargestellt* (Cöthen, 1891); Th. Büttner-Wobst, ‘Der Tod des Kaisers Julian. Eine Quellenstudie’ *Philologus* li (1892), 561–580; Robert Graf Nostitz-Rieneck, ‘Vom Tode des Kaisers Julian’ *xvi Jahresbericht des öffentlichen Privatgymnasiums an der Stella Matutina zu Feldkirch* 1906–1907, 1–35 (see H. D. in *Anal. Boll.* xxvii (1928), 98 f.); W. R. Halliday, ‘St. Basil and Julian the Apostate: A fragment of legendary history,’ *Annals of Archaeology and*

Anthropology vii (1914–16), 89–106; P. Peeters, ‘Un miracle des SS. Serge et Théodore et la vie de S. Basile dans Fauste de Byzance,’ *Anal. Boll.* xxxix (1921), 65–88.

² Socrates, *HE* iii, 21; cf. *Anal. Boll.* xxxix, 82 for quotation from Michael the Syrian.

³ Libanius, ed. Förster, ii, 360 (=R. 618).

⁴ Sozomen, *HE* vi, 2. The reference to Greek views on the justification of tyrannicide is interesting.

⁵ ‘A fate that may well befall the modern traveller in the Levant’: Halliday, *op. cit.*, 101.

to be of good cheer and, as though intending to deprive Julian of the imperial power, hastily departed from the conclave. He who saw this surprising vision did not attempt to pursue his travel, but awaited in horrible suspense the conclusion of the revelation. He laid himself down to sleep again in the same place, and again he saw the same assembly. Then suddenly, as though coming from a journey, the two who had seemed to depart the preceding night to effect their purpose against Julian returned, and announced to the others that the emperor had been put to death.⁶

From this legend turn to the history of Faustus of Byzantium : unfortunately I cannot read Armenian, so that I can only give an English rendering of Lauer's German version.⁷

'King Valens commanded that search should be made in order that a learned man might be seen and found who should be capable of writing a refutation of the Christian faith. He was told that a learned sophist lived in a certain city ; so the emperor sent *magistriani* with orders to travel with all speed and to bring the man to him without delay. They took him and straightway brought him with them.

'As they went on their journey towards the shelter for the second night they came across another small town. Outside the town was the martyr-chapel of a holy lady, by name Thecla. When the sophist reached the spot, he dismounted and took up his abode in the chapel. The *magistriani* lodged in the town. When the sophist had eaten his meal, he threw down a mattress and shut the doors of the chapel. He cast himself upon the mattress and determined to lie upon his side. While he was still awake, he saw with eyes unclosed the doors of the chapel unexpectedly open, and there was a great gathering of many martyrs who appeared in glorious splendour. Before them walked the holy lady Thecla, adorned with great brilliance ; for rays streamed from her as though from a light. They greeted one another and the lady Thecla spake to them : "It is well that ye are come, dear friends and labourers of Christ." After that they had greeted each other and seats had been set for them all, they sat down in order. Then the saints began to speak and said : "The saints of the Lord who are not yet departed from the earth live here still in persecution, some in bonds, some in prison, some in exile, others in other forms of violence, shame, need, and misery. We have with haste gathered ourselves together that we should not through negligence delay to become the avengers for the faithful of the Lord. Many labourers of the Lord are hindered, many fields lie untilled and many vineyards are laid waste. We must do away with Valens, the hinderer of the labourers, that every labourer can go to his work. The diligent labourer Barsilios is hindered at his work. Come then, let us send two of our number to go and remove the evildoer Valens from life." One of these two was called Sargis, the other Theodoros. They sent them away, arranged a time and said : "At the same time you and we will come." Then they arose, went and parted.

'When the sophist who was in the chapel had heard all this and had seen the vision with open eyes he was filled with wonder and remained sleepless until break of day. Early in the morning the *magistriani* came and said to the sophist : "Up ! let us go on our way." He, however, pretended that he was ill and could not leave the spot. As they began to force him, he fell into a swoon, breathed with difficulty each single breath and could give no answer to their words until the evening. When it was evening, the *magistriani* left him in the chapel and went to their quarters in the town. The sophist shut the doors of the chapel and laid him upon his side in his place, when suddenly he saw once more the doors of the chapel opening, and the martyrs came and assembled, and the chapel was full of them. They met each other with great joy and greeted each

⁶ Sozomen, *HE* vi, 2.

⁷ M. Lauer, *Des Faustus von Byzanz Geschichte*

Armeniens (Köln, 1879). For a Latin version, cf. P. Peeters, *Anal. Boll.* xxxix (1921), 70-73.

other ; then they set their seats, formed a circle and took their places in a predetermined order. Then there came also the two, Sargis and Theodoros, from the work to which they had been sent, and stepped into the midst of the assembly of the saints. The whole assembly of the saints looked up : "How have ye accomplished your work to which ye went ?" They answered and said, "Since we departed from among you we have slain Valens, the enemy of the truth, and, see ! at the appointed time we have come back to you." The whole assembly arose, praised our Lord Jesus Christ and departed each to his place. And the sophist was in great distress until the break of day.'

The stories are obviously variants of the same legend ; 'Valens' in the history of Faustus is the title of the Roman emperor and not a personal name (*cf.* the use of the title 'Caesar'), and at this point in the work of Faustus 'Valens' stands for Julian.⁸ It has been argued⁹ that both stories do in fact refer to the emperor Valens, but this contention cannot be sustained.

When we compare these two versions as given by Sozomen and Faustus we can, I think, suggest the domicile of origin of the legend and the route by which it reached its new home in Armenia. In Sozomen's account Julian is in Persia and his friend is on his way to join the emperor. In Faustus, Valens sends from a distance for one who should write a confutation of the Christian faith. Julian, we remember, started on his Persian campaign from Antioch ; it was at Antioch or, if we may believe Jerome,¹⁰ during the Persian expedition that the Emperor wrote his work against the 'Galilaeans.'¹¹ We should thus naturally identify the 'learned sophist' of the history of Faustus with Libanius of Antioch, and our surmise is confirmed when we find that in the Pseudo-Amphilochian *Life of Basil*, alongside of the Caesarean version of the legend (see below), a similar vision was seen by Libanius the sophist.¹² But this is not all : in Faustus we read that S. Thecla presided over the heavenly council. The virgin Thecla, ἀπόστολος as she is called in the *Menologium*, τῆς ἀγίας πρωτομάρτυρος καὶ ἱσαποστόλου Θέκλῃς (*Horolog. Graecorum* at date 24th September), τὴν ἀγίαν καὶ πολύαθλον πρωτομάρτυρα Θέκλῃν as we read in Evagrius 3, 8¹³—was the glory of Antioch : here was her *martyrium*—her martyr-chapel ;¹⁴ on her festival was doubtless preached the homily, *De sancta Thecla*,

⁸ Cf. N. H. Baynes, 'Rome and Armenia in the Fourth Century' : *EHR* xxv (1910), 625–643.

⁹ By Peeters (see *supra*, p. 22, note 1).

¹⁰ 'Julianum Augustum vii libris in expeditione Parthica adversum Christum evomuisse.' *Ep.* 70 to Magnus (i, 425 E, Vall.).

¹¹ For a full discussion of the evidence for the date of composition of the work *cf.* C. J. Neumann, *Juliani Imperatoris librorum contra Christianos quae supersunt* (Leipzig, 1880), 5–8.

¹² In this form of the story Libanius is in Persia with Julian, acting as quaestor : ἰσοδύναμον δὲ ὄναρ ἐθεώρει τῇ αὐτῇ νυκτὶ καὶ Λιβάνιος ὁ σοφιστὴς συνὼν τῷ Ἰουλιανῷ ἐν Περσίδι καὶ τὴν τοῦ κοιαιστώρος ἀξίαν διακοσμῶν. F.

Combefis, SS. *Patrum Amphilochii Iconiensis Methodii Patarensis et Andreae Cretensis opera omnia quae reperi potuerunt* (Paris, 1644), 182. There is no reason, now that the legendary character of the Pseudo-Amphilochian life is recognised, to assume the existence of a Libanius other than the famous sophist of Antioch (so Combefis, *op. cit.* p. 269 f., n. 83), though it is surprising to find this consistent champion of the ancient faith converted to Christianity as is related in the *Vita*, 169 ff.

¹³ I owe these citations to the 'Monitum ad Homiliam de Sancta Thecla,' Chrysostom's works (ed. De Montfaucon, Paris, 1837), ii, 896.

¹⁴ V. Schultze, *Altchristliche Städte und Landschaften* iii (Gütersloh, 1930), 320.

a fragment of which is preserved and attributed to Chrysostom.¹⁵ The legend in fact bears clear traces of its Antiochene origin.

Further, since Gelzer's masterly study of 'Die Anfänge der armenischen Kirche,'¹⁶ we might expect that the story would have reached Armenia by way of Caesarea; and in fact this chapter of Faustus is imbedded in a section devoted to S. Basil of Caesarea.¹⁷ Not only so, but in the legend as recounted by Faustus there is a direct reference to Basil: 'the diligent labourer Barsilios is hindered at his work.' It is thus evident that Caesarea was a stage on the legend's journey.

In Armenia the two saints who carry out the death sentence are Sargis and Theodoros. Who are these saints? Sargis is S. Sergius who is commemorated in the Armenian calendar together with his son and fourteen companions.¹⁸ He is usually associated with S. Bacchus. He was 'primicerius scholae gentilium' (see *AASS*, October iii, p. 835)—a military saint—and as a soldier well qualified to carry out the task of slaying the emperor. S. Theodore is a martyr who suffered under Maximian or, according to another *Vita*, under Maximian and Maximin, and therefore in his lifetime had nothing to do with the Apostate. The fact of his name occurring in the legend as the slayer of Julian suggests that the saint was already associated with the familiar legend of the $\kappa\acute{o}\lambda\lambda\upsilon\beta\alpha$ —the cooked corn—which under the guidance of Heaven S. Theodore had supplied to his fellow-citizens of Euchaita at a time when Julian had contaminated the food-stuffs on sale in the market place by mixing with them the blood of pagan sacrifices.¹⁹ Since both SS. Sargis and Theodoros are *stratelatai*, it was probably their character as military saints which primarily determined the choice of the Armenians when they adapted the legend which they had received through Caesarea, while in the case of S. Theodore the story of the $\kappa\acute{o}\lambda\lambda\upsilon\beta\alpha$ may also have played a part in that selection.

We have still to consider the form which Caesarea gave to the story. In this connection it is important to remember that in the fourth century the cult of the saints was solely local in character. Each town or diocese honoured only those saints which specially belonged to it, and their cult long remained limited to the place and the land where they had lived, worked or suffered—the solitary exceptions to this rule would seem to have been S. Stephen, the protomartyr, and S. John the Baptist.²⁰ Thus, if a church desired

¹⁵ *Chrysostom* (ed. De Montfaucon), ii, 896–899.

¹⁶ *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der kön. sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig* (Phil.-hist. Klasse) xlvii, 1895, 109–174.

¹⁷ On this connection with S. Basil cf. P. Peeters, *op. cit.* (*supra*, p. 22, note 1), 65–70.

¹⁸ Cf. N. Nilles, *Kalendarium manuale utriusque ecclesiae orientalis et occidentalis* (Innsbrück, 1897) ii, 572.

¹⁹ For S. Theodore cf. H. Delehaye, *Les légendes grecques des saints militaires* (Paris, 1909), 11–43, 127–201.

²⁰ I summarise the conclusions of K. A. H. Kellner, *Heortologie*, 3rd edn., 1911. For the 'partikuläre Verehrung' of the martyrs cf. pp. 161 ff.: for St. John the Baptist and Stephen, pp. 165 ff.

to appropriate a legend it would naturally seek to accommodate it to its own calendar. This happened at Caesarea. In the Pseudo-Amphilochian *Life of Basil* the whole story centres in Basil himself, though, as we have seen, it is parenthetically acknowledged that a similar vision was granted to Libanius; it is no longer in an Antiochene chapel of Thecla, but in the *martyrium* of the Caesarean saint, Mercurius, that the revelation is given; the president of the heavenly conclave is now not Thecla but a nameless glorious female form which suggests the Mother of God herself, while it is now Mercurius who slays the tyrant. The Caesarean guise of the legend appears in many forms. The first mention in our existing literature of S. Mercurius as Heaven's executioner would appear to be in the Syriac romance on Julian which Nöldeke assigned to the first half of the sixth century: here Marcur reveals to Jovian, Julian's successor, the future doom of the Apostate. This comparatively late appearance of Mercurius is, it would seem, due only to the fact that we do not chance to possess any earlier treatment of the Caesarean version. This version became the generally accepted form of the legend, though in Malalas, the *Paschal Chronicle* and John of Nikiu, Christ Himself takes the place of honour formerly occupied by S. Thecla. Did it seem to the Byzantine world unfitting that a woman, however exalted, should preside over the senate of Heaven? In Western Europe through a ninth-century Latin translation of the Pseudo-Amphilochian *Vita* the legend, now definitely associated with the Virgin, becomes a constant element in the Mary-cycle of the Middle Ages.²¹

With that western development we are not concerned, but there remains one eastern variant of the legend which has not been noticed in previous studies of the Mercurius story. It is to be found in the *History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria*, and here Julian himself realises that his death is the work of the saint. The story is as follows:²² 'But as for Julian, the unbelieving prince, he marched on into Persia and God delivered him into the hand of his enemies on account of the saints whom he had imprisoned and threatened before his march. His death was thus. He saw in the night an army which came down upon him from the air, and one of the soldiers struck him with a lance on the head so that it

²¹ For the Syriac text of the romance cf. G. Hoffmann, *Julianos der Abtrünnige. Syrische Erzählungen* (Kiel, 1887); for dating, Th. Nöldeke, 'Über den syrischen Roman von Kaiser Julian,' *Zeitschr. d. deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* xxviii (1874), 263-292. Translation: H. Gollancz, *Julian the Apostate now translated for the first time from the Syriac original, etc.* (London, 1928); for the visions of Marcur cf. pp. 153-155, 190-192. Latin translation of the visions, P. Peeters in *Anal. Boll.* xxxix (1921), 79 ff. See also R. Förster, 'Kaiser Julian in der Dichtung alter und neuer Zeit,' *Studien zur vergleichenden Literaturgeschichte*

v (1905), 1-120 at pp. 9 ff. For the Mercurius legend see in particular H. Delehaye, *Légendes grecques des saints militaires*, 92-101 (with references to the sources which are not repeated here), Nostitz-Rieneck (*supra* p. 22, note 1) and for modern versions of the legend Halliday (*ibid.*). For a representation of the death of Julian in a Byzantine miniature of the ninth century, cf. Büttner-Wobst (*ibid.*), 577-578. For an acute Byzantine criticism of the legend cf. Glycas (Bonn ed.) 471.

²² *Patrologia Orientalis* i (1907), 419-420. For Julian's vision in another form cf. Malalas, 332; *Chron. Pasch.* 550-551.

pierced him through the body. Then, knowing that it was one of the martyrs, he filled his hand with his blood and threw it upwards saying, "Take that, Jesus, for thou hast conquered the whole world."²³ And after blaspheming thus, he fell dead. Thus God delivered his people and the Romans returned to their own country. And Basil, the holy man, three days before the death of Julian, being in prison, had awaked from his sleep and said to the two who were with him, "I have seen to-night the martyr S. Mercurius entering into his church and taking his lance saying, 'In truth I will not suffer this unbeliever to blaspheme my God.' But when he had said this he disappeared from me and I did not see him again." Then both his companions said to him, "Verily I also saw the same thing." So they said one to another, "We believe this firmly that it is so." And they sent to the church of the martyr S. Mercurius that they might look for his lance which was kept there to see whether it was still there or not. And as they could not find the lance they were assured of the truth of the dream. And after three days the letters with the news of Julian's death arrived at Antioch.

One would almost have expected 'at Caesarea'; is this an echo of the original Antiochene legend?

There remains to be considered one further text; Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopulos repeating in his *Church History* the legend and using Sozomen's account as his source—here it will be remembered the saints are anonymous—adds Ἀρτέμιον δὲ καὶ Μερκούριον λόγος ἔχει τούτους (*i.e.* the two saints) εἶναι.²⁴ I know that this addition has been treated with scant respect²⁵—'ce n'est là qu'une licence de plagiaire. Tout ce que Nicéphore connaît de l'anecdote il l'a copié dans Sozomène et il ne paraît pas qu'il se soit mis en frais de recherches érudites pour retrouver ou deviner les noms de ces deux personnages sans individualité définie.'²⁶ But S. Artemius at least does possess a marked individuality: he was originally an Arian saint, he appears as a hero in the history of Philostorgius and that Eunomian historian ἐκθειάζει τὸν μάρτυρα, πολλήν τινα τὴν ἔνστασιν καὶ ἀκρίβειαν τῶν αὐτοῦ πράξεων ποιησάμενος, ἐκ τῶν ἀνωθεν χρόνων τὴν τοῦ μάρτυρος προσοῦσαν εὐγένειαν ὑποσημνήσας καὶ πρὶν ἢ τῶν τοῦ μαρτυρίου ἀγώνων ἐφάσασθαι (*Artemii Passio* in *Philostorgius* (ed. Bidez), 154). He suffered martyrdom at Antioch under Julian the Apostate²⁷ as a result of his protest against the tortures inflicted by the Emperor upon the Christian priests Eugenius and Macarius (*cf.* Μαρτύριον τοῦ ἀγίου καὶ ἐνδόξου μάρτυρος Ἀρτεμίου in *Philostorgius* [ed. Bidez], pp. 167–8). Artemius was later regarded as an orthodox martyr and saint, but at what date

²³ For different versions of Julian's last words *cf.* Büttner-Wobst (*supra*, p. 22, note 1), 572–579.

²⁴ *HE* x, 35; Migne, *PG* cxlvi, 552.

²⁵ *Cf.* H. Delehaye, *Les légendes grecques des saints militaires*, 97.

²⁶ P. Peeters, *Anal. Boll.* xxxix, 74–75.

²⁷ *Cf.* the 'Altes Martyrium' in *Philostorgius* (ed. Bidez), 175.

he was so recognised I do not think that we can say. It is true that in the 'Altes Martyrium des Artemius' it is stated that a pious (εὐσεβῆς) διάκονος Ariste secured from Julian permission to preserve the body of S. Artemius: having embalmed it, she sent it to Constantinople with the idea of building there a worthy shrine for the precious relic.²⁸ In the *Martyrium of S. Artemius*²⁹ we are further told that she was unable to do this: the relics διέμεινεν εἰς δεῦρο τῷ τοῦ Προδρόμου ναῷ. But the deaconess Ariste is as suspect a person as is the Εὐσεβία . . . φερωνύμως εὐσεβῶς ζῶσα who performed a similar service for the remains of S. Theodore.³⁰ It has indeed been stated that the translation of the relics took place under the Emperor Anastasius, A.D. 491-518,³¹ but I do not think this can be deduced from the *Patria Cp.* which reads³² 'Ἡ Ὁξεῖα ὁ ἅγιος Ἀρτέμιος · τὸν δὲ ναὸν τοῦ Προδρόμου ἀνήγειρεν Ἀναστάσιος ὁ Δίκωρος ὁ ἀποσιλεντιάριος ὁ Δυρραχιώτης. Ὀντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ πρωτοασηκρήτης ἐκεῖσε ὦκει. μετὰ δὲ τὸ κομισθῆναι τὸ λείψανον τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀρτεμίου ὠνομάσθη ὁ ναὸς οὕτως. The church was still known by its original dedication in the seventh century and the date of the translation remains uncertain—any time between 491 and the middle of the seventh century is possible. The *Passio S. Artemii* attributed to John of Rhodes,³³ and therefore not the work of John of Damascus,³⁴ is also undated save that it must have been composed after the reign of Justinian I and probably before that of Basil I:³⁵ it cannot be by the same hand that wrote the διήγησις τῶν θαυμάτων τοῦ ἁγίου . . . Ἀρτεμίου, composed between the years 660-668.³⁶ In sum, it would seem that we can say no more than that by the middle of the seventh century Artemius was recognised as a ἅγιος μεγαλομάρτυς by the orthodox of Constantinople. Certain it is that the martyr who was extolled so highly by Philostorgius is never mentioned by Sozomen.

Now it has always appeared a singular fact that the saints in Sozomen's version of the legend remain anonymous. 'On ne supposera pas,' writes Père Peeters, 'que Sozomène a biffé ces deux mots par souci de brièveté; mais il est encore moins croyable que le rédacteur primitif les ait laissés en blanc. Les héros de ces histoires ne sont jamais anonymes, et s'ils le sont devenus ici, ce ne peut être que par un accident de la transmission.'³⁷ It would

²⁸ *Ibid.* 174-5.

²⁹ Migne, *PG* cxv, col. 1212.

³⁰ On Eusebia cf. H. Delehaye, *Les légendes grecques*, 135, 146, 188 ff. and the comment at p. 41. Note that Ariste becomes the deacon Aristos in the texts of the Armenian *synaxaria* translated by P. Peeters in *Philostorgius* (ed. Bidez), p. xlvi.

³¹ By H. Delehaye in *Anal. Boll.* xxxi (1912), 239.

³² *Patria Cp.* ed. Preger, fasc. 2, p. 235²¹. For the Oxeia cf. the documents published by A. Papadopoulos-Keramevs on the miracles of St. Artemius, *Shornik grecheskikh neizdannuikh bogoslovskikh Tekstov* iv-xv vyekov (St. Petersburg, 1909),

pp. 5³, 6⁵, 8¹⁹, 13³, 26¹⁹, 42²⁸, 46¹⁵, 61³⁰, 66¹⁰, 76¹¹⁻¹³.

³³ Printed in A. Mai, *Spicilegium Romanum*, iv, 340 ff.; *AASS*, October viii, pp. 856 ff.; Migne, *PG* xcvi, coll. 1252 ff. and see the better text of the beginning of the *Passio* in *Philostorgius* (ed. Bidez), 151 ff. On the *Passio* and its sources *ibid.*, pp. xlv-lxviii.

³⁴ As in Migne, *PG* xcvi.

³⁵ Cf. Th. Büttner-Wobst (*supra*, p. 22, note 1), 576, n. 4⁰.

³⁶ Cf. Papadopoulos-Keramevs, *op. cit.*, pp. i-ii.

³⁷ *Anal. Boll.* xxxix, 74.

seem unlikely that so remarkable an omission was due to accident. I would suggest that the legend in its original Antiochene form was imagined in honour of two Arian saints—Artemius (for this there is the support of Nicephorus) and Macarius, the confessor championed by Artemius. In Caesarea the name Macarius naturally brought to mind the name of the local saint Mercurius ; Sozomen, who knew the legend in its original form and for whom Artemius remained a heretic, adopted the story, but discreetly suppressed the suspected names. Thus we could explain the curious anonymity of the heavenly messengers. Later when the lapse of time had wiped out the stigma of heresy, when the martyr's revered remains had been translated to the capital and had found a resting place in the church of S. John the Baptist, when, too, he had become the great specialist for the healing of diseases of the genital organs, then Artemius could be restored to his old position in the legend (the evidence of Nicephorus), but meanwhile Mercurius had for ever, both in East and West, usurped the place of Macarius. But I would repeat that this is only a suggestion, and of it I can offer no shadow of proof.

If the considerations of this paper have any validity, the interest of this chapter of Faustus lies in the fact that it helps us to trace the rise of a legend at Antioch, its transference to Caesarea and thence into Armenia—all within the space of a few years, for Julian died in A.D. 363 and though the precise date of the composition of the history of Faustus is still a disputed point, it may well be that his work was written before the close of the fourth century. Thus rapidly did Christian hatred and Christian triumph find in legend their justification and explanation.



The Decline of the Roman Power in Western Europe. Some Modern Explanations

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THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN POWER IN WESTERN EUROPE. SOME MODERN EXPLANATIONS¹

By NORMAN H. BAYNES

It is the purpose of this paper to consider a few of the more outstanding contributions towards the solution of this familiar problem propounded since the publication in 1898 of Sir Samuel Dill's book on *Roman Society in the last century of the Western Empire* (2nd edn., 1899). It may well appear somewhat surprising that I should venture to speak on such a topic, since my own work, such as it is, has been concerned rather with the history of the Byzantine Empire. And yet for a student of Byzantine history the problem has a special interest: he is forced to consider that problem not merely as a West European issue, but rather to compare and contrast the historical development in the western and eastern provinces of the Empire. He is compelled to raise the question: why was it that the Roman Empire failed to survive in Western Europe while it endured for a further millennium in the East? The very fact that he is primarily interested in the history of the Byzantine Empire enables him to approach the Western problem from a different angle and to treat that problem in a wider setting and not in isolation. That is my apologia for what might otherwise appear to be an inexcusable impertinence. In a word I desire to ask what general considerations can be adduced to explain the fact that in Western Europe there is a cultural break—a caesura—while in the East Roman world the cultural development is continuous, the Hellenistic and Roman traditions being gradually fused to form the civilisation of the Byzantine Empire.

Of the recent explanations of the decline of the Roman power in Western Europe we may first take that of Vladimir G. Simkhovitch who in the *Political Science Quarterly* for 1916 published an article under the title 'Rome's Fall Reconsidered'² in which he attributed the collapse of the Roman power to the exhaustion of the soil of Italy and of the provinces. That article has been reprinted—somewhat incongruously—in the author's book *Towards the Understanding of Jesus*.³ The evil began under the Republic: in Cato's time agriculture had already declined in the greater part of Italy. When asked what is the most profitable thing in the management of one's estate he replied 'Good pasturage'. What is the next best? 'Fairly good pasturage.' What is the third best? 'Bad pasturage.' And the fourth best? 'Arare'—agriculture. Simkhovitch admits that the Romans possessed great agricultural knowledge. 'All that is implied by the agricultural revolution,' he writes, 'the seeding of grasses and legumes, the rotation of crops, yes even green manuring, all that was perfectly known to the Romans. Why was it not practised for two thousand years or more? I do not know.' Columella was already drawing upon a literary tradition in his counsel to farmers: his mistakes prove that he had never witnessed the operations which he describes. To seed alfalfa one cyathus for 50 square feet, which amounts to several bushels per acre, is an impossible proposition. Province after province was turned by Rome into a desert: draining was neglected, and deserted fields became mosquito- and malaria-infested swamps. The 'inner decay' of the Roman Empire in all its manifold manifestations was in the last analysis entirely based upon the endless stretches of barren, sterile, and abandoned fields in Italy and the provinces. The evidence adduced by Simkhovitch is drawn for the most part from writers of the Republic or of the period of the early Principate, but from the Christian Empire he quotes Constantine's legislation in favour of the children of the poor who have not the means to provide for their offspring, and also the constitution of Valentinian, Arcadius and Theodosius giving permission to the squatter to cultivate deserted fields. Against those who would maintain that the flight from the land was caused by oppressive taxation he contends that it was precisely the exhaustion of the soil which rendered the burden of taxation oppressive: it was because

¹ Read at the Joint Meeting of the Hellenic and Roman Societies on Friday, 4th September, 1942. This paper originally formed part of the Sir Samuel Dill Memorial Lecture delivered in Belfast on 27th January, 1933.

² *Political Science Quarterly* xxxi (1916), 201–243.

³ *Towards the Understanding of Jesus* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), pp. 84–139.

so much land was uncultivated that taxation pressed so heavily upon those who still continued the farming of their fields. The limits which confine the productivity of man's labour become for society physical conditions of existence from which it cannot escape. It was these limits set by the exhaustion of the soil which rendered the doom of Rome inevitable.

There is no doubt truth in this picture of the decline of agriculture: for the later Empire it may well be an accurate description of some parts of Italy: in A.D. 395 the abandoned fields of Campania alone amounted to something over 528,000 *jugera*; but in itself it is inadequate as an explanation of the fall of Rome. For in one country at least—Egypt—there can be no question of soil-exhaustion, and it is precisely from Egypt that we have our earliest reports of the flight from the land, of the disappearance of villages through depopulation. Modern studies of economic conditions in Egypt have demonstrated the fatal effects of the methods of administrative exploitation employed by the Roman government in that province. The burden of taxation here certainly came first, and the decay of agriculture was its result and not its cause. Further, the sweeping generalisations of Simkhovitch's paper cannot be sustained: even in the fifth century of our era where a resident proprietor supervised the cultivation of his own estate there can be no question of soil-exhaustion. Read again Ausonius' poem of his expedition in the valley of the Moselle, read the letters of Sidonius Apollinaris: still in the Gaul of the fifth century it is clear that there were smiling fields and well-cultivated farms. The real danger of the *latifundia* lay, I am convinced, in the fact that they were for the most part managed by bailiffs for owners who were absentee landlords, men who drew money from their estates in order to spend it in Rome, Ravenna, or some provincial capital. The primary cause of the agricultural decline is to be found in the abuses of the fiscal system, in the scourge of corporate responsibility for the collection of the taxes which ruined the municipal aristocracy of the city *curiae*, and perhaps above all in the absence of the personal supervision of the proprietor and the unprincipled use of authority by irresponsible bailiffs, controlling the cultivation of the large estates which now absorbed so great a part of the land of the empire. Soil-exhaustion is, in fact, an inadequate explanation of the collapse of the Roman power.

Another theory has been proposed by Professor Ellsworth Huntington—that of climatic change. The great sequoias of California—the big trees of a familiar advertisement—have been growing for some three or even four thousand years. Each year in the trunk of the tree there is clearly marked the circle of the year's growth: when the tree is felled these rings can be traced and according to their width a chronological chart of climatic variation can be established: the years of considerable width of ring recording the effect of favourable climatic conditions, the narrower rings marking the result of less favourable climate. In this way for the area of the sequoias the variations in climate can be traced for at least 3,000 years. On this basis Ellsworth Huntington constructed his theory. In an article published in 1917 in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* on 'Climatic Change and Agricultural Exhaustion as Elements in the Fall of Rome'⁴ he suggested that the climate of the Mediterranean world and that of California have always undergone similar modifications: that from the chronological chart of Californian climate one is accordingly entitled to reconstruct the changes in the climate of the Mediterranean area during the course of the history of Rome, and from the record of such changes we may conclude that the fall of Rome was due to a decline in the rainfall from which the Mediterranean world suffered during the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries of our era. It is easy to object that on Professor

⁴ On climatic change and the evidence of tree-growth, cf. Ellsworth Huntington, 'The Secret of the Big Trees,' *Harper's Monthly Magazine* cxxv (American Edition), lxiv (European Edition), 292-302 (July, 1912); *id.*, 'Climatic Change and Agricultural Exhaustion as Elements in the Fall of Rome,' *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (Harvard University Press) xxxi (February, 1917), 173-208; Carnegie Institute of Washington, *Publication No. 192* (1914, pp. vi, 341); Ellsworth Huntington, with contributions by Charles Schuchert, Andrew E. Douglass, and Charles J. Kullmer, 'The

Climatic Factor as illustrated in arid America'; *Publication No. 289* in three volumes: A. E. Douglas, 'Climatic Cycles and Tree Growth. A Study of the Annual Rings of Trees in relation to Climate and Solar Activity' (vol. i, 1919, pp. 127, Bibliography 124-7; vol. ii, 1928, pp. vii, 166, Bibliography 159-166); 'Climatic Cycles and Tree Growth' (vol. iii, 1936, pp. vii, 171, Bibliography 166-171); *Publication No. 352* (1925) on 'Quaternary Climates', Ernest Antevs, 'The Big Tree as a Climatic Measure' 115-153, Bibliography 150-3.

Huntington's own showing the latter part of the second century and the first half of the third century marked a climatic improvement : it might be hard to trace any corresponding increase in prosperity in the history of the Empire during this period. But a more serious objection would point to the hazardous character of the fundamental assumption. Records of rainfall in the neighbourhood of the great trees have only been kept for about half a century ; Professor Huntington prints a table of four year-groups in order to establish the climatic parallelism between California and the Mediterranean area (*Quarterly Journal of Economics* xxxi, 1916-17, 193) :

- I. Seven years of heaviest rainfall in California.
- II. Eighteen years with heavy rainfall in California.
- III. Seventeen years with light rainfall in California.
- IV. Thirteen years with least rainfall in California.

The table presents the following figures :

	<i>San Francisco</i>	<i>Rome</i>	<i>Naples</i>
I.	8·3 in.	10·7 in.	11·5 in.
II.	4·5 in.	10·6 in.	11·0 in.
III.	3·4 in.	9·8 in.	9·2 in.
IV.	1·9 in.	9·6 in.	8·6 in.

'The columns vary,' writes Professor Huntington, 'in harmony with the California rainfall.' That is true, but the disparity in the amount of the decline in rainfall between California and Rome—in California a fall from 8·3 in. to 1·9 in., in Rome a fall only from 10·7 in. to 9·6 in.—is very striking, and it is not easy to see what conclusions can justifiably be drawn from such figures.

But that is not all : the matter does not remain as it stood in 1917. In 1925 the Carnegie Institute of Washington published further discussion of the Big Tree as a climatic measure, and it now appears uncertain what part is played respectively by temperature and what by rainfall in the yearly growth. Thus a further element of ambiguity is introduced into the problem. Before this Ossa of doubt piled upon a Pelion of uncertainty the confidence of a mere student of history may well quail, and for the present I should hesitate to call in aid Nature's yardstick as a solution of our historical perplexities. The great trees still keep their climatic secret.

From Nature we may turn to the human factor in our search for the causes of the collapse of the Roman power. Otto Seeck has, I think, found no followers in his attempt to charge the third-century Roman emperors with the responsibility for that collapse. Through their continued *Ausrottung der Besten*—the persistent extermination of capacity and individual merit—the Caesars bred a terror of distinction and encouraged the spread of that slave mentality which issued logically and naturally in the triumph of Christianity—the Beggars' Religion—*die Religion des Betteltums*. An inverted Darwinism stamped out originality from the Empire : no man remained with the courage to be the master of his fate—the captain of his own soul. The way was open for 'Byzantinismus', for crawling servility and fawning adulation of authority. Here the prejudice of one who was inspired by a passionate and life-long hatred of the Christian faith has, I cannot but feel, attempted to wrest history to its own purpose. Is there indeed any single century in the annals of the Empire which can show so many men of outstanding personality as can the fourth century of our era ? Surely Professor Lot is not far from the truth when he exclaims : 'If ever there were supermen in human history they are to be found in the Roman emperors of the third and fourth centuries'—men who shouldered the burden of a tottering world and resolutely refused to despair of the Republic. And beside the Roman emperors stand in the Christian camp such figures as Athanasius and S. Basil in the East, as Ambrose and Augustine in the West. There is little of crawling servility in such men as these. The wonder of the fourth century to my mind is rather the heroic courage and the desperate resolution with which men strove to preserve that imperial organisation which alone safeguarded the legacy of the ancient world. Further, you will not have failed to notice with

what rigour Seeck presses the theory of the hereditary transmissibility of ἀρετή. So thorough-going a conviction might well rejoice the heart of a champion of an unreformed House of Lords. No, *Die Ausrottung der Besten* will not suffice to explain the decline of the Roman power.

Professor Tenney Frank, of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, has approached the problem from another angle. From an elaborate statistical study of the Corpus of Latin inscriptions⁵ he concludes that Rome and the Latin West were flooded by an invasion of Greek and Oriental slaves: as these were emancipated and thus secured Roman citizenship the whole character of the citizen body was changed: on the basis of a consideration of some 13,900 sepulchral inscriptions he argues that nearly 90 per cent of the Roman-born inhabitants of the Western capital were of foreign extraction. What lay behind and constantly reacted on those economic factors which have generally been adduced to explain the decline of the Roman power was the fact that those who had built Rome had given way to a different race. 'The whole of Italy as well as the Romanized portions of Gaul and Spain were during the Empire dominated in blood by the East.' In this fact Tenney Frank would find an explanation of the development from the Principate to the Dominate—the triumph of absolutism, of the spread of Oriental religions, the decline in Latin literature and the growing failure in that gift for the government of men which had built up the Empire.

But the foundations on which this far-reaching theory rests are not above suspicion. The nationality of Roman slaves is but rarely expressly stated in the sepulchral inscriptions, and thus it is upon the appearance of a Greek name for slave or freedman that Tenney Frank has inferred an Oriental origin. The legitimacy of this inference has been questioned by Miss Mary Gordon in her able study of the 'Nationality of Slaves under the early Roman Empire', *JRS* xiv, 1924. A slave was a personal chattel, and slave-dealer or slave-owner could give to the slave any name which in his unfettered choice he might select: the slave dealers with whom Romans first came in contact were Greeks and thus, as Miss Gordon says, 'Greek was the original language of the slave trade and this is reflected in servile nomenclature much as the use of French on modern menus and in the names affected by dressmakers suggests the history and associations of particular trades.' In fact the nomenclature of the slave in the ancient world was scarcely less arbitrary than are the modern names given to our houses, our puddings, our horses or our dogs. An attempt to determine the domicile of origin of our cats or dogs solely by the names which their owners have given them would hardly be likely to produce results of high scientific value. The outlandish names of barbarian captives reduced to slavery would naturally be changed to more familiar forms, and Latin nomenclature was singularly poor and unimaginative: the Greek names were well-known and resort to these was easy. It may be said that this reasoning is largely *a priori* and of little cogency. But Ettore Cicotti in a recent paper on 'Motivi demografici e biologici nella rovina della civiltà antica' in *Nuova Rivista storica*, Anno xiv, fasc. i-ii, has adduced an interesting historical parallel. L. Livi (*La schiavitù domestica nei tempi di mezzo e nei moderni, Ricerche storiche di un antropologo*, Roma, 1928) in 1928 published documents which his father copied from the State Archives of Florence. These documents record 357 sales of slaves: the transactions date from the years 1366 to 1390—for the most part from the years 1366 to 1370. The majority of the slaves were of Tartar origin, though some were Greeks, Roumanians, etc. In these records the slave's original name is generally given and then follows the Italian name by which the slave is known. Thus the name of Lucia occurs forty-two times and represents such original names as Marchecta, Gingona, Erina, Minglacha, Saragosa, Casabai, Alterona and many others. Similarly the name of Caterina is given to slaves of Greek, Tartar, Turkish, Circassian, and Russian origin and has taken the place of such barbarous names as Coraghessan, Chrittias, Colcatolo, Tagaton, and Melich. The parallel is very instructive.

But this is not all: the sepulchral inscriptions studied by Tenney Frank extend over a period of three centuries: suppose that Rome had during the early Empire a population

⁵ 'Race Mixture in the Roman Empire,' *American Historical Review* xxi, 1916, 689 ff.; see also by him *An Economic History of Rome* 1927, 207 ff., 211 ff.

of some 800,000 with an annual mortality of 20 per cent : in those three centuries the deaths would number 4,800,000. Tenney Frank has examined 13,900 inscriptions and those are derived from imperial and aristocratic *columbaria* : here the slaves would be better off and the percentage of accomplished foreign slaves would be higher : what of the nameless dead whom no record preserved, whose bodies lay in the vast common burial pits of the slave proletariat ? These 13,900 dead who left permanent memorials behind them cannot be regarded as really representative of the general servile population of the city : we are not justified in using the percentage obtained from these records and applying it as though it were applicable to the whole class of slaves and of freedmen.

In the light of this criticism Tenney Frank's statistics are vitiated, and it must be admitted that the nationality of the slaves of Rome under the early Empire remains a matter of conjecture. There must have been a far greater number derived from Western Europe than are allowed for on Tenney Frank's calculations.

A somewhat different form of biological explanation is given by Professor Nilsson in his well known book *Imperial Rome*. The most important problem for the Empire was that of race : that was decisive, for upon it depended the quality of Roman civilisation. Culture rests on racial character. If the alien races and barbarian peoples were to be assimilated, they must be interpenetrated by their conquerors. Since the Roman world was of vast extent and those of alien race were very numerous, an increase in the birth-rate of the Romans was required : instead of this the Roman birth-rate declined : the blood of the Romans became more and more diluted, and in place of the Romanisation of the Empire a civilisation of intercommunication and intercourse resulted in a mingling of races—an unchecked 'mongrelisation'. Under the Empire cross-breeding, hybridisation, spread throughout the provinces and in this widespread realm of mongrels all stable spiritual and moral standards were lost.

I confess that as soon as the word 'race' is introduced into any discussion I realise that my only safe course lies in a resolute silence, for I have never been able to understand the precise significance of that ambiguous term. But when folk begin to ascribe all kinds of moral and spiritual failings to race-mixture it will hardly be expected that an Englishman will accept the insinuation without a protest. It is beyond calculation to estimate how many races and peoples have gone to his ethnological make-up, and he will not readily admit that the results of 'mongrelisation' have in his case been wholly deplorable. As an Englishman I am unlikely to discuss dispassionately the theory of Professor Nilsson. And unfortunately I am also a student of Byzantine history and as such I am convinced that the essential condition of the prosperity of the later Roman Empire was its possession of Asia Minor—that reservoir alike of money and of men. And Asia Minor of the Byzantines was surely man's most stupendous effort in race-mixture to which history can point : it was an ethnological museum. Professor Nilsson, to be quite frank, will have his work cut out to persuade an English Byzantinist that race-mixture is of necessity so poisonous and deadly a process. I had better leave it at that : you had best form your own judgment on the theory without further comment from me.

There still remains, however, the explanation of Professor Rostovtzeff as set forth in his *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, a masterpiece for which any student of imperial Rome must have a sincere admiration. Professor Rostovtzeff's explanation of the collapse of the Roman power can be briefly summarised. It was through the medium of the *municipia*—of the towns—that Rome had unified Italy, and when she extended her conquests into the West of Europe she naturally favoured the growths of towns as centres of Romanisation. But the towns drew their wealth from the countryside, and the peasants bitterly resented this exploitation of their own class by the *bourgeoisie*. Under the peace of the Empire the civilian population became unfitted for the life of the military camps, and it was from the rude vigour of the peasantry that in the crisis of the third century the Roman armies were recruited. The peasant of the army made common cause with the peasant of the countryside and both waged a war of extermination against their oppressors of the city. The explanation of the downfall of the aristocracy and with them of the ancient civilisation is thus to be found in a class-conscious alliance between the soldier and the

worker on the land. Professor Rostovtzeff, it must be remembered, has seen in his native country an aristocratic régime overthrown by a similar alliance. And the only answer to this theory that I can give is quite simply that I can find no support for it in our extant sources. I have consulted every reference to the authorities cited by Professor Rostovtzeff and in my judgment none of them supports his reading of the facts. So far as I can see the constant terror of the peasants is the soldier : the last menace to a defaulting debtor is (according to the papyri) the creditor's threat : ' I will send a soldier after you.' The soldier is to the peasant what Napoleon or the policeman has been to successive generations of children in English nurseries. To the Roman peasant and soldier of the third century of our era there had not been granted a revelation of the gospel according to Karl Marx.

And thus I come back as a student of Byzantine history to the difficulty to which I referred at the beginning of this lecture. I believe that there was in Western Europe a break in the cultural development and that there was no corresponding break in the development of civilisation in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. To a Byzantinist, therefore, the problem which we are considering necessarily assumes a dual aspect : what he must discover, if he is to gain any intellectual satisfaction from the inquiry, is precisely the *differentia* which distinguishes the history of the Western provinces from that of the *partes orientales*. And so many of the modern explanations do not provide him with any such *differentia*. ' Die Ausrottung der Besten,' civil wars, and imperial jealousy of outstanding merit did not affect the West alone : the whole Roman world suffered from these scourges : the brutality of an undisciplined soldiery was likewise an evil common to both halves of the Empire. Soil-exhaustion, climatic change, these must have affected the entire Mediterranean area. The oppression of civil servants, the decay of the municipal senates, the flight from the land—all these ills the Eastern provinces were not spared. Greeks and Orientals invaded the West and we are told caused the collapse of the Roman power there ; but in the East these same Greeks and Orientals sustained the Empire against unceasing assaults for another millennium : it seems mysterious. And therefore in closing it only remains for me to state the *differentia* as I see it and to suggest an explanation of this diversity in the history of East and West—an explanation which is so humiliatingly simple that I am constrained to believe that it must be right.

You realise then that I speak as a student of Byzantine history : a Byzantinist looks at the world of Western Europe. As I conceive of it, culture is essentially a social thing : it is born of intercourse and it needs a conscious solidarity of interest in order to sustain it. Roman civilisation depended upon intercommunication, upon the influences radiating from the capital and returning to the capital for reinforcement. Such free communication, however, can be preserved only within an area which is safeguarded from violence : the Roman Empire was such an area safeguarded by the civil administration and by the frontier screen of the military forces. The civil service and the army together formed the steel framework which maintained the entire structure of civilisation. It is perhaps with the Emperor Hadrian that one first observes a conscious realisation of this function of the Roman power. The area of civilisation is delimited on permanent lines : not expansion of territory, but concentration of resources in order to protect the solidarity of culture—that is the emperor's task. The barbarian invasions broke into this area of intercourse, and the establishment of barbarian kingdoms on Roman soil destroyed the single administration which was its counterpart. And the fatal significance of the establishment of these barbarian kingdoms lay in the fact that they withdrew from the Empire not only Roman soil, but also the revenues derived therefrom. Africa lost to the Vandals, Spain occupied by Sueve and Alan and Visigoth : Southern France a Visigothic kingdom and the rest of Gaul a battleground on which Aëtius fought and fought again : Italy alone remained as a source of revenue, and Italy was an impoverished land. The Western state was bankrupt. And the defence of the Empire demanded money, for Rome had so effectually provided the area of peaceful intercourse in Western Europe that her subjects were no longer soldiers : if battles were to be won they must be fought by barbarian mercenaries and for mercenaries to fight they must be paid. Further, Rome's effort in the West was a struggle with a double front : against the barbarian on land and against the Vandal fleet upon the sea. Rome

possessed no technical superiority such as the invention of gunpowder might have given her, such as later the secret for the composition of the 'Greek fire' gave to the Byzantine navy. Thus the tragedy of the Empire in the West lay precisely in the fact that she had not the wherewithal to keep at one and at the same time a mercenary army in the field and a fleet in commission. And the *differentia* which distinguishes the situation in the East of the Empire is in my judgment that, while the Danubian provinces were continuously ravaged, Asia Minor was for the most part untroubled by invasions : Asia Minor remained as I have said a reservoir alike of men and money. It was this reservoir which the West lacked. The West could throw no counterpoise into the scale against the supremacy of the barbarian ; but the East amongst its own subjects numbered the hardy mountaineers—the Isaurians—and the fellow-countrymen of the Isaurian Tarasicodissa, whom history knows as the Emperor Zeno, could meet the menace of the barbarian mercenary and when the supremacy of the Alan Aspar had been broken, the Empire could send the Isaurian back to his mountains and Anastasius, an aged civilian who had only just escaped consecration as a bishop, could rule unchallenged. And as a consequence of the triumph of the civil power, the civil administration—the steel framework which maintained Byzantine civilisation—was likewise preserved, and from the city of Constantine culture radiated and through intercourse with the capital was again reinforced. Here is preserved that conscious solidarity in the maintenance of civilisation which guaranteed a real continuity. In the West there are survivals from the ancient world—true—a branch lopped from a tree may still produce shoots ; but for all that the continuity of life is broken : the doom of decay is sure. Gregory of Tours is a remarkable man, but he is a lonely figure and he feels himself isolated. And against that figure I would set a scene at a Byzantine court—when the Emperor's barbarian mistress appeared in her radiant beauty at a reception, one courtier uttered the words οὐ νέμεσις : the barbarian queen did not understand the allusion, but for Byzantines the two words were enough to summon up the picture of Helen as she stood before the greybeards on the walls of Troy. So well did the aristocracy of East Rome know their Homer : such is the solidarity of Byzantine culture. In a word it was the pitiful poverty of Western Rome which crippled her in her effort to maintain that civil and military system which was the presupposition for the continued life of the ancient civilisation.

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THE ICONS BEFORE ICONOCLASM

NORMAN H. BAYNES

LONDON

“THE FEELING against ikon-worship suddenly burst out in the earlier part of the eighth century when the iconoclastic (ikon-smashing) emperors of Constantinople tried to suppress the practice by force.” So wrote Edwyn Bevan in an admirable essay on Idolatry.¹ And from modern accounts of the iconoclast movement one does generally get the impression that after the violent challenge of Epiphanius in the fourth century — when he tore down a pictured curtain which hung in a church² — the East Roman world had accepted without protest and without question the widespread cult of the icon, while the policy of iconoclast emperors appears as a sudden breach with a universally recognized tradition. But is such an impression justified? When we put together such fragmentary pieces of evidence as we possess is it not rather probable that there was a continuous questioning of the legitimacy of the cult? May not the part played by the icon in the life and religious usage of the Byzantine world have been subjected to the constant criticism of pagans, Jews and even of Christians? And if this is so, it may help us to understand somewhat more clearly the primary motives which inspired the policy of the iconoclast rulers. It may be worth while to consider the evidence afresh since it has been increased by two recent publications.

In 1938 Franz Diekamp published³ a fragment from the *συμμικτὰ ζητήματα* — the “Vermischte Untersuchungen” — of Hypatius of Ephesus contained in the Codex Parisinus 1115 ann. 1276. fol. 254^v–255^v. These “Mixed Enquiries” were addressed to Julian, bishop of Atramution (in western Asia Minor), a suf-

¹ The Edinburgh Review, vol. 243, No. 496 (April 1926), pp. 253–272.

² I accept the authenticity of the Epiphanian documents. For a criticism of the argument of G. Ostrogorsky, Studien zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Bilderstreites (Historische Untersuchungen, Heft 5) Breslau, 1929 see Franz Dölger, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, August 1929, pp. 353–372.

³ In his *Analecta Patristica* (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 117), Rome, Pont. Inst. Orientalium Studiorum, 1938, pp. 109–153, text at pp. 127–129.

fragan bishopric of Ephesus. This fragment is from chapter 5 of the first book of the work and concerns τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις οἴκοις — “the things in the holy churches.” This text has not, apparently, attracted any attention from scholars, yet it is of considerable interest since Hypatius of Ephesus was a prominent champion of Chalcedonian orthodoxy in the reign of Justinian. Julian of Atrarnum was troubled by the scriptural prohibition of the making of images and by the command to destroy such images when they had been made. He will allow representations (γραφάς) in the churches but none on wood or stone and no sculpture. These γραφαί may be on the door-curtains (ἐπὶ θύραις: I suppose this is how the words must be translated), but no more is permissible. In his reply Hypatius urges that we must consider the reason for the Old Testament prohibition, and at the same time we must seek to understand why the making of sacred things (τὰ ἱερά) is allowed as it is at present. Since some, as sacred Scripture says, thought that the Godhead (τὸ θεῖον) was like gold and silver and stones and graven works of art, and since they made according to their own pleasure material gods and worshipped the creature rather than the creator, God rejected their altars and their idols (Hypatius quotes Romans 1²⁵, Deut. 7⁵, 4¹⁵⁻¹⁶, Ps. 71¹⁹), for nothing of all the things that are is like or equal to or the same as the holy Trinity and the Maker and Cause of all things. But we direct that the unspeakable and incomprehensible “philanthropy” (φιλανθρωπία) of God towards us and the sacred images of the saints shall be glorified in sacred representations (γράμμασι), though we ourselves have no pleasure at all in anything formed (πλάσει) or any representation (γραφῇ). But we allow simpler and immature folk to have these as being fitted to their natural development, that thus they may learn through the eye by means adapted to their comprehension. For we have found that often and in many cases both old and new divine commands have made concessions to the weak to secure their salvation. Hypatius instances the hierophant Moses who at God’s prompting had been his people’s legislator and yet had been bidden to make the images of the Cherubim. “And in many other cases we see the divine wisdom (τὴν θεολογίαν) with “philanthropy” (φιλανθρωπία) for man’s salvation releasing the strict-

ness of the law to benefit the souls of those who still need to be led by the hand." It is the care which guided the magi by a star and which led Israel away from idolatrous sacrifices to sacrifice to God. Therefore we, too, allow material ornament in our churches, not as though we thought that God was a god of gold and silver and silken vestments and vessels adorned with precious stones but making a concession so that each order of the faithful may be led by the hand in a way which is proper to itself and so brought to the Godhead. Thus of these, too, some will be led by the hand to spiritual beauty (*ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν εὐπρέπειαν*) and from the many lights in our churches to the spiritual and immaterial light.

And some of those who have studied the higher life (*τὴν ὑψηλοτέρα ζωὴν φιλοσοφισάντων*) have learned that worship in the spirit can be offered in every place and that it is holy souls which are God's temples. . . . So then we in our churches do not remove the sacred objects, but to the immature we stretch out a helping hand; we do not allow them to remain untaught concerning the more perfect doctrines, but them, too, we hold in the knowledge that the Godhead is not the same as any created thing nor is it equal or like to any such thing.

"As for ourselves we have no delight in the icons" — did that sixth century view persist among the bishops of Asia Minor? And if it did, it can readily be understood that any general cult of the icons in such extreme forms as later appear in the apologies of the iconodules would seem dangerous and a wrongful use of a practice which was tolerated only in the interest of the weaker members of the church. Here is an attitude which may help to explain the action of those bishops of Asia Minor who in the eighth century inaugurated the iconoclast movement.⁴

Through the sixth century protest of Julian of Atrarnum we can observe the Christian criticism of the place taken by the icons in the service of the church. We tend, however, to forget that not all the East Romans had been converted to the imperial faith. And in a fragment from St. Symeon's work on the Sacred Images⁵

⁴ See G. Ostrogorsky, *Les Débuts de la Querelle des Images*, *Mélanges Charles Diehl*, vol. 1, pp. 235-255.

⁵ P.G. 86b col. 3220 (P.G.=Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*).

we find the pagan argument that the Christians, too, through their obeisance to the icons were praying to lifeless idols. It could not have been easy for the Christians to refute the charge. The pagans, it is said, traduced the Christians and gave birth to heresies; ⁶ what those heresies were we are not told; did pagan criticism lead to the rejection of the use of the icons? A passage from the work of John, Bishop of Salonica ⁷ is in its argument unexpected. The Christians, says the bishop, do not give corporeal forms to powers which have no body; the icons of Christ through the effect of the Incarnation represent God as seen on earth "and not as He is conceived in His divine nature" (*καὶ οὐχ ὡς νοεῖται φύσει θεός*). This the pagans — surely surprisingly — were prepared to admit; granted, they said, that you can represent One made Man, what of the angels pictured on the icons as human beings though the Christians regarded them as spiritual and incorporeal (*νοερὸς καὶ ἀσωμάτους*)? And to this objection the Christians replied that the angels were not completely incorporeal (*ἀσώματοι*) as the pagans contended, they are of the air or of fire and their bodies are very fine. Angels are localized, they have appeared in bodily form to those whose eyes God opened and are therefore rightly so painted as spiritual created beings and ministers of God (*κτίσματα νοερά καὶ λειτουργοὶ θεοῦ*). It would seem that the essential point for the pagans was to establish that the Christian use of the icons was idolatrous: the Christian reverencing the Cross was a worshipper of a wooden god; if he worshipped the Cross he ought to worship asses. The Christian replied that no demon trembled when he saw asses.⁸ And under Justinian pagans were given a short shrift: they were arrested and carried in public procession, their books were burned and so were their "icons and images of their foul Gods" (*εἰκόνες τῶν μυσαρῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀγάλματα*).⁹ Did pagan criticism of the icons raise doubts of their legitimacy in the minds of the Christians? Our fragmentary sources give us no answer to such a question.

⁶ Byzantion 17 (1944-45), p. 66.

⁷ Mansi, vol. 13, col. 164-65.

⁸ Pseudo-Athanasios P.G. 28, col. 621-624.

⁹ Malalas (Bonn ed.), p. 491 ¹⁹⁻²⁰.

It is strange that, so far as I know, no study has appeared of the appeal of Leontius, Bishop of Neapolis in Cyprus, directed to the Jews who charged the Christians with having introduced idolatry into the Church. That appeal we possess only in fragmentary form,¹⁰ but it is of great interest as giving us the defence of the icons as it was formulated in the early years of the seventh century. Leontius knew Egypt well, he wrote the biography of the Patriarch St. John the Almsgiver;¹¹ and from the first many Jews had settled in Alexandria. It may well have been in Alexandria that Leontius composed his apology against the Jews (*ἀπολογία κατὰ Ἰουδαίων*). We have in the *Pratum Spirituale* of John Moschus an account of Cosmas, a scholasticus of Alexandria, who possessed a large library — he was *πολύβιβλος ὑπὲρ πάντας τοὺς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ὄντας* (*Pratum Spirituale* ch. 172, P.G. 87, 3, col. 3040 D) and generously lent his books to all who wished to read them. John Moschus went to see him daily and always found him either reading or writing against the Jews, for he was passionately desirous to convert them to the truth, “And he often sent me to the Jews that I might discuss with them on the evidence of the Scripture.” This is the background which must be kept in mind as one reads the appeal of Leontius. A summary of that appeal (so far as we possess it) is the simplest way of illustrating its significance.¹²

The Jews took their stand upon the God-given Law, and for the Christians also that Law formed part of their sacred scriptures since they had laid claim to the Old Testament as their own and refused to follow Marcion in rejecting the earlier revelation. And that Law had expressly ordained “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or likeness of any thing that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath or that is in the water under the earth, thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them” (Exodus 20⁴⁻⁵). “You shall make you no idols nor graven image . . . neither shall ye set up any image of stone in your land to bow down unto it” (Levit. 26¹; cf. Deut. 5⁸).

¹⁰ I do not understand the relation between the text cited from Mansi vol. 13, P.G. 93, col. 1597–1609 and the extracts quoted by John of Damascus P.G. 94.

¹¹ Translated in E. Dawes and N. H. Baynes, *Three Byzantine Saints*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1948.

¹² P.G. 93, col. 1597–1609.

Such was the tradition; but, Leontius argued, there was another legal tradition: God had said to Moses that he should fashion two Cherubim¹³ graven in gold (Exodus 25¹⁸), while God showed to Ezekiel a temple with forms of palms and lions and men and with Cherubim from pavement to roof (Ezekiel 41¹⁸). Thus had God revoked his own ordinance. "If you wish to condemn me," wrote Leontius, "on account of images (εἰκόνες), then you must condemn God for ordering them to be made."¹⁴ And though God gave no instructions concerning the adornment of His temple yet on the legal precedent of God's command to Moses (ἐκ νόμου λαβὼν τὸν τύπον)¹⁵ Solomon filled the building with lions and bulls and palm-trees and men in bronze and with carved and molten images. It was important for Leontius to prove that the Christians were not innovators, they were but maintaining a tradition derived from the scriptures which were sacred alike to Jew and Christian;¹⁶ elsewhere in a passage cited by John of Damascus (P.G. 94 col. 1273) he meets an objection that might be raised by the Jews. "It may be objected," Leontius writes, "that all those things which were in the tent of witness God ordered to be placed there and I reply that Solomon made many different things in the temple, carved and molten things which God had not ordered him to make nor were they amongst the things which were in the tent of witness nor were they in the temple which God showed to Ezekiel, but Solomon was not condemned for this, for he made these shapes to the glory of God just as we do."¹⁷

Others, it may be noted, carried the argument still further. Thus Hieronymus, a presbyter of Jerusalem, suggested that God had allowed each nation (ἔθνος) to worship its own gods through things made by man in order that no one might be able to raise objection to the Christian use of the Cross and the Christian obeisance (προσκύνησις) before the icons. So the Jews made their obeisance (προσκύνησις) before the ark of the covenant,

¹³ For the argument derived from God's direction concerning the Cherubim see P. — *supra*.

¹⁴ Cf. P.G. 94, col. 1384 A-B.

¹⁵ Cf. John of Damascus De Imaginibus Oratio, III, P.G. 94, col. 1384 A-B quoting Leontius: Solomon ἐκ νόμου λαβὼν τὸ τύπωμα.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, col. 1381 s.f. νομικὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ παράδοσις καὶ οὐχ ἡμετέρα.

¹⁷ Cf. Byzantion 17 (1944-45), p. 59 "Et Dieu ne désapprouva pas et il l'appela le temple de son nom."

the Cherubim and the tables of the Law, although Moses was nowhere bidden to do obeisance to or to reverence (*προσκυνεῖν* or *ἀσπάζεσθαι*) these things (P.G. 40 col. 865) and the same view is expressed in a fragment cited in a note, *ibid.*

The reply of the Jew was that these images, permitted to be made by God, were not to be adored as gods but served only to remind us. "Well said," responded the Christian, "the same is true of our icons."¹⁸ Elsewhere Leontius states that the godless (*πανάθεοι*) call the Christians idolaters and worshippers of wooden gods (*ξύλοθέους*). In P.G. 94 col. 1384 B he rejects the charge with scorn: "We do not make obeisance to the nature of the wood but we revere and do obeisance to Him who was crucified on the Cross" *ibid.* 1384 D. "We do not say to the Cross nor to the icons of the saints 'You are my God.' For they are not our gods, but opened books to remind us of God and to His honour set in the churches and adored" *ibid.* col. 1276 A. "If we worshipped the wood of the image, we should not burn the icon when the representation grew faint. When the two beams of the Cross are joined together I adore the figure because of the Christ who on the Cross was crucified, but if the beams are separated, I throw them away and burn them." This argument is adopted by other writers.¹⁹

One who receives an order from the Emperor and kisses the seal does not honor the paper but gives to the Emperor his obeisance and respect;²⁰ and in the same way, when we see the representation of Christ, through it we hail and do obeisance to the Crucified. Just as children, if their father is away, cherish his staff or his chair so we cherish the places which Christ visited, Nazareth or the Jordan, and remember his friends, the saints

¹⁸ This theme of the function of the icons to keep alive men's memory is constant, cf. e.g., the citations of Leontius in P.G. 94 col. 1276 A *ἀνάμνησις* and in *ibid.*, 1385 A; *ὑπόμνησις* in 1384 B and P.G. 28 col. 621 D. John Bishop of Thessalonica in Mansi 13 col. 164 on the icons of the saints *εἰς τὸ μεμνήσθαι αὐτῶν καὶ τιμᾶν αὐτοὺς . . . ὡς γνησίους δούλους καὶ φίλους θεοῦ καὶ παρρησίαν ἔχοντας πρεσβεύειν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*. Of the icons we read in *Quaestiones*; ad Antiochum, Ducem P.G. 28 col. 621 *ὥσπερ δι' ὑπόμνησιν καὶ μόνον ἐντυπούμεν καὶ οὐ δι' ἕτερον τρόπον* cf. Stephen of Bostra P.G. 94 col. 1376 B-D.

¹⁹ Cf. Les *Trophées* de Damas, ed. G. Bardy, *Patrologia Orientalis* Tome 15, Fasc. 2, Paris 1920, p. 245 (75) — Isaiah 44¹⁴⁻¹⁷ quoted; *Quaestiones ad Antiochum* Ducem P.G. 28 col. 621 B and the fragment *ibid.* col. 709 A.

²⁰ Cf. P.G. 94 col. 1384 D.

and the martyrs. And on account of Christ and of those things which are Christ's we figure his sufferings in our churches and houses, in our market places and on our garments — everywhere — so that through seeing them constantly we may be warned that we should not forget. Then turning to the Jew, Leontius says:

"You do obeisance to the book of the Law, but you do not make obeisance to parchments and ink but to the words of God contained therein. And it is thus that I do obeisance to the icon of God, for when I hold the lifeless representation of Christ in my hands ²¹ through it I seem to hold and to do obeisance to the Christ. As Jacob kissed the bloody coat of Joseph and felt that he held him in his arms, so Christians think that holding the image they hold Christ or His apostles and martyrs.

You say that there must be no obeisance paid to anything made by human hands or created. But haven't you, when wife or children have died, taken some garment or ornament of theirs and kissed it and shed tears over it and were not condemned for doing so? You did not do obeisance to the garments as to God; through your kisses you did but show your longing for those who once had worn them. Fathers and children, sinners and created beings as they are, we often greet them and no one condemns us, for we do not greet them as gods, but through our kisses we express our natural love for them. As I have said many times, in every greeting and every obeisance it is the purpose of the action which is in question.²² And if you accuse me of doing obeisance to the wood of the Cross as though it were God why do you not say the same of the staff of Joseph? ²³ Abraham did obeisance to infamous men who sold a sepulchre, and went on his knees before them, but not as though they were gods. Jacob blessed the idolater Pharaoh and did obeisance to Esau, but not as though they were gods. Do you see how many salutations and obeisances I have adduced out of the Scriptures and all without blame?"

"You call us idolaters when it was Christian saints and martyrs who destroyed the temples of the idolaters."²⁴ Leontius accuses the Jews of blindness because they fail to realize that through the relics of the

²¹ Cf. *τῇ σαρκί* P.G. *ibid.* 1385 B and the fragment P.G. 28 col. 709.

²² Cf. P.G. 94 col. 1385 B *ὁ σκοπὸς ἐξετάζεται*.

²³ P.G. 93 col. 1601 *διὰ τί οὐκ ἐγκαλεῖς τῷ Ἰακώβ προσκυνήσαντι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον τῆς ῥάβδου τοῦ Ἰωσήφ*. Jacob did not make obeisance to the wood but through the wood to Joseph. Hebrews, 11,21. Cf. F. Nau, *La Didaskalie de Jacob*, *Patrologia Orientalis* vol. 8, fasc. 5 p. 740 (30), *Quaestiones ad Antiochum Ducem* P.G. 28 col. 621.

²⁴ Cf. P.G. 94 col. 1385 D.

martyrs and through the icons demons are put to flight, and yet foul men pervert and mock and laugh at such things as these. Often blood will gush forth from the icons and from the relics of the martyrs and foolish folk, though they see this, are not persuaded; they treat the miracles as myths and fables. As Leontius writes in another fragment "If the bones of the just are impure, how was it that the bones of Jacob and Joseph were carried back with all honour from Egypt? How was it that a dead man touching the bones of Elisha straightway stood up? And if God works miracles through bones, it is clear that he can do the same through icons and stones and many other things."²⁵

With this belief in the cogency of the argument from miracle may be compared a passage from the *Quaestiones ad Antiochum Ducem*: "Let those who refuse to do obeisance to the Cross and the icons explain how it is that the holy icons have often poured forth streams of myrrh by the power of the Lord, and how it is that a lifeless stele when it has received a blow has miraculously given forth blood as though it were a living body. Let them say how it is that from tombs and relics and icons demons are often driven howling away."²⁶ In *Les Trophées de Damas* it is stated that the sick whether they be believers or unbelievers take their seat beside the coffins of the saints and are healed.²⁷

And daily, Leontius continues, almost throughout the inhabited world unholy and lawless men, idolaters and murderers, adulterers and robbers are suddenly smitten in their consciences through Christ and His Cross, say farewell to the whole world and give themselves to the practice of virtue. Tell me, how can we be idolaters who pay our homage (*προσκυνεῖν*) and do honor to the bones, the dust, the clothes, the blood and the tombs of those who refused to sacrifice to idols?

The Christian brings to the Creator, the Lord and Maker of all things, his adoration and worship through heaven and earth and sea, through stone and wood, through relics and churches, through the Cross, through angels and through mankind. For creation cannot itself directly worship its Maker, but through me the heavens declare the glory of God, through me the moon

²⁵ P.G. 94 col. 1272 C-D.

²⁶ P.G. 28 col. 621 C. For a story of a demon and the icon of the Virgin *ibid.*

²⁷ *Les Trophées de Damas*, ed Bardy. *Patrologia Orientalis* vol. 15, Fasc. 2 p. 273 (103) and cf. *ibid.* p. 272 (102).

worships God, through me the stars, through me the waters, the showers and the dew, through me all creation worship and glorify God.

When a good king has made for himself a rich and elaborate crown all those who are truly loyal to the king pay their respect and honor to the crown, but it is not the gold or the pearls that they honor but the head of the king and his skilful hands which have fashioned the crown. So with the Christians: whenever they pay their respects to the representations of the Cross and to icons it is not to wood or stone, not to gold or the perishable icon, not to the coffin or the relics that they bring their worship, but through these they bring their respect and their worship. For the honor paid to His saints courses back (*ἀνατρέχει*) to Himself. Thus it is that men destroying or insulting icons of the Emperor are punished with extreme severity as having insulted the Emperor himself and not merely the painted board. Man made after God's image is God's icon indwelt by the Holy Spirit. It is right therefore that I should honor and make obeisance (*προσκυνεῖν*) to the icon of the servants of God and glorify the dwelling of the Holy Spirit.

If the Jews accuse the Christians of idolatry they should be covered with shame, for they did obeisance to their own kings and the kings of other nations. Everywhere the Christians have armed themselves against the idols: against the idols we sing our hymns, against the idols we write, against the idols and the demons we pray. Supposing that an idolater had come into your temple and seen the two sculptured Cherubim and had blamed the Jews as being themselves idolaters what, asks Leontius, could you reply? For the Christian the Cross and the icons are not gods: they remind us of Christ and His saints that we should do them honor: they are there to beautify our churches; and he who pays his worship to Christ's Mother carries the honor to Him and he who honors the apostle honors Him who sent him forth.²⁸

If then prophets and righteous men bowed to the earth before idolaters because of services rendered why do you blame me when I bow before the Cross and before representations of the saints through whom from God I receive ten thousand good things?

²⁸ Cf. P.G. 94 col. 1276 A.

On this appeal of Leontius Dr. E. J. Martin writes (A History of the Iconoclastic Controversy, p. 141) "The views . . . are so complete an anticipation of the Iconoclastic struggle and its very arguments that the authenticity of all the passages attributed to Leontius must be gravely suspect." He conjectures that Leontius is really the champion of orthodoxy, George of Cyprus. This judgment seems to me perverse. I am struck by the great skill with which Leontius presents his case: the whole argument is based throughout on the Old Testament, the common ground of Jew and Christian. Leontius may have known the theological justification, deduced from the Incarnation, of the icons of Christ, but he makes no use of it: it would have had no cogency for the Jews. "The principle stands that we must either not argue with a man at all or we must argue on his grounds and not ours."²⁹ Leontius knows St. Basil's doctrine that the honor paid to the icon passes to the prototype (*ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος τιμὴ ἐπὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον διαβαίνει*); he may well have known that key-text, but nowhere in the fragments which we possess does he cite a Christian Father of the Church. The only distinctively Christian argument which he employs is the evidence of those miracles performed through the icons for which the Jew was in duty bound to furnish an explanation, since Leontius was persuaded that the fact of miracle was incontrovertibly established. The plea of Leontius is thus widely different from the later Iconodule propaganda and deserves close study.³⁰ Indeed it may be suggested that the repetition, in a series of works against the Jews, of the arguments of Leontius in defence of the icons was indirectly intended to meet the scruples of Christians impressed by the Jewish contention. It is to be observed that it is a Christian who asks Antiochus for a justification of the disregard of the Old Testament prohibition of images.³¹

It is not necessary to consider in detail that series of works against the Jews, since the argument concerning the icons for the most part does but reproduce the plea of Leontius. Thus in

²⁹ G. K. Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas, 1933, p. 110.

³⁰ It would, for example, be of interest to know whether there are parallels to the view of Leontius that the world of nature needs the help of man before it can worship its Creator.

³¹ P.G. 28 col. 621.

Les Trophées de Damas the Jewish charge of idolatry is repeated — the Christians are falling back into old pagan practices (τῇ παλαιᾷ ὑμῶν τῶν ἐθνῶν συνηθείᾳ),³² they do obeisance to things made by human hands (χειροποίητα καὶ κτιστὰ πράγματα). The Christian in reply points to the ark of the covenant, to Moses and the (second) tables of the Law and to the Cherubim. The book of the Law is brought from the synagogue and the Jews do obeisance to it and so prove the Christian's argument.

A. C. McGiffert's edition of the Dialogue of Papiscus and Philo³³ (Marburg, 1889) is not accessible to me, but the text of the curious brief section on the Cross and the icons is cited by F. Nau in his edition of the Didascalia of Jacob.³⁴ This, again, only repeats arguments which we have met with previously: the Jew asking why the order which was given by God forbidding to do obeisance to things made of wood (μὴ προσκυνεῖν ξύλοις) was disregarded by the Christians in their use of the Cross and of icons, and the Christian replying Why do you do obeisance to the book of the Law and why did Jacob do obeisance on the top of Joseph's staff (ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄκρου τῆς ῥάβδου τοῦ Ἰωσήφ)? In respect of the book of the Law the Jew answers that he does not do obeisance to the nature of the skins but to the meaning of the words of the Law, while Jacob did not do obeisance to the wood of the staff, but he honored Joseph who held it.

In the summary of Leontius' argument references have been given to parallels in the Pseudo-Athanasian Quaestiones ad Antiochum Ducem P.G. 28, Quaestio 39, col. 621; there is no fresh development. A fragment added to the Quaestiones ibid. col. 709 does but give a variant to the text of Leontius: "For if Christ is not present to my lips in His body, nevertheless with heart and mind I am present with Christ in the spirit." It is interesting in such passages as this to catch an echo of the emotion which inspired the cult of the icon: in the Quaestiones ad Antiochum Ducem: "We make our obeisance to express the attitude and the love of our souls (τὴν σχέσιν καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν) for

³² Les Trophées de Damas, ed. G. Bardy, *Patrologia Orientalis* vol. 15, p. 245.

³³ On this dialogue see A. Lukyn Williams, *Adversus Judaeos*, Cambridge, 1935, pp. 169–174.

³⁴ La Didascalie de Jacob, *Patrologia Orientalis* vol. 8, 5, p. 740.

those represented in the icon,³⁵ or “to show our longing (πόθος) for them just as we greet fathers and friends;”³⁶ through the Cross we express the true attitude of our souls (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν γνησίαν διάθεσιν) towards the Crucified.³⁷ The very simplicity of the wording seems to carry with it an assurance of genuine feeling.

There remain to be considered two documents recently translated from the Armenian, a seventh century apology for the icons and a letter of the vardapet John Mayragometsi taken from the history of Moses Kaghankavatsi.³⁸ The apology begins on lines which must have become traditional: the Old Testament prohibition of images is met with references to the Cherubim, and to Solomon’s Temple — God did not disapprove Solomon’s initiative, He called the Temple the Temple of His name. The Christian paintings are not the true God, but we paint them in the name of God “tel qu’il apparut” — a precise parallel to the passage quoted from John, bishop of Salonica (supra p. 96). The writer of the apology is addressing Christians and therefore he can proceed to quote from John Chrysostom, Severian of Gabala and Gregory the Illuminator, and can translate from Eusebius his account of the statue of the woman with an issue of blood at Paneas. Heretics consider the icons to be idle, for they can neither speak nor understand: “What of the ark,” is the reply, “when it overturned Dagon?” And the Cross raised the dead in the Holy City and still performs numberless miracles down to our own day — the Cross which is the pride of angels, the salvation of men and the terror of the demons. But the special interest of this apology lies in the statement that in Armenia two monks are preaching the destruction of the icons — “l’impie et l’égaré Thaddée et Isaïe et leurs compagnons qui entraînaient à leur

³⁵ P.G. 28 col. 621 B.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ P.G. 40 col. 865. It may be noted that the cult of the Cross was not extended to embrace other objects connected with the passion — the ass, the holy lance, the sponge, the reed — and when Christians asked the reason for this *ἄγια γὰρ εἶσι καὶ ταῦτα καθὰ καὶ ὁ σταυρός* it was not easy to find a satisfactory answer, see P.G. 28 col. 624, Trophées de Damas p. 249.

³⁸ Sirarpie der Nersessian, Une Apologie des Images du septième Siècle, Byzantion 17 (1944-45), pp. 58-87. By her translation of these texts and her fully documented commentary Miss der Nersessian has rendered a great service to those of us who cannot read Armenian works.

suite un grand nombre de personnes," and from the letter we learn that when the leaders of the movement were arrested and were asked why they refused to accept the image of the incarnate God they replied that that was alien to the commandments "et c'est l'oeuvre des idolâtres qui adorent toutes les créatures; quant à nous nous ne nous prosternons pas devant les images car nous n'en avons pas reçu l'ordre des saintes écritures. Alors, leur ayant parlé des images de l'autel de Moïse, des diverses sculptures du temple de Salomon, et expliqué que nous représentons les mêmes choses dans nos églises; leur ayant donc dit ceci, et d'autres paroles semblables, nous corrigeâmes leur erreur."

Thus the story which begins with the scruples of Julian ends with an active Iconoclast movement in Armenia and Albania. I would suggest that too little attention has been paid to this evidence as forming the background of imperial policy. Need we doubt that Iconoclasm was primarily religious in its inspiration? Is there any reason to believe that "Iconoclasm was but an outgrowth and indeed the climax of the caesaropapistic theory and practice of the State as represented by some of the most successful Byzantine Emperors"? ³⁹

³⁹ So Gerhart B. Ladner, *Origin and Significance of the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy*, *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, pp. 127-149. I prefer Louis Brehier's summing up of *Les caractères généraux et la portée de la réforme iconoclaste*, *Revue des Cours et Conférences* for 11 April 1901, pp. 226-235.

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ST. ANTONY AND THE DEMONS

By NORMAN H. BAYNES

With lively gratitude for the friendship of Sir Harold Bell

OF Greek popular religion Nilsson wrote: 'the Greeks had religious ideas . . . but they never made them into a system' (Martin P. Nilsson, *Greek Popular Religion*, 1940, 4). There were no doctrines but only some simple fundamental ideas about life and death (op. cit. 63). The power of the religion of ancient Greece was a result of the absence of dogma (ibid.). In pagan Greece every man might interpret the ideas about life and death according to the propensities of his age. But with Christianity this liberty was curtailed: a sacred book was given an orthodox interpretation and men sought for an explanation of a revealed faith. 'It is dogma that differentiates a Christian from a pagan society' (T. S. Eliot). Perhaps what students of the Byzantine world most need is a careful consideration of the thought of the ordinary East Roman; we have many monographs on the leading thinkers, but very little has been written on popular theology. What questions did the common folk ask? What problems troubled them? The *Life of Antony*—Athanasius' masterpiece—provides a window which lets us see the outstanding importance which the Devil and his demons held for the monks of Egypt in the fourth century. Here we can trust Athanasius: he knew personally the ascetic world for which he wrote, he knew the Coptic language. We think of Athanasius as a Greek, but there is not a little to suggest that he was himself by birth a Copt.

To become familiar with Byzantine popular thought it is essential to remember that the East Roman Christian knew and believed his New Testament; he read it or heard it read in church; it became a part of his life. Thus for the modern student the most useful introduction to Byzantine thought is perhaps to re-read the New Testament. It may be that he has failed to realize how profound is the pessimism when the world is regarded in its alienation from Christianity. This world is ruled by an evil power; the ruler of this world cometh, Christ had said, and hath nothing in me (John xiv, 30). It is true that the ruler of this world has been judged (John xvi, 11), but that judgement has not been executed; it is only in the future that the ruler of this world shall be cast out (John xii, 31). In this world the counsel is: keep sober, keep awake, for your enemy the Devil prowls like a roaring lion looking out for someone to devour (1 Peter v, 8). That is the instant peril, and thus Christ's task on earth, as He Himself said, was to cast out demons and heal diseases (Luke xiii, 32). To the Twelve He gave power and authority over all demons and to cure diseases (Luke ix, 1). The casting out of demons and the healing of disease are both aspects of the same saving activity, for it is the Devil who causes disease (cf. the woman whom Satan had bound for eighteen years (Luke xiii, 16)). The belief in the maleficent power of the countless foes of men is firmly founded in the Gospels. For Paul the Christian's fight is not against flesh and blood but against

evil governments, against evil powers, against the world rulers of the dark, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places (Ephesians vi, 12). Christianity came as a deliverance from the 'power of the dark' (1 Colossians i, 13, cf. Luke xxii, 53). Such is the sombre background of Coptic monasticism.

The aim of Antony's discourse to his followers is practical: he would strengthen and encourage his monks. The novice is terrified by the claims which virtue makes, but, Antony urged, do not fear concerning virtue and do not be offended at the word, for virtue is not far from us nor is it set outside of us. The work of virtue is within us and the doing of it is easy if only we will it. The Greeks leave home and cross the sea to learn literature. We have no need to leave home in search of the Kingdom of Heaven, for Christ Himself said 'the Kingdom of Heaven is within you'. So virtue needs only our will. If our soul remains as it was when it was created, then we shall be virtuous and it will not be difficult to keep our minds from evil thoughts. This doctrine has been regarded as Pythagoreanism by some, as Pelagianism by others, but this statement of Antony's thought is incomplete. The object of asceticism for a Christian is that the Lord may be our fellow-worker in achieving victory over the Devil (§ 36). The Christian's confidence is founded on divine aid, but this aid needs man's co-operation.

In his address Antony seeks to answer the monks' problems; naturally they raised the problem of the existence of demons: how was it that God had created them? And Antony replied that God had not created them: He did not create anything evil. The demons had fallen from the state in which they had first been on their creation. How was it that the Devil could work his will on Job? Of himself, Antony explained, the Devil could have done nothing: he had to ask God's permission *twice* before God, in order to test Job, gave his consent. Even to attack swine the demons had to secure God's licence; how much more if the assault was to be made on man?

But if the Devil can assume any shape at pleasure and can quote scripture for his purpose, how shall the monk recognize that the vision is not sent by God? Here Antony can adduce an unfailing aid—a psychological test. If it is a vision of the holy ones it is not confused; it will not strive nor cry, nor will anyone hear their word (Isaiah xlii, 2). The vision will come quietly and so gently that immediately joy and courage are awakened in the soul, for the Lord is with them Who is our joy and the power of God the Father. The thoughts of the soul remain without confusion and the waves are calmed . . . a longing for sacred things and for the future comes upon the soul and it will desire that it may be altogether united with them. And if some, as being human, fear the sight of the good, those who appear straightway take away the fear through love, as did the angel Gabriel (§ 35). But when the evil ones attack there is confusion, a resounding din and shouting like that of undisciplined youths. From this there arise faint-heartedness in the soul, disordered thoughts, depression, remembrance of relatives and fear of death.

This section of Antony's address is characteristic: it is a good example of his desire to provide a practical guide for his disciples.

For the pagans the demons constituted a real difficulty since some demons were good and some were evil. (For the horror which the bad demons inspired in Porphyry, see J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, 100.) Christians regarded all demons as evil; they knew that

there was a great variety of demons and a great difference between them (§ 21), but Antony will not discuss their nature and distinctions. It is through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit that Christians can know which demons are less wicked and which are more so, in which pursuits each one is interested and how each is routed and expelled (§ 22). With Antony's simplicity contrast the work of Michael Psellus with its elaboration and obscurity, e.g. the six classes of demons and the habitat of each.¹ Antony limits his exposition to the needs of his followers; he is concerned only with the practical methods of meeting the attacks of the demons. The first line of defence is a stricter devotion to asceticism—an upright life and faith in God are a great protection. Next comes the sign of the Cross (whether it be made on the person or on the house) accompanied by prayers (§§ 22, 23, 35; cf. § 13). The sign of the Cross fills the demons with dread, since it was on the Cross that the Saviour stripped them naked and held them up as an example. Or the Christian may chant a psalm or—more vigorously—blow into the face of the demon while calling on the name of Christ (§ 39), or—best of all—may summon up courage and challenge the demon (§ 43) asking him 'Who are you and whence do you come?'

At times the demons would attempt to gain their end by feigning piety or would encourage excesses of asceticism so that the monk revolts against discipline. Then the supreme need—and the Christian's privilege—is God's gift of the discerning of spirits through the Holy Ghost (§ 38). In this discrimination we reach the crown of Byzantine asceticism.

It is clear that there was a widespread belief that the demons possessed the power to foretell the future and Antony seeks to explain how such a belief had arisen. The bodies of the demons are more subtle than human bodies and the demons were thus able to travel at a far greater speed. A demon, for instance, goes to the source of the Nile in Ethiopia and sees the heavy rainfall there; then he hurries back to Egypt and announces that there will be a plentiful flow of water. Or *X* may have a friend *Y* living up the river whom he visits frequently. The demon sees *X* starting out and then hastens to tell *Y* that *X* is coming to see him. When *X* arrives *Y* naturally concludes that the demon had foretold the future. In truth the demon had only guessed what *X* intended to do. The demons are guessers (§ 23). Or take any professional man such as a doctor: from dealing with many patients he knows the symptoms of a malady; he 'foretells' the course of an illness, but in truth he is only using his medical experience. So pilots and farmers can 'foretell' the weather (§ 33). We do not possess virtue in order to prophesy, but that by the rightness of our life we may please God. To gain the gift of prophecy what is needed is purity of heart; then the Christian can see the future more clearly than the demons can (§ 34).

The belief in the subtlety of the bodies of the demons lived on. Of this there is an illustration in the *Vita Basilii* attributed to Constantine Porphyrogenitus. The Byzantine fleet was anchored near Monembasia; here the shepherds were on friendly terms with a number of demons settled there and the demons said 'yesterday Syracuse was captured by the Arabs'. Some would not believe the statement because it was made by

¹ Cf. K. Svoboda, *La Démonologie de Michel Psellos*; J. Bidez, *Catalogue des manuscrits alchimiques grecs*, vi.

wicked demons who could not prophesy. But it was urged that this was not a question of prophecy; it was the subtlety of the demons' bodies and their consequent speed of movement which gave them the power to announce that an event had occurred a long distance away.¹

And Antony is so refreshingly human. His address was drawing to its close when he suddenly thought: 'Perhaps they think that I am only *talking*', and he began to report his personal experience with the demons. The Pauline hierarchy of the powers of evil might well have daunted a simple monk, but in Antony's address there is no fatalism, no despondency, but a note of triumph. This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith (1 John, v, 4). It is a heartening message.

There has recently been published a new translation of *The Life of Antony*,² and it is to be hoped that students of history, and not merely of Church history, will read and re-read the *Vita*.

LONDON

¹ *Vita Basilii*, chap. 70. I owe this reference to Professor Jenkins.

² R. T. Meyer, *Saint Athanasius, The Life of Saint Antony* in the series *Ancient Christian Writers*, Westminster, Maryland, 1950.